Philosopher’s Challenge in Understanding the Language of Science: The case of Homology Concept

About fifty years ago Ernst Mayr, a German biologist, and philosopher of science reminded other philosophers of science of the significance of biology in philosophical studies. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the orthodox philosophy of science was still largely leaned toward physics among other empirical branches of science. It took some decades for philosophers of science to gradually change their focus to biology, but the course of action still needs development. This paper highlights some critical problems that biological case studies may pose against philosophers’ understanding of the language of science. It will be seen that at least for some biological case studies, scientific theory alone cannot determine meaning and reference. Contrary to the orthodox philosophy of science, causal and descriptive components are also insufficient to do the task. This paper reveals some reasons behind these biological complications but ultimately claims that above everything this complication stems from the historicity of the reference of biological concepts.