The Concept of "Truth" in Wittgenstein's Viewpoint

The question of "Truth", as an original question, is a guidance to Wittgenstein's thought. He tries to show that linguistics, epistemology and ontology are consisting to one another. In his view, although we can not to reply an ontological question in an epistemological way, but the results of the different ways should not contradict each other. In the early Wittgenstein's view, correspondence is accepted as the criterion of "truth" which is derived from experience. He says that this criterion is not applicable to logical propositions, because there is no correspondent for them. He believes that these propositions are logical because they are consistent to one another and this attribute is necessary for them. In the second Wittgenstein's view, he emphasizes on the application instead of the facts. Here the theory of correspondence collapses and "truth" finds its meaning in the different styles of lives.