پژوهشنامه حقوق اسلامی
پیاپی 63 (بهار 1403)

Ownership, a cornerstone of legal systems worldwide, delineates the relationship between individuals and their property under the purview of the law. In Islamic jurisprudence, this relationship is imbued with specific principles and interpretations, reflecting a nuanced understanding of property rights. Among the varied conceptions of ownership, the notion of Mora'a ownership emerges as a distinctive yet underexplored facet. While conventional forms of ownership, such as established and precarious ownership, have been extensively studied, Mora'a ownership remains relatively obscure, necessitating a focused inquiry into its nature, instances, and legal implications.

The fundamental inquiry guiding this study pertains to the scope and characteristics of Mora'a ownership within the framework of Islamic jurisprudence and Iranian civil law. Specifically, the research seeks to elucidate whether ownership, traditionally categorized as stable or precarious, encompasses additional modalities, including Mora'a ownership. By examining the conceptual underpinnings and practical manifestations of Mora'a ownership, the study aims to discern its unique features and distinguish it from other forms of ownership.

Building upon existing scholarship and jurisprudential insights, the research posits that alongside conventional paradigms of ownership, such as established and precarious ownership, Mora'a ownership constitutes a distinct category with its own defining characteristics. Contrary to prevalent assumptions, Mora'a ownership transcends the binary framework of stability and precarity, offering a nuanced understanding of property rights within Islamic legal traditions. Through a systematic analysis of legal texts, judicial decisions, and scholarly discourse, the hypothesis contends that Mora'a ownership manifests in diverse contexts, necessitating a comprehensive examination to grasp its implications fully.

This research adopts a primarily doctrinal approach, drawing upon Islamic jurisprudence, Iranian civil law, and legal scholarship to explicate the concept of Mora'a ownership. Utilizing a comparative methodology, the study juxtaposes Mora'a ownership with established legal doctrines and precedents, elucidating its distinguishing features and implications. Furthermore, the research incorporates a contextual analysis of relevant judicial decisions and legislative provisions, providing insights into the practical application of Mora'a ownership within the contemporary legal landscape. By synthesizing doctrinal analysis with contextual inquiry, the study endeavors to offer a comprehensive understanding of Mora'a ownership and its significance within legal theory and practice.

The examination of Mora'a ownership reveals distinct characteristics that differentiate it from other forms of ownership, such as precarious, temporary, and contingent ownership. While precarious ownership entails the possibility of termination under specific conditions, Mora'a ownership denotes a unique scenario where ownership, although established, may cease retroactively due to impediments that invalidate its inception. This distinction is crucial, as it elucidates the nature of ownership rights and obligations, particularly concerning the vesting of benefits.
     In Islamic Sharia and Iranian legislation, various instances of Mora'a ownership are explicitly identified, underscoring its relevance within legal frameworks. For instance, inheritance rights and the wife's share of her husband's immovable property are deemed as Mora'a ownership, as per specific provisions in the Iranian Civil Code. Additionally, fetal ownership concerning inheritance and the wife's entitlement to alimony exemplify scenarios where ownership status is contingent upon specific circumstances, thereby aligning with the principles of Mora'a ownership.
     Furthermore, recent legal precedents, such as the Iran Supreme Court Decision No. 810 - 1400 SH, reinforce the applicability of Mora'a ownership in contemporary jurisprudence. This ruling, which recognizes subsequent buyers' ownership despite contractual contingencies, underscores the retroactive effect of Mora'a ownership in contractual relationships, thereby expanding its scope beyond traditional interpretations.
     However, certain misconceptions persist among legal scholars regarding the classification of ownership instances, leading to erroneous categorizations of Mora'a ownership as precarious ownership. To rectify such misunderstandings, it is imperative for legal practitioners and scholars to adhere to the delineated criteria and accurately apply the concept of Mora'a ownership to analogous scenarios. Moreover, voluntary and contractual instances, such as conditional contracts and suspended sales, underscore the potential for Mora'a ownership to arise in diverse legal contexts, further substantiating its significance within legal theory and practice.

In conclusion, the study of Mora'a ownership illuminates a nuanced dimension of property rights within Islamic jurisprudence and Iranian law. Defined as ownership established but subsequently invalidated due to inherent obstacles, Mora'a ownership necessitates careful consideration to distinguish it from similar concepts such as precarious ownership, temporary ownership, and contingent ownership. The delineation of Mora'a ownership instances, including inheritance rights, spousal entitlements, and contractual contingencies, underscores its practical relevance within legal frameworks.
     To prevent confusion and foster a coherent understanding of property rights, it is imperative for legal scholars and practitioners to accurately apply the principles and implications of Mora'a ownership to relevant legal scenarios. By enriching and consolidating this indigenous theory within the legal system, stakeholders can ensure the equitable administration of justice and uphold the integrity of property rights in Islamic and Iranian legal contexts.

The exploration of ethical principles within the legal framework has always been a fascinating domain for scholars and practitioners alike. The "Golden Rule," a principle deeply rooted in various religious and ethical systems, provides a profound basis for examining moral conduct across cultures. This paper delves into the intriguing relationship between the golden rule—often encapsulated by the ethos of treating others as one wishes to be treated oneself—and its applicability within the domain of tort liability. Historically, the golden rule has transcended mere philosophical discourse, influencing moral and ethical guidelines across civilizations. Its simplicity and universal appeal have made it a cornerstone for evaluating interpersonal behaviors and, by extension, its potential relevance to legal norms and practices, particularly within the framework of civil liability. By examining the intricate relationship between this ethical principle and civil liability, this paper seeks to uncover whether the foundational values of the golden rule can be harmoniously integrated into the legal adjudication of torts, thereby offering a novel lens through which tort liability can be understood and assessed.

