Free will and determinism in Hume's view

Hume takes a compatibilist view in the debate on liberty and necessity. In his view, we need both “necessity” and “liberty” for moral responsibility. In this paper, at first, I will clarify Hume’s path to accomplishing his project. Then, I will explain the classic interpretation of Hume’s compatibilism according to which, in Hume’s view, it is the external compulsion that conflicts with free will rather than causation itself. Then, I will try to explain Botterill’s interpretation of Hume’s compatibilism. Botterill claims that Hume’s focus is on what he calls intentional agency or liberty 2. Finally, I will try to show that Hume’s project still faces difficulties, even if we accept Botterill’s account of Hume’s compatibilism. Although in his view, Hume’s emphasis is on agency, determinations of the will, and intention, it does not still respond to our concern about other possibilities. This interpretation also does not show that intentional agency is compatible with the broad determinism that governs an agent’s psychological states and passions.