نشریه ادیان و عرفان
سال پنجاه و هفتم شماره 2 (پاییز و زمستان 1403)

"Existential thinking, as a type of non-conceptual knowledge, involves a journey from falsehood to truth and from the outward to the inward, and in its essence, interpretive knowledge seeks to refer forms and appearances to their origin, inwardness, and reality. On the other hand, in the view of great thinkers, art is neither a representation of the external world nor an object of aesthetics but rather the revelation and emergence of truth. If we consider authentic art as the 'unveiling of truth' and 'something that opens a world,' then authentic art will be a kind of genuine openness and revelation of existence, and the artist is someone who manifests existence in their work. Accordingly, what the artist reveals in their art, if approached through the method of interpretation and unveiled, discloses a specific world to us and allows us to progress from the outward appearance of the artistic work to the inwardness of art—namely, the truth of existence and its inward manifestations—to take a step closer to the truth. Therefore, art is accompanied by pre-existing knowledge and insight, which serves as a ladder of knowledge for its practitioner. Authentic art, as something that reveals an aspect of truth, can be discussed in the context of mysticism, especially the mysticism of Ibn Arabi. Since an ascending and cognitive journey from the outward to the inward lies at the core of this art, it also constitutes a form of existential-presential knowledge. This research has been conducted through a library-analytical method."

Yoga is one of the six philosophical schools of India and is a set of physical, mental, and spiritual practices that originated in ancient India. Yogic practices have been used by Buddhists, Jains, and almost all systems that emphasise meditation. These different philosophical systems have led to the formation of different yogic thoughts. Jainism, like other religions of Indian origin, places great importance on yoga and meditation as a means of spiritual progress and liberation. The text of Yogadṛṣṭisaṃuccaya is one of the essential texts of the prominent scholar of the Jain tradition, Haribadra Seri, in the field of yoga. Haribhadra's writings on yoga provide an eighth-century analysis of yoga from a Jainism perspective. Haribhadra calls every spiritual and religious act that frees a person yoga. He practices three unique types of yoga that the seeker can achieve eight people by this path.

Work is a concept that has a semantic correlation with concepts such as property, service, poverty, etc. In religious and mystical traditions, such concepts often take on a spiritual aspect, as the source of value of work is the acquisition of income and moral values dependent on it. This point can be clearly understood by examining the circumstances and sayings of the Sufis of Baghdad in the second and third centuries of AH. These Sufis, who were primarily ascetics and impoverished and earned their living through work, disagreed with the concept and necessity of work. A study of the intellectual foundations and practical methods of four famous figures of Baghdad Sufism (Junaid, Kharaz, Nouri and Muhasibi), using the qualitative analysis of ancient texts, shows that (1) work did not have much central importance for them and (2) the doctrine of tawakkul caused differences of opinion about work among them, as some consider work as opposed to tawakkul and did not see it as necessary for the seeker (salik) to engage in it, while some did not see it as opposed to work and considered it dependent on the seeker's status. (3) In their view, official and government gob was rejected, and of course (4) service to one's fellow man and altruism were sacred concepts related to work, just as (5) earning a lawful livelihood and avoiding dubious earning, which are also related to work, were of interest to them. On the other hand, (6) work was highly reprehensible if it led to an individual's preoccupation with worldly affairs and neglect of the Hereafter.

Some believe that the verse "That bitter one whom the Sufi called the mother of all evils / Is more delicious to us than the kiss of the maidens" contains a jab and disrespect from Hafez towards the Prophet of Islam, as it refers to the phrase "wine is the mother of all evils," attributed to him, being spoken by a Sufi, who has a negative portrayal in Hafez's poetry. Furthermore, in the second hemistich, contrary to the Prophet's words, drinking it is deemed a commendable act. An interpretation of the ghazal, aimed at uncovering the poet's intent, relying on Dilthey's author-centred hermeneutics and a descriptive-analytical method, indicates the playful nature of the ghazal, particularly the mentioned verse. The vertical axis of the ghazal suggests a dialogue between Hafez and a group of religious scholars of his time. Hafez's advice for tolerance and kindness, along with the notion that his lack of good reputation is God's will, amidst signs indicating the poet's poverty during the time of composing the poem and his request for the audience's attention with phrases like kindness and tolerance, strengthens the possibility that the poem belongs to a period in Hafez's life when he was accused of being an outcast. On the other hand, considering Hafez's religious character, it seems unlikely that he intended to insult the Prophet; instead, his aim was likely to critique those who rejected him, who were the powerful elite associated with asceticism and Sufism and unjustly considered him to be of ill repute and tainted.

