نشریه حکمت معاصر
پیاپی 39 (پاییز و زمستان 1403)

What is the nature of woman in relation to man? In elucidating Ibn ʿArabī’s response to this question, it is necessary to approach the discussion of the ontological, epistemological, and pragmatic dimensions of woman in contrast to man within a trilogical framework. Ontologically, woman is the agent of proliferation and the emanation of various manifestations from the Divine Essence. Epistemologically, the cognitive capacity of the feminine gender is imagination (al-khayāl), and in epistemic terms, woman symbolizes wisdom. Wisdom refers to theoretical reflection combined with the pragmatic dimension. The wise person is responsible for resolving crises by drawing upon the knowledge of divine truths. In other words, through three processes—revelation, inspiration, and true dreams—woman perceives the divine names and attributes and molds them into tangible forms. She achieves a symbolic understanding of esoteric knowledge and wisdom. From a pragmatic perspective, woman is like the wise person. The difference between wisdom and mere theoretical contemplation is that the wise must have the ability to solve problems and crises using divine knowledge. Thus, naturally, woman becomes a guide.

The identity and character of an individual are formed through a combination of their thoughts, beliefs, traits, and character (khulq). Through self-knowledge and awareness of these existential attributes, one can strive to overcome personal shortcomings and cultivate their strengths. From a social perspective, understanding personality traits—particularly characters—of individuals within a society allows for the anticipation of their behavior in various social contexts, enabling more effective management and interaction within that society. Thus, the study of character has remained a focal point of philosophical inquiry throughout history.
Among ancient Greek philosophers, Socrates and Plato identified character (ethos) with knowledge (Copleston 2001, 1:130, 253). However, Aristotle distinguished moral virtues from knowledge, defining them as character or habits associated with the non-rational part of the soul. He argued that these virtues are not acquired through instruction and education but, like skills, develop through repeated practice (Aristotle 1964, 1:219–242).
Among Muslim philosophers, al-Kindī was the first to reconcile Plato’s theory of faculties and Aristotle’s theory of moderation. He suggested that the soul consists of three faculties—rational (nāṭiqa), irascible (ghaḍabiyya), and appetitive (shahawiyya)—and, contrary to Aristotle, applied the theory of moderation not to actions but to these three faculties (Atrak 2014). Ibn Miskawayh and al-Fārābī emphasized the role of social interaction in shaping moral character, incorporating the social dimension into the essence of character (Fārābī 1996, 83; Ahmadpour 2006, 111–118). Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) highlighted the role of practical reason (al-ʿaql al-ʿamalī) among human faculties, stressing its transcendent or subordinate status in relation to the animalistic faculties in shaping various characters and moral traits (Ibn Sīnā 1996, 65–66). Mullā Ṣadrā, drawing on the fundamental principles of his philosophical system, offered a distinct analysis and interpretation of the nature of character and its role in the emanation of action, setting him apart from his predecessors.
The main question of this article is: From Mullā Ṣadrā’s perspective, what is the ontological status of character in the emanation of human action? In this context, subsidiary issues such as the nature of character, its developmental stages and influencing factors, as well as the criteria for categorizing character, are also examined.

One of the disputed stories in the Qur'an, which is related to the discussion of the infallibility of the prophets, is the story of Adam. Regardless of the controversies about whether this story is real or symbolic, the appearance of these verses indicate Adam's disobedience to God's command. A group of Islamic theologians, who believe in the absolute infallibility of the prophets, did not consider this disobedience of Adam as a sin and tried to justify his disobedience based on the concept of Taki Awla (abandoning a better act and doing good one). The purpose of this article is to examine the strength of this justification and criticize it.

This article has been done by descriptive-analytical method and collecting information from library sources.

