In recent decades, the concept and nature of international security has been evolved through the emergence of terrorist non-State actors and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) so that access to WMD by such non-State actors has become a serious threat for the international community. The lack of provisions in international documents on the prevention of WMD to deal with such threat has made the international community to take special steps in preventing access to WMD by terrorist non-State actors. Notwithstanding these international efforts has not resulted in complete removal of supervisory challenges regarding such non-State actors. In this framework, this paper, using descriptive and analytical method, examines supervisory challenges in prevention of terrorist non-State access to WMD and concludes that the removal of these challenges requires globalization of international obligations, universal and complete co-ordination and co-operation among States, international organs and organisations and the managers of the respective industries in standardization of securing the WMD related materials and supervision over their establishment. As an essential strategy, adoption of a special and comprehensive international convention on the prevention of terrorist non-State actors to access WMD has been suggested in this paper.

Nongovernmental public institutions are those institutions whih have been founded after the Islamic Revolution as well as recognized by the Iranian Public Audit Act. Considering differences of legal regimes between government departments and nongovernmental institutions, discussions have been raised whether they are governmental or non-governmental organizations sine their establishment. This ambiguity which is arising from the title as well as codition of supplying more than fifty percent of their budget from non-governmental financial sources has made it difficult to discern the nature as well as legal ruling regime over these institutes. This Ambiguity has been sometimes led to a growing tendency to create a legal entity of (under) public law in the form of a nongovernmental public organization.The elimination ambiguity from nature of these institutions is one of the requirements for administrative health promotion as well as combating  corruption. The paper is seeking to answer two main questions which are arisen through using descriptive-analytical research method Are the nature of nongovernmental public institutions ambigious? As well as what are the meaning and purpose of "Non-governmental" term? At first, legal components of these institutions are explained. Then, different attitudes towards theses institutrions' legal nature are analyzed. Finally, we investigate three examples of these institutions. These institutions are neither exactly similar to legal entities of private law nor perfectly compliant about legal norms and constituents of the state bodies. In fact, they have a combination of the constituents and criteria which constitute government agencies as well as legal entities of private law; the situation that puts them among these institutions. The identification of an independent sector called the "Non-Governmental Public Sector" needs consideration for specific rules and regulations governing them as well as avoidance of any ambiguity in their nature, circumstances and legal system.

The jurisdiction of the Administrative Justice Court chambers regarding complaints about the actions and decisions of public non-governmental institutions (PNGOs) has been a contentious issue within the Iranian administrative justice system. Currently, Article 10 of the 2013 Law of the Administrative Justice Court (amended in 2023) raises doubts about the Court's ability to handle complaints against PNGOs beyond municipalities and social security organizations, as explicitly mentioned in the article.This descriptive-analytical research seeks to answer the question: "What is the ideal model for the Administrative Justice Court chambers to oversee decisions and actions of PNGOs?" It aims to clarify the extent of the chambers' competence in dealing with such complaints.Based on the investigation, current practice suggests that the chambers cannot handle complaints from PNGOs. Under present circumstances, the Court can only hear complaints about the decisions and actions of PNGOs specified in Article 10(1)(a) of the Law, those with a revolutionary nature, and those designated by special laws for judicial supervision by the Court.The research findings argue that this approach contradicts the original intent of the legislator as reflected in Article 173 of the Constitution, which uses the term "government units." It also clashes with the developmental approach adopted in the 2012 Law of the Administrative Justice Court. Therefore, the authors propose that the Court chambers modify their procedures to allow for handling complaints against all PNGOs, based on the evidence presented.

Rationale for Expanding Jurisdiction:

Article 173 of the Constitution establishes the framework for the Administrative Justice Court's jurisdiction within the Iranian legal system. This article serves as the foundation for the Court's existence, granting it the authority to address public grievances concerning officials, government units, or regulations.While the term "non-governmental" appears in the title "public non-governmental institutions," these entities are still considered part of the governing body within the country's administrative system. The term "non-governmental" should not mislead us regarding their role and benefit from public authorities. In reality, all PNGOs are dependent elements within the administrative structure. They are categorized as "non-governmental" only due to specific administrative needs, such as a lack of technical, local, or professional concentration.If the legal system acknowledges that PNGOs exercise some governance functions, it must recognize them as part of the "government" concept and subject to the Administrative Justice Court's oversight as the general authority for judicial supervision.