The central inquiry of this paper revolves around the feasibility and implications of applying the golden rule within the civil liability system. Civil liability, a pivotal aspect of private law, often grapples with the ethical dimensions of actions and their consequences on others. The research question thus formulated is: "can the golden rule be effectively applied to the civil liability system, and if so, how does its application influence the determination of liability?" This question aims to bridge the gap between ethical imperatives and legal obligations, investigating whether a principle rooted in moral and ethical considerations can provide a viable framework for adjudicating tort claims.

The hypothesis posited in this paper is that the golden rule, with its universal ethical appeal and simplicity, can serve as an effective moral guide within the civil liability system. It is theorized that this ethical principle can be operationalized in legal adjudication, providing a nuanced criterion for evaluating the actions of the tortfeasor in light of potential harm to others. Specifically, the application of the golden rule could influence the determination of liability by fostering a non-reciprocal behavior theory, which assesses actions based on the approval or disapproval of the conduct if roles were reversed. This hypothesis suggests that integrating the golden rule into civil code could promote fair conditions of interaction and social cooperation, ultimately guiding the adjudication process towards more equitable outcomes.

To comprehensively explore the application of the golden rule within the civil liability framework, this paper employs a doctrinal research methodology, using a wide array of sources including legal texts, jurisprudential analysis, and philosophical discourse. This methodological approach allows for an in-depth examination of the conceptual underpinnings of the golden rule and its historical significance across various ethical and religious traditions. Furthermore, the paper adopts a non-reciprocal behavior theory as its analytical framework, examining how the golden rule's ethical mandate of mutual respect and empathy can be translated into legal principles governing civil liability. This framework critically evaluates the potential of the golden rule to serve as a guiding principle in determining the liability of tortfeasors, considering the complexities and nuances of civil code. Through this methodology and framework, the paper aims to elucidate the theoretical and practical implications of applying the golden rule in civil liability, contributing to the broader discourse on the intersection of ethics and law.

The comprehensive analysis undertaken in this paper elucidates the profound impact of the golden rule on civil liability, manifested through the innovative "non-reciprocal behavior theory." This theory posits that the essence of civil liability hinges on a fundamental disregard for the victim's welfare, prioritizing self-interest over mutual respect and empathy. The application of the golden rule within this framework emphasizes a decision-making process that seeks to harmonize the interests of all parties involved, thereby fostering a legal and societal environment characterized by fairness, efficiency, and stability. By integrating ethical principles such as Kant's categorical imperative and Rawls's veil of ignorance, the non-reciprocal behavior theory aligns closely with the ethos of the Golden Rule, advocating for impartiality and the elimination of selfish motives in determining tort liability.
     This theory's application significantly influences the adjudication of strict liability/liability without fault cases within civil code. In strict liability, the determination revolves around establishing a duty of care and the extent of this duty, with the tortfeasor's choice of activity and the concept of moral agency playing pivotal roles. The golden rule, thus, serves as a criterion for assessing the tortious responsibility in considering the welfare of others, delineating a clear boundary between voluntary acceptance of risk and contingent duties based on knowledge of potential harm.
     The implications of the golden rule extend more prominently to strict liability, particularly in the context of activities deemed extraordinarily dangerous. Under this theory, the adherence to reasonable care in such activities absolves the tortfeasor from liability for damages arising from inherent risks, aligning with the principle of moral agency and the inability to alter outcomes through different decisions. This perspective challenges traditional views on strict liability, advocating for a reevaluation of liability in cases where the tortfeasor, despite taking all reasonable precautions, cannot mitigate the intrinsic dangers of certain activities.

The golden rule, with its ethical profundity and universal acceptance, emerges as a pivotal influence on the legal doctrine of civil liability. Through the lens of the non-reciprocal behavior theory, this article has demonstrated how ethical considerations, deeply embedded in the golden rule, can be intricately woven into the fabric of tort law, guiding principles of strict liability towards more equitable and just outcomes. The theory underscores the importance of considering the welfare of others as a foundational aspect of legal responsibility, advocating for a legal system that mirrors the ethical ideals of fairness, empathy, and mutual respect.
     The integration of the golden rule into civil liability challenges conventional legal paradigms, proposing a shift towards a more ethically informed adjudication process that values decision-making over behavior, and collective welfare over individual gain. This approach not only aligns with the moral imperatives of the golden rule but also addresses the complexities of tort law, offering a nuanced framework for assessing liability that transcends the limitations of traditional fault and strict liability doctrines.
     In conclusion, the application of the golden rule within civil law, as explored through the non-reciprocal behavior theory, reveals the potential for a more harmonious and morally cohesive legal system. By embracing the ethical principles encapsulated by the golden rule, civil liability can evolve towards a more empathetic and just adjudication process, reflecting the inherent value of treating others as one would wish to be treated. This paper, therefore, lays the groundwork for further exploration and integration of ethical principles into legal practice, fostering a dialogue between morality and law that enriches our understanding of justice and responsibility in an interconnected world.

The concept of "mistake" in contractual agreements is a critical point of consideration within various legal systems, each offering distinct approaches to its resolution. This paper focuses on the nature of "mistake" as addressed in Iranian civil law, highlighting the complexities arising from the amalgamation of concepts derived from both the French legal system and Imamiya jurisprudence. The primary aim is to unravel the ambiguities and interpretive challenges presented by the current legal provisions in Iran concerning mistakes in contracts. These challenges are attributed to the convergence of two distinct legal philosophies, each with its unique terminological and conceptual understandings of "mistake." Through a comparative analysis, this study seeks to elucidate the semantic and judicial confusions, proposing pathways towards a more coherent legal interpretation or possible legislative reformations to mitigate these ambiguities.