In this research, the most important justification of Islamic and Shiite theologians for Adam's disobedience in eating from the forbidden tree, i.e.  Tarki Awla or disobeying God's advisory prohibition was investigated. First, it was pointed out that Adam's action was not an instance of Tarki Awla, but it was the commission of God's compulsory prohibition. And since according to the Usulian rules, divine prohibitions indicate the existence of corruption in the prohibited act, it should be concluded that committing God's prohibition in any case, whether it is a compulsory, advisory or Tanzihi prohibition, is intellectually wrong, and committing a wrong act is not compatible with the prophets' infallibility thought.
In the following, the claim that God's command to Adam was advisory was examined. By stating the definitions and criteria of advisory prohibition mentioned in ʿIlm al-Usūl and applying them to Adam's actions, I came to the conclusion that God's command to Adam was not advisory.
Then, by proposing another fundamental discussion in ʿIlm al-Usūl that the negative imperative verb has initial semantic appearance in forbiddance unless there were some evidences indicating that action is permissible, it was shown that God's command to Adam was compulsory prohibition. Then, the evidences mentioned in the verses 117-119 of Surah Taha that Shia theologians claimed for being God's prohibition advisory was investigated and it was shown that the divine warning to Adam for leaving paradise and falling into hardships cannot be the proofs of being God's prohibition of eating from the tree as advisory prohibition.
 In addition, the words such as disobedience, misleading, and injustice used in the Quran about Adam's actions have initial appearance in violation of God's compulsory prohibition and committing a sin.
On the other hand, on the assumption of accepting the justification of Tarki awla regarding Adam's disobedience, it seems that this justification is still incompatible with the theory of the prophets' absolute infallibility in the Shi'ite tradition. Because accepting that Adam's action was an instance of Tarki awla is in the meaning of accepting that he committed a mistake and was tempted by Satan, which the reasons for infallibility in the Shia theory are against both.

The final result is that, according to the author's opinion, the justification of Tarki Awla and being God's command advisory is not successful in defending the infallibility of Prophet Adam, and it is better to carry these verses in the same apparent meaning according to the principle of apparent authenticity or use other justifications for Adam's action that are mentioned in theological sources, such as: committing the prohibition of God in heaven, or the omission of a noun i.e. the children of Adam, or disobedience due to forgetfulness or error, etc. Of course, deciding on their strengths and weaknesses requires another research.

Determining the reason for legislating worships and their role in other human affairs provides the opportunity for perceptions such as the intrinsic purpose, negative dignity or positive and preparatory dignity of worships. The present research is trying to answer this question that in the eyes of Sadr al-Mutalahin Shirazi, what is the status of worship in the origin, evolution or emergence of human conditions and knowledge? The purpose of this research is to discover the functions of worship in this process, which is followed by descriptive-analytical method. Sadra considers the rulings to be subject to the criteria of self-determination and considers the purpose of legislating rulings to be to provide general benefit and general expediency to humans. Based on the findings of this research, in explaining the relationship between actions, circumstances and knowledge, the existence of real criteria for worship should be accepted and focused on the interaction between human affairs and the process of the two ascending and descending arcs of the voluntary course of man. According to Sadra, the aforementioned three authorities have a bilateral and multilateral relationship, and discovering this relationship is possible through understanding the interactive movement between the soul and the body and explaining the collective reality of human beings. Paying attention to the interactive relationship and the positive-preparatory interaction between the soul and the body, and the concession and escalation of the citizen of the two, shows that actions in the arc of ascent have non-existent, preparatory and preliminary status, and in the arc of descent, they have existential and fruitful status.

The present article examines and critiques the concept of "generic unity" (al-waḥdat al-sinkhiyya) in Islamic philosophical thought, particularly in relation to the primacy of existence (iṣālat al-wujūd). Initially, the concept is precisely explained, and it is clarified that proponents of this type of unity do not accept any external realization of unity, considering it only as a mental construct that does not have true correspondence with external reality. In contrast, proponents of permeating unity (al-waḥdat al-sarayāniyya) affirm an external realization of unity, accepting all multiplicities within that singular, real, permeating unity. According to the findings of this study, this understanding of unity cannot be accepted due to its logically flawed consequences. There is a profound inconsistency between this notion of unity and key concepts in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, such as the criterion of gradation (tashkīk) in existence—the primacy of existence. The results of this research suggest that generic unity, particularly within the framework of the primacy of existence, faces serious contradictions that appear unacceptable in metaphysical explanations.

This article focuses on the evolution of the concept of mimesis from the Greek philosophy to al-Fārābī's philosophy and the relation between mimesis and art in al-Fārābī's thought. Mimesis is a core concept in exploring ideas of Plato and Aristotle about art. The same key role is traceable in al-Fārābī's philosophy of art. Mimesis was translated as muḥākāt in Islamic philosophy and played an important part in explaining how artworks are shaped and how they affect their audience. The question is whether this transformation from Mimesis to muḥākāt was simply a formal transformation or there happened recognizable changes in this concept making it interpret artworks differently. 

