نشریه مطالعات سیاست خارجی تهران
پیاپی 4 (بهار 1396)

Émile Jamil Lahoud, the renowned former President of Lebanon, ruled the country from 1998. Taking advantage of his valuable experiences during his army service and ten years of being commander-in-chief could direct his country’s ship for one dangerous decade with lots of both internal and regional hazards. Émile Lahoud managed the country during the turbulent times of internal sedition, especially after assassination of Rafic Hariri, Lebanese Prime Minister at the time. His strategy for leaving the internal crises behind was based on distancing from sectarian dependencies and strengthening a national view in political equations. He believes that the Zionist regime intends to fulfill his purposes by provoking sectarian challenges in Lebanon. In asserts that when the Zionist regime couldn’t use Rafic Hariri to provoke sectarian sedition, it tried to provoke sectarian conflicts even harder by assassinating Rafic Hariri. Another great achievement of him during his presidency was to free Southern Lebanon’s occupied lands. He made the victory over the Zionist regime’s army by uniting the army, resistance group and people. It was the first occupied Arab country to be able to free its occupied lands from dirty clutches of Zionist armies by mere dependence on the internal power and national resistance and giving no advantage to the occupiers. He was a noble President who didn’t slip while encountering the triangle of gold, force and hypocrisy of the regional and international powers, regarded his country’s independence as the main goal of all his attempts, and prevented the foreign powers to interfere in Lebanon’s affairs. He always thought the national interests preferable to personal, party and sectarian interests. As the army Commander-in-Chief and President, he based army’s defense doctrine on the national (and not sectarian) values and standing up to the Zionist regime’s security threats or other terrorist movements (supported by some Arab countries) that threatened Lebanon’s security. At the last hours of his tenure (24 November 2007) and while there was still no designated replacement for him, he left the Pres idency Palace with an admirable calm and told the reporters: “I leave power with peace of mind”. The Tehran Foreign Policy Studies Quarterly is honored to have examined Lebanon’s changes and Émile Lahoud’s management experiences through the difficult and turbulent years of 1988 to 2007 in a friendly interview with him. This interview offers the aspects of this great politician’s strategic approaches which can be a good model for solving the current challenges in regional countries for the readers and political experts to judge.

Since 1980 Iraq has been struggling with war and conflict. Saddam Hussein first prepared a vast attack on Iran with clear and pre-stated aims and then mobilized all Iraq’s capabilities for 8 years of war with Iran. He then invaded Kuwait because of its refusal to pay the cost of reconstructing the destructions left after the war and claimed Kuwait an integral part of Iraq. Saddam’s occupation of Kuwait led to international conflicts and criticism. After liberating Kuwait from Iraqi military, Iraq’s security system got weak, and people uprising against Ba’ath regime’s oppressive policies, especially in central regions and Kurdish provinces threatened the stability of the ruling party and Saddam’s power. Since the US 2003 invasion of Iraq that toppled the government of Saddam the country has struggled with tension, murder and terrorism and there is no clear perspective to reach peace in near future. Various pieces of evidence picture America’s longterm goals in Iraq. According to these facts the White House has done everything to reach its strategic plans in Iraq and establish military bases in this country. Some of its most important plans include managing regional changes from its established bases in Iraq, weakening the countries and opposition trends and controlling energy sources in the region. Under present circumstances the regional countries are going through a historical phase and Western powers aim at disintegration of regional countries. There is no doubt that a new Sykes-Picot is being planned for Persian Gulf states and other parts of Arab region. The most important goal the enemy is pursuing in the region through its pre-planned programs is to invade Iraq borders and then threaten Iran’s borders; this goal will also be pursued in America’s future strategy.