The central inquiry of this research revolves around the following question: how does the conflation of the lexical and conceptual frameworks of "mistake" from both the French legal system and Islamic law contribute to the ambiguities and interpretive challenges within Iranian civil law, and what reforms or interpretations could enhance the coherence of legal provisions regarding mistakes in contracts?

This study proposes two hypotheses: Firstly, the provisions regarding "mistake" in Iranian civil code are inherently ambiguous, leading to significant interpretive challenges. This ambiguity is largely due to the dualistic incorporation of "mistake" as understood in both French legal terminology and Imamiya jurisprudence, without a clear distinction or integration strategy. Secondly, the root of these controversies and ambiguities lies in the failure to acknowledge and address the "common lexical" nature of "mistake" between these two systems, resulting in semantic and judicial inconsistencies that fundamentally hinder the adjudication process regarding contract mistakes in Iranian law.

The research methodology employed in this study is primarily library-documentary, involving an extensive review of existing literature, legal documents, and previous research findings. The comparative analysis framework is pivotal to understanding the juxtaposition of the French legal system's and Imamiya jurisprudence's interpretations of "mistake." This approach facilitates the identification of similarities, differences, and theoretical advantages, providing a comprehensive understanding of how these divergent perspectives contribute to the current legal ambiguities in Iran. The analysis extends to recent amendments in the 2016 French civil code, offering updated insights that previous studies have overlooked. Through this methodological lens, the paper delves into the conceptual-terminological conflict that underpins the ambiguities in Iranian civil law, presenting novel arguments and explanations to address these challenges.

The analysis conducted in this study reveals the ambiguities present within the Iranian civil law concerning the concept of "mistake" in transactions. This issue primarily stems from the amalgamation of the French legal doctrine's interpretation of mistake and the Imamiya jurisprudence's approach, both of which have historically influenced Iranian legal systems but offer differing perspectives on the nature and implications of mistakes in contractual agreements.
     From the French legal doctrine, the categorization of mistakes into errors that lead to a defect in will, defect in consent, and ineffective mistakes, with their corresponding legal consequences (absolute nullity, relative nullity, and validity, respectively), has been a cornerstone in understanding and adjudicating contracts. The 2016 reforms in the French civil code, which sought to align more closely with the Roman tradition, underscored a significant shift by placing all mistakes under the umbrella of relative nullity, thereby prioritizing the preservation of contracts unless a significant defect in consent is proven.
     Contrastingly, Islamic law distinguishes mistakes that lead to a defect in will, resulting in the nullity of the contract, from those constituting a defect in consent, which merely give rise to the right of annulment. This distinction is crucial as it underscores a more nuanced approach to handling mistakes, recognizing the varying degrees of impact a mistake can have on the contractual agreement's validity.
     The integration of these diverse perspectives into Iranian civil code, particularly through the borrowing of terms and concepts, has led to a situation where the provisions related to "mistake" are fraught with ambiguity and inconsistency. This is evident in the legislative texts, where French-influenced (articles 199 to 201) coexist with those drawing from Imamiya jurisprudence (articles 353, 762, 1070, etc.), without a clear distinction or harmonization of the underlying principles.
     This study's findings underscore the critical need for a comprehensive review and revision of the Iranian civil law's provisions on mistake. The semantic and judicial conflicts that arise from the current framework do not merely represent an academic concern but have real-world implications for the interpretation and enforcement of contracts. The lack of clarity and consistency undermines the predictability and security that are fundamental to contractual relations, posing significant challenges for both domestic and international legal transactions involving Iranian law.

The investigation into the provisions related to "mistake" within the Iranian civil law highlights a critical area of ambiguity and contention, stemming from the confluence of French legal doctrine and Imamiya jurisprudence. This study proposes that the root cause of these disputes lies in the failure to clearly distinguish and harmonize the concepts of mistake as understood in these two influential legal traditions.
     To address this issue, this paper recommends a theoretical and practical overhaul of the relevant provisions. Theoretically, adopting a jurisprudential approach to categorize mistakes into three distinct types—defect in will, defect in consent, and ineffective mistakes—with corresponding legal consequences, offers a pathway to clarity. This approach would align the legal framework with the nuanced understanding of mistake in Imamiya jurisprudence while providing a clear, structured basis for adjudication.
     Practically, for an interim solution, a more precise interpretation of "the subject matter itself of the transaction" in Iranian civil code articles 199 and 200 is advocated. This interpretation aims to reconcile the current provisions with the practical realities of contract law, ensuring that defects in consent related to the characteristics of the subject matter lead to voidability rather than nullity, thus preserving the integrity of contractual agreements where possible.
     Ultimately, the resolution of the ambiguities surrounding the concept of "mistake" in Iranian civil code requires a balanced integration of jurisprudential tradition and contemporary legal principles. By embracing a more defined and harmonized approach, Iranian law can enhance the predictability, fairness, and effectiveness of its contract law provisions, thereby fostering a more stable and trustworthy legal environment for both domestic and international parties.

The genesis of Iran's encounter with modern legal principles can be traced back to the Constitutional Revolution of the early 20th century [Enghelab-e Mashrooteh], a period that heralded significant legal and political reforms aimed at dismantling the autocratic governance structures of the time. The revolution catalyzed the introduction of Western legal concepts such as law, parliament, and constitution into the Iranian socio-political lexicon, laying the foundation for a new legal order. This order was characterized by the amalgamation of religious decrees with modern legal structures, a process that, while innovative, was not devoid of challenges. The crux of the issue, as identified in the current research, lies in the hasty and uncritical adoption of these new legal concepts without a thorough understanding of their theoretical, philosophical, and historical underpinnings. This oversight has precipitated a crisis of theory and practice within the Iranian legal system, manifesting in conceptual ambiguities and operational inefficiencies. At the heart of this research is the reevaluation of the punishment of imprisonment, a fundamental concept in criminal law, through a comparative lens focusing on modern criminal law and Imamia jurisprudence.

