A Critique and Analysis of the Arguments over the Closure and Opening of the Doors of Legal Reasoning (Ijtihād)

The issue of opening (infitāḥ) or closure (insidād) of the doors of legal reasoning (ijthād) has been one of the age-old and wide-ranging questions with the Sunnis that has been prevalent through history with each one of the opening and closure having found their own advocates and each having brought up their arguments to prove their claim. A group of the earlier and later Sunni jurists have inclined toward closure and most of the contemporaries have accepted this perspective too and have come to believe in closure of the door of ijtihād, especially the absolute independent ijtihād. In contrast, this
theory has not been accepted by a group of the earlier and later jurists and they have opined for the permissibility and even the obligation of ijtihād upon the qualified, while the later jurists have made the most attempts to prove the opening. The present article has undertaken to explore the course of opinions in this respect and has concluded through comparative study and by critique, analysis, and examining that from among the above-mentioned theories what seems to be more logical and appropriate is the opening of the door of ijtihād.