فهرست مطالب hamed khubyari

The ease of access to information sources in cyberspace and the possibility of uploading information by users has made a great deal of data regarding people's lives and history available to the public. The rapid dissemination of information and its persistence in various websites and networks has caused users to judge people relying on their past and current data. If the past data is related to matters such as committing a crime, bankruptcy or unacceptable behavior of a person in the past, it will make it difficult for him to change and rehabilitate socially. Therefore, in recent years, the need to create such a right as the "right to be forgotten" has been emphasized by some countries, especially European ones.  The result of this study revealed that, "With the acceptance of the 'right to be forgotten,' anyone can request the deletion of information that has previously been uploaded on websites and social media, either by themselves or in relation to them; provided that they can prove the lack of relevance, insufficiency, or excess beyond the initial purpose of the upload.The exercise of this right will be especially beneficial for individuals who have a criminal record or those who have faced bankruptcy in the business world. Although the aforementioned right has attracted the attention of many jurists, some others have approached it with greater caution and have sometimes criticized it. the 'right to be forgotten' may only be accepted in cases where the individual has uploaded data to the virtual space without any necessary electronic contract and is now requesting its deletion. Additionally, it is possible to envision situations where minors have published data and, upon reaching adulthood, wish to have it deleted. This ruling has even been acknowledged in countries that oppose the 'right to be forgotten.' However, regarding the first case, it should be stated that the individual's revocation of their consent to upload information is in accordance with the rule, and fundamentally, deleting data as a result of revoking consent cannot be considered an exercise of the 'right to be forgotten.' Ultimately, it is expected that advocates for the creation of such a right will regard it as an exception to the principle of freedom of expression, rather than assuming that data deletion is inherently permissible as stated in Article 17 of the general regulations. Examining the arguments set forth by both supporters and opponents, we can come to the conclusion that the exercise of this right would be in conflict with such other fundamental rights as those of freedom of expression and free access to information and therefore the presumption should be the impossibility of deleting data. Of course, the generality of this principle is restricted to the right of children to delete personal data.

Despite prevalence of jurisprudential discussions on the role of imperative rules in contracts, very little can be found in the works of legal thinkers – and equally – in the verdicts of the judiciary system. Jurists’ inattention to the difference between positive and imperative rules has resulted in many cases in disappearance of boundaries between property law and law of obligations. For instance, some jurists argue that obligation coming from an affirmative condition depends upon occurrence of ownership, also stating that undertaking an obligation in favor of a third party may cause issuance of positive rule of indebtedness. Given the above, the principal question in this study deals with underscoring distinction between imperative and positive rules and the status of either one in the law of obligations. Pinpointing examples of imperative rules in Civil Code with respect to its effects such as dispossession, lack of indebtedness, and lack of inheritance can be effective in interpretation of pertinent laws as well as verdicts of the judiciary system. In this paper, applying a descriptive-analytical method and resorting to library documents, we have tried to review the status of imperative rules in articles related to affirmative condition, interpretation of Article 959 of Civil Code, usurpation, and guarantee of discharging obligations in the light of Imam Khomeini’s opinion. An analysis of imperative rule indicates that first, it belongs to the act of obligee and its subject may be a property or an act, the latter paving the ground for imposition of imperative rule on obligations. Understanding Imam Khomeini’s opinion on this can create an appropriate ground for legalization of customary guarantee based on the guarantee of discharging obligations.

Though urban planning has a long history in Iran, the growing population in the cities, especially in recent centuries, the emergence of governments in its modern sense, and particularly numerous and different needs of the citizens has led each city to implement its own particular comprehensive and detailed plan suited to its specific circumstances.In Iran, ratification and modification of detailed urban plans are undertaken by a commission called the Detailed Plan Commission.These commissions are generally known as Article 5 Commissions and this refers to the Article 5 of the Act entitled Establishment of the Iranian Supreme Council on Urban planning and Architecture.Regulation and modification of detailed plans require a high degree of expertise and the legislator has therefore sought to minimize the possibility of error by bringing together experts from different fields.Nevertheless, the possibility still exists of error or intentional misconduct on the part of the members of the commission, and the resultant damage inflicted on the citizens. Therefore, the main challenge is how to compensate for this damage.However, to achieve the desired result, we need to answer such questions as the nature of the commission, the status of its capacity for rights and the capacity to exercise its rights and obligations, the extent of the government's liability for the damages caused by the commission’ actions, and finally the position of the delinquent committee members in this equation. According to the authors, in the first step, the government has the responsibility to compensate for damages sustained by individuals as a result of errors and wrongdoing committed by the commission, and for number of reasons Article 11 of the Civil Liability Act lies outside of the subject of this research.In the next step, the government may claim compensation from members present in the commission who committed intentional misconduct or error.Stabilishment and adoption of such an approach can serve to make the members of the commission more cautious in examination or ratification of minutes and would prevent the occurrence of possible errors or misconducts.

