Examining the Narrational Reasons for the Exclusion of Virtues from jurisprudence

The relationship between jurisprudenc and ethics is one of the important and influential topics in the interdisciplinary discussions of these two fields of study. There are various perspectives regarding this relationship, which can be categorized into three groups: unity, conflict, and interaction. Proponents of distinction, whether they believe in conflict or interaction, consider one of the fundamental differences between jurisprudence and ethics to be their subject matter: jurisprudence pertains to human behavior, while ethics deals with virtues and dispositions. This research examines the narrational reasons that may exclude virtues and dispositions from the domain of jurisprudence and include them in the science of ethics. The research method involved the collection and semantic analysis of narrational propositions. The findings indicate that the three possible narrational reasons for the non-subjectivity of virtues in jurisprudence lack sufficient strength. Finally, an anthropological rational reason that interprets narratives indicating the prohibition of moral vices has been examined and critiqued.