Wisdom, and consequently, philosophy as the symbol of rationality, is one of most important components of the formation of religious epistemology in the bilateral relationship of wisdom and narration. In this regard, enumerating revelation, wisdom, and heart intuition and discovery as means to religious knowledge, and using these three, Allameh Tabataba'i has tried to create a unitary approach in the area of religious knowledge. But, introducing separation and inventing terms like self-founded religious wisdom and treasured wisdom, Mr. Hakimi tries to imply independence of religious texts from philosophical understanding. It is attempted to study this issue through a library method and a comparison of the works of these two. Findings indicate a lack of correspondence between the two viewpoints and the approaches taken. Hakimi is found to fight and avoid philosophy as much as Tabataba’i is found to be a philosopher and practitioner of philosophy in the area of religious teachings, such that Hakimi emphasizes self-efficacy and argumentation of the appearances of religious texts and rejects any philosophical inquiry in religious texts.

The question of what kind of intellect is in Tafkikian is one of the most important issues. Comparing the views of the two influential characters in the Tafkik school is that Isfahani regards mind as an abstract individual, in contradiction to science and philosophy, and with other sensible ones. It is a fact that discontinuity and certainty are valid if they produce the acquired knowledge. Also, the belief in the intellect and the knowledge of both knowledge is similar to the Asharite's view. Hakimi, however, believes that there is no equality between the philosophical and theological sciences with the divine teachings, and in the event of a conflict between reason and appearance, he does not interpret the meaning and does not convey the power of reason. The essence of the perception of the eternal will be on the rational and original wisdom of the religious foundation. Their opinions differ in the method of using intellect and intellect.

Popularization domain has also covered the scientific theories and among them, theories of popularized ethics have emerged. Focusing on human mind and its independence, popularized ethics simply takes human mind, rather than religion, as the ultimate reference of ethical criteria as well as the norms governing the human characteristics and behavior. Rejecting the religious ethics, Adel Zaher, Arab-decent contemporary scholar, sees the epistemological foundation of ethics in human independent mind. For him, ethics is logically independent of religion and it is possible to achieve the epistemological foundation without religious knowledge. He attempts to deny the claim that religious epistemology is prior to ethical epistemology and dependency of the latter to the former. Enumerating the theories viewing religion to be dependent on ethics and, consequently, ethics popularized, this paper intends to analyze and criticize Adel Zaher’s viewpoint of popularized ethics.

Law is a concept that has a long history in western thought. Even with all of the intellectual-cultural upheavals that have taken place in the western world from ancient times till the modern era, it has always retained its importance and centrality [in the totality of knowledge]. In modern thought, law changed along with the fundamental changes that occurred in the relation between modern man and the world. This was such that the subject became the foundation of the world and everything else became the object of this subject. In this relation, law took on a new meaning. Better than anyone, Kant, one of the greatest philosophers of modern thought, depicted the concept of modern law under the topic of the relation of the subject with the world. According to Kant, with its subjective law, the practical intellect delineates the will. Thus, the intellect delineates and legislates. This delineation is the very concept of freedom in the modern interpretation of this term. Therefore, modern law is autonomous. In the creation of the practical law, it is necessary for the intellect to assume its existence. This understanding of the law is completely different from the common meaning of the term that is popular in our legal circles today. An analysis of it is important in the understanding of our relation with modern law, especially in the delineation of the place of law in foundations of religious thought.

Ayatollah Javadi Amoli’s theory on the religious knowledge is one of the most significant theories articulated in recent decades. Whether we agree or disagree with the elements of this theory entirely, it is inevitable for the scholars to analyze and speculate its contexts. This theory illustrates the shortcomings of modern sciences, specifying the pillars of religious knowledge. This theory is based on three principles: science unavoidably is bounded by the philosophical presuppositions; the sciences are separated from each other by their subjects; and the intellect is one of the resources of religion and of the religious sciences. The important thing which has been mostly neglected is that although this theory is new and creative, but his theory and principles are rooted in Allameh Tabatabai’s intellectual school. This article attempts to explain this issue and to illustrate how Allameh Tabatabai has influenced Ayatollah Javadi Amoli. At this article, three principles of the theory will be explained while its critics are deferred to another article.

Since the beginning of philosophical thought until Kant, the faculty of theoretical reason was deemed the foundation of the faculty of practical reason. One influential philosopher in the West, working on practical reason and morality, was Henry Bergson–the French philosopher. In his intellectual system, perception is reinterpreted as the first result of action and reaction, and the human image with the external world, action, and the faculty of practical reason are viewed as having primacy over theoretical reasoning. The result of this fundamental turn is manifested in Bergson’s ethics. Given the predominant atmosphere in Bergson’s period, this modern philosopher is concerned with the revival of the moral and axiological human, elaborating his ethics in two realms: social ethics under “closed morality” and “human open morality.” In his close morality, he tries to correct errors in Kant’s deontological ethics, opening the path to the flourishing of a new ethics in terms of prominent models as moral models. Bergson rejects autonomous reason as the foundation of morality. In his account of open morality, he establishes it upon an evolved rationality, which reaches passion and consciousness in its creative development and reconnection with life, and can guide the human to acquisition of genuine knowledge.

An epistemological contemplation on the theological disputes of Imam al-Reza (AS) with the approach of examining the confrontation of religion and reason shows that, by confirming the function of reason before and after the religious faith and emphasizing on its role in rejecting or accepting the religious beliefs, he allowed the critical analysis and examination of the religious beliefs. Without considering the rational reasons as contradictory to faith in God, he regarded them as effective in examining the religious beliefs. Nevertheless he admits the limitedness of reason in decisive proving the religious beliefs and, considering this point, he proceeds to prove the religious beliefs. By comprising three current approaches in the western thought that is maximum rationalism, fideism and critical rationalism with the theological disputes of Imam al-Reza (AS), one can see the nearness of the approach of Imam al-Reza (AS) with critical rationalism that at the same time that confirms the possibility of rational criticism and examination of the religious beliefs, in contradiction to the maximum rationalists doesn’t want to decisively prove them and convince all others.

Methodology of understanding of religious texts is among the fundamental issues of methodology in religious studies in that what tools, approaches and strategies could be used to understand religious texts. In the meantime, reason is of particular relevance. Regarding the function of reason to understand religious texts, there has always been disagreement among Islamic thinkers including contextualists and rationalists. For contextualists, in understanding the sacred texts, reason does not receive much validity. Unlike them, rationalists maintain authority and validity for it. Does Ghazali apply rationalism approach in understanding religious texts or contextualism approach? In terms of methodology, there seems to be conflict between these two views i.e. one cannot be inclined to contextualism and accept rationalism simultaneously. What is the way to unite these two approaches? Ghazali is among the thinkers who unite these two approaches. This paper examines Ghazalis integration method.