Expanding Jurisdiction Through Legislative Interpretation:

From a parliamentary law perspective, with a developmental view of the Court's jurisdiction, the chambers' authority should not be limited to the PNGOs specified in Article 10(1)(a). Instead, it should encompass all PNGOs, including those with arevolutionary nature and those designated by special laws.The argument hinges on the fact that Article 10 initially refers to "decisions and actions of government units" before listing specific authorities under its purview. This term "government units" undoubtedly reflects the concept of "government" used in Article 173. Therefore, the arguments presented for the meaning of "government" in Article 173 also apply here, and it could be interpreted broadly (encompassing the ruling class). Furthermore, the word "including" in the mentioned section suggests that the listed PNGOs are illustrative examples, and all PNGOs should fall under the Court chambers' jurisdiction.

Critique of the 2023 Amendment Process:

For the aforementioned reasons, the Administrative Justice Court chambers should amend their procedures to allow for overseeing all PNGOs. Critically, the legislator's approach to the 2023 amendment process raises concerns. Despite the identified problems and numerous amendments made to the 2013 Law, the legislator avoided amending Articles 10 and 12, which define the chambers' and the Court's general jurisdiction. This omission was likely due to considerations such as avoiding delays in getting the amendments passed by the Council of Expediency. Consequently, the ambiguities and problems identified in these articles remain.It was anticipated that Article 10, similar to Article 12, would explicitly grant jurisdiction over all PNGOs to the chambers. This would have provided the necessary legal basis for amending the existing procedures in this area.

While much ink has been spilled to Iran's regional policy, the majority of these analyses, either intuitively or deliberately, build their explanation on the so-called ‘Persian-Shia offensive intentions’. Conversely, the present paper seeks the roots of Iran's regional policy in its specific geography and history. From this perspective, Iran’s regional policy is inseparable from its geopolitical strategies. To shed light on these strategies, the paper begins with the rise of the Persian Achaemenid until the establishment of the Islamic Republic, focusing on major driving forces behind Iran’s regional policy and strategies. The paper elaborates on a foundational concept of ‘strategic loneliness’, as Iran’s permanent feature, by highlighting the country’s curse of geography and its long- standing historical insecurity. In following, it shows the consequential impact of Iran’s strategic loneliness for the country’s non-state foreign policymaking strategic connections with military non-state actors—in the containment of its regional enemies. The paper ultimately argues that while this policy has kept Iran’s national integrity and security while entrapped the country in a durable ‘geopolitical predicament’ and deepened regional crisis in the Middle East

The present paper engages intimately with Iran’s connections with its proxies through adopting an ‘analytical process-tracing narrative.’ The strength of this narrative lies in its potential to generate a conceptual framework organically and incrementally along the unifying theme. As Alexander George and Andrew Bennett argue, analytical process-tracing is a tool in extrapolating a case study’s “explanation into a generalization.” Process tracing will allow me to capture the dynamics of change and the causal mechanisms behind these changes within the evolution of the subject under study. Put differently, in the analytical process-tracing an otherwise atheoretical narrative presented “in the form of a chronicle that purports to throw light on how an event came about” is embedded into “an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical terms.”

