فهرست مطالب سیدناصرسلطانی

Maurice Duverger was a French political scientist and professor of constitutional law in the 1950s-1970s, and greatly influenced the intellectual climate of constitutional law and political science. His fame spread abroad throughout Europe, North America and Asia, and his books and articles became known to thinkers and students in a score of countries as diverse as Iran, the U.S., and Spain. Duverghe stood between these two academic disciplines and tried to establish a link between them. Abolfazl Qazi, a constitutional law professor at the University of Tehran undertook the task of translating some of Duverger’s books into Persian, e.g., Institutions politiques et Droit constitutionnel (Constitutional Rights and Political Institutions), and Sociologie politique (Political Sociology). He also wrote a book which was clearly and significantly influenced by the French scholar’s writings on the subject of constitutional law. Nowadays, research conducted on the history of French constitutional thought have been analyzing the negative impact of Duverger’ school of thought. The important narrative that he presented about political institutions, for example, his discussions of ‘semi-authoritarian system’ and ‘semi-parliamentarism’ has been gradually forgotten. At the end of the 1970s, a slow but significant change in political science was taking place as the result of the systematic and comprehensive use of methods and theories of sociology and history by political scientists, and the growing value of collaborative research, empirical analyses and multidisciplinary scholarly efforts to discuss and analyze issues. This change turned Maurice Duverge into a historical figure who belonged to an obsolete and pre-scientific period. This "new" political science was not exclusively interested in the same issues that were of concern for Duverge such as voting. behavior and political parties. Instead, the attention somehow turned to exploring how politics can draw inspiration from other disciplines and encourage collaboration, elaboration, and evaluation.The results of the recent studies which have critically examined Duverger’s writings might also apply to the discussions of Iranian Constitutional theory. The main objective of this article is to find suitable answers to the following research questions: a) How have Duverger's works influenced Iran’s theory of constitutional rights? and b) What consequences have these works had on research concerning constitutional rights in Iran? Using the qualitative content analysis method, the most significant works of Duverger and Abolfazl Ghazi are examined in order to answer these questions. In the research hypothesis, the author claims that Ghazi’s translations of Duverger’s books have had a negative impact on the studies of constitutional law in Iran. The main findings indicate that the studies of constitutional rights in Iran are still under the influence of Abolfazl Ghazi’s work which had been in part influenced by Maurice Duverger's thought. These studies have been diverted from the right course and have not found its way. Thus, Iranian scholars and leading experts must pay closer attention to the link between constitutional rights and political science as two imperative fields of knowledge.

Constitutions hold the status of being national treasures, cherished for their intrinsic value and their material significance. Prior to the formal inscription of written constitutional texts, foundational principles often took shape in the guise of established customs. Yet, the passage of time has highlighted the constraints of fixed principles when confronted with the dynamic demands of evolving societies and emerging generations. Should these principles fail to evolve in sync with contemporary concerns, even the most meticulously crafted written constitution risks becoming an archaic relic, relegated to obscurity on library shelves. Constitution Revision functions as an equilibrium between the twin poles of stability and transformation. It serves as a counterbalance that wards against the pitfalls of constitutional instability and ceaseless amendment, while simultaneously safeguarding the elasticity that codified principles. need to accommodate evolving circumstances The concept of constitutional revision is mentioned in the texts of codified constitutions in many legal systems. However, unwritten constitutional adjustments and revisions remain. Notably, in Iran, the interplay of customary transformations alongside formal amendments revealed an intriguing omission—namely, the absence of explicit reference to constitutional revision in the face of shifting societal paradigms. A parallel scenario arose post-Islamic Revolution when the developing Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran neglected to incorporate a provision for the revision of its textual framework. Only after the decree of Ayatollah Khomeini (RA) was the principle of revision formally enshrined within the constitution's text. Yet, despite this articulation, after more than three decades this principle still lays dormant. Simultaneously, in reality and practice, there have been undeniable modifications to the implementation and utilization of certain constitutional principles, alluding to a state of "unofficial" revision that contrasts with the structured processes outlined in the Constitution.The Comprehensive Nature of Constitutional Change A constitution, despite its comprehensive purview, seldom possesses the capacity to encapsulate the entirety of a political system. Irrespective of its encompassment of legal principles, even the most autocratic or democratic political framework grapples with the challenge of reflecting the evolving tapestry of political changes within the confines of a constitution. In instances where a nation's constitution remains ostensibly unaltered over prolonged periods, the possibility of a subtle, unwritten evolution looms large. This article tries to elucidate the framework of informal constitutional modification through established customs. Drawing from historical precedents predating the Islamic Revolution, as well as post-revolution occurrences, alongside a comparative exploration of revision experiences in global jurisdictions, the article embarks on a quest to address the central query: Can the constitution undergo revision by way of constitutional customs?

