جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « چسبندگی هزینه » در نشریات گروه « حسابداری »

The experimental investigation of the behavior of costs is one of the topics that has recently attracted the attention of many researchers. Since the expenses form an important part of the financial statements of the companies, therefore, proper understanding and awareness of it helps the managers in order to achieve the short-term and strategic goals of the company. The purpose of this research is to investigate the effect of CEO power and free cash flow on cost stickiness. The statistical population of the research companies admitted to Tehran Stock Exchange and the sampling method of systematic elimination and the studied sample includes 140 admitted companies during the years 1397 to 1401. The research method is descriptive-survey and correlational in terms of communication, applied in terms of purpose and post-event in terms of occurrence. Regression method, panel data and fixed effects model were used to process and test the hypotheses. The results obtained from the analysis of the hypotheses showed that the power of the CEO has a positive and significant effect on the stickiness and the free cash flow has a positive and significant effect on the stickiness of the cost.

This research aims to investigate the effect of management style on the stickiness of general, administrative and sales costs at the company level and its impact on shareholder value. The problem is whether the choices and decisions (management style) of CEOs affect the stickiness of administrative and sales costs, and if the management style causes part of the stickiness of costs, is this part of the excess stickiness of costs a consequence of Worth participating? Therefore, in the current research, the excess stickiness of administrative and sales costs compared to the specific stickiness of the company is considered the stickiness caused by the CEO's choices and decisions. Then, its relationship with the company's value is investigated. The direct influence of CEOs on cost adjustment decisions is not easily discernible. Because resource allocation decisions are made at different levels of the company (for example, business unit level). However, the empirical background shows that the hypothesis "the role of manager's style in cost adjustment decisions" is logically provable. Based on this, it is assumed that part of the stickiness of administrative and sales costs at the company level comes from the difference in the specific style of the CEO. In this regard, the first hypothesis is formulated as follows: the fixed effects of the CEO have a significant relationship with the excess stickiness of administrative and sales costs at the company level. Managers seek to increase their personal interests without paying attention to the interests of the shareholders, and the resulting agency costs are directly imposed on the company and shareholders. Therefore, we expect that regardless of the direction of the deviation, the excess stickiness related to the CEO has a negative effect on shareholder value. Of course, adjustment of resources and costs can be caused by supervision and supervision duties. However, it is expected that, on average, the expected effects of the agency model will prevail. Therefore, the second hypothesis of the current research is formulated as follows: the level of excess stickiness of administrative and sales expenses related to the CEO has a negative relationship with shareholder value. 

In the present study, the relationship between the excess adhesion of administrative and sales costs resulting from the decisions of CEOs and shareholder value was investigated. Based on agency theory and neoclassical theory, it was expected that CEOs would be significantly  effective in the level of cost stickiness due to their unique management style. Therefore, research hypotheses were formulated based on the identification of the fixed effects of the CEO on the stickiness of administrative and sales costs and the negative relationship between the stickiness of the surplus related to the CEO and shareholder value, and based on the company's 2016 information from the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2010- 2019; it was tested using multiple regression analysis. 

The results indicate that CEOs play a significant role in the stickiness of general and sales costs, and management style has a positive relationship in the stickiness of costs with shareholder value. 

The results of this research are among the first pieces of evidence showing that managers' selection and decision-making style affect cost stickiness, which can be useful for the company and shareholders. In the current research, in accordance with previous research and our expectations, the effect of CEO selection and decision-making style on cost stickiness was confirmed. However, contrary to previous research, a positive relationship between CEO and company value was obtained. In other words, the manager's decisions regarding cost management are not based on personal motives but on increasing the company's value (based on Q. Tobin's criteria). Since the second research hypothesis is based on agency theory, it can be argued that incentives and other methods of reducing agency problems have reduced the conflict between owners and managers. This is an issue that can be further investigated in future research. However, building a model that controls all economic determinants is challenging. Also, the variable measurement indices may not be complete. Nevertheless, the research findings provide evidence of the effect of management style on cost stickiness. The present research and related research can help develop an experimental model to detect bad or good cost stickiness.

