A critical Analyzing Moritz Schlick's compatibilist Approach to Moral Responsibility

This research critically examines Moritz Schlick's perspective on the nature of moral responsibility, aiming to demonstrate the inefficacy of his theoretical framework. By denying the necessity of "alternative possibilities" in accepting "moral responsibility", Schlick faces three challenges: providing a consistent definition of moral responsibility; the compatible definition and explanation of the agent's sense of responsibility and the compatibility of the examples of these two with each other. Schlick's view, Moral responsibility is defined as "the agent's capacity to motivate through the imposition of punishment." Based on this, A is responsible for X only if punishment motivates A to avoid similar actions. Subsequently, Schlick delves into the psychological dimension of responsibility, grounded in the agent's "feeling of responsibility," which he defines as the "fulfillment of innate desires," aiming to reconcile the objective and psychological definitions of responsibility. Through the presentation of three counterexamples, I demonstrates: a) the inherent inconsistency in Schlick's theory, wherein instances of his two definitions fail to align. b) The incompleteness of the definition of the feeling of responsibility. c) The insufficiency of the objective definition, as it does not account for scenarios in which an agent remains impervious to the influence of punishment, but common sense ascribes the highest degree of responsibility to such an agent. Consequently, these three critical shortcomings underscore the indefensibility of Schlick's theory in addressing the issue.