The biblical account of the creation event indicates that God has created man in His image to be like Him. This account closely connects two realms of divinity and humanity: one (man) and the likeness of the other (God). Given that in Christian theology, the doctrine of original sin is considered to mean the gap between God and human beings, the way to restore this relationship and how it is possible (salvation) has been discussed from many aspects. Aquinas presents the existence and likeness of man to God from the perspective of the concept of "participation". He believes that man's being is based on participation in the divine existence. Man's participatory being is, in fact, participation in the divine good (first activity). And man's primary goal is to attempt to actualize this potential good in himself. Man's downward arc is participation in the divine existence (creation), and his upward arc is becoming an operational instrument of God in nature (continuation of participation). He is in the process of perfection, actualizing his existential goal and becoming the "image of God". This article examines the human condition and its sub-topics, such as "evil", "faith", and "salvation", from Aquinas's perspective of the concept of participation.

Repentance (tawbah) is one of the key concepts in Islamic mysticism and has been extensively explored in the works of numerous thinkers and Sufis. Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, in Qūt al-Qulūb, and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, in Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn, have elaborated on this concept. Al-Makkī conceptualises repentance (tawbah) as a spiritual and psychological process involving inner struggle (mujāhadah) and self-correction. He emphasises the practical and ascetic aspects of repentance (tawbah), presenting it as the first step on the path of sulūk (mystical journey). In contrast, al-Ghazālī, adopting a systematic and rational approach, divides repentance (tawbah) into three stages: knowledge (knowing sin), spiritual state (feeling remorse), and practice (decision to abandon sin). In addition to accepting al-Makkī's views, al-Ghazālī, through philosophical and psychological analyses, presents repentance (tawbah) as a path to spiritual transcendence and the purification of the heart (qalb). This study employs a comparative approach to examine the views of these two thinkers and analyses their differences and similarities. The findings suggest that al-Makkī primarily emphasises practical and ascetic sulūk, while al-Ghazālī, utilizing rational and philosophical tools, offers a more systematic approach. Ultimately, this article demonstrates that while these two thinkers share common ground regarding the importance of repentance (tawbah), their divergent approaches reflect differences in their intellectual schools of thought.

Madhyamika is one of the Mahayana schools that has created a new epistemological and ontological horizon in Indian and Buddhist thought by proposing the theory of "Emptiness" (Shunyata). "The phenomenon of Mind" is one of the practical components that the philosophers of the school have included in their fundamental concerns, the analysis of issues related to it; however, independent study of this issue has been neglected to some extent from the perspective of researchers. Therefore, the present research is based on the question: first, what is the meaning of the Emptiness of Mind? And second, based on what evidence and on which meaning does Madhyamika insist on the illusion of the Mind and its intentionality? Research findings indicate that the Madhyamika tries, in one respect, to demonstrate the unreality of the Mind and its signifiers through various arguments, including the negation of the source of knowledge (object), the demonstrating of the unreality of the Mind (subject), and the inexplicability of what is called mental knowledge; although, based on their claim to the dual aspects of reality, a). Samvrti-satya (relative reality) and b). Paramartha-satya (absolute reality), one can also conclude that its thinkers accept the relative reality of the Mind. Furthermore, from the perspective of this school, according to the dual assumption of reality, one can speak of two types of knowledge. The highest kind of knowledge in this school is Prajna, which is assumed to be another title for Shuniyata, and its actualization is possible only by going beyond mental knowledge and relative reality.

The problem of knowledge has always been a critical issue in the history of Indian thought. The role attributed to knowledge by Indian sages and philosophers in their soteriological frameworks has led to discussions characterized by remarkable precision and depth. Among these discourses, Indian scholars have paid special attention to cognitive instruments, and the Nyāya, one of the realist schools in India, is engaging in extensive debates on this issue. Specifically, it recognizes four valid instruments: perception, inference, testimony, and analogy. In contrast, Nāgārjuna, the Buddhist philosopher and founder of the Mādhyamaka, considers the realism espoused by Nyāya School, deeming it erroneous, and challenges their epistemological positions based on specific ontological presuppositions. This article employs a descriptive-analytical methodology to elucidate Nāgārjuna's critiques of the epistemological perspectives prevalent during his time, particularly those of the Nyāya school.Furthermore, we will clarify how he responds to critiques from adversaries concerning perceived inconsistencies within his philosophical system. Generally, Nāgārjuna, at first, articulates three explanatory approaches to defend the validity of cognitive instruments, which are 1) the theory of mutual validation of cognitive instruments, 2) the theory of self-validation of cognitive instruments, and 3) the theory of the validation of the cognitive instruments by their objects. He subsequently finds all of them inadequate and, ultimately, by asserting that he possesses no doctrine, attempts to resolve the fundamental inconsistencies in his philosophical views in a manner reminiscent of a quasi-Wittgensteinian approach by analysing various reference types.