Regarding unwritten constitutional principles, the specific concept of constitutional revision remains shrouded in relative obscurity, with an absence of comprehensive articles or treatises delving into its intricacies. Iranian legal scholars, while contributing to the discourse surrounding formal revision within the constitution, have largely overlooked its informal, customary dimensions.

This article embraces a descriptive-analytical methodology, an approach that holistically examines the subject matter in both its historical and contextual dimensions. The descriptive aspect entails a meticulous dissection of the historical progression of unwritten constitutional revision, tracing its evolution from pre-revolutionary times to the contemporary landscape. This chronological expedition provides invaluable insights into the genesis, evolution, and possible trajectories of unwritten revision. on the other hand, the analytical dimension engages in cross-examination of these historical occurrences, thereby identifying patterns, disparities, and commonalities that serve to shed light on the possibilities of informal constitutional change. This dual-method approach fosters a comprehensive comprehension of the subject matter by situating it within both its historical and contemporary setting.

Amendment and review of legal statutes are an essential part of societal development. The underlying philosophy of legislative endeavors centers on catering to societal needs, and as long as these needs persist, the volume of legal regulations inevitably increases. However, refinement and revision of existing laws rather than a sheer accumulation of statutes is an astute strategy. While the process of altering a constitution is inherently intricate, at its core, it is a form of legislation that demands responsiveness to contemporary demands. When textual revisions are hindered or fall short of aligning with the evolving demands, customary revision acts as a potential alternative. The identification and utilization of foundational customs play a pivotal role in the process of constitutional amendment. Nonetheless, caution must be exercised to prevent the misuse of these customs as tools for political manipulation. These fundamental customs, when synchronized with the tenets of governmental institutions, political actions, and the constitution's fundamental spirit, can facilitate the refinement and adaptation of core legal texts. The ambit of their influence, however, is subject to the limits and powers of governmental bodies and political actions. However, they cannot overrule the individual liberties enshrined within the constitution. In essence, these customs should function as instruments of societal progress in harmony with prevailing needs, rather than mechanisms for advancing political agendas.

The legislators primarily aim to compile clear and unambiguous rules; however, it is in some cases inevitable to use equivocal and paradoxical terms. The reasons for such an occurrence are galore. In the present study, this subject was investigated in the Iranian Constitution since prior to Constitutional Revolution to the present time, and some examples were brought. In each case, the basis of the equivocality and representation in constitution was separately investigated and the motives were discussed. One of the aspects of using such terms indicated the lack of unanimity among the working groups over using the clear and unambiguous terms insofar as no conclusion has been drawn in socio-political discussions, and no unanimity over the conflicts has been reached. Therefore, ambiguity of the socio-political level has entered into a legal level and has affected the legal texts. In other words, members of working political groups haven't still come upon an agreed solution for the controversial issues, and choosing each way solely will satisfy one of the parties, resulting in an imbalance of powers in favor of one party. Hence, solving such a controversy is achieved through delaying precise expression of the will by each party and postponing the decision-making over the issue, all of which is earned by using equivocal phrases and silencing the issue; discussing such issues will result in the futility of the Constitution. The article ultimately recommended that jurists take into account the principle of silence and equivocality in constitution,

