Re-reading the Feasibility of “The Judiciary’s Budgetary Independence” Within the Framework of Iran’s Constitutional System

Judicial independence is a complex and wide-ranging issue, the realization of which requires the preparation of appropriate contexts and comprehensive planning. One of the main issues in this area is the relationship between the independence of the judiciary and the financial and budgetary system above it. The present study, with the hypothesis, that "the idea of institutional independence of the judiciary fails regardless of the financial system and budgetary prevailing", makes it possible to improve the budgeting system of the judiciary within the framework of the constitutional system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this regard, the main issue of the article is based on the question that: "Can the theory of financial and budgetary independence of the judiciary be defended?" This question has been answered through the critique of various theories, by the theory known as: "relative competence of the government to change the proposed budget of the judiciary" that can ensure a favourable budgeting system for the judiciary and protect its independence from government pressures and threats with budgetary means, while being compatible with the principles of the Constitution, the procedure of the Guardian Council and the financial and budgetary laws and regulations of the country.