The law scholars have been seeking, especially in the area of commitments, to enact verdicts that support the individuals’ ownership. The results of supporting ownership in the laws of contracts have been theories like will’s governance and contract’s adulation and, in the extra-contractual requirements, efforts for restoring the victim into a prior state. The veneration of ownership in the course of time caused the accumulation of capital by the individuals and, resultantly, the impression of the economic theories on the science of law. The economic theories are so rooted in the domain of the commitments that they give rise to the emergence of theories like the contract’s administration against its adulation in the laws of contracts and the instrumentalist theories in the non-contractual commitments. The acceptance of the economic phenomena as a legal challenge caused the issues like contract moderation, buoyant price and/or the option-related provisions such as the option of refusal to be looked at from a new perspective. In the present article, the author intends to analyze the single article “about the elimination of invasion and compensation of losses imposed to properties” as well as the note 3 to article 8 of the law on “the compulsory insurance of the losses caused to third persons as a result of the accidents stemming from vehicles” as examples that are completely influenced by the economic conditions and are apparently against the preliminary legal regulations meanwhile dealing with the foresaid important challenge.

The concepts of commitment and requirement and their relationship with the concept “obligation” in the western laws, on the one hand, and the relationship between these concepts and duty in Imamiyyeh jurisprudence, on the other hand, are amongst the most complicated legal relationship s in Iran. Some jurists realize commitment as a legal relationship; some other s as the composition of a relationship and another group as a fixed duty to be shouldered by an individual. . The exact identification of the concept “commitment” along with the elucidation of a contract’s subject from its exchangeable item would contribute to the analysis of the nature of promissory contract s in the laws of Iran. Investigating the notions of the jurisprudents and jurists, the authors have come to this conclusion that the commitment lacks a legal relationship sense in the laws of Iran and it means the composition of a situational relationship in its infinitive form. Acceptance of commitment in this sense would correct the flaws related to article 183 of the civil law and it will become incorporative of the possessory, promissory and permissive contracts. As an infinitive without to, commitment is a fixed duty to be shouldered by an individual and it can be the subject of a promissory contract whereas the transaction item is the commitment-based doing or not doing of an action in the promissory contracts.

Most law scholars and well-known Islamic jurists consider that the fudhuli (unauthorized) regulations are of the the general rules of the agreements (contracts) and have generalized (spread) it to all types of the contracts. This broadness causes that some law scholars think that some fudhuli (unauthorized) rulings is in conflict with the public order. In contrast in the law of England as an excuse to maintain public order there are exceptions to the rule “the impossibility of transferring of title by the unauthorized person (a person has no ownership right)” and in some case the transfer of another person’s property is effective. Moreover, in the law of this country to facilitate the business affairs, the transaction of the agent acting without or outside his authority or the transaction of any person who pretends (claims) as an agent are effective. The disagreement between attitudes about efficiency of the legislation about the transfer of another person’s property originates from the difference of basics of “the transaction (sale) of another person’s property” in these two legal systems. In this paper with differentiating between the fudhuli (unauthorized) transactions of “mora’a” (meaning in the sale there is a right for the third person and the efficiency of the transaction relating to fulfil his right) and “moquf” (meaning ite efficiency relates to the consent of the true owner), it will be revealed that ineffectiveness of the recent transactions has been the theory “assigning the contract of sale to the true owner” and in the law of England the transaction of another person’s property is established in proportion to the ruling pursuant to the basics “agency resulting from ratification” and the Contract management (It’s a term which is used in the law of Iran and not explicitly in the law of England meaning: Contracting in situation that it does not conform to the accepted criteria (rules) by the legislature but the legislature for different social reasons is not going to announce its annulment).

Imamiyah jurists and Iranian legal experts have divided contracts into valid and invalid in terms of their effect and often, classified the unauthorized contract under the valid contracts. Comparative studies in recent years have led to the emergence of a new circumstance as voidable contracts in Iranian law. These contracts are considered to be valid and operated by the parties but they are voidable due to reasons such as mistake, duress or operation. Referring to some articles of the Commercial Code and Sea Act, the legal experts though consider the relative refutation to be in contradiction with the general rules of contracts, have still accepted them as a necessary and new establishment in specific cases. The authors, studying the reasons of the relative nullity in common law and comparing it with similar cases in Iranian law through a descriptive-analytic method,  have concluded that there is no necessity for discussion of the voidable contracts in Iranian law, common law and Roman-German law and contrary to what is taken certain, the claimed extensions are in line with the general rules of the contracts related to the unauthorized contracts and are justified.

