mohammadsadegh farahani

The ratification of treaties in Iran is the scene of confrontation between two distinct legal systems. In this conflict, any inconsistent interpretation of the foundations of these legal systems results in different legal effects. In fact, the dichotomy between Sharia law and the constitution with the principles of international law, which can be seen in treaties, imposes certain legal requirements on the executive and legislative branches, and the recognition of these requirements depends on the opinions of the guardian council in reviewing international instruments to complete the country's foreign policy in the field of international agreements. The main question of this research is to examine the legal requirements governing bilateral or multilateral agreements, which is written in a descriptive-analytical method. From the total opinions of the guardian council, two substantive and structural rules can be taken in the review of the approvals, which narrate the procedure of this council in examining the emerging issues of international law, which ultimately led to the protection of the people's rights.

The relation of the constitutional review institution as an institution that guards and guarantees the implementation and application of the constitution in a democratic system (in a nation-based system as a precise meaning) with its previous procedure and precedent is one of the issues that has different forms and implications depending on the requirements of different legal models. Although different models of constitutional reviews can be considered based on various criteria, but in general, two models of written law and common law are divided into the formulation of the relationship of the constitutional review institutions with their previous procedures and precedents. Based on this, the current research is trying to use the descriptive-analytical method, while examining the mentioned issue in relation to different countries under the two models of written and common law and according to the model of the constitutional review institution in the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in addition to applying the preferences and advantages of the constitutional review model. The Islamic Republic of Iran should take into account the achievements and experiences of different countries in order to improve the quality of the performance of its own model of constitutional council.

The application of competition rules in legal systems necessitates defining the market and measuring market power. These two prerequisites form the basis for enforcing competition laws, and their regulation becomes increasingly crucial with the expansion of internet-based platform businesses and their impact on consumer rights. This research addresses the challenges in setting prerequisites for applying competition rules in digital platforms and offers new solutions. The traditional approach to competition analysis involves defining the relevant market and assessing market power. However, the unique characteristics of digital platforms present obstacles in achieving these objectives. To establish rules governing market definition and market power measurement, a three-step process is proposed. Firstly, the traditional rules for market definition and market power measurement in conventional businesses are examined, as they are commonly used in judicial authorities. Secondly, the specific competitive challenges in digital platforms are assessed to identify cases where traditional criteria fall short in providing  prerequisites. Finally, new criteria for market definition and market power measurement in digital platforms are proposed. The research reveals that both market definition and market power measurement in platform businesses face significant challenges. Defining the market in digital platforms proves difficult due to the inability to assert that virtual and traditional businesses coexist within the same market. Additionally, the traditional product and market scope determination method (SSNIP test) may not apply to two/multi-modal platforms and platforms offering products with zero prices. Furthermore, traditional indicators for calculating the market area, such as "transportation" and "main area," do not apply to virtual markets with cross-border transactions. Measuring market power in digital platforms presents its own challenges. Relying solely on income as a criterion is inadequate, as it cannot be compared to other factors like the number of active users, volume of traffic, or time spent on the platform. Furthermore, using income to determine market share is not applicable to platforms with zero-priced products. Measuring product demand elasticity using the Lerner index is also hindered by the zero marginal cost of many platforms. Moreover, identifying effective entry barriers specific to digital platforms and devising mechanisms for measuring them presents a challenge not yet addressed by legal systems. To overcome these challenges and provide new criteria for market definition in digital platforms, a three-step process is proposed. The identification of non-linear value chains helps identify platform components. Assessing whether each component constitutes a separate market or a part of the same market relies on their correlation and their contribution to specific services. To address challenges in defining the product and scope, the research suggests using the SSNDQ test (small but significant and stable reduction in quality) instead of the SSNIP test. Criteria such as "service speed," "data protection," "privacy protection," "exchange cost," "negotiation cost," and "search cost" can measure the quality of service provision in digital platforms. For measuring market power in digital platforms, distinguishing between "transaction-based platforms" and "audience-based platforms" is suggested. The "users' payment" criterion, instead of platform income, can determine market share using indicators like the number of users, traffic volume, time spent, and number of visits. Recognizing new structural and strategic entry barriers in digital platforms within relevant laws and regulations is crucial. Evaluating the three-stage process of "possibility of entry," "possibility of competitive influence," and "possibility of limiting market power" in platform markets offers potential solutions to measuring market power in this context.

