musa malayeri

Since the onset of intellectual development, belief and faith have played a natural part in human institutions, either rightly and intentionally or subconsciously and by imitation. The rise of schools, faiths, and other religions has been attributed to this. The masses of people frequently form their beliefs based on mindless imitation, while the elites, who truly serve as the leaders of various masses, frequently adapt and convey their opinions based on knowledge and research. The issue of reason, to which most philosophers and intellectuals have attempted to find a solution, is unquestionably one of the fundamental problems of the human mind. One of the Islamic philosophers, Sadr al- Mutalahin Shirazi, also known by the moniker Mullah Sadra, was able to synthesize the philosophy of the Masha'i and the Ishraqis and adapt it to Islamic teachings in a way that resolved the fundamental issues that the sages of the Masha'i and the Ishragi were facing. Mulla Sadra integrated the three approaches of self-improvement, revelation, and reason. This strategy had a significant part in developing religious knowledge and philosophical ideas. The current study uses a descriptive-analytical approach to analyze Mulla Sadra's theories and establish the role and levels of reason in transcendental knowledge.

One of the brightest points of view of Muslim scholars is their reflection on the criterion for distinguishing sciences. The popular opinion is that the purpose and subject as a criteria have been the tools for distinguishing between two or more sciences. This article answers two central questions in this regard. One is whether the criteria used by scholars to differentiate between sciences have an ontological origin or it had abstract origin. Another question is whether the answer to this question will have a significant effect on the philosophical issues. Studies of this article will shed light on three issues: First, scholars have used the end, not only as a criterion for distinguishing between two or more sciences, but also as a criterion for the large classification of sciences (theoretical and practical). Second, the end of all knowledge is not merely a  non- factual value, but an existential end. Third, if the said end is existential and objective, the distinction between the various forms of wisdom is also objective and real, and this means that none of these sciences can play another role. One of the important results of the ontological approach in the division of sciences, especially in practical wisdom, is that the separation of home management from civil politics is a real separation and the rules and requirements of these two fields cannot be considered in another field. The virtues and perfections of the soul, the categories in society (civic wisdom), the categories in individual life (morality), and the categories in the family (home wisdom) can be studied. Thus, as much as individuality and individual life are genuine, family and community are also original, and this is contrary to the opinion of many late individualist thinkers.

Most Muslim philosophers – including the Peripatetics, Illuminationists, and Sadrians – have rejected the possibility of change and motion in immaterial things based on their own principles. However, during the last two decades, some authorities in the field of philosophy have opposed this idea and argued for the possibility of motion and change in immaterial thing. This theory has attracted the attention of a number of academic centers, and some papers and books have been written on this subject. The proponents of this view have provided some arguments in its favor, and its opponents have rejected them. Following an analytic approach, this paper defends the theory of the existence of motion in immaterial things at two stages. Initially, the authors provide a response to the criticism targeting the main argument of this theory and defend its legitimacy; secondly, through resorting to the createdness of the soul, they present a new argument in its favor. Finally, they conclude that the mentioned theory is acceptable in the realm of rationality and reasoning and is superior to its counter-theory.

The supreme place of the issue of the final cause is no secret to the people of thought. This topic is so important that some great figures, such as Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, have considered it as the most important component of wisdom. At the same time, there are some salient differences in this regard among its advocates and opponents. In Islamic philosophy, the problem of final cause has been mainly tackled by responding to the advanced criticisms while, in contemporary Western philosophy, the discussion of this topic is considered to be unimportant and superfluous. Rarely ever have either Islamic or Aristotelian philosophers dealt with the fundamental reasons and roots of the confirmation or rejection of the final cause; however, no consensus will be arrived at regarding superstructures without first analyzing the basic ideas. Here, through an analytic study of the conceptual and assertoric bases of the final cause, the authors have tried to investigate and evaluate the main roots of the conflicts over this problem in order to facilitate the judgment of superstructures. In doing so, they have focused on such concepts as the relationship between efficient and final causes, origin of motion, potency and predisposition, and essentialism and archetype.

