Examining the Soul as a Bundle of Mental Images

Mental impressions and images are considered as things that are frequently used in various forms to prove the essence of the soul. In the meantime, Hume believes that human truth is a bundle of mental impressions and images that follow each other in a series, and beyond them, there is no substratum called sensual essence. Therefore, the bundle-like view of mental impressions is a serious obstacle to proving the sensual essence through mental impressions. The root of this denial lies in Hume's rejection of the essence itself because according to his epistemological principles, we do not have a category called impression essence, and in turn, we have no idea of ​​it. In this article, we prove that it is not possible for the "soul", the "mind" or the "I" to be merely a series of impressions without any underlying essence. To do this, while introducing two categories of epistemological and metaphysical objections to the bundle-like view of the soul, we critique the whatness of essence from the perspective of proponents of the bundle theory, as well as their reason for rejecting essence.  Finally, we formulate an argument to prove the existence of soul in the field of the mentioned view.