نشریه اصول الفقه؛ رویه مقارنه بین المذاهب الإسلامیه
پیاپی 2 (خریف و الشتا 2024)

One of the key issues in contemporary jurisprudence is the reference to the principle of human dignity and the emphasis on human rights. Advocates of this principle argue that human dignity has various jurisprudential implications in different areas. What is mentioned in Surah Al-Isra about the dignity of the children of Adam is in reference to their existence, while in Surah Al-Hujurat, dignity is addressed in terms of virtue. Therefore, there is no mention of the potential for dignity. This shift in perspective is based on modern anthropology, which prioritizes human rights over obligations and rejects rulings that contradict the human's personal dignity. This view defends the rights of minorities, women's rights, the right to choose, and the prohibition of violence, considering such practices inconsistent with the Islamic jurisprudential tradition. These jurists believe that social rulings and laws that do not have a devotional nature are not transcendent, and if the legislator has spoken about them, it is in his capacity as a rational authority. The rulings of the Sharia are based on interests and harms that arise from the underlying purposes of the rulings. Although these underlying purposes cannot be uncovered in specific devotional rulings and some non-devotional matters, the wisdom and purposes behind certain rulings, especially social and criminal rulings in Islam, can be understood by the collective rational intellect of humankind. Consequently, this principle leaves its mark on the understanding of jurisprudential texts, the application of rules, and the inference of rulings. This article, using a descriptive-analytical method, aims to explain and analyze this principle, its various effects, and provide examples of such rulings with a focus on the views of jurists from both major Islamic sects (the two major branches of Islam: Sunni and Shia) in contemporary jurisprudence

Respect for human dignity is not only a religious ruling but has also been considered as a jurisprudential principle in the process of jurisprudential inference. It is argued that there is a correlation between the recognition of human dignity and the compatibility of divine rulings with human dignity. However, both the principle of this correlation and its specific applications have been subjects of debate. The differences in jurisprudential inference regarding new issues have created challenges, and since human dignity has a direct impact on the inference of rulings on these new issues, investigating the foundations of this correlation is essential. The aims of this research are: first, to understand the validity and extent of the influence of dignity in jurisprudential inference, to assess its dominance over other principles, and to evaluate its validity in conflicts with other evidence and in the inference of rulings for new issues. Second, to correct the methodology for using dignity to establish rulings and to prevent certain errors in this regard. The research methodology combines description and analysis. After defining the concept of human dignity and affirming it as a characteristic of humanity, the study focuses on explaining and analyzing its implications and consequences in jurisprudential inference. The novelty of this article lies in presenting the role of dignity as a jurisprudential principle, distinguishing its various instances in different contexts, and offering criteria and boundaries for utilizing dignity in the inference of Sharia rulings, based on the rational correlation between human dignity and the formulation of corresponding rulings.

One of the most important research tools for refining and deepening discussions is consulting and utilizing the opinions of thinkers on the subject at hand and similar topics. Usul al-Fiqh, as one of the most analytical human sciences, is no exception to this rule. In this article, to deepen the understanding of issues related to the topic of "the obligation of preparatory acts," which holds a special place in Usul al-Fiqh, we explore the relationship between this topic and the principle of "blocking the means (Sadd al-Dhara'i)" in Sunni jurisprudence, using a library-based method. One of the key outcomes of comparing these two principles is the recognition of differences in their "ruling-centered" and "harm-centered," which can ultimately transform the results of the discussion. Additionally, understanding the distinction between "externality and intrinsicness" of the inferred rulings based on these two principles, and their specific impact on the chapters of "conflict and concurrence" in jurisprudence, is another finding of this comparison. This article highlights seven fundamental differences between these two principles, which will significantly contribute to a profound understanding and comprehensive grasp of each topic, God willing.

Human reason is the foundation of obligation, and with it, a person becomes accountable. In the realm of ijtihad, the obligation of ijtihad and specialized learning in religious sciences is not possible for everyone, which is why only those capable of ijtihad should fulfill this duty, and others should follow them. Those engaged in ijtihad must operate within specific rules to ensure their ijtihad is regulated. This research aims to establish rules for the use of reason as evidence. It first examines reason and its various types from the perspective of Usulis and then seeks to extract and establish foundational rules for them. The results of this research have identified five key principles: Al-asl at-tadhyeeq fee ahkaam al-'aql al-mustaqill wa at-tawsi'a fee ahkaam al-'aql ghayr al-mustaqill (The default is to restrict the rulings of independent reason and expand the rulings of dependent reason); 'Aql al-mujtahid al-mustaneer binoor ash-shar' huwa ad-daleel (The reason of the mujtahid, enlightened by the light of Sharia, is the evidence); 'Aql al-mukallaf bil-ijtihad huwa ad-daleel (The reason of the one obligated to perform ijtihad is the evidence); Lil-'aql majaal fee al-ahkaam al-mutlaq 'an az-zamaan wal-makaan wal-muqayyad bihima wa yalzim at-tafkeek baynahuma (Reason has a role in absolute rulings, free from time and place, and those bound by time and place, and distinguishing between them is necessary); Yajibu intisaab ahkaam al-'aql bil-'aql wash-shar' bish-shar' (The rulings of reason must be attributed to reason, and the rulings of Sharia to Sharia. These are examples of the necessary principles in this field. Another result is the need to differentiate between various rulings: "purely Sharia," "purely rational," "Sharia-rational," and "rational-Sharia." This distinction must be addressed through the presentation of specific works by proficient and specialized scholars so that those obligated can distinguish between Sharia and rational rulings. The research was conducted using library methods, aiming to extract rules and principles that can subject the reason of the mujtahid to regulation and structure.