مجله تاملات فلسفی
پیاپی 27 (پاییز و زمستان 1400)

Nowadays, human capital is considered as the most important asset for the development of institutions, organizations and firms. Researchers have found that the enhancement of individual authenticity is the base for socially improvement of spontaneous innovation, founding significant cultural progress and consequently influential industry, entrepreneurship and economy. Strengthening of human capital get obtained when individuals get enhanced spiritually. Indeed, virtue and moral ethics of the authentic individual is the most important factor for the emergence of idea novelty and pragmatic potentials of innovative forces. Applied approach to the authenticity of the creative individuals and ethics create competitive advantages in the institution, because it reduces moral vices and even before the law, eliminates corruption and ensures the health of the administrative apparatus. In this article it is descriptively and interpretively discussed how an authentic individual, in the bed of institutions and by playing a role in the implementation of top-down and bottom-up policies, can express his innovative talents in order to achieve major progress. Also, the role of formal institutions in serving, setting disciplines and providing a healthy supportive environment for the activities of the authentic individual and as well the role of informal institutions as facilitators of participation of lower level actors has been described. At the end, it has been concluded how innovation, meritocracy, livelihood prosperous and economic justice will be prevailed through enhancing virtue enrichment of individuals.

The present study uses an analytical-descriptive method to explain the relationship between philosophy and religion in Boethius’ Christology. For this purpose, three things are done in the Theological Treatises as a representative of Boethius' theological views: 1. Determining and explaining the theological problem that Boethius sought to answer in Christology. 2. Explain components such as: rational explanation of "Trinity" with the help of the category of relation, precise definition of "person" and "nature" in the issue of "Trinity", Demonstrating the intellectual and narrative weakness of the views of Euthychius and Nestorius, as well as emphasizing the distinction between nature and the person through whom Boethius solves the problem. 3. Boethius' final answer to this theological question. In the Consolation of Philosophy as the representative of Boethius' philosophy, we seek to examine two issues: 1. Does this treatise, as some have claimed, lack any Christian symbolism or teaching? 2. Does Boethius explicitly question Christian teachings in this treatise, or does he not merely explicitly refer to Christianity? Examining these cases, it was concluded that in the Theological Treatises, Boethius saw the Christian faith in a rational explanation in agreement with reason; in the Consolation of Philosophy he saw no need to refer directly to Christian teachings; he seeks the salvation of reason, and this has no conflict with his Christian faith.

In the “phenomenology of the spirit”, there is evidence of absolute Identify as divine order. For Hegel, the divine order has a rational essence; therefore, the infinite divine order must be present in a finite being in order for the spirit to realize itself in the world. This movement of the spirit appears in “natural religion” and in parallel in symbolic art. “Plant Sculptures” are the first embodied form of the divine order. This primitive form is first shown as simple “columns” on which the least “work” has been done. These columns are mainly architectural components. Independent plant Sculptures are rarely found, because at this step the spirit is not free and its knowledge of itself is limited to the knowledge of plants. There are innocent in “plants religion” who lost with the onset of animal life and the resulting struggle and dynamism. With the end of natural religion and symbolic art, plant Sculpture continue to be repeal “Aufhebung” form in religions and the art of later periods. Plant religion is the beginning of the expression of the divine commandment embodied in religions.

The development of computer science- especially in the field of artificial intelligence - led to the formation of digital theology. Digital theology saw all the phenomena of the universe from the perspective of computer science. Frank Tippler explains the bodily resurrection by presenting omega point theory and a digital definition of human And tries to reconcile it with religious teachings - especially Christianity. This article explains and evaluates the omega point theory according to the basics.The conclusion is that this view is not based on solid foundations. Fundamentals such as the singularity of technology are flawed and the final principle of entropy is not scientific. This theory - contrary to Christian teachings - is atheistic and leads to incorrect results and supplies such as the negation of divine attributes. The omega point in justifying the wisdom of the resurrection and explanation of the purgatory world, the reward and the eagle of the hereafter are powerless.