Benefiting from descriptive-analytical method, this article employs primary and secondary sources on al-Fārābī to explore its inquiries. 

Analyzing al-Fārābī’s discussions on Mimesis, one could see close similarities between Mimesis in the Greek philosophy and the newly branded muḥākāt. Primarily, the terms mimesis and techne and their corresponding translations in al-Fārābī’s Arabic texts have been discussed. Al-Fārābī has approved muḥākāt as an equivalent for Mimesis and ṣanāʿa for techne. Aristotle has marked out the difference between mimetic technes and other technes. What distinguishes technes like painting or poetry from other practical technes is the presence of the element of Mimesis. Likewise, in al-Fārābī’s philosophy, muḥākāt is what distinguishes artistic ṣanāʿas from practical ones. Although the the term “mimetic technes” has been used by Aristotle and hasn’t been adopted by al-Fārābī, but the idea of some technes being different because of mimesis is still traceable. Al-Fārābī assignes multiple capabilities to imagination which is corresponding faculty of the soul for muḥākāt. The most basic capability of imagination is saving a sensible image after the sensory medium is disconnected. For instance, one sees a lion, then closes her eyes, and she imagines the same lion. This is the principal ability of the imagination faculty. The second, more complex capability of imagination is composing and the composing sensible images. For example, one takes a lion’s body and attaches a human’s head to it. There is a level of decomposing man’s body and lion’s head and a level of composing a lion with a man’s head. The third function of imagination is muḥākāt which itself consists of two types, the more basic being likening a sensible image to another sensible image. For instance, a warrior is likened to a lion. These are both two things from the realm of the sensible. The second, more complex type of muḥākāt is likening a concept from the realm of the intelligible to an image from the realm of the sensible or imaginable. For example, Rumi likens soul to a dragon in his verse “Your soul is a dragon; not dead, only frozen.” What distinguishes al-Fārābī’s coordinates of muḥākāt from Mimesis is the ability of muḥākāt in imitation from the intelligible concepts. Al-Fārābī has also categorized mimetic technes based on other criteria, i.e. moral perspective and objective perspective, that is, the ends towards which imagination is used. In his moral categorization, al-Fārābī counts six types of music; music being an instance of mimetic techne. Three of these types are commendable and the other three are condemnable. The first type of commendable music is the type that tends to balance low extremes of the soul like fear and laziness. The second type tends to balance high extremes of the soul like impetuosity and selfishness. In the third type of commendable music, the element of muḥākāt is considered. Such type of art tends to move all thoughts and deeds towards goodness and happiness. Al-Fārābī’s other categorization dealing with ends of mimetic technes describes three objectives. In case of music, for instance, there are some tunes that merely tend to cause joy and comfort in the soul. Another type tends to create imaginations and mimetic images in the soul in addition to causing joy and comfort. Al-Fārābī mentions another type inspired by reactionary sentiments of the soul. This type isn’t concerned with objectives of such technes, but instead describes their roots. One could outline multiple similarities between what al-Fārābī describes about muḥākāt and the general understanding of Mimesis in the Greek philosophy. But what differentiates Al-Fārābī’s specifications of muḥākāt from Mimesis is a capacity in the former in likening intelligible concepts to sensible examples. 

Through analysis of the subject according to al-Fārābī’s treatises, it was concluded that Al-Fārābī’s muḥākāt has new features compared to the concept of Mimesis in Greek philosophy. This is particularly conceivable in the idea of imitating from the intelligible or maʿqūlāt, which is a bonus of al-Fārābī’s philosophy compared to imitation from the sensible and imaginable sources which was already suggested in Greek philosophy.

In another article, I have shown that Avicenna regards categorical propositions as “different” and “not identical,” yet “equivalent” to conditional propositions. In this article, I demonstrate that Arabic logicians after him disagreed on whether categorical and conditional propositions are “identical” or merely “equivalent.” Unlike Avicenna, Suhrawardī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭusī, and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī accepted the “identicality” of categorical and conditional propositions, while Khūnajī, Samarqandī, Mīrdāmād, and Mulla Ṣadrā defended Avicenna’s theory of “equivalence” by rejecting the theory of “identicality.” Alongside these logical discussions, linguistic scholars such as Sakkākī, and following him, Taftāzānī, presented a new version of the theory of “identicality” between categorical and conditional propositions, considering the antecedent of a conditional as a part of the consequent’s predicate and as one of its adverbs or modifiers.

