Analyzing consideration Theory as the Foundation of the Legal Actions with a Comparative Approach to the Status of Preliminary Condition and Ex Gratia Promise

The reason as to why the legal actions are indispensable is a fundamental challenge that is discussed in England’s law under the title of “the theory of contracts”. The primary question raised by this theory is that what issues cause the dispatch of mental issues from the ethical world into the realm of law? The crude answer to this question can be sought in the theory of “free will” and the creative power of will. The abovementioned challenge has also been posited in Iran’s law and Imamiah jurisprudence, especially for the fact that remaining loyal to some legal actions is necessary and the fulfilment of some others is permissible in both of the aforesaid systems. So, the present study looks for an answer to the question that “why the binding legal actions are legally considered indispensable?” Despite such a seminal answer as the governance of will, it seems that the necessity and permissibility of staying loyal to the legal actions are latent in the  Hidden  expediency of them. This Hidden expediency requires basing of the gratuitous legal actions on permissibility and basing of the exchangeable legal actions on necessity. This principle has been considered herein as the foundation of consideration theory and issues like ex gratia in England’s law and preliminary conditions in Imamiah jurisprudence and Iran’s law will be investigated in the light of the aforesaid theory.