The management accounting literature traditionally focuses on the economic explanation of asymmetric cost behavior. While non-economic considerations likely also a role in explaining resource adjustment decisions. The socio-emotional wealth perspective refers to non-financial aspects such as the identity and ability to exercise influence of the owners that satisfy the emotional needs of the family owners. In this regard, the cost behavior of family firms is the result of non-economic goals such as protecting the socio-emotional wealth of family owners, and these goals will lead to asymmetric cost behavior. The pourpose of the present research is to examine the asymmetric cost behavior in family companies according to the socioemotional wealth perspective. In this regard, the data from 154 firms listed on Tehran Stock Exchange during the period from 2016 to 2021 has been used. Hypotheses have been tested using multivariate regression models. The findings indicate that family firms have greater costs than non-family firms. In addition, the findings showed that family firms with a high percentage of family ownership and family CEOs have more cost stickiness than non-family firms. On the other hand, the presence of a high proportion of family managers on the board does not lead to an increase in the cost stickiness of family firms compared to non-family firms. Understanding how family firms adjust their costs in response to changes in demand is useful for investors and analysts who forecast the future earnings and cash flows of these firms.

The present research investigated the relationship between political uncertainty (presidential elections) and asymmetric cost behavior and the moderating effect of ownership type (state versus private). The sample consisted of 325 Iranian companies (1,990 observations) listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and the Iran Over the Counter. Data were analyzed using panel data and OLS multiple regression with robust standard errors. The results showed that the asymmetric behavior of selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs is linear during times of political uncertainty (presidential election years), but sticky in non-election years. In other words, costs decrease less than the increase in non-election years. The results also indicated the sticky cost behavior of state-owned firms and the linear (non-sticky) cost behavior of private-owned firms in election years, with state-owned firms exhibiting greater cost stickiness in election years than in non-election years. Additional tests showed that the cost behavior of goods sold is anti-sticky in both election and non-election years, with a greater degree of anti-stickiness in election years. Moreover, in state-owned and private-owned companies, this behavior was non-sticky in both election and non-election years, and state firms exhibited greater anti-stickiness in election years compared to non-election years and private-owned firms. Finally, the behavior of operating costs in both periods was linear and was not significantly different for state-owned and private-owned firms.

Deciding on resource adjustment costs in terms of efficient decisions or opportunistic behaviors of managers, on the other hand, the existence of liquidity in the company to meet the expectations of shareholders, increase the company's value or to promote the personal interests of managers, can be effect cost behavior and consequently dividend behavior.  Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of cost stickiness on dividend stickiness with emphasis on maintaining the cash holdings of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. This research is applied in terms of purpose and correlation and post-event in terms of method. In order to test the research hypotheses, 154 companies were selected in the period 2013-2021 and analyzed using multiple regression models. The results showed that cost stickiness at the operational level has a significant positive effect and at the total cost level and at the industry level has a significant negative effect on dividend stickiness which indicates the ability to control and manage operating costs and the involvement of managerial decisions in adjusting resources using the main operations of production and sales of the company. The interaction effect of cash holdings with cost stickiness at the operational level, total costs and at the industrial level has a negative effect on dividend stickiness

Sticking and spending costs is one of the most important issues in the field of financial and accounting management. The literature in this area suggests that the stickiness of costs can not be separated from management incentives. In order to achieve this goal, 197 companies were surveyed during the period from 2016 to 2021. According to the literature, The main purpose of this research is to investigate the moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship between profit management and cost stickiness in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. The results show that there is a significant relationship between profit management and cost stickiness, and on the other hand, corporate governance has no effect on cost stickiness. Also, the moderating effect of good corporate governance on the relationship between profit management and cost stickiness was not found to be significant.

This research seeks to investigate whether credit trade can decrease cost stickness (as a signal of opportunistic behavior of manager) or not? and whether agency problem, product market competition and customer concentration can moderate the effect of trade credit on cost stickness or not?