Modern rationality fostered autonomy development in its historical course, which was identical to "rationality" and opposed to epistemic authority in an unalterable sense. Zagzebski mentions this process as the autonomous conceptual turn. He ignores essential rational necessities that have high epistemological and virtuous significance. Therefore, Linda Zagzebski (1946) exposes this misconception and examines the concept of autonomy. She explains the necessities that have been ignored in acquiring knowledge.The concept of autonomy states that humans should understand propositions by relying on their epistemic powers and prevailing views and not entrust the responsibility of justifying their beliefs to anyone. It faces the important questions as follows: 1) Is the goal of knowledge achieved by focusing solely on faithful belief? 2) Does autonomy pay attention to the rational necessities required for acquiring knowledge in this comprehensive sense? 3) In which rational ignored imperatives do the moral imperative understand and promote knowledge or accept the epistemic superiority of another being harmed? 4) Is the absolute negation of epistemic authority rational and feasible for these necessities? In the following research, we have analyzed Zagzebski's pillars of epistemic authority and its relationship with rationality. We find Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi's (549-587 AH/1155-1191 AD) critical and sympathetic components, which reflect the ordinary and original approaches in the thinking of these two thinkers in the approach of the illumination philosophies. Suhrawardi attempts to move beyond purely argumentative knowledge and change the evaluation focus from belief to the believer. He advances the true path of knowledge differently from his peripatetic philosophy. The themes of the illumination philosophy reveal the importance of forgotten angles, thoughtful coherence with Zagzebski's philosophy's pillars, and a deep understanding of the issue of epistemological authority. 

This research was conducted using a comparative method between Linda Zagzebski and Suhrawardi. Although it is difficult to find common features and compare two philosophers who have viewed knowledge from different civilizational and temporal perspectives, this can be influential in gaining a broader understanding of some problematic philosophical issues. To understand Zagzebski's perspective, epistemic authority, a topic widely questioned in today's epistemology, contains important rational imperatives that become clear. Like Zagzebski's viewpoint, Suhrawardi's philosophy does not address the issue of epistemic authority, and his important epistemic themes contain some standard features that criticize the proposition-centered view and justify epistemic authority. It becomes increasingly apparent in comparison and analytical studies and is introduced as a unique example of Zagzebski's results.This study is organized into three parts, with three common pillars between the two philosophers. The method proceeds in each section: First, we address the concept's pillars. Zagzebski places autonomy in its true meaning and makes it justifiable while compatible with epistemic authority. Then, from Suhrawardi's point of view, we compared his approach with Zagzebski's perspective by dwelling on consistent themes. Finally, we have reached a final summary and conclusion.   

In the first section, we have shown that Zagzebski's central importance of reflective self-consciousness is consistent with Suhrawardi's theme of self-knowledge. Zagzebski recognizes the contemplative trust consciously to accept the sublime based on intellectual virtues. Suhrawardi also achieves knowledge by emphasizing the practical approach to self-knowledge and acquiring spiritual virtues to aid self-discipline.In the second part, we have shown that Zagzebski focused on reflective reasons to explain the rationality of epistemic trust in the virtuous by achieving the foundation of trust's validity as a non-cognitive state. This component's coherence with the theme of companions of trust and truth opposes self-supremacy in Suhrawardi's revival of wisdom. It is worthy of consideration and provides the basis for tolerance and interaction in religions and cultures.In the third section, we compare Zagzebski's epistemological model to the development of practical wisdom in Suhrawardi's divine model. We emphasize the transfer of personal and intuitive knowledge to increase humanity's cognitive reserve and the unity and cohesion of societies. 

We can reach the following conclusion and summary based on the comparative nature of this research:There is an understanding of seeking truth from two perspectives that reduce the distance between the other self and another. At the same time, he sees himself as similar and familiar to the other in that understanding. This self-cultivation and reflective attention reduce incorrect inference and, consequently, the incorrect tendency towards epistemic egotism.Autonomy without a practical path of self-purification lacks the humility or intellectual courage necessary to acknowledge the epistemic superiority or another's authority.Zagzebski and Suhrawardi have considered influencing the nature of knowledge and changing its relationship with rationality by proposing reviving wisdom and transmitting the legacy of sages and theologians.Mere imitation and the pleasure of seeking resemblance are not conscious and virtuous. It must be taken not to lose self-confidence and self-awareness.In Suhrawardi's philosophy, ​​epistemic authority is compatible with the components of traditional culture, and its challenges in endangering self-awareness have not been considered. However, Zagzebski thinks about limiting it and is aware of the consequences of epistemic tyranny.