The research is driven by the imperative to scrutinize the punishment of "imprisonment" within the context of Iran's hybrid legal system, specifically examining how this form of punishment is conceptualized, rationalized, and implemented in modern criminal law vis-à-vis Islamic law. The overarching question guiding this inquiry is: How does the comparative analysis of the punishment of imprisonment in modern criminal law and Islamic law illuminate the theoretical and practical discrepancies in the Iranian criminal law, and what implications do these findings have for the evolution of a more coherent legal framework?

The hypothesis underlying this research posits that the theoretical and practical dissonance observed in the application of imprisonment in the Iranian legal system stems from a fundamental misalignment in the criminal rationalities governing modern criminal law and Islamic law. This research suggests that while modern criminal law predominantly views imprisonment through the lens of disciplinary power aimed at the normalization and psychological correction of the criminal for societal reintegration, Islamic law approaches punishment with a focus on the spiritual and moral rehabilitation of the individual, emphasizing the afterlife and the perfection of the human soul. This divergence, it is hypothesized, results in fundamentally different implementations of imprisonment, with the modern approach prioritizing correctional normalization, and the Islamic approach advocating for the preservation of the individual's moral agency and freedom.

To explore the delineated research question and hypothesis, the study employs a multifaceted methodological approach that combines doctrinal research with inductive, interpretive, and argumentative analysis. This methodology is predicated on an extensive review of philosophical texts, legal treatises, and jurisprudential discourse from both the modern and Islamic legal traditions. The framework for this comparative study is structured around identifying and analyzing the differences in criminal rationality between modern criminal law and Imamia jurisprudence and how these differences manifest in the conceptualization and practice of imprisonment.
     A critical component of this methodology involves examining the evolution of the modern prison system, particularly its emergence as a mechanism of disciplinary power in the modern era, aimed at seizing the individual’s soul and will for the purpose of societal normalization. This analysis is juxtaposed with the examination of imprisonment within Imamia jurisprudence, where the focus is on penal correction with an emphasis on moral and spiritual rehabilitation, highlighting a significant departure from the modern system's focus on psychological correction and normalization.
     Furthermore, the research methodology includes a critique of the existing theoretical and practical frameworks within which imprisonment is situated in the Iranian legal system, arguing that a neglect of the nuanced differences in criminal rationality has led to the uncritical adoption of modern penal practices that may not align with the philosophical and ethical underpinnings of Imamia jurisprudence. Through this comparative analysis, the study seeks to unearth the theoretical and practical implications of these differences, offering insights into how a more informed and theoretically coherent approach to the punishment of imprisonment could be developed within Iran's legal system.

The findings of the study illuminate a significant divergence in the conceptualization and application of imprisonment between modern criminal law and Islamic law. Modern criminal law, with its roots in disciplinary power, seeks to reform the criminal by targeting the soul and will, aiming for normalization within society. This approach signifies a qualitative shift from physical to psychological modes of punishment, where the prison becomes a space for the psychological transformation and normalization of individuals. The emphasis is on altering the criminal's personality and psychological structure in relation to their crime, marking a profound intensification of power that penetrates the deepest layers of individual identity.
     Contrastingly, Islamic law offers a fundamentally different perspective, viewing punishment as a means to achieve the perfection of the human soul and maintain civil order, grounded in the attainment of afterlife happiness. This system prioritizes the individual's freedom and moral agency in accepting Islamic law and self-correction. Punishments, including imprisonment, are framed as corrective measures that deprive the individual of certain freedoms only to the extent necessary for societal protection and personal purification from sin. The emphasis is on voluntary correction and spiritual discipline, with non-penal institutions like repentance playing a significant role in the penal rationality.
     The discussion of these findings highlights the theoretical and practical challenges posed by the hybrid nature of current Iranian legal system, which incorporates elements of both modern and Islamic law approaches to punishment. The research underscores the importance of penal rationality in defining the effectiveness and ethical grounding of penal institutions. Without a clear alignment with a coherent penal rationality, the legal system risks perpetuating theoretical confusion and practical inefficiencies.

The study concludes that the current form of imprisonment in the Iranian legal system represents a critical juncture between two divergent penal rationalities. The acceptance of modern imprisonment practices, characterized by an emphasis on psychological normalization, does not necessarily represent a more humane approach to punishment but rather a shift in the focus of disciplinary power from the body to the soul. This shift, while reducing the physical harshness of punishments, intensifies the control over the individual's identity and autonomy.
     In contrast, the Islamic penal system, as understood through Islamic law, offers a vision of punishment that centers on the spiritual and moral rehabilitation of the individual, respecting their freedom and capacity for self-correction. This approach aligns punishment with broader ethical and spiritual objectives, such as the preservation of fundamental human interests and the perfection of the human soul.
     The research calls for a critical self-awareness within the Iranian criminal law system to reconcile these divergent penal rationalities. It poses pressing questions about the future direction of Iran's penal system: should it adhere more closely to the principles of Islamic law, or continue incorporating aspects of modern penal rationality? The exploration of these questions requires further investigation into the social, cultural, and legal feasibilities of adopting either penal rationality more fully.
     This conclusion serves as a call to action for legal scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to engage in a deeper examination of the foundational principles guiding punishment in Iran. By contemplating the possibilities for embracing either Islamic  law or modern penal rationality, future research can pave the way for a more coherent, just, and effective legal system that respects both the individual's dignity and societal needs.

