The fact that the knower is existentially weak and the known existentially strong is the greatest challenge for the possibility of knowing Allah. Mulla Sadra deals with this issue in knowledge by presence as well as in knowledge by acquisition. Knowledge by presence includes the knowledge of cause about its effect, the knowledge of an immaterial thing about itself and the knowledge of an effect about its cause. The first two types are detailed presential knowledge whereas the last is short presential knowledge. According to Sadrian thought, the presential knowledge of existents about the necessary being does not have anything to do with the first two types of presential knowledge; it is from the last type of presential knowledge instead. Mulla Sadra believes that it is impossible to know the essence of Allah through acquired knowledge, though it is possible to obtain non-essential knowledge about Him through short acquired knowledge. Despite being deep and profound, Mulla Sadra’s theory suffers from certain defects and flaws which we will touch on in this inquiry.

God’s Knowledge is one of the important philosophical problems whose various dimensions have continually been explored by different thinkers. In order to avoid the problem of change in divine essence, Ibn Sina argues that God’s Knowledge of particulars is possible through the knowledge of universals and causes. He also holds that the divine undifferentiated knowledge of existents is possible through imprinted forms. On the other hand, Muhaqqiq Tusi considers the necessary knowledge to belong to the category of relation and maintains that, in the Necessary Being’s Knowledge of changing particular affairs, some changes occur in the relation while the essence remains the same. Therefore, unlike Ibn Sina, Tusi accepts God’s Knowledge of particulars. He also criticizes Ibn Sina’s theory of the imprinting of established forms in the essence of the Necessary Being. Ibn Sina argues that the knowledge of divine essence through His Essence and the essential knowledge of imprinted forms, which is the cause of the appearance of existence, are of the presential type, while the differentiated knowledge of other existents is of the acquired type. In this paper, the writers explain and explore the philosophical principles of these two thinkers.

Messengers and Imams are regarded as Divinely chosen people and, therefore, of particularities like sinlessness and knowledge of the unseen. Quranic verses of the knowledge of the unseen are of two types: some denote the knowledge limitation to God and some denote its inclusion to all beings other than God. Studying the verses of two types show lack of disagreement in the field. the former refers to God`s independent knowledge of the unseen and the latter to prophet and Imam`s God-given partial knowledge of the unseen. It should be stated that those verses negating this knowledge of the beings other than God are not absolute; they negate independent knowledge of the unseen from creatures. Surely essential knowledge of the unseen belongs only to God. This negation does not disagree with prophet or Imams knowledge of the unseen permitted by God.

On the issue of the possibility of seeing God in some authentic hadith books of the Imamiyah, There is a hadith attributed to Imam Reza (p.b.u.h) according to which the association of seeing God with faith in him in this world and the hereafter is considered forbidden. Shiite thinkers have listed this hadith as one of the difficult and ambiguous hadiths and have tried to explain its meaning; But the problems that are noticed in their explanations indicate their inaccuracy. According to the intellectual foundations of the theologians of the time of Imam Reza (p.b.u.h), an innovative solution can be proposed based on the opposition of “obligation to faith” and “occurrence of essential knowledge”. And the conflict between “seeing God” and “believing in Him” can be seen as related to the mentioned opposition. According to the intellectual foundations of the theologians of the time of Imam Reza (p.b.u.h), an innovative solution can be proposed based on the opposition of “obligation to faith” and “occurrence of essential knowledge”. And the conflict between “seeing God” and “believing in Him” can be seen as related to the mentioned opposition. But this solution is not without problems; therefore, as stated by some thinkers, the attribution of this hadith to the Imam should be negated, at least in the way it appears in the hadith sources; especially, its content is in conflict with some verses of the Qur’an and some hadiths.

The Social factors in mathematical and logical knowledge The "Strong Programme" in the sociology of scientific knowledge is known by Edinburgh school and the relativistic approach of this school. According to their attitude all things accounted as "knowledge", have causes that make them acceptable in the society; no matter they are right or wrong. And the sociologists have to find these causes. This program, despite weaker programs that exclude scientific knowledge, is based on the idea that social factors have a role in the formation of empirical scientific knowledge, and even mathematics and logic -- types of essential knowledge. In this article we are trying to introduce and explain Edinburgh school's thought on logic and mathematics. So, first of all we will introduce the intellectual foundations of this school, and then we will try to explain briefly its main approaches with respect to sociological aspects in mathematics and knowledge. Then we will focus on the most important and outstanding case studies and their appraisal. Finally we will bring forward some points about their theoretical approaches and present some conclusions that seem to be drawn from this discussion.

