Criticism and Investigation of Probable Objections to the Principle of Contradiction

The impossibility of reconciliation of two contradictories has an important position as the ‘mother proposition’ in the system of foundationalism. This article attempts to explain, through an analytical-critical method, the objections that can be posed to this principle and answer them. Doubt in recounting position of this principle and considering it as a mental structure, doubt in its realism, doubt in the instances of this principle due to probability of not discovering some of the conditions of contradiction, doubt in possibility of adjusting an argument by relying on this principle due to no independent proposition of it and, finally, doubt in referring to this principle in foundationalists’ scientific efforts are among the most important drawbacks in this regard. None of these drawbacks seems to be right. Impossibility of reconciliation is the essential judgment of two contradictories, no matter in which existential sphere they are assumed. Doubts in realism of this principle will lead to skepticism, and intuitive knowledge is the foundation of affirming it. The inductive nature of the conditions of contradiction is not in conflict with the axiomaticity of this principle. Argumentation is not restricted to syllogism. Besides, according to some foundations, the primary axioms are pluralized along with this principle. In their scientific efforts, the foundationalists also are obliged, merely in the position of offering proofs on the basis of restricting the primary axioms to this principle, to refer their arguments to this principle.