The legal framework and governance of a nation are profoundly influenced by its foundational theories and intellectual bases, which are often encapsulated in the nation’s constitution. This is particularly evident in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the concept of the authority of the supreme leader [Velayat-e Faqih] has been a cornerstone of its legal and political system since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The principle, deeply rooted in Islamic law, posits that the governance of Muslims should be under the guidance of a qualified jurist during the era of Imam occultation. This concept was institutionalized through the Iranian Constitution, particularly with the ratification of article 5, marking a significant departure from prior constitutional frameworks. Martyr Dr. Sayyed Mohammad Hosseini Beheshti (1928-1981), a pivotal figure in the revolution and the establishment of the new constitution, played a central role in articulating and implementing this principle. This paper aims to delve into Beheshti's contributions and perspectives on the authority of the supreme leader, examining the evolution of this concept and its practical implications within the framework of the Iranian Constitution.

The primary inquiry of this paper revolves around the conceptualization of the authority of the supreme leader as articulated by Martyr Beheshti. Specifically, it seeks to address whether Beheshti's discourses and writings support the notion of the absolute authority of the supreme leader during the era of Imam occultation. Additionally, it questions how Beheshti justified the necessity of this absolute authority and the extent to which he envisioned the scope of the supreme leader’s powers within society. This exploration is crucial for understanding the theoretical underpinnings of Iran's political system and the constitutional legitimation of the supreme leader’s authority.

It is hypothesized that Martyr Beheshti’s intellectual and juridical endeavors significantly contributed to the conceptualization and institutionalization of the Authority of the supreme leader in the Iranian political and legal systems. Beheshti, leveraging his scholarly background and political activism, posited that the absolute authority of a qualified supreme leader is essential for guiding the Islamic community in the absence of the Imam. This hypothesis further suggests that Beheshti envisioned a broad scope of powers for the supreme leader, aiming to ensure the governance of society aligns with Islamic principles. This study seeks to affirm these hypotheses by examining Beheshti's contributions to the theoretical foundation and practical application of Velayat-e Faqih.

The methodology employed in this research is content analysis, focusing on a systematic examination of Beheshti’s speeches, writings, and the constitutional texts. This method allows for an in-depth analysis of the discourse, enabling the extraction of key concepts and viewpoints without imposing external interpretations. The research utilizes library resources, including primary and secondary sources, to construct a comprehensive understanding of Beheshti’s thoughts and the legal-rational structure of the Authority of the supreme leader in Iran. The framework for analysis involves categorizing and tabulating the data to facilitate a clear, systematic presentation of findings. This approach not only highlights Beheshti’s influence on the development of Iran’s constitution but also provides insights into the dynamic interplay between religious authority and state power in the context of modern Islamic governance.

The research meticulously explores Martyr Beheshti’s profound contributions to the constitutional law of the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly focusing on the authority of the supreme leader [Velayat-e Faqih] and its operational limits within the state’s governance. The findings underscore Beheshti’s pivotal role in articulating a vision where the supreme leader’s authority, grounded in Islamic jurisprudence and the collective will of the Muslim community, serves as the linchpin for the governance of an Islamic society. His interpretations emphasize the balance between divine guidance and the community’s welfare, advocating for a leadership model that, while authoritative, fundamentally differs from autocratic or tyrannical governance.
     Beheshti’s perspective on the supreme leader’s authority elucidates a governance model that is neither democratic in the conventional Western sense nor autocratic. It highlights a unique framework where the supreme leader, meeting stringent qualifications and enjoying broad public support, leads with an authority derived from both divine law and the consent of the governed. This model proposes a symbiotic relationship between the jurist’s leadership and the community's welfare, advocating for decisions that prioritize the collective good over individual interests.
     Further, the analysis reveals that the absolute authority of the supreme leader [Velayat-e Motlaqe-ye Faqih], as envisaged by Beheshti, inherently contains checks against tyranny. Beheshti's distinction between tyranny and the supreme leader’s governance lies in the voluntary acceptance and religious obligation of the community towards the supreme leader's leadership, reinforced by the latter's adherence to Islamic principles and the public interest.
     The constitutional place of the guardianship of the Islamic jurist, as articulated by Beheshti, is central to the Islamic Republic’s governance philosophy. Beheshti champions the necessity of an informed, divinely guided leader to ensure the Islamic character of the state's governance. This principle, he argues, is paramount, forming the constitutional bedrock of the Islamic Republic.
     Beheshti's discussions on the limits of the supreme leader’s authority indicate a nuanced understanding of governance. While the constitution delineates the framework within which the supreme leader operates, Beheshti acknowledges the flexibility required to address the community's needs and the public interest, suggesting that in exceptional circumstances, the supreme leader’s authority can extend beyond constitutional stipulations, as exemplified by Imam Khomeini's actions prior to the 1989 (1368 SH) constitutional amendment.

This study concludes that Martyr Beheshti’s contributions to the conceptual and practical understanding of the authority of the guardianship of the Islamic jurist in Iran's constitutional law are both foundational and transformative. Beheshti's vision delineates a governance model that integrates Islamic jurisprudence with the principles of collective welfare and leadership accountability. His interpretations advocate for a leadership that, while authoritative, is fundamentally anti-tyrannical, grounded in the community's welfare and the principles of Islam.
     Beheshti’s elucidation of the guardianship of the Islamic jurist’s role and authority within the Islamic Republic's constitution provides a critical framework for understanding the balance between divine guidance and the societal contract in Islamic governance. The nuanced portrayal of the supreme leader’s authority, with its inherent limits and responsibilities, offers a unique perspective on the governance of an Islamic society, highlighting the dynamic interplay between religious authority, constitutional law, and the public interest.
     In essence, this research underscores the enduring relevance of Beheshti’s thought in the discourse on Islamic governance, presenting his work as a cornerstone in the development of the Islamic Republic of Iran's constitutional and legal framework. Beheshti’s legacy, as examined through this study, offers invaluable insights into the implementing Islamic principles in the governance of a modern state, reflecting a profound engagement with the challenges of religious authority and political power.