The expansion of the Internet and its ever-increasing rate along with the rise of smart mobile phones have made Internet-based businesses one of the inseparable sectors of today's economy. The part that this type of business plays in today’s world economy is so much that now the top companies in the world, in terms of capital and market value, are companies in the field of digital economy. This is a reality that Iran will also face in the not-too-distant future; then, companies in the field of digital economy will take a significant share of the market. So, today, it is especially necessary to pay attention to the issue of competition in digital platforms and to set the appropriate rules to govern them.

Literature Review:

Until the writing of this article, most of the issues raised in Iran's competition law are devoted to the examination of rules governing competition in traditional markets. Only one article titled "Competition Council and Internet Businesses" by Zarei et al. (2019) has been written in relation to platform markets, and this work is also based on the traditional rules of competition law and regardless of the specific challenges of this field. Analysis of the vote number 306 of the Competition Council. Therefore, it can be claimed that the explanation of the characteristics and challenges of platform markets and its effect on the regulation of competition in this field, which is examined in this article, qualifies as innovation.

In order to correctly set the new rules applicable in the field of digital platforms’ competition, it is necessary to go through a three-stage system: first, we must get a correct understanding of the prominent features of the digital platform markets that affect the issue of competition. In the second stage, the competitive challenges arising from these characteristics, with which the traditional rules are not able to fully deal, should be examined and evaluated; and finally, new rules of competition in the field of platform markets based on the aforementioned characteristics and challenges should be put in place.As the title of the article suggests, the purpose of this article is to explain and analyze the first and second stages of the aforementioned process to show the deficiency of traditional rules in response to the competitive challenges of the field of digital platforms and the necessity of revising them. For this purpose, after explaining the meaning of "platform" and its conceptual evolution over time (the first part), the prominent features of digital platforms that affect the issue of competition are counted, identified, and evaluated (the second part) and finally, the challenges due to the aforementioned characteristics and the inadequacy of the traditional rules in response to them will be explained (part three) to prove the necessity of revising the traditional rules of competition law in the field of platform markets.

Based on the findings of this article, the main economic features of digital platforms are such as "the network effect", "reduction of transaction costs", "replacement of ownership with access", "fragmentation of supply and demand", "economy of scale and economy of significant scope", "simultaneous improvement of economies of scale and personalization" and "fundamental importance of data". Although they are not entirely new and traces of them can be seen in traditional markets, their simultaneous presence in digital platforms makes the market tend towards them. In addition, this problem may be aggravated by the actions of digital platforms to strengthen and expand their position in the market. It is noteworthy that none of the aforementioned features that have led to the occurrence of the mentioned challenges have been recognized in the traditional rules of competition as an obstacle to entering the market or as an anti-competitive practice. Therefore, the first competitive challenge of platform markets, which requires the regulation of appropriate rules, is the growing monopoly of these markets. Naturally, the most suitable solution to get out of this situation is to recognize the aforementioned features as specific types of entry barriers for digital markets.It should also be kept in mind that the preliminary stages to apply anti-competitive rules and guaranteeing them in digital platform markets face serious challenges. In these markets, it is not possible to identify the product as easily as it is in traditional markets, and the application of the conventional SSNIP test cannot be applied to many platforms that offer zero-price services or two- or multi-modal platforms. This makes it a serious challenge to recognize the exact share of the platform in the market and, accordingly, to recognize the market power. It seems that the transition from "quantitative criteria" to "qualitative criteria" is the way out of such challenges.Also, following the traditional rules in recognizing the anti-competitive behavior of platforms, causes many platforms to be accused of aggressive pricing at the very beginning due to having zero marginal cost. In addition, the existence of the aforementioned features has facilitated the conditions for committing anti-competitive acts, such as establishing exclusive conditions in the transaction, selling a package of products, collusion, etc. It seems that the requirement to overcoming such challenges is to promote ex-ante regulations along with the implementation of the current (mostly a-posteriori) regulation model.Finally, it seems that the simultaneous presence of these features in digital platforms has largely led to the reemergence of traditional issues of competition law as current issues, and this will consequently require a review of competition laws in this area, as countries such as the United States, China, and the European Union have followed the same path.