By paying attention to the correspondence between the levels of existence and the levels of perception in Suhrawardi's thought, a new definition of science can be presented, the validity of which is generally different from other theories in the field of knowledge. In the school of enlightenment, "intuition" is considered as a great support for understanding the deep degrees of truth, which can be achieved through the world of imagination and the promotion of the realm of human enlightenment. The present article intends to study the coordinates of this type of scientology in the wisdom of illumination with a descriptive-analytical method, and through this it can explain its educational results in accordance with the results of this research "Gradual evolution" The degree of "perception" and, consequently, the "recognition of different understandings of a single truth" in such a way that it does not lead to skepticism and reprehensible relativism. There are two main consequences of the theory of intensity science, the realization of which depends on the implementation of the definition and dimensions of the theory of intensity science and the adoption of appropriate solutions in the educational system; Therefore, it seems that the vast capacity of the wisdom of enlightenment in inferring the various dimensions of education and improving the components of the educational system, such as the principles, results and strategies of education, is undeniable.

The Humean theory of motivation maintains that cognitive states like beliefs lack motivating force, and if an agent were to be motivated to perform an action, s/he necessarily would have a preceding desire Φ and a means-end belief that by Ψ-ing s/he would be able to satisfy Φ. Although different accounts of this theory have been provided so far, in this paper we will examine the account put forward by Bernard Williams according to which satisfying the preceding desire is the only basis for motivating someone to choose actions. This paper attempts to show that although the Humean theory of motivation as described above is considered to be a standard view in explaining intentional actions, it may encounter considerable difficulties to make plausible distinctions between the right and wrong kinds of motivations. In order to demonstrate that, we will first explain Bernard Williams’ Humean view and then discuss that ordinary people not only draw distinctions between de re and de dicto motivations, and between self-regarding and other-regarding motivations, but also think that moral agents normally have reasons to be motivated according to the right kind of these motivations in the relevant circumstances. Finally, we shall design a thought experiment to illustrate the point more strikingly. It seems that a plausible theory of motivation in meta-ethics should accommodate these intuitive and common-sensical sorts of distinctions, while Williams' account of the Humean theory of motivation lacks this feature.

The world's population is growing exponentially, and people are facing significant problems such as hunger and extreme malnutrition. According to some people, the production of genetically modified foods can be a good solution to provide healthy and adequate food and thus solve global hunger. The production of genetically modified foods has also met with much opposition. A group of opponents, by presenting theological reasons, consider the production of genetically modified foods to be immoral and disgusting on their own, regardless of the consequences. This paper seeks to examine and critique the most important theological reasons for opposing the production of genetically modified foods, such as playing the role of God, crossing species boundaries, violating the intrinsic value of plants and animals, and changing creation. The results show that these reasons are not sufficiently convincing and cannot prove the immorality of the production of genetically modified foods, although this is not necessarily the case.

As Kierkegaard has explained, humankind’s pain is recognized with its individuality. But, what happens for the pain during a prevalent disaster, and what changes does it go through? Is generality of a disaster can always help anyone to endure the pain? Does the generality leave any room for help to those who are all affected? Is there no difference among all kinds of pains in terms of their requirements for enduring or overcoming the individual pain? Such questions lead us to reconsider the relationship between the individuality of pain and the generality of calamity based on Kierkegaard’s meditations, especially because he himself did not engage this issue exactly. In his book, Sickness unto death, signed by a pseudonym called Anti-Climacus, as a representative of a special existential condition, he take a look on the meaning of pain that is deeply related to concept of despair, which is the basis of our analysis. In this article, by using an approach we call it as “Anti-Climacian”, we conclude that the individuality of pain in the context of a general disaster may prevent the alone person form pursuing a three-staged dialectical movement to set free from despair

Jürgen Moltmann argued, following World War II and its consequences for society, that traditional views of eschatology could not provide a firm foundation for Christian hope because they are indifferent to human suffering. Moltmann argues that God the Father sent His son to correct the current order, but that the powerful of this world crucified him. God, however, thwarted their purpose with the resurrection of Christ. According to Moltmann's eschatology, the promised order of the New Testament can serve as a basis for realizing Christian hope in the end-times. This order encompasses components that can be applied to meet the needs of contemporary society. Therefore, the eschatology of Moltmann is temporal, contextual and inclusive. Additionally to critique of traditional views, Moltmann's eschatology offers groundbreaking innovations in twentieth-century Christian theology, such as a holistic view of the subject of hope, an analysis of the praxis of hope, and the role of the future in a historical horizon. Some challenges challenge this eschatology, including doubts about the psychological dimension of hope, contradictions between the doctrine of the Holy Spirit and the astonishing dimension of Christian hope, and uncertainty in the mechanism of linear time and eternal time.