The legal framework within which public and private entities operate is foundational to their legitimacy and functionality. This analysis delves into the specific realm of "Government-Approved Statutes" within the Islamic Republic of Iran, focusing on the legislative nature of these documents and the oversight mechanisms in place. The statutes in question are essential for the operation, duties, and authorities of legal persons and entities, both governmental and non-governmental. Their importance is underscored by the requirement for such statutes as a prerequisite for the registration and formal recognition of companies. This study is particularly concerned with statutes related to government and government-affiliated organizations, given their significant impact on the country's administrative system and citizens' rights. The legislative framework for these statutes was established under Article (85) of the Iranian Constitution in 1989, allowing for the delegation of statute approval to relevant commissions of parliament or directly to the government. This research aims to elucidate the nature of these statutes, the processes involved in their amendment or modification, and the authorities responsible for their oversight.

The primary inquiries of this study revolve around three pivotal questions:     - What is the nature of the statutes whose approval has been delegated by the Islamic Consultative Assembly to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran?
     - How are these statutes amended or modified?
     - Which authorities are tasked with overseeing these statutes?
     These questions aim to uncover the legislative and operational dynamics of government-approved statutes and the institutional checks and balances that govern them.

This research operates under the hypothesis that the statutes approved by the Parliament and delegated to the government for oversight are essentially "governmental decrees." As such, they are posited to fall under the scrutiny of the Guardian Council, the Speaker of the Parliament, and the court of administrative justice, according to the principles laid out in the Constitution of Iran. This hypothesis suggests a structured mechanism of oversight and amendment, ensuring that these statutes align with constitutional mandates and effectively serve their intended purpose within the legal and administrative framework of the country.

The methodology adopted for this research is descriptive-analytical, utilizing a comprehensive review of library sources alongside a detailed examination of legal practices in Iran. This approach involves an analysis of documentation from the Guardian Council, the court of administrative justice, the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament), and the cabinet. The study also reviews the historical background and discussions surrounding the approval of article (85) of the constitution, aiming to provide a clear understanding of the legislative intent and the practical application of these statutes. This framework allows for a thorough exploration of the statutes' nature, the process of their amendment or modification, and the extent and quality of their oversight by designated authorities.
     By systematically addressing the research questions and hypothesis through this methodology, the study seeks to contribute novel insights into the legislative nature of government-approved statutes in Iran and the oversight mechanisms that ensure their alignment with constitutional and legal principles. The findings of this research are anticipated to have significant implications for the understanding of legal governance and administrative oversight in the context of Iranian law, with potential broader applications in comparative legal studies.

The investigation into the nature and oversight of "Government-Approved Statutes" within the Islamic Republic of Iran reveals several key findings, grounded in the constitutional provisions, particularly article (85). The distinction drawn by the constitutional review council between the legislative authority of the Parliament and the delegated approval powers for statutes of governmental organizations and companies underscores a nuanced approach to legislative delegation. This delegation is justified by practical needs for expedited approval processes, the complexity of statutes, the necessity for content coherence, and confidentiality concerns in certain cases.
     The analysis delineates the approval of statutes by the cabinet under article (85) as constituting "governmental decrees" rather than conventional laws or legal statutes. This classification has profound implications for the oversight mechanisms applicable to these decrees. The dual oversight by the Guardian Council for conformity with Sharia and the Constitution, and by the Speaker of the Parliament for alignment with ordinary laws, is complemented by the jurisdiction of the court of administrative justice. This court's practice underscores a layered oversight model, where it primarily addresses issues related to the execution of laws, jurisdictional overreach, and the protection of rights, without encroaching on the purviews reserved for the Guardian Council or the interpretation of Sharia and constitutional compliance.
     The study highlights a significant operational challenge within the oversight framework, particularly the potential for conflicting interpretations between the Speaker of the Parliament and the court of administrative justice rulings. Such conflicts can lead to ambiguity and confusion within the executive branch, underscoring the necessity for legislative refinement. The "Law on the Implementation of articles (85) and (138) of the Constitution of Iran" is identified as requiring amendments to introduce clear deadlines for the Speaker of the Parliament's opinions, aiming to mitigate the risks of operational discord among governmental agencies.

The findings of this research elucidate the intricate nature of "Government-Approved Statutes" in Iran and the sophisticated oversight framework designed to ensure their conformity with the broader legal and constitutional framework. The statutes approved by the Cabinet under Article (85) embody a distinct category of governmental decrees, necessitating a multifaceted oversight mechanism involving the Guardian Council, the Speaker of the Parliament, and the court of administrative justice. This oversight is pivotal in maintaining the decrees' alignment with Sharia, the Constitution, and ordinary laws, while also safeguarding individual and institutional rights against governmental overreach and misinterpretation of powers.
     However, the research identifies critical areas for improvement within this oversight structure, particularly the need for clearer procedural guidelines to resolve potential conflicts between oversight authorities. The recommendation for legislative amendments to specify a deadline for the Speaker of the Parliament's opinion is a constructive step towards enhancing the clarity and efficiency of the oversight process. Moreover, the study advocates for a comprehensive review and redefinition of the oversight scope by the involved authorities to address the evolving challenges within Iran's legal and administrative landscape.
     In sum, while the legal framework for "Government-Approved Statutes" in Iran is robust, navigating its complexities requires ongoing attention to detail, legislative refinement, and an adaptive approach to oversight. This research contributes to a deeper understanding of the statutory approval and oversight processes, offering insights that are pertinent not only to legal scholars and practitioners but also to policymakers engaged in the refinement of Iran's legislative and administrative systems.