The role of the King in selecting the Prime Minister and ministers in the Iranian Constitution of 1906-1907 is the focus of this study. Prior to the victory of constitutionalism and the formulation of the Constitution, efforts were made to establish a cabinet, with chancellors appointed by Naser al-Din Shah Qajar and subsequent rulers to govern the country. The King's involvement in choosing the chancellor and ministers had a significant impact, as reflected in the constitutional law. However, the constitutionalist government, with the Parliament as its main institution, played an active role in overseeing the executive branch. Conversely, the King, as a non-responsible body in the constitutionalist government, had to distance himself from governance and restrain his authority. Given its historical background in Iran, the monarchy sought to maintain its political superiority by interpreting the constitution differently and exerting influential interference in the selection of ministers. This dynamic has undergone changes from the Qajar period to the Pahlavi era and beyond.This article aims to demonstrate the existence of such precedents in Iran's constitutional rights and to provide real cases and examples of the role played by the country's leader in appointing officials in the executive branch, even if not explicitly stated in the laws. The documentary evidence presented in this article substantiates the role of the country's leader in the selection of ministers and prime ministers. The challenges associated with this issue within the legal system become apparent when examining the political practices resulting from such procedures. The study delves into each period, exploring the role of the Parliament in ministerial selection during the Qajar era, the King's personal decision-making in the first Pahlavi era, and the diminishing role of the Parliament in the second Pahlavi era, when constitutional governance rules were observed from August 1941 to July 1953.The tradition of kings choosing chancellors and ministers in pre-constitutional systems influenced the inclusion of such decision-making powers in the constitutional laws. In the establishment of the Supreme Court during the reign of Mirza Husayn Khan, it was stated that the appointment and dismissal of the chancellor was solely at the discretion of the King, and the appointment of ministers was subject to the chancellor's appointment by the decree of the King. This distinction between the monarchy and the government was highlighted in the Supreme Court Bill, emphasizing the role of the chancellor as the head of the government responsible for all government departments. Early treatises promoting constitutionalism also recognized the king's power in appointing and dismissing government officials. However, in the constitutional monarchy, this role was redefined in relation to other principles and underwent significant changes.The establishment of the Grand Court aimed to separate the monarchy from the government, with "consultation of ministers" being a prerequisite. The Prime Minister was to oversee the entirety of the government in the presence of the King, while ministers held responsibility in their respective branches under the chancellor. These provisions sought to delineate the authority and competence of each entity, although some brevity and ambiguity remain. Nevertheless, the intention behind these provisions is discernible.

The main demand of Constitutionalism movement which was succeeded by the slogan of “The Court,” was the law, based on which the first work of constitutionalists was compiling laws and reestablishing the judicial courts. They also continued their former trial for establishment of legal system, and made a huge success by abolishing the Capitulation in April, 1928. Nowadays, the New Iranian Legal System is on the verge of its hundredth anniversary of establishment. During the last century, important endeavors have been made for establishment of the new legal system, one of the most brilliant and everlasting of which was compilation of civil law. The law is important because of its continuation and survival, and it is hence necessary to investigate the reasons of its success. However, in spite of such a position, Iranian Civil Law has disregarded the study of history of civil code, while it is one of the parts of civil law and a topic of interest in many law faculties around the world. Although research done by researchers of other fields is important and useful in historical and sociological viewpoints, such fields cannot explain some legal realities and subtleties; hence, it is necessary for law faculties to do the required trial for the history since no other field can fulfill this gap. The present study is done based on a legal viewpoint to compile the history of civil law and to provide lessons for Iranian Legal System.

This research aims to indicate the roots of public law in the Constitutionalism in which the prerequisites for the citizens of the country to participate in public affairs as well as the basis for developing the concept of political participation were provided. This study examines the topic in the works of one of the famous jurists of this era. The concept of political participation should be developed by restricting both claims and obstacles. First, it had to constitutionalize the independent monarchy that it considered the whole country as its absolute property, and then recognized an authority for the public in public affairs, which was previously under the authority of the jurists. Both of these obstacles were removed through the concept of political equality. It was for years that concepts were being prepared in the workshop of Constitutionalism to create equality of humankind. Even a concept like representation was the result and implication of the concept of political equality. Within concepts such as "common house", "thirty crores" and "public affairs", the notion of political equality of the people of the country was developed and with the help of such foundation, thinking about such concepts was made possible. The present paper indicates that the emergence of these concepts was a sign of a fundamental change in the basis of sovereignty and its transfer from the king to the people on the one hand and the establishment of a kind of the public authority on the other hand.