Trade credit is measured by two ratios: accounts payable to cost of good sold ratio and accounts payable to sale ratio. Cost stickness is measures by selling, general and administrative expense stickness (SGA) and cost of goods sold stickness(CGS). The statistical population consists of the firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange between 2014 to 2020.

Credit trade affects negatively on cost stickiness and this effect is prevalent in the firms with more agency problems and active in less competitive market.

According to obtained findings, using credit trade leads to decrease the opportunistic behavior of managers and cost stickiness and so, it is a monitoring tool that can be used in evaluating performance and expense efficiency of firms. Additionally, in the firms suffer from more agency problems or active in less competitive market, trade credit decreases cost stickness more because suppliers monitor these firms more than others in order to maintain their interest.

In the accounting literature, attention has been paid to understanding how differences in national culture affect the outcomes and consequences of accounting and financial markets, so much of the research done in this area focuses on examining the impact of culture on broad management and reporting decisions. Accordingly, the aim of this study is to study the objective evidence of the relationship between small cultures on the cost-stickiness phenomenon. The statistical population of the study was 104 companies listed on the stock exchange during a 6-year period from 2014 to 2020. The research methodology is applied in terms of purpose, and in terms of its implementation, descriptive, survey and correlation type. Also, in order to analyze the data of the research using EVIEWS 9 and SPSS software, the results of hypothesis testing indicate that between the microcrops (masculinity / femininity, individualism / collectivism, power distance and avoidance of uncertainty) on the adhesion phenomenon Cost with a 99% confidence is significant

Understanding cost behavior in the case of changes in sales and examining the factors which affects asymmetric cost behavior lead to the greater awareness of managers' motivations and decisions. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between trade credit and corporate cost stickiness as well as the moderating effect of agency problem and customer concentration on the relationship. The sample of this paper includes 161 companies listed on Tehran Stock Exchange in a period of 7 years from 2014 to 2020. Our results show that trade credit as an external governance mechanism has a negative relation with cost stickiness. In addition, the findings show that the agency problem strengthens the relationship between trade credit and corporate cost stickiness, however, customer concentration weakens that relationship. Our study contributes to the cost management literature through identifying one of the potential factors that can reduce cost stickiness in companies.

The information provided through the financial statements must be reliable, relevant, relevant and complete. The disclosure of financial information should take into account the needs and wishes of major investors, investment institutions, creditors and financial analysts. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of cost stickiness on the quality of financial disclosure in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. The research done in terms of the type of purpose is part of applied research and the research method is cause and effect in terms of nature and content. The research was conducted in the framework of deductive-inductive reasoning and panel analysis was used to analyze the hypotheses. To collect information, data from 148 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period 1391-1391 have been used. The results of this study show that cost stickiness has a negative and significant effect on the quality of financial disclosure of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange.

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether trade credit can play an effective role in reducing the stickiness of costs or not? Also, can agency costs have a moderating effect on this potential relationship? In other words, can trade credit regarded as a control mechanism and considers as a governance mechanism?

Panel data regression was used to analyze the data and test the hypotheses. Data was refinement based on the requirement and availability of all variables. Therefore, data related to 185 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange in a nine years’ period leading to 2020 was gathered.

The results of the study did not reject the research hypothesis that there is a significant effect of trade credit in reducing the stickiness of administrative and sales costs.  It also posits that when sales decrease, trade credit can accelerate cost reduction and prevent cost stickiness. Also, this effect can appear stronger in companies with higher agency cost.

The research results show that commercial creditors try to prevent the opportunistic behaviors of customers in line with their interests. The results also show sensitivity of creditors to inefficient use of resources with their available tools and collecting customers’ information.

This study showed that trade credit acts as a control mechanism. Therefore, corporate governance can require the manager in any business unit to make part of the financing through trade credit. Monitoring and directing the manager's behavior by creditors can benefit all stakeholders, especially shareholders who are affected by the conflict of interest.