The Holy Quran stands as a foundational source for comprehending the principles that underpin Islamic thought across diverse domains, with legal studies and philosophy being notably pivotal. Within the realm of legal philosophy, the origin of laws and the identification of sources for distinguishing right from wrong have given rise to various legal doctrines, among which the natural law theory holds significance. This article undertakes an exploration of the origins of law in Islam, specifically examining the Qur'anic evidences in conjunction with the natural law theory. The focal point is deciphering whether the Quran aligns with the principles of natural law or diverges in its perspective on ethical and legal obligations.

In the context of Islamic legal thought, a fundamental question arises: What is the origin of obligations according to the Quran? Does the Quran provide evidence that resonates with the principles of "natural law," or does it present a distinct perspective on ethical and legal obligations? This inquiry is pivotal as its implications extend into legal, legislative, and ethical systems. The central concern lies in determining the criteria for the legitimacy of laws, the standards for ethical conduct, and the broader impact on political philosophy within the Islamic framework. The crux of this exploration hinges on unraveling the Quranic evidence, especially within the Holy Quran.

The hypothesis underpinning this research posits that if there exists evidence within the verses of the Quran, the origin of rights in Islam aligns closely with the principles of natural law theory. The assumption is rooted in the understanding that natural law theory, which asserts the intrinsic nature of rights and wrongs, may find resonance in the divine legislation as expounded in the Quran. The research aims to scrutinize and evaluate the Quranic verses to discern whether divine legislation is akin to contractual laws or if it aligns more with the inherent concepts of good and evil. The research hypothesis, therefore, becomes a guide in exploring the compatibility between Islamic thought and the natural law doctrine.

This research adopts a multifaceted methodology to address the complexities of the research question. Firstly, it engages in the conceptualization and analysis of natural law theories and positive laws, delineating their primary features and definitions. This serves as the foundational step in creating a comparative framework. Subsequently, an analytical and inferential approach is employed towards selected Quranic verses. These verses are scrutinized to discern any alignment or disparity with the characteristics of natural law theories. The comparative approach is paramount, placing Quranic findings side by side with the tenets of the natural law theory to illuminate potential correlations or distinctions.
     The historical background is considered crucial, acknowledging the ancient roots of legal philosophy and the formulation of laws in Islamic civilization. Attention is given to theological discussions, especially those pertaining to the oneness of God and legislation, recognizing the centrality of these themes in the theoretical formulation of the issue. Importantly, the research acknowledges the divergence in structure, terminology, and titles between Islamic theology and contemporary legal philosophy, highlighting the need to trace the origin of the issue within theological and doctrinal foundations.
     In summary, the research method encompasses a conceptual analysis, an analytical approach to Quranic verses, and a comparative framework that places Islamic thought within the context of natural law theory. The historical background provides the necessary context for understanding the development of these ideas within Islamic civilization.

The exploration of Quranic verses reveals a nuanced relationship between Islamic thought and the principles of natural law. The Quran is acknowledged as the paramount source of knowledge for Islamic social systems, attributing both creation and legislation to God. Yet, a careful analysis suggests that the Quranic perspective does not entirely align with positive laws. Instead, evidence emerges within Quranic verses that manifests an acknowledgment of and alignment with natural law in legislative systems. The results can be categorized into two groups, providing insights into the interplay between divine legislation and natural law.
     Firstly, certain verses within the Quran articulate the intrinsic goodness or evilness within the nature of specific actions, irrespective of religious commands. These verses align with the foundational tenets of natural laws, suggesting that the Quran recognizes an inherent moral order that precedes divine legislative intent. The implication is that certain actions carry an intrinsic virtue or vice, independent of external influences such as governmental will or divine intervention.
     Secondly, other verses exhibit an overlap with the rational aspect of natural law. These verses entrust the perception of good and evil in certain matters to human reason and conscience. Here, actions and behaviors within the created system are seen as intrinsically inclined towards good or evil, manifesting in conduct without external interference. Religious laws, in this context, assume a role in guiding, emphasizing, or determining these internal virtues of good and evil. While not all religious laws fall under this category, a significant portion, particularly those foundational to law and ethics, aligns harmoniously with the principles of the natural law doctrine.

The findings of this research shed light on the relationship between the Holy Quran and the natural law theory. While the Quran is unequivocally regarded as the foundational source for Islamic knowledge, including legal and ethical principles, it does not strictly adhere to the framework of positive laws. The evidence presented in Quranic verses supports the argument that a substantial part of rights and wrongs in Islam is rooted in the essence of actions, aligning with the principles of the natural law theory.
     Categorizing the Quranic verses into those reflecting inherent goodness or evilness and those overlapping with the rational aspect of natural law provides a comprehensive understanding of the Quran's stance. The acknowledgement of an intrinsic moral order, predating religious commands, challenges a purely positivist interpretation of Islamic legislation. Moreover, the Quranic alignment with the rational aspect of natural law underscores the role of human reason and conscience in discerning ethical values, reinforcing the idea that certain virtues and vices exist independently of external influences.
     It is crucial to emphasize that the alignment between Islamic thought and natural law does not necessitate a strictly secular interpretation. The foundational theory of natural law itself is not inherently secular, and certain religious statements within Islam harmonize with its principles. While secular interpretations of natural law have gained prominence in recent centuries, the historical context reminds us that a divine interpretation is equally viable.
     In light of these findings, the conclusion posits that the foundation of natural laws is not contingent on secularist assumptions. Instead, it can coexist with religious and divine interpretations, as observed in the dynamic interplay between the Holy Quran and the principles of natural law in Islamic legal philosophy. The nuanced relationship uncovered in this research prompts further exploration and dialogue within the intersection of Islamic thought, legal philosophy, and ethics, contributing to a richer understanding of the foundations of law in Islam.