Nowadays, transparency as one of the indicators of qualified governance is an essential need of governments in almost all aspects of governance. Definitely, transparency in the process of holding elections is one of the ways of holding a healthy election. Accordingly, evaluation of transparency in elections may include observers and executors of elections on one hand, and election candidates on the other hand. In the general policies of elections, as an upper-hand document, the requirements of a transparent electoral system have been illustrated in order to improve the country's electoral system and reach the favorable condition. Based on this, this article, by a descriptive-analytical method, aims to answer this question of, according to the general policies of elections, what are the weaknesses and gaps concerning transparency in the current legal regime governing the parliamentary elections and the solutions to reform it? By examining the general policies of elections, it was found that the lawmaker should reduce the ambiguity of requirements of candidates based on the foundations of Islamic Republic regime. Furthermore, the assets, properties and election costs of candidates should be made transparent to all voters. The executor of elections should employ clear and trustworthy framework in the process of voting and vote counting. Furthermore, legal authorities must respond to the inquiries made as to the approval or rejection of candidates’s qualification in due course and avoid any delays.

The clear manifestation of the country's treaty system is reflected in the opinions and decisions of the Islamic Consultative Assembly or the Guardian Council in accepting or rejecting international agreements. In this perspective, several ambiguities in the issue of constitutional law can be seen as a threat to the national security of the Iran. On one hand, international treaties can forcefully impose their effects on Iran's transnational obligations without being considered by the parliament and the Guardian Council, while on the other hand, due to the lack of a monitoring mechanism, it is possible to change the approved internal and external documents. What was discussed in this study is the need to formulate a system of claim and counterclaim in the international practice of Iran and also to prepare a special mechanism to inform the competent institutions about the post-ratification process of treaties

The performance of professional jobs for the public interest of society and their entry into the field of public services, doubles the need for government intervention in regulating the rules governing their performance. The present study, by exploiting the studies of the control library and adopting an analytical-descriptive approach, in order to explain the components of government intervention in regulating the legal profession, has reached the conclusion that contrary to the idea, the UK government intervenes in three levels of criteria. Governing the "structure and organization of the legal profession", "how to enter the legal profession" and "professional tenure" to pay the legal regime governing the legal profession is paid. Items such as "Determining the legal nature of the Bar Association", "Comprehensive government oversight of the Bar Association and the legal profession", "Regulation in the field of advocacy", "Reporting the Bar Association's obligation to nine government governments", "Reviewing the Bar Association's request and supervision On the approvals of the pillars and management components of the association "," Obligation to apply transparency in the performance of bar associations "," Determining the conditions of representation and admission "," Intervention of lawyers' training "," Intervention in the names in the list of lawyers "," Establishment of lawyers 'disciplinary courts and investigation of their violations "," Regulation of public oversight of Uber Bar Associations "," Regulation of government oversight mechanism in Bar Associations "," Supervision of lawyers' training "," Determining the amount and "How to obtain attorneys' fees", "Suspension and revocation of attorney's license", "Prohibition of attorney by qualified persons", "Control over employees and attorneys" and finally "Regulation of the mechanism of attorneys and non-attorneys" are examples of government intervention in England The establishment of bar associations in this country is considered.

Judicial independence is a complex and wide-ranging issue, the realization of which requires the preparation of appropriate contexts and comprehensive planning. One of the main issues in this area is the relationship between the independence of the judiciary and the financial and budgetary system above it. The present study, with the hypothesis, that "the idea of institutional independence of the judiciary fails regardless of the financial system and budgetary prevailing", makes it possible to improve the budgeting system of the judiciary within the framework of the constitutional system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this regard, the main issue of the article is based on the question that: "Can the theory of financial and budgetary independence of the judiciary be defended?" This question has been answered through the critique of various theories, by the theory known as: "relative competence of the government to change the proposed budget of the judiciary" that can ensure a favourable budgeting system for the judiciary and protect its independence from government pressures and threats with budgetary means, while being compatible with the principles of the Constitution, the procedure of the Guardian Council and the financial and budgetary laws and regulations of the country.

