جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "مالکیت سرمایه گذاران نهادی" در نشریات گروه "حسابداری"

The asymmetric behavior of costs is one of the phenomena that originates from the conflict of interests between managers and owners. The ability to compare financial statements by determining the level of coordination between the accounting procedures of different companies makes the information environment transparent and provides the possibility of correct evaluation of performance and optimal allocation of resources. Institutional owners, as one of the pillars of the corporate governance system, play an important role in monitoring management. Based on this, the current research examines the relationship between the comparability of financial statements and the asymmetric behavior of costs with considering the moderating role of institutional investors’ ownership. The statistical population of the research include the companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange for the years since 2013 to 2020, and 139 Firms were selected as a statistical sample using the systematic elimination method. The research method is post-event and the data analysis method is multivariate linear regression. The results of the research showed that, there is a negative relationship between comparability of financial statements and asymmetric behavior of costs. Also, ownership of institutional investors exacerbates the negative relationship between comparability of financial statements and asymmetric behavior of costs. Therefore, the comparability of financial statements and the ownership of institutional investors play a complementary role in reducing the negative consequences of conflicts of interest between managers and owners and providing the goal of optimal use of resources.

Investors and other users can correctly benefit from the company's profits for investment decisions and forecasting future cash flows and profits when the company's profits are based on the actual financial performance of the company and not on the actions Management's opinion on the use of accounting methods should be reported. Based on this, the aim of this research is to investigate the influence of board independence and institutional ownership on the relationship between information asymmetry and profit management. The current research is applied in terms of purpose and causal research (post-event) in terms of method. The statistical population of the research is the companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange, and using the systematic elimination sampling method, 141 companies were selected in the period between 1395 and 1401. The research hypotheses were tested with the help of multivariate linear regression with Eviuse software. The results show that the ownership of institutional investors and the independence of the board of directors have a significant effect on the relationship between information asymmetry and earnings management.

Moral characteristics, including narcissism, have a great impact on managers' actions. Studies show that it is possible that the severity of narcissism has different effects on the corporate social activity. Considering the role of institutional investors' perspectives regarding the company's decisions, some of studies have emphasized the impact of ownership of institutional investors on corporate social activity. The purpose of this research is to investigate the linear and non-linear relationship between CEO narcissism and corporate social activity with the moderating role of ownership of institutional investors. In the present research, 60 companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange were examined in a period of 7 years. To measure the narcissism of CEO, the results of two criteria (WHR ratio and signature area) have been used. To measure corporate social activity, a checklist including 44 options in six dimensions has been used. The results shows that the CEO narcissism has a negative linear relationship with corporate social activity, and the ownership of institutional investors weakens this negative relationship. Also, there is a significant U-shaped nonlinear relationship between CEO narcissism and corporate social activity, and the ownership of institutional investors widens the curve and weakens the effect of narcissism on corporate social activity at different levels.

The present study is based on experimental of the relationship between corporate governance and economic value added With a sample of n = 122 firms listed in Tehran StockExchange during the period 1388 to 1385.The present study is descriptive - analytical study based on panel data. In analyzing the data stepwise and multiple regression methods were used and to estimate regression fixed effects, random effects and ordinary least squares methods were used. The results indicate that among the five elements of corporategovernance only institutional investor ownership variable have significant and positive impacts on economic value added. Moreover, causality of this variable with economic value added is confirmed by Granger causality test. Iran Khodro investment in mining and metals and Saipa, respectively, have the highest impact on corporate governance on economic value added.

The spate of corporate scandals in the last years points to a failure of corporate governance in effective monitoring on managers decisions and corporate performance. Reforms require the increasing in effective monitoring on corporate performance. One of effective mechanism on corporate governance is the emergence of institutional investors that is very important. Institutional investors have ability and incentives to monitor the companies. In this study, institutional ownership role in the corporate performance is examined from 1998 to 2006. Three indexes (tobins,Q, return on assets and net income margin) are used to measure corporate performance. The results demonstrate evidence of a positive association between institutional ownership and corporate performance. In addition, this study classifies Institutional investors in two categories (active Institutional ownership and inactive Institutional ownership) and examines their relationship with corporate performance. Findings always show that these two types of institutional investors significantly positive related to corporate performance. Therefore we don, t say that being active and inactive affect on monitoring role of institutions.