The issue of immorality or materiality of the soul, is still a challenging issue for theologians and philosophers. Philosophers believe in immortality, and some of the theologians believe in its materiality. Bring up the theory of the human’s triple dimension and studying the properties of the third domain as an ideal dimension, seeks to resolve this conflict so that, the religious texts, which refers to the materiality of the soul, do not need to any symbolic hermeneutics. Apart from immaterial “soul” and material “body” human being has “spirit”, which can be considered as a kind of state of matter, that today is called plasma, very tiny particles, pregnant, formless, and yet fluid. One of the evidences of the adaptation of the “plasma” with purgatorial immortality is the theory of movement in abstractions, which is accepted by some later philosophers. Accordingly, the ideal world cannot be considered abstract if it has the ability to change aside from the domain. Using the library method, this paper brings up the theory of existence of the energetic objects and plasma as the ideal body and then it brings some evidences from the traditions and physical and metaphysical experimental observations.

The present paper deals with the issue whether the concept of substance, can be considered as a genus and constituent of substantial species or it is an abstract and non- essential concept. Most of Muslim philosophers have defended the genus of substance, but some like Fakhr- e Razi maintain that substance is not a genus and constituent for substantial species, Mulla Sadra has advocated the substance as a genus and widely criticized the arguments which stated by the opponents. In this paper, first of all we will report the most important arguments of the opponents and then review Sadra's critics against them in detail to show that not only his criticism has not reduced the strength of its arguments, but also in many places, he has unconsciously strengthened the claims of the opponents. In the next step, two arguments supporting the genus of substance, one of them is demonstrated by Sadra and the other by Allameh Tabatabaeiare, are explained and then they put into assessment. finally, it is stated that the theory of regarding the substance as a genus has not been supported by any strong argument, whereas there are considerable arguments for denying that. As a result, we will survey that denying the genus of the substance will be led to the positive philosophical consequences, three of them will be discussed as following: a) new categorization of substances. b) removing ambiguity from substantiality of soul and the other simple things. c) eliminating the vagueness of substantiality of the Necessary being.

The present paper deals with one of the most important and complicated epistemological problems targeted by Muslim philosophers, that is, determining the referents and realm of essential accidents. The main question here is whether accidents are considered to be essential through the more particular. In this historical study, the writer examines the development of the various theories regarding this problem over three centuries (1050-1312 AH) and then reports and evaluates the solutions suggested by four of the most prominent theoreticians of this historical period. To this end, he initially explores Mulla Sadra’s solution, which is based on the necessity of distinguishing between particular accidents and accidents through the more particular. Then he discusses the view of Hossein Khwansari, who, after criticizing Mulla Sadra’s theory and acknowledging its weakness in solving the problem, presents his own theory of juristic preference and consensus in determining territories and setting boundaries between sciences. Later the writer deals with the views of Mulla Mehdi Naraqi, who accepts a part of Mulla Sadra’s theory but solves some parts of the problem using a different method. Naraqi’s method necessitates the screening of sciences and extracting some problems from the domains of related sciences. Finally, the writer focuses on the last character of this period, Mirza Habibullah Rashti. He was a capable fundamentalist who enriched this discussion more than ever before in the light of his own profound insight and increased the accuracy of the technical language used to describe the problem. Although he benefitted from the words of other thinkers, he did not accept the solution of any of the preceding philosophers in its totality. He believed that the scholars working in each field are allowed to discuss the related scientific problems within the borderlines of their own knowledge as long as no specific sciences have been devised for investigating them. This view, as explained in the body of the paper, is quite compatible with the apriori-historical approach to the development of various disciplines.

