مهدی همازاده ابیانه

The paper, initially, explains the traditionalists view, illustrating their reason, on importance of traditional arts in Islamic history and civilization. The author compares traditionalist and modern consideration of beauty, and explains the symbolism strategy, which is based on matching of perceptible forms and eternal truths (in platonic heaven). The sacred art forms, then, should be in accordance with non-physical truths beyond the space and matter. This paper describes how any individuation of characters and events is not legitimate in traditionalist view. It refers to traditionalist leaders who deprecate temporal and local elements in art; according to which cinema and novel are evaluated as mediums without required capacity to be sacred. The author, then, illustrates the ontology of universal truths according to Islamic philosophy, and their relation with particulars. To do so, he begins by delineating two key doctrines of Hikmat-Mutaa'lieh ontology: the world of universals or Platonic Ideas (‘ālam al-muthul) and the discontinuous imaginal world (‘ālam al-mithāl al-munfaṣil). In Mulla-Sadra’s view, as the paper describes, there is a universal in the world of intellectual forms for each natural kind; a universal truth from which all instances of the kind come into existence and which is present in all of these particulars. Intellectual forms are self-subsistent, function, as spirits for specific forms, and the perceptible forms are their embodiments; that is, their shadows. For the intellectual forms are fine-grained, and these embodiments are coarse-grained. The world of intellectual truths is the lowest stage of abstract worlds, and is (in lower causal stages) the gateway to the physical world, so to speak. The discontinuous imaginal world is, nevertheless, a physical world (with shapes, dimensions, and temporality), though it is different from material corporeality, spatiality, and temporality, intermediated between non-physical and material world. Imaginal forms are manifestations or loci of the revelation of intelligible forms; that is, whatever exists in the world of Muthuls has a weaker degree of existence in the Mithal world. The author, after providing an account of the nature of these two worlds, considers some of their functions for, and effects on, creativity and symbolism in art. Since there is an important step in downward creation/causation from Mutul intellectual ideas to Mithal perceptible forms, and art, in many cases, deals with bringing meanings down to forms, and meanings are considered as abstract and immaterial, and physical forms are closely tied to sensory objectivity. The author, finally, concentrates on universals manner of existence in Muthul world according to Sadra’s philosophy, which includes immaterial unity and flowing existence among its particulars, at the same time. Thus, temporal and local perceptible forms not only can refer to their relative non-physical universals, but also include the presence of these universals. Therefore, as the author explains, it is not necessary to have a direct reference to absolute existence of universal truths in term of unindividuated forms. The paper concludes that cinema has a remarkable capacity to represent immaterial truths in case of their relevant particulars, and, contrary to traditionalists, to be one of the sacred arts.

I seek to explicate the ways in which the soul is deemed immaterial in two main strands of Islamic philosophy and then consider with the physicalistic approach some arguments for the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I first overview Avicenna's theory of the spiritual incipience (al-ḥudūth al-rūḥānī) of the soul and his version of substance dualism. I will then discuss Mullā Ṣadrā's view of the physical incipience (al-ḥudūth al-jismānī) of the soul and how the soul emerges and develops towards immateriality on his account. I then overview and discuss five of the most important arguments presented by these two great Muslim philosophers in favor of the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I will also point out some of the main contemporary physicalistic views of the nature of mind and mental states. I will then argue that arguments for the immateriality of the soul – dealt with here – do not indeed target or challenge any significant versions of contemporary physicalism. I conclude that the most important narrow physicalistic views – such as identity theory – have a very different formation than what Avicenna and Mullā -Sadrā are refuting. Also, the most important wide physicalistic theories – such as the externalist representationalism - are inconsistent with assumptions and readings of materialism in the Islamic philosophy framework and propose other types of physicalism about the mind were not fundamentally considered by the Avicenna and Mullā -Sadrā arguments. Moreover, some of these arguments, in my opinion, involve conflations of epistemological or ontological issues.

This paper - in order to make a comparative study between Sadra ,s theory and a new western theory about soul s occurrence - first focus on studying and explaining the new theory in philosophy of mind; which called “Emergentism” by contemporary philosophers. The author distinguishes between two version of Emergentism: strong and weak, and describes two challenges against the strong version which have adduced by physicalists.He, then, makes a brief review of Sadra ,s theory about soul ,s occurrence and its ranks, and thus considers the similarity and difference between Sadra ,s view and strong emergentism. The paper by referring to the common aspects of these two theories, believes that most challenges which have made against strong emergentism are reformable versus Sadraism. He, finally, implicates some explications of Sadraist philosophers about mind – body connection, and shows their inefficiency to meet the objections and ambiguities of physicalist philosophers. He believes that Sadra ,s philosophy of mind needs further completion to satisfy this requirement. The main contribution of this paper is explaining the intersections and dissociations of these two theory, and some deficiencies and ambiguities of Sadra ,s view in deal with physicalism.