Studying the sentences of jurists and legal experts concerning the definition of contract and enumeration of its effects, one can reach the conclusion that in their view, reliance upon the intention of construction and creation of a change in the world of mind are two inseparable features of contract. This approach has caused the term “contract” to be merely used in the course of time in its true meaning and the void contract to be identified with a contract that has not been sealed. Nevertheless, it seems that although both abovementioned states are the same in failure of creation of an effect, void contract is a real phenomenon that in some cases can create effect. The practical outcome of this claim is clear in such cases as the option of contract invalid in part, right of termination as a result of the nullification of the condition, even the principle of reduction of single contract into several contracts. Having assayed the ideas of the jurists and the Iranian laws, authors of current essay believe that the term “contract” is coined to refer to both correct and void contracts and thus, contract is considered to be a source of division and not a mentally posited entity that is taken as a real phenomenon.

Although the subject “commitments’ being injunctive or situational” has been posited and investigated in the jurisprudential resources with a lot of seriousness, this aspect of the commitments has been neglected in most of the works by jurists. Important legal effects such as non-inheritance in the injunctive rulings, lack of materiality of these rulings, impossibility of conveyance and/or abortion of the rights related to the injunctive rulings have caused some jurists to recently start dealing with this domain and, relying on the jurisprudents’ verdicts, conclude that injunctive rulings exist in the laws of Iran. The authors have investigated the nature and effects of the injunctive rulings and analyzed the reasons presented by the proponents and opponents of the existence of the injunctive rulings in the laws of commitments and concluded that there is no purely injunctive ruling in many questioned examples, including the contractual obligations and extra contractual requirements and one can believe in the existence of the situational ruling for demand right at least for the obligee. The present study uses a descriptive-analytical method to identify the various kinds of commitments in the contractual obligations and to investigate the course of purely injunctive ruling in each of them separately. Considering the fundamentality of the proposed introductions, the results obtained in the area of the contractual commitments can be also generalized to the extra contractual requirements, as well. Undoubtedly, the understanding of the type of the commitments’ rulings is effective in the identification of their effects and also useful in delimiting the laws of properties and laws of commitments.

Many jurists have considered the wife’s alimony to be among the secondary rules and explained its difference with the alimony of the relatives based on the distinction of the concepts “debt” and “obligation”. This theory is raised and accepted by most legal experts. They have regarded the marriage as the basis of the alimony as a debt. The author believes that although marriage is the basis of alimony as an obligation, the reason for changing of this obligation into a debt is the refusal of the husband of payment of the alimony and transformation of its nature into a contractual responsibility. Accordingly, the wife even as regards the current alimony is not the owner of the debt of the husband and the latter’s obligation depending on the type of the subject of the alimony is the obligation of gift or permission of possession. Thus, such issues as the guarantee of the future alimony, transfer of the current alimony as a whole either as an obligation or its permissibility are all essentially baseless in view of the denial of their subject. The findings of this study can influence in judicial opinions, because if the alimony is considered to be a contractual obligation and not a debt, by demonstration of insolvency and force majeure as a basis for refusal of payment, the current alimony will not turn to a debt and wife can use other legal solution to redress damage and even can assume the duty of disburse on commonwealth shoulders.

Although there is a wide and detailed discussion about determination of marriage portion and its quality in the jurisprudential and legal sources of the country, but in some cases, the legal precedent, by ignoring the existing sources, has followed the custom, which has led to results contrary to the legal principles. Accepting the condition of giving possession of future housing and creating an obligation in favor of a third party as the marriage portion, as well as the condition of “claiming if the couple can afford it” are examples of this discrepancy and indicate judges' disregard for rich jurisprudential sources. It seems that the source of this problem is the lack of clarification of the nature of marriage portion in the legal system of the country, which some have considered as a condition in the contract and some believe that it is an element of marriage. Each of these approaches plays a decisive role in the possibility of creating an obligation in favor of a third party, giving possession of future housing, or determining a right as a marriage portion. The author believes that the marriage portion under the titles of determined marriage portion and customary marriage portion is one of the financial and legal consequences of marriage on the husband, the amount of which may be changed as a determined marriage portion, with the consent of both parties, in the form of an ownership and exchange contract within marriage. In the case of being the determined marriage portion of an exchange nature, determining it by a third party or in his favor will not be correct. In addition, the possessive nature of this type of marriage portion causes the determination of a right as a marriage portion, the insertion of the condition of future housing, as well as the insertion of the condition of the marriage portion in the form of conditional on ability to be doubtable.

