نشریه فقه و حقوق خصوصی
پیاپی 5 (بهار و تابستان 1399)

Justice and injustice are two influential and highly debated issues in human schools of thought. One key discussion in this regard, is the role the concept of injustice can play in the procedures related to inference of the religious rules. This paper intends to clarify the role of injustice in this procedure. Based on the dictionaries, especially those belonging to the immediate post-Revelation period, injustice means “trespassing limits”. It also means the same in religious texts, the Holy Quran in particular. On this basis, in jurisprudential inference, injustice takes place whenever one trespasses the limits specified by the legislator. The valid limits in jurisprudence are the same specified by the legislator as well as the rational and common limits based on which the legislator has set the limits or avoided prohibition. Consequently, injustice is a criterion at work throughout the totality of jurisprudence and legal inference. Two major roles have been considered for injustice: First, in cases where attribution of something or reasoning is in incompatibility with general guidelines of Sharia law, it can restrict reason or dissuade the case. Second, it can serve as a proof of judgment in jurisprudential ramifications and newly raised issues.

The condition of banning Halal and authorizing of Haram is one of the most important discussions in Imamiya jurisprudence. Jurists consider the proviso enforceable in case the condition does not ban Halal nor authorize Haram. There is difference of opinion among them on conceptual authority in discerning the condition of banning Halal and authorizing Haram. Some jurists like Sheikh Ansari are of the opinion that the condition leading to authorization of an unchangeable rule on Haram and banning an unchangeable rule on Halal, shall be considered an instance of banning Halal and authorizing of Haram. Some other jurists, like Mohaqeq Yazdi and Nayini believe that the verdicts must first be divided into mandatory and conditional rules before expressing any authorization or banning. In mandatory rules, the late Naraqi – like Sheikh Ansari – only considers commitment to unchangeable rules (Wajib or religiously obligatory act and Haram or religiously forbidden) against the Book and Sunnah or tradition, however, commitment to act or avoid to act in permissible rules is allowed. Also, he says any change in conditional rules by setting a condition is against the Sharia law. Some other jurists, like Imam Khomeini, have resorted to the common law in expressing the quality of authority in its discernment.

The issuance and delivery of commercial papers do not mean fulfilment of payments or extinction of previous obligations; rather, it is with the hand-over of the commercial papers that both obligations under the commercial papers are met and the original obligations become extinct. Although commercial papers bear obligation per se, until before payments for commercial papers are made, the criterion for action will be original obligations. There is, of course, difference of opinion among jurists on this rule, while it has been confirmed in the majority of the legal systems. However, there is another theory stipulating that issuing a commercial paper and handing it over to the creditor suffices for extinction of original obligations. The proponents of this theory believe in the “substitution of commercial papers”. Although they accept the fact that a commercial paper means ‘commitment to pay’ not ‘payment per se’, they believe that the obligation coming from the commercial paper shall be replaced with the original obligation, suggesting that somehow a shift of obligation takes place.

The role commercial papers play in transactions and economic relations is this that they are appropriate substitutes for cash in payments. Along with easy, fast and safe transfer and turn-over, they guarantee the rights of the owner as well. Realization of this will be possible when obligations of the signatories of the papers are expressed absolutely and clearly, not conditioned to anything else. The prerequisites calling for unconditionality of commercial papers are considered among the fundamentals of this principle, which we have studied in this paper in two sections of “legal requirements” (the need for using commercial papers instead of cash, the need for meeting speed, ease and security in carrying and transfer of commercial papers and the need for protecting the rights of the commercial paper owners) and “jurisprudential requirements” (exigency of protecting property and preventing disruption in economic system).

In this paper, we have first tried to define coma and then compare it with general anesthesia and brain death by resorting to the opinions of the jurists and latest medical findings. Unlike common belief, coma is not a disease; rather, it is a prolonged state of unconsciousness that results from damage to the person’s brain. In this paper, we will investigate the nature of coma and compare and contrast it with similar states of unconsciousness in the science of jurisprudence and law. The most important outcome of this study and the aforesaid comparison and contrast will emerge in the answer to the following question: What state of life is “the person in coma” in? There is an in-depth relation between humans’ life and death on one side and jurisprudence and law on the other side, in the sense that some rules are only applicable to death and the dead person while on the contrary, there are rules that are applicable to the person as long as he is alive and become inapplicable with the passing away of the person. Therefore, a precise examination of the concepts of life and death will be inevitable toward realizing the purpose of this paper.

Transaction with right of restitution refers to any supplementary and commutative contract in which the assignor reserves the right for himself to reject consideration and restitute transferred property. In view of the law on registration of deeds and real estates, transaction with right of restitution is a combined contract of rendable property and mortgage. There are, however, differences between transaction with right of restitution and mortgage including this that the contract interests belongs to the transferee in the transaction with the right of restitution while corpus interests of the mortgaged property belong to the mortgagee. By virtue of Article 324 of the law on registration of deeds and real estates and the existing precedent, all the benefits belong to the purchaser and given religious rules and regulations, this stipulation is the same as the debt interest. However, if we ignore the right of the purchaser to collect interests, given the degree of inflation and devaluation of money, we have equally ignored commutative justice in his case. Therefore, belongingness of the interests to him seems to be possible via bartering and realization of relative balance.