The paper address one of the most important objections against representational theory of Michael Tye: The inverted earth exam, which is a counterfactual example has proposed by Ned Block to challenge Tye ,s theory on phenomenal mental states. Tye, in contrast, has illustrated two response which are the main topic of this paper. The first response – according to author ,s arguments – faces with a significant problem; regardless of some peculiar requisites of the theory. The second – final – response, also, can be hit by a counterexample about inverted spectrum proposed by the author. He, finally, concludes that Tye ,s attempts to rescue wide representational theory from the hardship was not successful, and it seems that the above theory should try to find some paths to solve the problem

The paper deals with a particular group of objections against representational theories about phenomenal experiences. The author, primarily, illustrates the importance of representational theories and clarifies some helpful categories of representational versions which has used in the paper. Then, it focuses on an especial group of objections against the inclusion of these theories. This group of objections undermines the inclusion of representationalism about "bodily sensations" and "intentional states". Opponents, in fact, make some doubts that representational approach cannot explain the phenomenal character of bodily sensations and intentional states. The paper has described these two difficulties, the first one has been discussed among scholars and the later represented by the author. It, finally, peruses the actual and potential responses of representationalists and, then, concludes that representational theories can come over the objections about bodily sensations, but they should give some explaination in order to unravel the objections about intentional states.

The present article briefly explains Frege’s theory of proper names and investigates the objections presented by Kripke to that theory. The writers distinguish the two different versions of Frege’s theory – also acknowledged by Kripke – and hold that the first version is defeated in facing with Kripke’s objection regarding the necessity in possible worlds. Then, they state two readings (subjective and objective) of the second version of Frege’s theory, and accept Kripke’s objection to the objective reading by adducing the errors of the speakers in connecting one group of attributes to an external referent. The writers, however, offer Kripke’s various objections to the subjective reading to defend it against those objections; except for the existential statements (affirmative and negative), they answer all other objections regarding the puzzles of ‘identity’ and ‘substitution’ and so on. The article concludes that the subjective reading of the second version of Frege’s theory has the least drawbacks and the most power to explain, and seems more justified in comparison to the two groups of ‘denotation/ direct reference’ and the ‘first version of Frege’s theory’.

The current article examines the criterion of jurisprudential debate in dealing with art. The author addresses the above subject from three different perspectives namely “artist”, “audience” and “artwork”.
As regards the creator of the artwork, the artist’s intention is the main discussion point, approached from two aspects: “compatibility of the intention with the effect” and “incompatibility of the intention with the effect”. Accordingly, referring to some traditions and sireh of the infallibles, the former encompasses rules of preference -Istihbab- and detestability –Kirahat- (in various assumptions), while the latter covers inqiyad and tajarri (the intention of committing sin).
As regards the audience of artworks, the present study discusses the type of effect that the artwork creates and presents the conditions of permission and forbiddance of using such works. Likewise, the issue of lahv (corrupting entertainment) and absolute aesthetic pleasure is brought up when no evidence of ethical or religious impact (positive or negative) is seen.
Finally, as regards the “text of an artwork”, an examination of the permission or forbiddance of publication of artworks in accordance with incompatibility (tazahom) under different conditions and with respect to special language of art is addressed, while considering issuance of its rule specific to religious leaders and not individual mukallaf. 2

This paper deals with a group of basical theories about «phenomenal consciousness» in analytic philosophy. The author، after definition of «phenomenal consciousness»، quotes different theories of it،s analysis and explanates The difficulty of this analysis in physicalism. After this introduction، the paper goes to deliberates and criticizes a main group of these theories; well-khown with the title: «representational theories». The author casts three famous theory under representational theories: First Order Representation (FOR)، Higher Order experience (HOE)، Higher Order Thought (HOT)، and deals with the difficulties and disadvantages of these theories. The paper، at the end، illustrates the disability and deficiency of representational theories in explanation of phenomenal consciousness; For they don،t have needful backbone encounter the objections.

In the present article، the theory of “realization” put forward by physicalists adherent to functionalism، has been investigated from the viewpoint of the extent to which it has been successful in solving the problem of mental causation. The authors show that various versions and editions of that idea have not managed to solve the problem of mental causation; rather they have recessed to typical identity and reductionism، or have involved in double causal determination. In the present article، Shoemaker’s “subset theory” presented in 2007 and Yablo’s theory of “particularism” presented in 1992 have been explained، both of them as versions of realization theory. The authors have shown that the two theorists have sought to prove the originality and objectivity of mental features (an escape from reductionism) and to present a picture of exerting a causal force by those features. Afterwards، however، by presenting the criticisms of Kim and others، they show the continuity of the problem of causal deprivation and involvement in reductionism in both readings.

Donald Davidson, a great analytic philosopher, represented a theory on token identity through which he provided another theory concerning the relation between mental and physical properties called "Supervenience" theory. He tried to avoid involving in reductionism through preserving dualism of these properties.In this Paper first, we explain his theory, then we show how he failed to solve mental causation problem and how his theory faces with either causal exclusion or overdetermination. So, the main problem of Cartesian dualism remains unsolved in this theory.

This paper is trying to explain The dominant paradigm of contemporary Philosophy of Mind. The author, through Analytical method, descripes the fact that dominant paradigm of contemporary Philosophy of Mind is strongly affected by empirical sciense, such as Physics, Empirical Psychology, Biology, Neurology, Computational Sciense. To the authors', we can see The dominant of Physical paradigm of contemporary Philosophy of Mind, in central issues; Topics such as "Inexplicable of phenomenal qualities", "The principle of simplicity (Occam's razor) and Removal of non-physical mental properties", "Physical clouser and Denial of mental causation in physics".