The theory of “the simplicity of the reality of existence” is one of the achievements of transcendental philosophy. Having accepted this theory, Mulla Sadra (Sadr al-Muta’allehin) infers three important epistemological (a) the reality of existence is unimaginable and unperceivable, rationally and through acquired knowledge; (b) the reality of existence is non-affirmable, rationally and through acquired knowledge; (c) knowledge by presence is the only way to perceive and affirm it. In the present article, first the principle of “theory of simplicity of the reality of existence” is challenged and it is proved that we cannot consider limited and substantive beings as simple, and substantive being can only be considered simple when it is negatively conditioned from quiddity. And existence with such consideration exists just in the mind and not in the outside world. The article continues with criticizing related epistemological upshots. It is clarified that those effects face with criticisms as well. The author has tried to show that epistemological upshots of “the principality of existence” as well as commitment to epistemological consequences of Mulla Sadra’s theory in mental existence require that Neo-Sadraites give up the epistemological results of the “theory of simplicity of existence”.

Based on the basis that sending the prophets is one of the cases for Lutf al-muqarreb, the majority of the previous Mutakallemun proved the necessity of sending the prophets by the Lutf rule. From Allah al-Hilli in Kashful- Murad, some grasped that sending the prophets is not a case for the Lutf rule. Thus, from their opinion, the Lutf rule is no longer useable for proving the necessity of prophet-hood. In the other hand, from Sheik al-Mufid upwards, another theory had been current that Lutf is not rationally necessary, and as a result, its effectiveness in proving the belief issues has been challenged. To resolve this problem, AyatullahSubhani separated between the cases. He maintains that Luft al-Muqarreb in some cases is rationally necessary and in some other cases is notnecessary, but is a demand of God's grace and bestow. In present article, the above mentioned discussions are examined in the AyatullahSubhani's works and its success and failure extents are evaluated.

To explain the relationship between God and everything other than God, four major theories has been formed among intellectuals, that one of them is “Personal Unity of Existence”. This theory has been entered into the realm of philosophy by Mulla Sadra and then, several arguments have been adduced to prove the theory of “Personal Unity of Existence”; that one of them is based on infinite existence of transcendent God. In this article, the argument has been reflected and each of its premises considered separately. We have tried to plan and analyze all critics on the premises, and then, logical strengths and weaknesses points of argument have been discussed in order to prove the claim. At the end, two “gradation” (Tashk9k) and “existential connection” (Wujud Rabit) theories have been criticized and considered as the opponent theories for personal unity.

After evaluating and presenting an exact report of Mulla Sadra’s view and Allameh Tabatabai’s one about the will of God, the authors of the paper try to offer a theory closer to traditions. Mulla Sadra considers the will of God as the attribute of the essence and tantamount to the knowledge of the best order. Allameh Tabatabai, due to the philosophical weakness of the Mulla Sadra’s theory and also due to its conflict with traditions that regard the will of God as created, attribute of action and other than the knowledge and love of God, has offered another theory that considers the will of God as attribute of action and a prerequisite for the God's power. According to the third theory, which we think is concluded by the hadith, the divine providence, which is derived from divine wisdom, goes between the knowledge and power and the will of God. As a result the will of God brings about fate and destiny and consequently causes the external realization of an action. From a negative point of view, this theory is in consistent with the Allameh Tabatabai’s theory but is in contrary to it from a positive point of view.

Although knowledge of God is so important that it is considered as the first step of one’s being religious in the Islamic sources on the one hand and Muslim thinkers have dealt in detail with such discussions as proving the Divine Essence and God’s attributes and actions on the other, the question of possibility of knowledge of the Almighty, which is prior to them all logically, is neglected as an independent, comprehensive discussion in the sources dealing with the knowledge of God. Such a discussion may be dealt with in three categories of possibility of mediated knowledge, that of natural knowledge, and that of immediate knowledge. There are four opinions concerning mediated knowledge: two proving and two negating. This essay discusses and surveys the two proving opinions.