Critical Analysis of the Essential Interpretation of Substantive Motion; Comparing the Views of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra

Unlike Avicenna, who considered motion as a subsequents of the natural body and accepted its existence in only four accidental categories, Mulla Sadra considered motion in the essence and essence of objects and transferred the discussion about it from natural sciences to theology. But this theory has been exposed to two different interpretations in his metaphysics. Essential interpretation in which the concepts of peripatetic metaphysics such as matter and form are used and existential interpretation which is presented based on the fundamentality of existence and the use of concepts such as flowing existence.
Regardless of the criticisms that may be leveled at the second interpretation, this article focuses on the essential interpretation. An attempt has been made by analyzing Avicenna's arguments to Check out his presuppositions on these reasons. It is then shown that presenting any view of Avicenna's attitude requires a fundamental change in his presuppositions in accepting immobility in substance. Therefore, any explanation that seeks to be presented on the basis of the previous principles will not be satisfactory, as Mulla Sadra has failed to present it.