Some Quranic verses indicate knowledge of the unseen to belong only to God; while according to some others, such ability has been also given to some special people. Commentators for solving the problem have noticed the matter that what is meant by knowledge during the age of messengership and after that includes essential knowledge not accidental and the claim for such knowledge means Divinity. In this way undoubtedly many differences between God and servants remain in its place. It is not, therefore, reasonable to view messengers as being of knowledge of the unseen; because such a belief would be equal to polytheism. In this way, it becomes clear that God`s knowledge differs with that of servants. The former is essentially and the latter accidentally bestowed upon servants.

Phronesis or practical wisdom is one of the intellectual virtues which Aristotle has defined as a predisposition for continuously becoming involved in practice while thinking wisely about good and evil affairs. The outcome of this predisposition or phronetic act is the product of a kind of philosophical thinking which, in addition to viewing certain established principles, attends to madīna (polis) as a cradle for the development of acts; to finite, particular, and changing affairs as the subject of knowledge, and to Man as a free agent. The irregularity and, at the same time, legitimacy of phronesis provides individuals with a strategy not to surrender to fixed and strict scientific laws as the only legitimate tools of knowledge acquisition. Through making a methodological distinction between sophia or theoretical wisdom and phronesis, Aristotle has in fact founded the independence and irreducibility of practico-ethical knowledge about what is correct; practical deliberation cannot be reduced to logical arguments. In Aristotle’s ethical philosophy, accidental knowledge, as the knowledge of finite, particular, possible, and changing affairs, is a complement to essential knowledge, which pertains to pre-eternal and universal affairs and primal and fixed basic principles. Sophia and phronesis can lead to happiness only in case they function as the two sides of the same coin.

Bada' (appearance) is one of the most important Shiite doctrines, and a true understanding of this doctrine in the light of theology, prophetology and imamology help answer the questions raised in the regard by testifying divine will and infallible Imam's knowledge of the Unseen. Citing transmitted and intellectual proofs, the present paper criticizes the charges made by Nasser Al-Qefari, a Wahhabi scholar, and proves that the idea of using Bada' by which is confirmed by Shiite scholars dispels such notions like attributing ignorance to God, superiority of the Holy Prophet's household over the Creator or Imam's position extreme. The use of Bada' by God has a figurative meaning; that is, its occurrence contained in the Tablet of Effacement and Affirmation in which predestinations are recorded and is associate with God's active knowledge. God's essential knowledge which is eternal and unchangeable contained in the Protected Tablet with God. Furthermore, Imam's knowledge of the Unseen has toots in and due to the clear difference between God's knowledge of the Unseen and that of Imam's in quality and quantity there is no indication of attributing superiority to Imams. The historical stories to which Qefari refers are contradictory and not reliable.

In this paper we will discuss whether God has knowledge in the level of his essence and we will compare Plotinus''s and Sadra''s views on this problem. Plotinus''s approach is completely different from that of Mulla Sadra. Plotinus does not represent any clear and specific argument for the essential knowledge of God. But he does not attribute ignorance to God at his essence level، and based on his negative theology concerning the «One»، he accepts that God possesses a kind of witness at this level. On the other hand، Mulla Sadra initiates a new method discussing God''s knowledge and represents several arguments in this relation. In the final step we can find a kind of similarity between these two thinkers in attributing a sort of knowledge by presence to God.

According to Mulla Sadra in his famous work، al-Asfar، God’s pre-knowledge is a set of epistemic forms which are (1) inseparable from His essence، (2) uncreated، (3) beyond the universe، (4) devoid of real possibility، (5) eternal per se، and (6) extant by His extance. Tabatabayi in Nihayat al-Hilmah believes that the term، “inseparable”، in (1) does not mean “out of essence”; otherwise، (1) would contradict (2) - (6). Furthermore، if the epistemic forms were out of God’s essence، then if they were known by presence، the theory of Ideas would be true، and if they were known by acquisition، the theory of “depicted Forms” would be true، while both of them are rejected by Mulla Sadra. Tabatabayi، therefore، says that these epistemic forms are identical with God’s essence، and that pre-knowledge in Mulla Sadra’s view is the same as God’s essential knowledge of the details of creature. In my opinion، but، this claim and its arguments، both، are incorrect، because the mentioned epistemic forms، in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy، are identical with abstract intellects which have all six properties without any contradiction. Again، Mulla Sadra، in contrary to Tabatabayi’s strange claim، believes in the existence of Ideas as thesauruses of divine pre-knowledge.