Phenomenal Concepts Strategy and Chalmers’ Argument

Physicalists have given several responses to anti-physicalist arguments based on epistemic/explanatory gaps. One of the most critical answers has become known as the phenomenal concepts strategy. Proponents of this strategy embrace the explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal facts. Still, appealing to the special nature of phenomenal concepts, they try to explain why we confront this gap. Chalmers has presented an argument in the form of a dilemma against this strategy. He argues that each horn of the dilemma results in the failure of the strategy. In this paper, I will explain Chalmers’ argument. Focusing on the second horn, I will attempt to show that one of the premises of his arguments faces the problem; then, I will argue that following the second horn, the strategy could be successful, even if one of the conditions he takes necessary for the success of the strategy is not met.