فصلنامه حکمت و فلسفه
سال نهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 34، تابستان 1392)

After entering the Islamic philosophy, gradation underwent major changes to the point that gradation of existence became replaced with gradation of manifestation in transcendental theosophy as mystical epistemology gave no credit to gradation of existence.Allameh Tabataba’i not only criticizes gradation in existence but also suggests some methods for moving from gradation of ranks to gradation of manifestations.

This is a comparative investigation of the views held by two philosophers (one practicing analytic philosophy and the other German idealism) regarding the foundation and beginning of philosophy. However, the article mainly addresses later Wittgenstein’s. The fact that Hegel and later Wittgenstein hold different views about the nature of philosophy and its methods and missions makes the discussion difficulty but interesting. With an emphasis on the foundation and beginning of philosophy, the researcher conducts a comparative study of their views about the social nature of language, private language, another, desire, form of life, essentialism, Platonism, Descartism, holism, doubt and certainty, groundless belief, worldview, subjectivity, description and clarification, rationalism, modern subjectivism, sense, and so on. The two share a belief in common sense or social discourse as well as the necessity of another. Another has a strong presence in their approach to the foundation of philosophy. The same is true about action. Philosophy has no foundation in absence of common sense, social discourse, and action. Their main areas of difference are essentialism, holism, and description and clarification. Finally, some areas for further research are suggested.

Any discussion of apophatic and kataphatic theologies as two opposite trends which have, throughout the history of philosophical though on God, attracted great thinkers, sheds light on one of the most important aspects of God-human epistemological relation. The present paper investigates Meister Eckhart’s viewpoint on these two approaches to theology. First, his definitions of apophasis and kataphasis are studied. Then, some suggestions are made to narrow the gap between the two definitions. Later in the paper, the two definitions are recognized as proper and discussed in detail. The paper ends with a study of Eckhart’s intellectual fount which aroused his interest in the two opposing trends of apophasis and kataphasis.

As a remarkable achievement of Islamic philosophy, the theory of religious knowledge has had its opponents and proponents since its conception. Seyyed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas is one of the proponents and theoreticians of Islamization of knowledge. He, first, adapted philosophy and worldview to the Quran, belief in the ranks of existence, and absolute dependence of existence on God. He went on to shed light on the unbreakable relation between human and the world, stating that human is the most important part of existence and an immortal being whose nature is best described in the Quran. Al-Attas, finally, defined the structure and goals of an effective educational system. For him, the true goal of education is to realize the truth of the Quran in human; therefore, the language and knowledge of the Quran should constitute the most important part of education. Moreover, al-Attas raised the issue of Westernization of knowledge to clarify the Islamization of knowledge. In his belief, Westernization of knowledge covers (a) Western culture and civilization (b) key elements of natural sciences and (c) humanities and applied sciences. On the other hand, Islamization of knowledge, according to al-Attas, requires (a) recognizing the key elements of Islamic knowledge (b) replacing Western key elements with Islamic ones (c) basing natural and applied sciences on Islamic foundations and (d) revising these sciences in accordance with Islamic elements.

This article seeks to study Rumi’s and al-Ghazali’s approaches to ta’wil (text interpretation). First, literal and figurative meanings of ta’wil are explained, and its manifestations in the Holy Quran are investigated. Then, its rules, characteristics of interpreter, legitimate and illegitimate interpretation, as well as tafsir (exegesis) are discussed. Moreover, al-Ghazali is shown to be under the influence of Batiniyah and Mu’tazilah when interpreting texts while he is known to be a formidable opponent of their beliefs. Then, Rumi’s approach to ta’wil is addressed and shown to cover ta’wil at three stages, including the Quranic verses and hadiths, signs, and mystical expressions. Finally, Rumi’s and al-Ghazali’s approaches are compared. The results indicate that Rumi’s approach to ta’wil is somehow similar to al-Ghazali’s.

Interpreters of classical philosophy, especially those concentrating on the philosophy of Plotinus, mostly believe that he, in contrast with Plato who laid the foundations of political philosophy, was not concerned with politics and the introduction of an efficient political system as the basis for the classical political philosophy. While Plotinus did not explicitly address issues such as administration, government, freedom, and justice, the authors of this paper believe that his non-political philosophy carries some political implications which can be tapped to compile his political philosophy. Therefore, they seek to find and fit these implications together in order to complete the picture of Plotinus’s political philosophy.

Husserl’s thought on philosophy of language and meaning can be divided at least into two distinct eras. In the first era (sometimes called Platonic realism), Husserl held views similar to those of Frege who believed meaning to be an ideal type. In the second era, his views took a transcendental turn and he used the term noema to refer to the complicated nature of meaning. This article is an attempt to shed some light on the said eras and underline the important role intention and awareness played during them. The results demonstrate that, against the ups and downs of his views, Husserl followed a fixed line of thought.