Because of their position and power regarding soul, property, and honor of people, the conduct of judges has crucial or fatal effect on the life of clients of courts. Therefore, some threats and issues threaten the position of judges. Moreover, the personal conduct of judges can influence the entire judicial system and monitoring their conduct is therefore an unavoidable course of action. With respect to the difficulties and increasing complexity of judgment, some working groups in Judicial Branch and High Disciplinary Court of Judges in the studies countries have been established to investigate the number and nature of faults and reports of regulatory bodies and to take further measures including in-service trainings for judges in order to avoid and control the offences, and teach the ability to overcome the problems and failures. Hence, every judicial system is supposed to utilize precise investigations and experiences of other countries to achieve the desired objectives of judicial branch, and to provide opportunities and strategies for correction of professional conduct of judges. In the studied countries, a set of ethical codes for judges is provided in which principles are defined and clarified on which the judges should rely on. Precise and detailed monitoring of commercial and economic activities of judges are ordained which are not noticed in Iranian Judicial System, and the nature of social and economic transitions of Iranian society urges ordaining such regularities, whereas in the law of monitoring the conduct of judges in Iran which is ratified in the recent years, such aspects of this issue has not been the concern of Iranian legislators.

The Constitution must be regarded as one of the elements of a larger order, and the political system based on it, and the "text of the constitution" is just one of these elements. The relationship between political forces and their balance, as the context in which the constitution is flowing, directly affects its life and expands it. In this article, we will draw a conception in which the constitution is not just a text but it includes also a bunch of non-written rules, which play a role in the political system. We are trying to find a fundamental notion on which this distinction is based. Legality and legitimacy are our criterions for such a distinction. We are trying to identify the moments in the political life of Iran in which these two conceptual couples (legality and legitimacy) have been revealed.  For, we will identify these categories in the system of constitutional law in Iran, and show the importance of researching them. Research on the constitutional law in Iran, with lack of these rules, cannot provide a true picture of the Constitution.

After the process of codification of the constitution, with all its complexities of review, a number of unwritten procedures and rules are formed around each principle of the constitution or even separately which are occasionally appeared as the conditions and bounds for the principle of the constitution. Such rules are sometimes so prominent and superior that are able to alter the competence of the public authorities. Representing a true, precise image of constitutional system would not be possible without explaining such rules. Therefore, a methodological drawback can be indicated in the current description of the constitution. Moreover, considering this issue is important in the sense that it can enlighten the more profound layers of The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran, resulting in a better recognition of this constitution. In the present study, one of the unwritten principles of The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran, named Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, is investigated. The process of formation and development of the council is explored. The condition in which the council was established as well as the story of its setting, despite the challenges, is described.

The constitutionalism idea in Iran has a historical background and battle against arbitrary since many years ago considerable efforts have been made in this respect. Since the introduction of Constitutional Vision as one of the most important tools for bounding the extreme powers of the government in all over the world, this issue became prevalent in Iran as well. Amir Kabir and Sepahsalar were the first people in Iran who tried to write a constitution and the constitution as a device to beat against despotism has attracted their attention. Although Amir Kabir’s attempts failed due to the fact that he was murdered, they were followed by other people and the first draft of Constitution was provided thanks to attempts of Yousef Khan Mostashar al-Dowleh. In spite of the marginal principles indicated in the draft by authors, they could act as an overture to further efforts and contributions. Noting the concepts of constitution and principles of the rule of law indicated by the authors can contribute to a better understanding and recognition of these concepts. A number of concepts included in the passage need more elaboration and moreover, the passage points out some of the historical concepts of Persian Constitution Revolution which have not been well-investigated in the current Constitution of Iran. Exploring this heritage and its reflections in the constitutional courses is considered as one of the ways to develop and extend Constitution of Iran.

In the preceding years to Constitutional movement in Iran, the political thought was transferred from independent monarchy to constitutional monarchy due to the inability to govern the country. Therefore, the participation of people in public affairs was the ultimate way to survival and progression of the country in the constitutionalist thought. Moreover, the community and public (species) were recognized in debates. With respect to the advent of such unit, demand for participation in such generic, public unit was recognized. With the awakening and awareness of the public, the demand for participation in “the legislation and governance of respublica” was increased, being set as a “right and share”. In the aforementioned period of Iran’s Constitutionalism, and with respect to the advent of such new issue, a special category of law named Public Law was introduced as a new public law in Iran. In the present study, after explaining the first sign of advent of public and genre, and demand for participation in generic and public affairs, development of the concept was investigated as the origin of Public Law in Iran.

