احمد حمداللهی

The main question of this article is that what are the important differences or similarities between Aristotle's and Frege's analysis of the categorical proposition? Based on the famous view, Aristotle analyzes the categorical proposition into three components: Subject, Predicate and Relation; while Frege analyzes the categorical proposition into two components of Variable and Function, and therefore; these two analyses are completely different and there is no similarity between them. In the other article, I have argued that in the Aristotle's viewpoint, in the logical analysis of the categorical proposition, against its linguistic analysis, it is divided into two main components of subject and predicate. At this article, I have shown that by accepting of this analysis and based on it, it becomes clear that: firstly, there are important similarities between these two analyses: 1) both are two-part analyses 2) Aristotle, like Frege, considers «to be attributed to something else» to be the essential feature of the predicate part; Secondly, there are important differences between them: 1) Aristotle considers «to be attributed to something else» to be merely the essential property of the Role of Predicate, but Frege considers it to be also the essential property of general concepts that replaces in this role, and therefore 2) Frege, against Aristotle, maintains that general concepts cannot be the subject of propositions. This viewpoint of Frege is based on the «Fundamental distinction between Object and Concept». Therefore the root of the differences between the two analyses should be sought in this assertion..

The question of "the origin of ideas and concepts" is one of the most important issues in the new age of Western philosophy. In this article I have attempted to provide an analysis of the process of formation and importance of this issue during this period. I have shown in this analysis: The first step in the formation of this problem was the presentation of the Idea of innate ideas by the rationalists of new age, which is due to some of their metaphysical foundations and views, rather than answering an explicit and independent question called "the origin of ideas and concepts". At this stage, although the question of "the origin of ideas and concepts" has been raised in some way, it has not yet emerged as a serious and independent issue. In the second step, John Locke with the aim of rejecting of the Idea of innate ideas, for the first time explicitly and directly raising the question of "the origin of ideas and concepts" and discussing it seriously and in detail. Leibniz's re-defense of innate ideas against Locke's attacks, has led to the explicit formation of dualism of Rationalism and Empiricism for the first time, and thus making this debate particularly important. In the third and final step, Hume, by linking the fate of very important issues such as the possibility of Science and Metaphysics to the question of "the origin of ideas and concepts", makes it a matter of immense value that it never had before.

In the Hume period and beyond, through some of his views The Idea has been formed in the minds of some scholars that "the explanation of the way in which ideas or concepts originate is a way or the only way to secure their reality and epistemological validity" That is to say "if we cannot explain how a concept or idea originates, it will lack epistemological validity". By adopting this Idea, the fate of very important issues such as the possibility of Science and Metaphysics is tied to the discussion of the "origin of ideas" and thus this debate has found an extraordinary importance. The trace of this Idea is also, more or less, visible in the Contemporary Islamic philosophy. In this article I challenged this Idea and tried, with establishing some arguments, to show that; the epistemological validity of a concept lies, above all, in the very concept itself and is revealed in its comparison with reality and thus, explaining how concepts originate is not, firstly the only way and secondly the best and the shortest way to attain their epistemological validity, and yet has considerable difficulties within itself. If this claim is true, then it will have very important consequences, Including: 1) Tying the fate of Science and Metaphysics to the discussion of the origin of ideas is wrong and is an epistemological-historical mistake. And so 2) the discussion of the origin of the ideas has no epistemological utility and necessity as some had attributed to it.

The ninth chapter of De interpretation is one of the important logical works of Aristotle. This paper has tried to provide an accurate and comprehensive analysis of this chapter's structure and its major and minor discussions. Many of Aristotle's commentators believe that his main problem in this chapter is to deny the necessity of future events. But a careful review of this chapter shows that Aristotle's main problem in this regard is in explaining and establishing the claim that "none of the items in the pair of negative and affirmative individual propositions regarding the future should necessarily be true or false", and the issue of the necessity or unnecessity of future events as well as some other important issues have been raised along with this claim. Much of Aristotle's remarks in this chapter has been devoted to his reasoning to support this claim. In this paper, we have presented a clear analysis and formulation of his argument and its introduction. A significant number of Aristotle's commentators have claimed that by stating such viewpoints, he has violated the principle of contradiction. But attention to the exact meaning of that claim on the one hand, and the provisions of the principle of contradiction on the other, show that the claim does not in any way violate the principle of contradiction.