Delineation of Avicenna’s and Suhravardi’s Views on the Distinction between Existence and Quiddity

Avicenna has based his philosophical system on the principle of distinction between existence and quiddity. However, this principle has been criticized by some other philosophers and thinkers in the Islamic world. It has been accepted by many scholars since past times that some of these critics such as Suhrawardi and Ibn Rushd, have misunderstood Avicennian view of this distinction. But, is there really such a misunderstanding? Our response to the question of misunderstanding is that, as for Ibn Rushd, yes he did, but, as for Suhrawardi, the answer is no, he did not. Because Ibn Rushd sees Avicenna as a commentator who had misinterpreted Aristotle. While Suhrawardithinks differently. The analysis of Suhrawardi's 'iitibarat aqliyyah' (rational considerations) shows that, understanding the basic differences between Aristotle and Avicenna and basing himself on the new elements of 'anvar-I ilahiyyah' (metaphysical lights]) and 'idhafah ishraqiyyah' (illuminative relation) which are the philosophical explanations of the theorem of 'iijado-shey la min shey' (existentiating the thing not from something), makes him a different critic of Avicenna’s philosophy. Avicenna himself in some cases has mentioned that he has never meant external distinction between existence and quiddity; what he had in mind is a metaphysical and not an external distinction. Suhrawardi was aware of this kind of distinction precisely. Indeed, Suhrawardi's criticism is about metaphysical distinction, not external distinction, though the structure of his specific objections is similar to those which Avicenna and Ibn Rush pose against external distinction. This may be the reason why some have formed the idea that Suhrawardi misunderstood Avicenna’s distinction between existence and quiddity.