moral cognitivism and noncognitivism

One of the most important issues in the field of epistemology of ethics is the possibility or impossibility of obtaining moral cognition. In this article, we examine moral beliefs that are propositions; it studies the possibility of being right and wrong of the propositions derived from real affairs or expressing desires, tendencies and expressing feelings, or even they are the kind of imperatives. The humen are often capable of doing moral action; While they often don't even have the ability to express or argue about it. Although people do not speak confidently about their moral cognition, they do moral action whether it would be right or wrong. In the first part of this article, people's confidence and intuition about moral cognition and action are discussed. In the second part of this study, moral cognitivism argues that moral propositions express a kind of cognition and can be really right or wrong, but on the other hand, there are some other philosophical currents in the field of ethics that put the possibility of moral cognition under the question. And these philosophical currents that are opposite to cognitivism are known as non-cognitivism and moral skepticism. According to non-cognitivists, moral imperatives and propositions are not beliefs about real affairs and do not have the ability to be right or wrong. Although skeptics accept that humen are supposed to have moral beliefs, they believe that these beliefs are completely unjustified. In this article, the above-mentioned issues are discussed.