In this paper, the effect of economic crisis (economic sanctions and corona) and economic growth on cost attachment to 110 companies among the companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period 2001-2019 has been studied. Multiple regression was used to test the hypotheses and Petronoster test was used to compare the coefficients during normal and severe embargo. By dividing the research period into three periods of growth and recession (corona), severe economic sanctions and low sanctions, cost stickiness in these periods and also in three levels of public and administrative costs, the total cost of goods sold and operating costs Were examined. Based on the results, costs react asymmetrically to uniform sales changes. Economic prosperity also has a positive effect on cost stickiness, in other words, cost stickiness increases during economic boom. But the recession has a negative effect on cost stickiness, meaning that there is no cost stickiness during the recession and the corona. Severe economic sanctions have a negative effect on cost stickiness, but the difference in cost stickiness during normal and severe sanctions is only significant in terms of operating costs, and in the case of cost-effectiveness of sold goods and the cost of public works and public works. On adhesion, this difference is not statistically significant.

The purpose of this research is investigating the effect of community social capital on asymmetric behavior of cost. Social capital refers to features of social organization such as norms and networks that simplify cooperation and harmony for mutual benefit. Community social capital captures the strength of cooperative norms and the density of social networks in a region. Cost stickiness is a behavioral property of cost that is substantially based on managerial decisions. In this case of cost behavior, managers are quick to expand resources when demand is increasing, but for a variety of reasons choose to stick with unutilized capacity when sales are decreasing. As such, community social capital is a socio-economic factor that might affect managerial resource adjustment decisions via different channels.  

The method of the present research is descriptive-correlation because in this study the principle is to make hypotheses, test them, explain the relationships between phenomena and also analyze the dependent variable based on independent variables.For this purpose, we have collected the financial information related to 191 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during the period of 2012 to 2018 and measure the community social capital index by different provinces of the country. In order to measure the community social capital index, we used the components of participation rate in elections, labor force participation rate, density of social networks and density of non-profit organizations by quarterly method. We also use multiple linear regression patterns to test research hypotheses.  

Research findings indicate that, there is a significant relationship between community social capital and the degree of stickiness in selling, general and administrative costs. In this regard community social capital significantly increases the degree of stickiness in selling, general and administrative costs. The findings also show that, there is no significant relationship between community social capital and the degree of stickiness in the total operating costs and cost of goods sold. Hence, we observe an issue related to the personal motivations of managers and their opportunistic behaviors.

Based on the findings of the study, it can be argued thatcommunity social capital restrains managers from taking opportunistic resource adjustment decisions that would reduce costs stickiness. And this leads to an increase in the degree of costs stickiness. This article confirms the important role of managerial opinion in cost behavior and how local environmental factors show differences in firm’s cost behavior.

One of the fundamental issues in the section of management accounting is to explaining the expenses’ behavior and estimating the amounts of expenses in order to compute the companies’ operation budget. This research intends to investigate the effect of Intellectual Capital on stickiness of companies’ cost of goods sold, also present one model to explaining the asymmetric behavior for aforementioned expense with the maximum ability to estimate. Also, the research studies the effects of Intellectual Capital on expenses’ asymmetric behavior using of 101 firms over the period 1387-1396 (1010 firm-year) selected from Tehran stock exchange. Following the Andeson’s and Banker’s base model, the depended variable is considered the growth of cost of goods sold. The independent variables are included the intellectual capital, organization capital, financial & physical capital and human capital. Also the variable of decreasing in sale for one period considered as a dummy variable. The hypotheses of research analyzed with using of multi-regression and Panel Data methods. Results indicate the existence of anti-stickiness behavior in firms of Tehran stock exchange. Also, there is meaningful relation between intellectual capital, organization capital human capital with stickiness of cost of goods sold, while the impact of physical and financial capital on the stickiness of costs mentioned was not meaningful.

