Nuclear Talks and the National Power Factors

Abstract:

Nuclear talks between Iran and P5+1 gains its significance from the USA’s disappointment in forcing Iran to give up its nuclear rights through the option of military force. In addition to the inefficiency of the military option during this soft war against Iran, Iran’s national resistance and Iran’s Islamic regime against the sanctions were also demonstrated. The opponent team’s agreement to solve the nuclear issue through negation and diplomacy indicates that the two options of “sanction and war” are worthless. It is also worth mentioning that in each negotiation there are some advantages which are compromised in order to reach the goal, and a “deal” is the result of a successful negotiation between what is given and what is taken. The agreement is reached when the two parties are both “quite satisfied” with their gains. One could never be one hundred percent satisfied. The person who negotiates draws power from the support of “national power factors” and is considered powerful when he can translate the national power into national benefits. From the aforementioned discussion we conclude that if there had been a possibility to attack, or attack without losing much, Iran’s nuclear facilities, it would have certainly be done, the same way the Zionist regime attacked Iraq and Syria’s nuclear facilities and destroyed them to no avail. What disappointed US and other Western countries of destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities and dragged them to negotiating table was nothing but out country’s defense power, especially its missile power. Therefore, raising the subject of Iran’s ballistic missile program was considered a big and un-crossable red line for Iran’s negotiating team. On the other hand, Iranian people and regime’s resistance power against the sanctions which were referred to as “crippling sanctions”, is a symbol of the national power. These sanctions were really costly for the people and the country, but couldn’t cripple Iran’s economy or subdue it, and more importantly, didn’t even look promising in regards to Iran’s submission. If the Western parties had had the slightest hope that their vast sanctions would be effective, even during a one or two-year period, the wouldn’t have deem it reasonable to come to the negotiation table. Iran’s scientific progress in nuclear field, especially in uranium enrichment, played a fundamental part in coercing the other party to come to the negotiation table. They started to become certain that they can’t impede nuclear progress by restraining Iran in scientific and industrial fields. The country’s political stability and authority, its admirable security and high-level effectiveness in the region and people’s active political participation in different elections were some other factors signifying Iran’s national power before and during nuclear negotiations. In the meantime the diplomacy skill tried to direct the national power towards the negotiation goals and reaching the best deal. Eventually, the Foreign Ministry’s nearly 4 decades of experience in using diplomacy led to Barjam (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) agreement, an agreement which imposed the Iranian people’s will on global powers and the achievements included acceptance of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program and failure of “zero enrichment” policy which the Western powers had been trying to establish. Barjam agreement fulfilled our slogan that “nuclear power is our absolute right”. Other benefits of this agreement included breaking international consensus against Iran; breaking the internal consensus of the Security Council; and more importantly, breaking US-Europe consensus and even the consensus inside America’s political structure; failure of Iran’s securitization project; disappearance of anti-Iranian sentiments and threat shadow; separating the ballistic missiles issue from the nuclear program; removal of all the legal documents regarding Iran’s nuclear sanctions and removal of the sanctions.

Language:
Persian
Published:
Journal of Foreign Policy Studies, Tehran, Volume:1 Issue: 4, 2017
Page:
99
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