Among the arguments for God's Existence in the Islamic philosophy and kalam, the proof of the truthful (Burhān-i ṣiddīqīn) due to its merits has a unique position. invented by Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), soon received a noticeable reception from his followers who tried to present new versions of the proof. Among the post-Avicennian Imāmī theologians, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) set forth an important, new version of the proof of the truthful in his theological treatise entitled Fūṣūl, which is known by some of later Imāmī theologians as an innovative version of the proof. The gist of his argument is that since contingent beings are not beings by itself, nor can be by itself the cause for something to exist, there must be a necessary existence among the beings of the universe. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s innovative version of proof of the truthful and its effects and reception in the later theological and philosophical works has not received much attention in the recent researches so far. In the present article, having discussed and analyzed al-Ṭūsī’s innovative version of the proof, point out that some of the Imāmī theologians showed considerable attention to it and set out various versions of the proof in their writings.

The relation between film and philosophy is not so easy that firstly seems. On one hand, philosophers discuss the nature of film, and, for example, ask: what makes a recording a work of art? And, on the other hand, some filmmakers attempt to utilize philosophical themes in their works, and, in a word, produce philosophical movie. But it not the whole story, and a third claim has been proposed in recent dedicates: that movies can philosophizing. This new approach usually is called “film as philosophy”, “film-philosophy”, or “filmosophy”. Several arguments have been advanced in defense of this hypothesis, and every defender of this claim have proposed their own explanations. In this essay, we try to show, from a different position, that movies can doing philosophy in six ways. That is, there are movies make an account of a philosophical point, movies aske some philosophical questions, movies make defense or denial to a philosophical position, movies propose a philosophical thesis, and movies remind us important things.

Facing death has always been regarded as a main philosophical issue in human`s life. Major philosophical traditions have given it abundant attention and tried to analyze it as the most serious concern of humans. One of the main ancient philosophical traditions, Epicurean relying on human wisdom tries to address this issue. Death, since the Stone Age, has brought alterations to the context of societies so that fear of death is currently seriously investigated by philosophers and psychologists, specially the change in the concept of death to an evil/despicable event. It was once presumed as a journey with this world or the other world nature in the pre-modern world, while now a social challenge with numerous effects. The current study aims to illustrate how it would be possible to re-interpret Epicurean`s doctrine in the modern world. This re-reading has its foundations on the hypothesis that argument therapy enables humans to face death in the modern world.

In this essay, we intend, in the first place, to seek out a theory of the meaning of life in the view of the first Wittgenstein focused on the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. However, exegetical works on Tractatus Logico-philosophicus have culminated in the impossibility of speaking about a theory of the meaning of life in the view of Wittgenstein because all of them, in one way or another, accepted that the face value of the article 6.54 and 7, that is, to leave meta-scientific propositions. Hence, the first part of the essay delves into the analysis of this problem and suggesting an interpretation of Tractatus which solves this issue. This is done by adopting a grammatical-transcendental reading. After this job is done, different possible Wittgensteinian answers to the problem of life, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, is offered and scrutinized. Finally, the best answer is offered based on Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophicus for a theory of the meaning of life. He believes the meaning of life requires a kind of eternity which is not a very long time but one which does not have timeless.

In the peripatetic philosophy, there are two views on self-awareness: the idea that claim self-awareness is dependent on cognition of other things (cognition-dependent self-awareness) and the views that state self-awareness is a permanent phenomenon and can be directly access through introspection. The former idea is often attributed to Aristotle and the latter opinion stated by Avicenna who believed in inseparability of human nature and self-awareness. Although Aquinas was a proponent of cognition-dependent self-awareness, tried to preserve benefits of the opponent view (eg. Preserving first person perspective, our introspective intuitions and ontological self-identity) and reducing deficiencies and ambiguities of the theory of Aristotle by proposing Habitual self-awareness and actual self-awareness. In my view, he was somehow successful in the second task but he couldn’t pass some objections on cognition-dependent self-awareness and benefit from the first one consequences due to the purported gap between the unconscious habitual self-awareness and the conscious actual self-awareness.