Application of the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Method to Optimal Allocation of Shared Water Resources under Water Bankruptcy Condition

Under conditions of water scarcity due to limited water resources and improper exploitation, management based on the characteristics of flexibility, equity and sustainability of water resources can play an important role in preventing the continuation of the crisis and the reduction of water conflicts. In this study, using a combination of bankruptcy and asymmetric Nash bargaining concepts, the framework was presented for the optimal allocation of shared water resources. The Atrak basin including Golestan, North Khorasan and Razavi Khorasan provinces was considered as a case study. First, water allocation in this basin was done by Nash optimization model in symmetric and asymmetric states. In addition to this model, common methods in the bankruptcy approach were used and compared with Nash bargaining model. The results showed that in terms of different assumptions, the proposed bargaining model is able to cover the results of common bankruptcy laws. Also, the involvement of water production potential in determining water weight can be an important step towards more equitable water allocation. In this case, water allocation of Golestan, North Khorasan and Razavi Khorasan provinces is 138, 902 and 174 million cubic meters per year, respectively. The results of sensitivity analysis indicated that with relative weight change, the percentage of water supply changed. The research findings suggest that the proposed flexible model, by providing negotiation capabilities, can be considered as an effective management tool for solving common problems of shared water resources allocation.