Critique and Examination of the Exclusiveness of Absolute a Posteriori Proof from General Concomitants in Philosophy According to ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī

The issues in first philosophy are established by proof (burhān), which is either a priori or a posteriori. Each of these two is further divided into categories. According to ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, reasoning or dalīl (i.e. proceeding from effect to cause) or any argument that requires proceeding from effect to cause, inherently lack certainty. Therefore, the philosophical problems cannot be established through them, and essentially these arguments have no place in philosophy. According to him, although a priori proof brings about certainty, it has no place in philosophy; since introducing it in philosophy is tantamount to the contingency of the existent from the perspective of existence. ‘Allāmah’s claim has been critiqued by scholars such as ‘Allāmah Miṣbāḥ, ‘Allāmah Jawādī Āmulī and Āyatullāh Fayyāḍī. This discourse, by using proof as a methodology, shows that none of the raised criticisms dismiss ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s claim because we will show by proof that:-The proof is either “a priori”, but establishing the judgment is not among the essential accidents of existent from the perspective of existence. Hence, it is not a philosophical issue. - Or it is not “a priori”, and the judgment of essential accidents of existent is from the perspective of existence. The middle and the major terms are from the general concomitants, and the issue belongs to first philosophy.