One of the historical demands of Constitutionalism Movement was equality of the people before the law. Violation of equality principle was the cause of the corruption and legal decay of the independent monarchy. In response to this historical national demand, supplementary of the constitutionalism's Constitution reflected this historical demand in the form of a single article. Statement of this principle was faced with the protest of some groups of the society. These groups, on one hand, considered the equality before law to against their social class and union privileges and on the other hand, they understood it to be in conflict with Sharia. It appears that the recent group was seeing a content beyond its meaning in this principle and in addition, merged this problems with some fallacies. The new point that exists in the comparative study on the first issues revolving around this topic in Federal Germany Constitution and Iran’s supplementary Constitution is the similarity which was the motif of the protests and defenses in these two countries. In this article, after discussing the issue in the two countries, analogies of the reasons of both groups are outlined and particularly the arguments of the prominent lawyers presented in Germany's constituent assembly are compared with those of Naini and Mahalati through an analytic and comparative method. Such studies can serve to reveal new dimensions of the importance of the Constitutionalist jurisprudents' endeavors

The thought of Iranian Constitutionalism, the rudiments of which was noticed along with Iran and Russia war, was indeed a reaction to the crisis precipitated all over the country. This thought was a route for renovation and rise of Iran. Based on the fathers of Constitutionalism, a facet of the rise and its bases was the endeavor to enter all ordinary people of the country in deciding for the fate of the country. With the rise of Constitutionalism, such a viewpoint was so spread that with the provision of rudiments, some constitutionalists such as Akhund Khorasani and his disciples identified a common denomater for the public based on which they passed the verdict of equality of the public. After the provision of such rudiments, Akhund Khorasani identified the governance in Occultation as taken by the public, therefore authorizing the generic and public affairs to be handled by ordinary people, while such a right was not observed for ordinary people before the Constitutionalism, being the freeheld of the King. Akhund Khorasani also denounced the monopoly of Islamic jurists, i.e. Faqih, in this field and authorized it for the public.

On the one hand, the ever-growing difficulties caused by the increasing number of legal cases presented at courts, coupled with a shortage of qualified legal experts to efficiently and effectively handle these cases, and on the other hand, the large number of young graduates from Law Schools, present us with an opportunity to solve a substantial portion of our legal system problems using the potentials existing in this new generation of Law Practitioners. However, to make use of this potential, there is a need for change in the curriculum of Law Schools to meet the training needs and provisions for apprenticeship programs in the Jurisdiction System. “Law Clerks”, as a strategy to improve knowledge and skills, has a long standing in other legal systems. Young Law Practitioners in France attempting to begin their careers as lawyers, judges or employment in governmental companies, look back at their Law Clerk apprenticeship as one of the most instructive period in their professional life. In the present article, we will discuss the implementation of this concept in France, efforts made by Iranian judicial pioneers in this regard and courts’ and Law Schools’ approach toward this matter, in order to refresh our frame of mind toward Law Clerks. It is clear that defining roles and responsibilities of Law Clerks towards the court, judges and their legal and professional duties and obligations is a delicate matter and requires in-depth and detailed analysis to ensure the success of this scheme.

Legal expressions and concepts are abundant in the numerous fundamental texts of the modern political thought. The language of law has been one of the main means within which discussions about political thought has been taken place. Therefore, when these texts are translated into other languages, the meaning and the content of the legal expressions and concepts in terms of their scope and connotations shall be considered. Only in this situation one can rely on these translations and they deserve to be cited. So the revision and reconsideration of these texts from the legal concepts point of view seem very useful and necessary. In this paper, focus has been on the public law expressions and concepts of the Persian translation of the Leviathan and their precision and accuracy is evaluated.

