The impact of oil rents and corruption on central bank independence in oil exporting countries

The main purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of oil rents and corruption on central bank independence in oil exporting countries. The panel data method is used for 25 oil dependent countries over the period of 2000-2012. The results show that oil rents and corruption reduce the central bank independence in oil exporting countries. In addition, in order to make a comparison between the role of oil rents and other rents in affecting the central bank independence, the present study examines the effects of other rents arising from other sources such as gas rent, the forest rents and the total rents of natural resources on the central bank independence. The results show that gas and forestry rents do not have a significant effect on central bank independence in oil exporting countries, but the effect of total natural resource rents, including oil rents, on central bank independence is negative and statistically significant. Moreover, according to the other control variables employed in our empirical models, we find that GDP per capita, government expenditures and liquidity have negative and statistically significant impact on central bank independence in oil exporting countries. While, the improvement in the transparency index and public information may reduce the central bank independence in these countries. The results of this study indicate that the oil exporting countries can protect their central bank independence by managing their oil rents and controlling the liquidity and government spending behavior. This may happen through improving the transparency index and public awareness.