From the beginning of time to the present, man's most significant concern has been to solve the mystery of death in a way that makes it possible to distinguish humans from animals by predicting death and the afterlife; as a result, this can also be seen in the earliest myths of humanity. The construction of the majestic Pyramids of Egypt and other opulent monuments further supports this assertion.The attitudes and beliefs of four Middle Eastern mythological categories—Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Hebrew Bible, and Zoroastrian—about and after death are reported, examined, and contrasted in this article. This article aims to address issues like whether death is a natural part of human existence or if it has become accidental. Who is the one who created death? God, man, or the evil power of the cosmos? Does dying have to be a pleasant or unpleasant experience? What qualities do heaven and hell have in these myths? Who was the first victim of murder or death? In the other world, are all people or only a few judged? How is the resurrection judgment carried out, and who are the judges? While the myths of Egypt and Aryan Zoroastrianism, despite the geographical coexistence of their adherents, don't have many similarities, a comparative analysis reveals that the myths of Mesopotamia and the Hebrew Bible (also known as the so-called Christian Old Testament) do.

By separating the hermeneutic approach from the hermeneutic theory, this article first explains the hermeneutic theory of Friedrich Schleiermacher, a 19th-century Protestant theologian. It then expresses and evaluates his hermeneutic approach based on this theory.According to Schleiermacher, in understanding a text, attention should be paid to the text itself and the author's mentality; otherwise, the interpreter cannot be sure of their understanding of the author's work. Secondly, besides grammatical and linguistic rules, he presented rules and methods that enable the interpreter to reconstruct the author's mentality. Thirdly, he believed that the interpreter must set aside their assumptions when reconstructing the author's mentality to understand the author's work truly. Fourthly, he continued to use the "method" to understand the author's subjectivity and considered it possible, albeit difficult, to attain the final understanding—namely, the author's intention.Despite significant innovations, such as 1) paying attention to the concept of understanding as the goal of hermeneutic theory, 2) presenting a theory about the nature of language, 3) exploring the intertwining of language and thought, 4) emphasising the role of the author's subjectivity in the understanding process, and 5) providing methods for achieving insight into the author's subjectivity, Schleiermacher's hermeneutic theory acknowledges the possibility of transcending the interpreter's assumptions when understanding the text. He defended the objectivity of understanding in terms of the potential to grasp the author's subjectivity within the framework of their historical tradition.However, postmodern hermeneutics, such as Gadamer's, argue that it is impossible to transcend the interpreter's presuppositions in understanding the text and, consequently, reproduce the author's subjectivity or achieve objective understanding—specifically, the author's subjectivity within their historical context.

The verse in the Old Testament that states, "All the firstborn are mine," has been interpreted in two different ways. One interpretation suggests that Yahweh demanded the sacrifice of firstborns, and children were offered as sacrifices to Him. The other interpretation reveals Yahweh's abhorrence of such practices and the severe warnings He issued to the Israelites against child sacrifices. The authors of the Old Testament depict "Molek" in the ancient Near East as a deity associated with child sacrifices. It seems that these authors deliberately attributed the act of child sacrifice to the God Molek to portray it as an alien and detestable practice in the eyes of Yahweh and to dissuade people from offering their children to Yahweh. The main question is: What is the connection between child sacrifice and Molek? Is Molek the name of a god, or does it refer to a specific ritual? This study is descriptive-analytical, based on sacred texts, historical records, and interpretations by scholars, and seeks to examine the nature, concept, and role of Molek among the Hebrews.

The issue of predestination and free will is one of the most challenging and complex epistemological questions. Muslim scholars have long debated this matter, presenting various perspectives that have been categorized into four main views: determinism (jabr), acquisition (kasb), delegation (tajwid), and the doctrine of amr bayn al-amrain (a position between the two extremes). Among these perspectives, the view of Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī, as a prominent figure in Islamic mysticism, holds significant importance. This study seeks to determine whether Ibn ʿArabī’s position aligns with the theory of kasb. In other words, does the mystical perspective on predestination and free will correspond to the Ash‘arite interpretation? Using a descriptive-analytical method and by examining Ibn Arabi’s works, this study concludes that his mystical principle of the Unity of Being (wahdat al-wujud) renders the issue of predestination and free will meaningless due to the negation of the subject itself. However, it is still possible to interpret predestination and free will within a mystical framework, considering the relationship between God’s existence and its manifestations. Moreover, based on the mystical doctrine of aʿyan thābita (immutable archetypes), Ibn Arabi asserts that the immutable archetype of a human being, in its divine realm (suqʿ al-rububi), inherently possesses will and volition. This potentiality manifests in the created world as a willing and choosing agent. Therefore, while Ibn Arabi regards God as the ultimate agent (fāʿil), he also acknowledges the realisation of actions through the human agent, who wills them freely. In this view, humans perform acts voluntarily while God actualises them. These two mystical foundations lead to the conclusion that Ibn Arabi does not subscribe to the Ash‘arite theory of kasb. Unlike the Ash‘arites, who uphold the independent existence of God, humans, and multiple entities, Ibn Arabi maintains that only one existence encompasses all of reality. Furthermore, in contrast to the Ash‘arite doctrine of kasb, which denies human agency and restricts human participation to the mere acquisition of actions, Ibn Arabi embeds volition within the very essence of human reality, asserting that will (irādah) is inscribed in the immutable archetype of each individual