After the ISIS, Iraq needs to pursue three interconnected approaches; a) social-political (national reconciliation); b) strengthening security-information structures; c) post-war reconstruction and renovation of damaged cities and bringing the refugees back to their hometowns. It seems, provided that these approaches are fulfilled at the same time and in a cooperative way, Iraq can develop internally and get out of the current crisis. However, the implications of the ISIS defeat are not just limited to Iraq and are remarkable both regionally and internationally. It is worth mentioning Iraq’s important and critical role in this regard. Other advantageous results of the defeat of the ISIS terrorist organization are as the following: relationship improvements and solving the conflicts with the neighbor countries; reexamining and redefining Iraq’s regional and trans-regional role; regional integration of all the countries in the region in a way that pursues regional interests in the framework of each country’s interest; dynamizing economic relations with regional countries, especially participating in common strategic and trans-strategic projects; vast cooperation on security in the event of fighting terrorism; vast cultural and scientific exchanges with these countries; defending the independence, unity and integrity of the countries with common positions against the presence of foreign forces in the region.

The coup attempt on 15 July 2016 failed. This paper aims at studying the reasons of this attempt and examining opponents’ and proponents’ positions. Turkish officials accused the group linked to Fethullah Gülen and other supporters like USA as being the principal conspirators. This coup could change Turkey’s views and perspectives on regional issues and help it move from the policy of credit decrease-enemy increase to the attempts at normalizing relationships and adopting new measures. Some commentators believe that this trend had started a while ago with dismissal of Davutoğlu which aimed at preventing such changes to continue. However, these changes obviously attracted more attention after this coup. Some of the most important changes that followed the coup are Turkish officials’ new positions in foreign policy, especially in developments regarding Syria; closer cooperation with Iran and Russia and participation in Astana Talks; however, these changes have been treated with doubt and ambiguity after Trump’s rise to power in the US. In any case, what is certain is that Turkey’s Western and Arabic allies, that were considered Turkey’s supporters in regional policies, were either supporting coup attempters of 15 July 2016 coup, or announcing their support of the Turkey’s government after the coup’s failure a little too late. However, the critics of Turkey’s regional policies such as Iran and Russia, and ever Syria, announced their support of the established Turkey’s government. The position of Turkey’s Western and Arabic allies during the coup attempt indicates that the plans performed in Iraq and Syria can also be followed in Turkey itself. Turkey’s positions after the failed coup involve some signs of its trying to distance itself from Neo-Ottomanism. These signs need to be studied more meticulously. This paper has examined some parts of these changes.

Nuclear talks between Iran and P5+1 gains its significance from the USA’s disappointment in forcing Iran to give up its nuclear rights through the option of military force. In addition to the inefficiency of the military option during this soft war against Iran, Iran’s national resistance and Iran’s Islamic regime against the sanctions were also demonstrated. The opponent team’s agreement to solve the nuclear issue through negation and diplomacy indicates that the two options of “sanction and war” are worthless. It is also worth mentioning that in each negotiation there are some advantages which are compromised in order to reach the goal, and a “deal” is the result of a successful negotiation between what is given and what is taken. The agreement is reached when the two parties are both “quite satisfied” with their gains. One could never be one hundred percent satisfied. The person who negotiates draws power from the support of “national power factors” and is considered powerful when he can translate the national power into national benefits. From the aforementioned discussion we conclude that if there had been a possibility to attack, or attack without losing much, Iran’s nuclear facilities, it would have certainly be done, the same way the Zionist regime attacked Iraq and Syria’s nuclear facilities and destroyed them to no avail. What disappointed US and other Western countries of destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities and dragged them to negotiating table was nothing but out country’s defense power, especially its missile power. Therefore, raising the subject of Iran’s ballistic missile program was considered a big and un-crossable red line for Iran’s negotiating team. On the other hand, Iranian people and regime’s resistance power against the sanctions which were referred to as “crippling sanctions”, is a symbol of the national power. These sanctions were really costly for the people and the country, but couldn’t cripple Iran’s economy or subdue it, and more importantly, didn’t even look promising in regards to Iran’s submission. If the Western parties had had the slightest hope that their vast sanctions would be effective, even during a one or two-year period, the wouldn’t have deem it reasonable to come to the negotiation table. Iran’s scientific progress in nuclear field, especially in uranium enrichment, played a fundamental part in coercing the other party to come to the negotiation table. They started to become certain that they can’t impede nuclear progress by restraining Iran in scientific and industrial fields. The country’s political stability and authority, its admirable security and high-level effectiveness in the region and people’s active political participation in different elections were some other factors signifying Iran’s national power before and during nuclear negotiations. In the meantime the diplomacy skill tried to direct the national power towards the negotiation goals and reaching the best deal. Eventually, the Foreign Ministry’s nearly 4 decades of experience in using diplomacy led to Barjam (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) agreement, an agreement which imposed the Iranian people’s will on global powers and the achievements included acceptance of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program and failure of “zero enrichment” policy which the Western powers had been trying to establish. Barjam agreement fulfilled our slogan that “nuclear power is our absolute right”. Other benefits of this agreement included breaking international consensus against Iran; breaking the internal consensus of the Security Council; and more importantly, breaking US-Europe consensus and even the consensus inside America’s political structure; failure of Iran’s securitization project; disappearance of anti-Iranian sentiments and threat shadow; separating the ballistic missiles issue from the nuclear program; removal of all the legal documents regarding Iran’s nuclear sanctions and removal of the sanctions.