Iran’s specific geography and historical insecurity are integral elements and dimensions of regional policy and strategy. In addition to its geostrategic location and geographical proximity to the threat sources, Iran’s geographical vulnerability and its lack of natural defense impediments have shaped the country’s fate of territorial occupation and military encirclement for more than twenty-five centuries. This fact has nourished and galvanized Iran’s historical insecurity. The final product is Iran’s strategic loneliness. For a country with a deep sense of greatness, Iran’s strategic loneliness pushes the country to take a dynamic geopolitical strategy—namely, non-state foreign policy—to preserve its national security and territorial integrity. Indeed, the very logic of geography and history reveals the fact that Iran’s ultimate deterrence capabilities have been mainly predicated on its ability for the external power projection (Reisinezhad, 2016). Nonetheless, the lack of regional collective security institutions and pact(s) has trembled the credibility of this geopolitical strategy. Although Iran’s non-state foreign policy has been partially effective in keeping the country’s security safe, it has weakened Iran’s financial sources and, more significantly, entrapped the country in a durable offensive-defensive complex. It is Iran’s durable geopolitical predicament. Iran’s specific geography and history have crucially shaped its geopolitical strategy. However, it should be important to disentangle the argument from geographical and historical ‘determinism’. At first glance, putting emphasis on these two factors opens door for fatalism while ignores human agency. Geography and history by no means determine state’s approaches to use military force and regional strategies. In reality, human agency matters since it is men who decide and take action. There are still historical instances wherein men overcame the dictates of geography and unchained historical patterns. Nevertheless, “in the long run, those who are working in harmony with environmental influences will triumph over those who strive against them” (Parker and Mackinder, 1982: 121). Indeed, geography and historical trends limit human choices by constraining or instigating states’ actions. To be more precise, geography and history provides a framework within which geopolitical strategy is formulated and implemented. They set contours on which trajectory and path is achievable and which is not. As Robert D. Kaplan cogently argues, “the more we remain preoccupied with Iran’s specific geography and history have crucially shaped its geopolitical strategy. However, it should be important to disentangle the argument from geographical and historical ‘determinism’. At first glance, putting emphasis on these two factors opens door for fatalism while ignores human agency. Geography and history by no means determine state’s approaches to use military force and regional strategies. In reality, human agency matters since it is men who decide and take action. There are still historical instances wherein men overcame the dictates of geography and unchained historical patterns. Nevertheless, “in the long run, those who are working in harmony with environmental influences will triumph over those who strive against them” (Parker and Mackinder, 1982: 121). Indeed, geography and historical trends limit human choices by constraining or instigating states’ actions. To be more precise, geography and history provides a framework within which geopolitical strategy is formulated and implemented. They set contours on which trajectory and path is achievable and which is not. As Robert D. Kaplan cogently argues, “the more we remain preoccupied with current events, the more that individuals and their choices matter; but the more we look out over the span of the centuries, the more that geography plays a role (Kaplan, 2012: 28). Therefore, a balance between geography and history, on the one side, and the decisions and actions of men, on the other side, matter for a deeper analysis of Iran’s regional policy. In short, geography and history imprison Iranian leaders and delimit, rather than determine, their choices and opportunities for regional maneuver. The ideas emerge and vanish, the leaders are born and then die; but what remains durably is Iran’s geography and history!

For more than half century, Iran’s connections with its proxies have been the country’s pivotal geopolitical strategy crafted to contain regional and global threats. In contrast to the mainstream view, this strategy is rooted less in Iran’s revolutionary ideology rather than its specific geography and history. The paper shows that Iran’s strategic loneliness is a very historical product of its specific geography and history. It also argued how Iran’s geopolitical strategy has intensified its geopolitical predicament and entrapped the country in the offensive-defensive complex. Within this situation, regional cooperation in several domains, particularly the conflict resolution processes, is vital and necessary for Iran’s regional policy. The establishment of a path-dependent bilateral or multilateral security institution(s) with regional states would be crucial for the stability of the Middle East. As the regional tensions spiraling out of control, building comprehensive collective security with tripartite power centers of Tehran-Ankara-Riyadh would deescalate geopolitical competition in the Middle East.While it is a major driving force for the country’s power projection beyond its borders, strategic loneliness sets Iran’s center of gravity within its internal territory. Relying on the inside shows that Iran’s center of gravity has predicated on ‘state-society relation’; rather than on strategic alliance with whether the Great Powers or non-state actors. In other words, Iran’s strategic loneliness shows intrinsic and independent foundations of Iran’s national security. Within this context, popular support and legitimacy are the most crucial and vital assets for a country whose borders have been historically bloody frontier zone. It was this very fact ignored by the last Shah of Iran.