Legal Expenses Insurances (LEIs) are among the tools experienced in many countries to increase citizens' access to justice; however, Iran is one of the countries without such experience. LEI means the arrangements that distribute the risk of failure in judicial cases.  LEI  transfers the costs of litigation, administration of case and enforcement of the judgment from citizen who is involved in the proceedings, and therefor makes it an option for citizen to go to court. In a such way financial obstacles are removed from the citizen's litigationproject.
This article is a comparative library study using descriptive and legal critical methods. The purpose of this study is to investigate the features of LEIs which remain unusual in Iran's legal system. This article attempts to introduce legal requirements for the formation of LEIs in Iran. For this goal,firstly we'll introduce legal expenses insurance and alternative methods that are not insurance in fact, but formulated on the basis of the distribution of heavy costs of judicial services.
Judicial cases are based on a variety of different types of risks, including speculative or pure ones; therefore, the current insurance is used to cover pure risks and not to cover cases that have a speculative risk due to the heavy costs that such files can impose on insurers. These types of insurance are also subject to 'moral hazards'. One of these hazards is the purchase of a policy for an existing conflict, or raising the risk of conflict by citizens who have bought a policy. Insurers, of course, are also in charge of the growth of false claims, but foreign experiences show that failure in insured demands is not more than the other demands. In other words, the growth of existing cases for the growth of insurance represents an increase in access to justice, not the abuse of the possibility created by insurance.
The review of this article shows that the non-transparent and unregulated market of lawyering services is a huge obstacle to the growth of LEIs in Iran. The prevalence of LEIs needs regulating the market of lawyering. In countries where the market is free, these insurance policies have not been redeemed. At the same time, it should be noted that lawyering services in Iran are offered in a free market in spite of the monopoly of bars. The supply side of the market is monopolized; therefore, the market formed in Iran around the lawyering is not really free, and it still offers free pricing for the monopolized side. However, it is one of the market failures in which the intervention of government is justified. In the United States of America, lawyering services cost hourly by convention, but in Iran, we do not have even this level of regulation. In such situation, insurer can't assesses the risk and therefor pricing of these policies become impossible. This major weakness is the main obstacle to the spread of legal expenses insurance in Iran.
This article briefly presents the alternatives designed in the literature as the legal expenses insurance. Such methods are not necessarily insurance, because of the underlying element of insurance, that is, the distribution of risks, but these tools just make it easy to pay the costs of the proceeding. These include: "group buying of lawyering services", "helping employees by employers and with facilities available to businesses," "Founding the claim by bank loans," and "After the Event Insurance." Of these, after the event, could means knowing the insurance. These insurance products are sold after a lawsuit and are priced higher, because they cover the larger risk.
In this paper, the merits and demerits of LEIs from the perspective of legal empowerment are also examined. In addition to being able to increase citizens' domination over their lives, legal insurance is able to reduce their domination on their cases. LEIs may not reduce the domination of customer or opt-out him from choosing appropriate services. Such actions may be imposed on the insured as a contractual term and force him to choose a lawyer, strategy for the court, or anything else that reduces the degree of autonomy of the insured party. Therefore, we need regulation-making for such situations.

Collective litigation is a proper tool which can empower vulnerable people by collecting the power of numerous and affected but disempowered people against a powerful party. Before importing the procedure in our legal we need to respond some theoretical problems. First is the dependence to group and disappearing personal autonomy in a collective litigation, however the procedure can ensure the litigant interests in the best way. Second is the promotion of unfair compromises -or in other words- legalized blackmail. It's really a defect in the procedure, but Shiite's Fiqh validates a conciliation that based on an untrue claim. Finally, the third is the intervention of an unauthorized representative. We may solve this problem by the concept of adequacy of representation on the context of a functional red of unauthorized representative. Explanation of these main problems shows us that using of the procedure still is better than ignoring. The peper concludes that utilizing this procedure need to promote the groups' position in our legal system.

Perusing the text of the Constitution is not sufficient for understanding the performance of the political system. One of the cases the Constitution and other regulations haven’t broached anything on it is the present precedent for nominating the Minister of Intelligence. The current precedents aren’t based on the text of the Constitution. The purpose of this study is to question the discrepancy between the body of the written Constitution and the real performance of the legal institutions. Such an approach is indeed an answer to those who consider the Constitution as indicated in its body which restrict the Constitutional law issue subject to the text of the Constitution and the decisions and comments of the Guardian Council. This approach inadequately and incompletely delineates the Constitution. The Constitutional institutions broadly or narrowly interpret their jurisdiction with respect to the balance of the political powers. This article aims to point out these issues in the studies of Iran Constitutional law. We’ll attempt in one hand to indicate whether the Constitutional law theory of Iran would provide a basis for acceptance of such rules and in the other hand to present the sovereign criteria on these rules.

After the victory of constitutional revolution the first ever election in Iran’s history was held. Election was the ceremony of sovereignty transfer to people, which was formerly transferred by succession. Thus the new election institution revealed the rupture in the foundation of the state. Not all classes and estates were allowed to participate in the election at the beginning of constitutional revolution, most people did not have the chance to participate in that first election and only six classes did. In the present article we will try to explain the basis and justifications of class system of election from the view point of constitutionalists. Why did the constitutionalists choose a class based election system and not one in which everyone, regardless of class and estate, could enroll and vote? We will conclude that, through this election, constitutionalists were after a means of solidifying the foundations of constitutional revolution, and that at the beginning of the 20th century Iranian society was not capable of a universal suffrage..