Propositional Logic in Al-Farabi and Avicenna

The first chapter of the paper discusses the concept of “Propositionality” attributed to logical arguments, and by adopting the criterion introduced by Christopher Martin, the “Propositionality” of logical arguments is elaborated based on the Principle of Substitution in compound propositions. The second chapter discusses the viewpoints of Kamran Karimullah on the “non-Propositionality” of Al-Farabi’s conditional arguments and “Propositionality” of Avicenna to reach a judgment. In this approach, the “non-Propositionality” of Al-Farabi’s logical teaching is confirmed not only in its dialectical context, but is also confirmed beyond it. The chapter continues by showing that Avicenna’s viewpoints on the conditional arguments and propositions maintain differs somehow from modern “propositional logic” despite satisfying the criterion of propositionality.