This study delves into the domain of criminal liability in instances of false testimony within the framework of Islamic penal code of Islamic Republic of Iran, with a particular emphasis on the Iranian Islamic Penal Code of 1392 SH. The act of bearing witness plays a pivotal role in the adjudication process in Islamic law, serving as a critical means of crime proof. However, the veracity of testimony becomes a grave concern when witnesses, intentionally or unintentionally, provide false testimony, leading to wrongful convictions. This paper specifically scrutinizes scenarios wherein false testimonies lead to the wrongful retaliation [Qisas] of an accused individual, under the claims of murder, exploring the resultant legal and moral ramifications. It dissects the layers of accountability, distinguishing between scenarios where witnesses act independently or in conspiracy with the victim's next of kin/ avenger of blood, and the implications of their actions on the adjudication of capital punishment.

The core inquiry of this research revolves around the determination of criminal liability for the wrongful death of an accused person due to false testimony in Islamic law and Islamic penal code. It seeks to answer: "in instances where false testimony leads to the wrongful conviction and retaliation of an accused, who bears the criminal liability, especially under the conditions of conspiracy and non-conspiracy between witnesses and the victim's next of kin?" This question probes the depths of jurisprudential principles and legal statutes to uncover the nuances of liability and justice in such circumstances.

The research hypothesis posits that in cases of false testimony resulting in wrongful retaliation, the allocation of criminal liability varies significantly based on the presence or absence of conspiracy between the witnesses and the victim's next of kin. It hypothesizes that: without conspiracy, the lying witnesses are solely responsible for the wrongful death, irrespective of whether the retaliation is carried out by the court's execution officer or the next of kin.
     In contrast, when a conspiracy exists, and the next of kin personally executes the accused, the liability primarily falls on the next of kin. However, if the retaliation is performed by the court's execution officer, the criminal liability is jointly shared between the conspiring witnesses and the next of kin.

This research employs a doctrinal methodology, a traditional approach in legal scholarship that involves a comprehensive analysis of legal texts, statutes, and jurisprudential opinions. By meticulously examining the Islamic Penal Code of Iran and the extensive body of Islamic law literature, the study seeks to interpret and reconcile the principles of Islamic law with contemporary legal challenges posed by false testimony. The framework for analysis is structured around a comparative examination of the conditions under which testimony is given and the subsequent legal outcomes of wrongful retaliation due to such testimony.
     Through the lens Islamic law and the statutory provisions of the Iranian Islamic Penal Code, the study evaluates the conditions and implications of bearing false witness in cases leading to capital punishment. The analysis is enriched by a critical review of scholarly works and the opinions of penal law experts, aiming to bridge the gap in literature concerning the criminal liability for wrongful reatliation precipitated by false testimony.
     The research meticulously categorizes the assumptions into two main scenarios: one without conspiracy between witnesses and the next of kin, and the other with such conspiracy. Each scenario is further subdivided based on who executes the retribution sentence, whether it be the court's execution officer or the next of kin. This structured approach allows for a nuanced understanding of the legal and ethical considerations that govern the allocation of criminal liability in these contexts.

The research meticulously investigates the allocation of criminal liability in instances of false testimony leading to wrongful retaliation under Islamic law and Iranian penal law. The findings elucidate a nuanced differentiation in criminal liability based on the presence or absence of conspiracy between the witnesses and the victim's next of kin, alongside the direct executor of the retribution sentence.
     Without Conspiracy: the study confirms that when false testimony originates from witnesses acting independently, without any conspiracy with the next of kin, the witnesses bear sole criminal liability for the wrongful death of the accused. This outcome persists regardless of whether the retribution is executed by the next of kin or a court's officer, highlighting the principle that the executioner, acting in ignorance of the testimony's falsity, does not bear criminal liability. This consensus among Islamic jurists underscores a critical aspect of Islamic penal code: the sanctity of truthfulness in testimony and the severe consequences of deviation.
     With Conspiracy: conversely, when false testimony stems from a deliberate conspiracy between the witnesses and the next of kin, the allocation of liability becomes more complex. If the next of kin personally executes the accused, liability for the murder falls exclusively on them. This finding points to the prioritization of direct action in the attribution of criminal liability within Islamic penal law. However, if the execution is carried out by an officer upon the conspiratorial testimony, both the witnesses and the next of kin share criminal liability. This shared liability underscores the compounded culpability inherent in the act of conspiring to produce false testimony, leading to wrongful retaliation.
     The research highlights the importance of intentionality and direct action in determining criminal liability, reflecting the depth of Islamic law thought and its application in contemporary legal contexts.

The investigation into the criminal liability for murder in cases of false testimony, underpinned by Islamic law and the Iranian Islamic Penal Code, reveals a framework of ethical and legal considerations. The study concludes that: witnesses providing false testimony without conspiracy are solely liable for the wrongful death, emphasizing the individual responsibility for truthfulness.
     In cases of conspiracy, the liability shifts significantly. If the next of kin acts as the executioner, they bear full responsibility for the murder, highlighting the juridical emphasis on direct action. Conversely, when an execution officer enforces the sentence based on conspiratorial testimony, both the witnesses and the next of kin share the liability, reflecting the shared moral and legal culpability in causing wrongful death.
     This nuanced approach to criminal liability, distinguishing between direct and indirect actors, and considering the presence of conspiracy, reflects the intricate balance between justice, intention, and action in Islamic penal code. The findings not only contribute to the scholarly understanding of testimony and liability in Islamic law but also offer critical insights for legal practitioners navigating similar cases within jurisdictions governed by these principles.
     The implications of this study are profound, providing a Islamic basis for re-evaluating legal practices and reinforcing the ethical imperative of truthfulness in testimony. It underscores the need for rigorous legal mechanisms to discern truth and prevent the grave injustice of wrongful retaliation based on false testimony.
     In sum, this research illuminates the dynamics of criminal liability in the context of false testimony, offering a Islamic-legal framework that navigates the delicate balance between truth, justice, and moral responsibility.