State-owned enterprises established to facilitate the proper provision of public services by governments have become one of the ambiguities in the geometry of public law in the country due to the lack of a coherent and precise legal system that regulates their activities. One of the most important shortcomings of the domestic public law system in this regard is the lack of effective monitoring methods on the performance of these enterprises, which has increased the incidence of corruption in them. "Creating transparency" as a way to prevent corruption while developing and strengthening their accountability and oversight is one of the most basic solutions to this problem that the present article seeks to find a suitable mechanism to ensure it. The present study utilizes library studies and adopts a descriptive-analytical approach, while enumerating the principles governing the realization of administrative and financial transparency of these companies, including "establishing the most appropriate methods of accountability", "applying organizational transparency", "participation with stakeholders in programs to combat "Corruption" and "Ensuring transparency in corporate ownership", its practical realization in countries around the world under the four models of "submitting a comprehensive annual report", "creating an internal audit process", "disseminating information" and "inserting the budget of state-owned companies in the budget law" Has examined and highlighted the gaps in the domestic legal system in this regard

The Article 52 of the Constitution makes the review and approval of the annual budget of the country within the competence of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. On the other hand, Article 85 of the Constitution considers legislation to be within the competence of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and considers the delegation of the approval of laws to the internal commissions of the Assembly to be possible only under certain conditions. This research by using library studies and adopting an analytical-descriptive approach, in the position of explaining the relationship between the Articles 52 and 85 of the Constitution and the feasibility of approving the budget bill in the internal commissions of the parliament has reached the conclusion that the unauthorized approach to experimental budget approval is legally more robust. The license-based approach for experimental approval of the budget, is based on four axes: "Philosophy of the experimental legislation", "Non-fulfillment of the necessity stated in Article 85 of the budget laws", "Exceptional nature of legislative delegation and suffice to axioms in its interpretation" and "budget allocation based on the provisions of Article 85 of the Constitution". On the contrary, the view of the impermissibility of experimental budget approval is based on "Compatibility in the philosophy of experimental legislation with experimental budget law", "Similarity of budget and other laws in terms of "experimental implementation", "Inclusion of general and exceptional rules of legislation in relation to the budget law" and "Presentation of a new analysis of the phrase "Some Laws ".

The Article 45 of the Constitution, in the position of reviving the macro and systematic attitude towards the public wealth of the society and by emphasizing on the jurisprudential teachings of the Imami religion, has provided the public wealth and its examples to the Islamic state. The present study, using library studies and adopting an analytical-descriptive approach, in the position of recognizing the concept of these properties, has reached the conclusion that, contrary to the popular belief, "public wealth" is not merely "Anfal". The properties mentioned in this Article fall into three general categories: "Anfal", "Mobahat" and "User-centric public properties"."Anfal" are the properties belonging to the legal entity of the state and the nature of the state's relationship with them is the relationship of ownership of a legal entity with its properties within its jurisdiction. "Mobahat" are the properties belonging to no particular person and anyone (whether government or other natural or legal persons) can own and exploit them, although the state has the power to impose restrictions on their exploitation. "User-centric public properties" are also those not owned by the legal entity of the Islamic state like Anfal, nor it is possible for individuals to own them, as Mobahat. The administration of these properties, which are permanently allocated for a general or non-restricted purpose, is in the possession of the Islamic state, and their ownership belongs to the legal personality of these properties.

Properties that are permanently assigned to meet a public goal and use a form of public property, which is referred to as "public property of user orientation". The present research, using library studies and adopting an analytical-descriptive approach, has identified the "legal nature of the relationship between government and public property of user orientation" through the study of the works and theories of the Imamie`s jurisprudents has come to the conclusion that they have described the legal nature of the government's relationship with this category of property as "supervision, management and maintenance" by providing three theories of "ownership", "ownership of the title" and "ownership of the legal personality of public property" in all legal periods. Although the main owner of this property has identified different from the other in each of the above theories.