Article 196 of the civil law finds it feasible to prove transaction performance for a third party even after the contract conclusion and, in case of being proved, the transaction is considered to have been performed for a third person. Despite the purport understood from the term “transacting party”, the majority of the jurists realize the foresaid article as being indicative of transactions by an agent for an Undisclosed client. The present article’s authors are of the belief that the subject of the article includes transactions by an agent and a rouge and its rulings refer to the article 197 of the civil law. This way, if the contract subject is an objective and specific property belonging to another person, there would be essentially no need for proving the agency contract’s intention and its justification only causes the transaction to be excluded from unauthorized contracts and elicits the owner’s bound to the contract. On the other hand, if the transaction subject is an action to be done by the transacting parties, proving of the agency or unauthorized contract’s intention would be useless due to being non-attributable and the contract is condemned to invalidation. Thus, the rulings of the article 196 should be interpreted for supporting the transacting party and not the Undisclosed person. The comparative study of these verdicts in Iran and England’s laws can assist the reduction of conflict between the purports of the article 196 and the commutative justice and public order considering their similarities.

The reason as to why the legal actions are indispensable is a fundamental challenge that is discussed in England’s law under the title of “the theory of contracts”. The primary question raised by this theory is that what issues cause the dispatch of mental issues from the ethical world into the realm of law? The crude answer to this question can be sought in the theory of “free will” and the creative power of will. The abovementioned challenge has also been posited in Iran’s law and Imamiah jurisprudence, especially for the fact that remaining loyal to some legal actions is necessary and the fulfilment of some others is permissible in both of the aforesaid systems. So, the present study looks for an answer to the question that “why the binding legal actions are legally considered indispensable?” Despite such a seminal answer as the governance of will, it seems that the necessity and permissibility of staying loyal to the legal actions are latent in the  Hidden  expediency of them. This Hidden expediency requires basing of the gratuitous legal actions on permissibility and basing of the exchangeable legal actions on necessity. This principle has been considered herein as the foundation of consideration theory and issues like ex gratia in England’s law and preliminary conditions in Imamiah jurisprudence and Iran’s law will be investigated in the light of the aforesaid theory.

In Shia jurisprudence and law of Iran the ruling related to unauthorized transaction in most cases is ineffectiveness. In English law, the representative's unauthorized transaction for himself except for exceptional cases is void and his transaction for others could be authorized only when his intention of representation is revealed. This difference in ruling is rooted in distinct bases of these systems. The authors, as the result of studying these bases, believe that the basis for unauthorized transactions in Shia jurisprudence and law of Iran is the "reference to the owner" theory, while the English law follows the "administration of contracts" theory for the unauthorized transactions of the representative for himself and "representation resulted from authorization" theory as regards the unauthorized transaction of the representative for the owner. Despite the difference in terms of bases and rulings, there are many features shared by the above mentioned legal systems as to effects of unauthorized transactions; insofar as one can, against the majority, claim that the rules of unauthorized transactions in Imamiyah jurisprudence and law of Iran, like English law, can only be implemented under certain conditions. Examination of the effects of the unauthorized transactions demonstrates that permission of denial or authorization and adherence of the authorized representative to the transaction are among the most significant effects of the unauthorized transaction in both legal systems. Acceptance of the aforementioned facts as the common effects cause the following questions: whether the permission of denial or authorization can be inherited or transferred by/to others? Whether the authorized owner has the right to terminate or transfer the transaction subject before the authorization? Answering these questions and the comparative study of the said effects contribute to the better accommodation of this type of transactions with the public order and globalization of the contracts law.

In modern world, the human beings have succeeded in winning themselves an optimal grade of comfort with the progresses made in science and industry, but at the cost of losing comfort in the environment. The world has lost its prior security in the uproars of technology and rapid changes that have come about accordingly and the legislators are subsequently seeking to enact regulations that safeguard the public interests against these dangers. The precaution principle is now elapsed almost five decades since it was first applied as an independent principle. However, there are such basics in our regulations as no-loss axiom and the logical-canonical principle of foresight that are capable of filling the gap that has emerged in the absence of precaution principle; but, legalization of the precaution principle can create positive waves in psychological terms thereby to provide the legislator with wider array of options in approving supportive rules through replacing the compensatory liabilities by the preventive provisions. In the present article, we have made efforts to compare the jurisprudential principle of foresight with its western counterpart so as to figure out their similarities and differences thereby to evaluate the feasibility of inventing a principle of precaution based on the jurisprudential-legal premises of our country. Now that many of the regulations passed in Iran are found residing in the neutral part of the canonical rules, it seems better to accept the precaution principle as a logical tenet and put it into practice with protection of the environment and the mankind.