Barjam (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) has opened a new season before Iran-USA relationships. Though the USA thinks that this agreement is focused on Iran’s nuclear plan, this agreement is practically is the linking loop in the chain of impeding Iran in both regional and internal arenas. In other words, the USA seeks to use Barjam as a strategic instrument to exert some pressure over Iran. This means that America also enjoys some benefit from Barjam. Then why does it do things which contradict Barjam either implicitly or explicitly. The present paper aims to answer this question, and in addition to discussing the strategic importance of Barjam for the USA, it examines the USA’s contradictory behaviors at three technical, political and strategic levels, and finally suggests an answer for the Iranian government to give in reaction to these policies.

Since late 19th century fossil energy began to become governments’ development engine and that’s why super powers made some arrangements to control regions with multiple oil and gas reserves. The theory of “out of oil” and “peak oil” theory doubled the importance of energy-producing regions or strategic energy ellipse. The Middle East, which has largest reserves of oil and gas, has clearly become significant and the super powers have put controlling over this region in their agenda. Some of their usual approaches to control the region included military attack, coup d’état, using a proxy government and establishing military bases. New advances in energy field including discovery and commercialization of unusual resources, which started in the US and will likely spread to other regions, have challenged two keywords in the former paradigm of fossil energy concentration in particular regions and “out of oil” and therefore undermined the importance of this region for the US. This article examines the implications of unusual energy commercialization on the US foreign policy strategy in the Middle East. Based on hegemonic stability theory, this article argues that the US, despite energy independence, will still be present in this turbulent structure. The necessity of controlling energy artery and opposing security threats in this region will make the Americans not to let go of this region despite energy independence.

Cyberspace security is one of the new fields in international security which has become a common and increasing concern of technical, legal, political and security experts, and internal and external players, and therefore has found a special significant place in national security and international security discourse. The governments, as the first receivers of international security and the most important followers of international law, have established various plans and policies to tackle this new security challenge. Since the traditional borders are removed in cyberspace, the principle of un-dividability of security is proven more than any other time, and the governments have come to the conclusion that it is unlikely, even impossible, to secure internal cyberspace without regarding its international transformations. Among the strategies, suggestions and plans offered internationally to secure the cyberspace Russia’s international initiatives are more conspicuous. Russia is one of the pioneers in this field and has suggested some plans and projects from 1998, i.e. the beginnings of cyberspace growth and international increase in the number of cyber users including: Resolutions on Cyber Information Security, Information Security Ethics, and Draft Convention on International Information Security. Our country’s diplomatic system has not reacted in an acceptable way in interacting with diplomatic transformations in cyber field and deciding on appropriate cyber diplomacy, especially in regards with Russia’s suggested plans. Our diplomatic system is more or less principally ignorant of the novel and important area of cyber, especially its diplomatic aspect. This paper will also study Tehran’s practical weakness of foreign policy about cyberspace.