One of the theories of perception is the Theory of Appearing based on which when we see, the physical objects appear to us. But like other direct realist theories, it faces many challenges, the most important among them are the illusion and hallucination challenge and the time-lag challenge. Alston presents the Theory of Appearing more clearly, more extensively, and more powerfully than others. But it can still be improved−which is what this article is about.
 

With an analytical approach, including linguistic analysis, and by using the ideas of copula existence (wujūd-e rābit) and copulative existence (wujūd-e rābitī) and two types of copula existence, I will bring up two types of appearing, and I will focus more on the objective aspect of appearing. Thus, the following facts will get a better explanation: time-lag, illusion, senses’ producing knowledge.
 

Alston’s Theory of Appearing
According to this view, for S to see X is for X to appear/seem/be presented to S in some way (as so and so, as p). This appearing, seeming, being presented, in this view, is fundamental and unanalyzable. The very appearance provides us with a prima facie justification for the belief that comes from that perception. This justification will lead to unqualified justification if there is no rebutter (i.e., sufficient reason to think the belief false) or underminer (i.e., sufficient reason that the basis of belief lacks its usual justificatory power). An advantage, or rather an important difference, of the appearing theory over/from naïve realism is that the way in which an external physical object presents itself to perceiver may not be the same as the reality of that object.
 

A New Version Based on Alston’s View:

In our view, appearance takes different forms depending on many external factors. The least elements involved in the formation of an appearance are the totality of the environment in which the object is, such as the object itself, water/air/etc., light with its different degrees and colors, and the place and angle of view. Different combinations of these elements cause different appearances−appearances that are where the object is and are not separated from it. According to this point, illusion is explained. In illusion, no error has actually occurred, but the object has appeared in a different way. We think that the object should always be such and such because we are accustomed to see certain appearance and because of its regularity. But this is not the whole story.
Another element that plays a role in the formation of an appearance is concepts, judgements, memories, expectations, culture, language, images, models, character traits, moods, and even the sense organs and genes of the knowing subject; in other words, the nature of the knowing subject. By adding this element, the appearance of the object no longer has only an objective aspect where the object is, but also finds a subjective dimension. Now it can be said that the appearance of an object for a person is a combination of the mental activity of the subject and the appearance of the environment containing the object exposed to consciousness.
Now the question is whether this appearance is relational and should there be a subject indeed for appearance to be realized? If the answer is yes, can this subject be something else besides animals and humans?  From our point of view, contrary to Whitehead and Alexander, only humans and animals can be parties to the relational connection of appearing in perception. But in this case, when humans and animals are not around to perceive the objects, the unperceived objects will suffer from a kind of emptiness, and with the coming of the subject, a kind of miracle will happen and the appearance for the subject will expose the reality itself to the subject.
This is where it seems that the solution should be found in the negative answer to the first question. It should be said that appearing is not relational and, for example, a book can appear without appearing to anything. Just as existence is sometimes copula existence and sometimes copulative existence, appearing can sometimes be copula and relational and sometimes copulative and non-relational. The first is realized between two things, but the second is a feature of one thing. It is also possible to express the meaning by introducing two types of copula existence: the one established between two things such as ratios and the indigent one dependent on one thing such as the existence of the effect compared to the cause in some philosophies. Similarly, there will be two kinds of appearing: the appearing of something for something and the appearing dependent on something. Our language also supports us in our claim. As we can see in English, the word “appear” is used in two different ways: “appear to” and “appear as”.
In our view, various appearances, at least to some extent, arise from reality itself; they confirm a relativism arising from reality. It is as if reality is a dark substance that manifests itself in different ways. Of course, the relativism arising from the subject is also added to it. 
 

In this article, we tried to empower the theory of appearing. In this way, illusion is easily explained, because it is nothing but a different appearance that we are not used to it. This appearance is as much rooted in reality as the veridical perception, but we constantly expect our other perceptions to be the same as the latter because of its regularity. It was also revealed that the irreducible hallucination to the veridical perception, assuming the truth of the phenomenal principle, is discernable and separate from the veridical perception. The time-lag difficulty is resolved in our version of the theory of appearing because the appearance of the destroyed/changed object remains as long as the light is in between. By coping with illusion and hallucination, the senses' knowledge-producing is readily established.