Cost stickness accurs when managers adjust resources related to oprating activities effectively. Tax avoidance brings tax saving (extra money) for the company. The finantiol resource of tax avoidance effects on managerial decisions and help them to recover the expences and also make difference on cost behavior. The main purpose of this research is to identify the impact of tax avoidance on cost stickness with an emphasis on bussines strategy of company. Analysis of the hypotheses based on the sample of 90 companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange between the years 2010 to 2015 in the stock exchange have been obtained. The results show that the tax avoidance has  significant effects on cost stickness. In addition the results also suggest that bussines strategy has the impact on the relationship between tax avoidance and cost stickness, it seems that strategic posisions  effects on management decisions which is about keeping resources and this object reflects on assymetric cost behavior.

Investment in fixed assets requires a large amount of capital cost. If investment fails, there will be huge losses. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the Cost Stickiness when investing in fixed assets. This paper takes the fixed assets as the dependent variable and takes the Cost Stickiness as the independent variable. Carrying out an empirical study, the paper discusses the influence of the Cost Stickiness on the investment decision of the fixed assets. At the same time, it also studies the regulation effect of the ownership concentration on the relationship between Cost Stickiness and fixed assets investment. For this purpose 125 companies in the period 2011 to 2016 were selected. This study has applied Multiple regression to test hypotheses.The results show that cost stickiness has negative effects on fixed assets investment, and ownership concentration positively regulates the relationship between Cost Stickiness and fixed assets investment.

Response of cost to changes in the level of activity is called cost behavior. Namely changes in costs are associated with increase and decrease their activity levels. Cost Adhesion means that cost when sales increase, go up, but when sales decrease, they don’t go down that much. The main purpose of this study, is to empirically examine the adhesion operating costs in the manufacturing companies at three levels included cost of goods sold, administrative and sale expense and other operating expenses in Tehran Stock Exchange companies during the period 1386 to 1395. The result showed that increased sharply in all three levels of costs for the same level of activity, was bigger than reduced costs levels for the same decrease in the level of activity. So, the cost of goods sold, administrative and sale expenses and other operating expenses have adhesion in cost behavior. There is also adhesion at the levels of total operating expenses.

The main purpose of this research is Investigate effect of  Ownership Concentration on relationship between Cost stickiness and Enterprise Risk in accepted companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. For this purpose 125 companies in the period 2013 to 2018 were selected. This study has applied Multiple regression to test hypotheses. Results indicates that there is a significant and positive Relationship between Cost stickiness and Enterprise Risk. Also Ownership concentration, as the core content of corporate governance, would impact the relationship between cost stickiness and company risk level: when the ownership concentration is higher, the impact of cost stickiness on company risk is less.

The main purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of cost stickiness and ownership concentration on firm risk based on evidence of capital market. In this applied research with a descriptive-correlational post-event approach (based on historical and historical data) using financial statements of companies in stock exchange (statistical community) analysis of hypotheses using panel data (panel data) over the year The years 2009 to 1986 (nine years) were performed. Sample data were collected by screening method, and hypotheses were tested using R statistical software. Results of data analysis using multivariate regression at expected error level (5%) indicated that there is a significant relationship between cost adherence and firm risk. Ownership structure has no significant effect on the relationship between cost stickiness and firm risk.

This research examines the moderating effects of agency costs on the relation between corporate social responsibility and cost stickiness of firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). The sample consists of 102 firms listed in TSE over the period from 2005 to 2014. This research is a quantitative research and research method is correlation and Panel data analysis using constant effects method. The results indicate a direct influence of corporate social responsibility and the agency costs on the cost stickiness. Also, results show that two groups of agency costs indices including asset turnover ratio and the interaction between a firm growth opportunities and free cash flows have a moderating effect on the relation between corporate social responsibility and cost stickiness; however, operating costs to net sale ratio has no moderating effects on the relation. Findings indicate that corporate social responsibility and agency cost have a direct impact on the costs stickiness, that is, firms with higher rate in social responsibility have more operating costs stickiness than firms with lower rate of social responsibility. In addition, agency cost decreases the relation between CSR and cost stickiness, according to the Vald test.