نشریه مطالعات تاریخی جنگ
سال چهارم شماره 2 (تابستان 1399)

By virtue of the Iranian Constitution, Islamic Consultative Assembly enjoys some authorities in the foreign policy of the country. As such, along with institutions including the Leadership and the Supreme Council of National Security and the government, it can be influential in foreign policy. One of the most important political events which made the country and particularly the Islamic Consultative Assembly involved in the events after the end of the war between Iran and Iraq is Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Considering the importance of this issue, this paper is an attempt to deal with the role and approach of the Islamic Consultative Assembly in this regard. Hence, the problem addressed is the effect of the Iranian parliamant on Iran's way of deciding on the issue of war. It is an attempt to investigate the parliamentary positions taking a descriptive- analytical approach. The results show that the existence of institutions, such as the Supreme Council of National Security and the government with special authorities in foreign policy, the specialized nature of political issues, the scarcity of experienced forces and the slowness of the decision-making process in the parliament due to structural features as well as the separation between the parliament and the government in investigating the issue led to a lack of serious influence of the parliament.

The methodical rereading of the ayahs of Jihad, with the aim of identifying the discourse of the Qur’an and engaging in a new reading of these ayahs using approaches such as the theory of speech act, allows researchers to look at their research problems from different angles and explore the invisible aspects of the text. Accordingly, in the present study, which has been conducted by a descriptive-analytical method, we seek to find out the results of the analysis of the ayahs of Jihad based on the theory of speech act. The findings indicate that Searle's five types of speech acts, based on the frequency of repetition, in the ayahs of Jihad are representative, directive, declarative, expressive and commissive acts. In these ayahs, God has explained Jihad and fighting by using various verb types such as condition, correction, explanation and clarification, and has informed the audience about the aspects of Jihad. The high frequency of representative acts of reasoning, describing, informing, clarifying, defining, explaining, affirming, etc. on the one hand suggests that the divine will is consistent with the discourse of guidance and promotes the understanding of the audience, and on the other hand, it shows that the speaker wants to tell the audience about the reason of fighting before the fighting itself.

The wars that Prophet Muhammad (SAW) did not personally fight but appointed commanders to lead the battles are called Sariyya. Early sources have cited 36 Sariyyas during the prophet's age, whose functions can be broadly divided into offensive, defensive, propaganda, and intelligence. The commanders of these wars were elected with regard to the Prophet (SAW)'s goals. The present descriptive-analytical study tries to investigate the process and reasons of electing the commanders given the features and the nature of Sariyyas in order to shed light on the approach adopted by the Prophet (SAW). The findings of this study show that in electing commanders, the Prophet (SAW) not only considered military and political points, but also paid attention to religious and tribal facts. He elected commanders from among the Muhajirun and their tribes and the Ansar and Medina' tribes. People elected as commanders by him were trustworthy and militarily-capable.

Numerous structural, political, economic, and tactical factors were involved in the strengths and weaknesses of the Safavid military forces, each of which requiring a separate evaluation opportunity. The present article focuses solely on the role and influence of the tactical factor in the military achievements and failures of the Safavids. Using a historical (descriptive-analytical) method, it tries to discuss the combat tactics used by the Safavid army and the role of these methods in the Safavid military defeats and victories. The findings show that the Safavids mainly chose their war tactics based on time and space requirements, offensive or defensive positions, number of troops and military equipment and other conditions. The most important of these tactics were regular warfare, irregular warfare, castle warfare, urban battle, and destruction of resources. Although the Safavids were generally successful in adopting the best war method, sometimes superior military methods of the enemy and some miscalculations by the Safavids, and consequently adopting inappropriate war method imposed huge costs to the country and the government in various respects.

With the intention of retaking Samarkand, the Battle of LAY occurred at the bank of Chirchiq River on the first of Ramadan in 766 AH between Ilyas Khoja, the ruler of Chagatai Ulus, and the army of Amir Husayn and Amir Timur Gurkani. One year before that, Amir Husayn and Amir Timur fought against Ilyas Khoja's troops near Kash city. In this battle, Ilyas Khoja was defeated and fled but Ilyas Khoja moblized an army to retaliate this defeat and came to Transoxiana in order to retake Samarkand. While describing the Battle of LAY and the interaction between Amir Husayn and Timur, this descriptive-analytical article tried to answer the question of how the development of disagreement between the two commanders after the war led to Timur's rise to power and the ruling of Samarkand. The results evaluates how East Mongols achieved victory in this battle as a result of the disagreement between the amirs of the West army, and the significance of the Battle of LAY in the destiny of Amir Timur and the political future of  Transoxiana.

The emergence of the Samanids in 287/900 followed the success of war in battle with the Saffarids, the Alawids of Tabarestan and some Turk’s tribes bordering the eastern of Khorasan and Transoxiana. However, the intensification of the arrogance of the armies from the fourth century disrupted the court affairs and governance of the Samanid government and made the ministers and the court obey the sword. The main question of this study is if the invasions of the Qarakhanids caused the collapse of the Samanids or the engendered stability of the Ghaznavid Turks? The findings of the study show that if we assume the fall of the Samanids as a blow from the commanders of Ale-Afrasiab, undoubtedly the bedrock of this collapse should be considered in the preparations of the Ghaznavid generals to eliminate the Iranian Samanids. The fall of Bukhara by the Qarakhanids was really influenced by the fall of Neishabour by the Ghaznavids. This problem of this study concerns the consolidation and strengthening of the Ghaznavids, not the Qarakhanids' invasions. It was the greed of the Ghaznavids that was aroused by the invasions of the Qarakhanids and provided the final excuse for the removal of the Samanids. Even the jurists of Transoxiana gradually confirmed the rule of the Ghaznavids. The Qatawan peace treaty clearly realized the real division of power between the Qarakhanids and the Ghaznavids on both sides of the Oxus. The research method is analytical-descriptive and documented to the main sources of the fourth and fifth centuries.