جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "بنای عقلا" در نشریات گروه "علوم انسانی"

This paper addresses the nuanced relationship between Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh) and the evolving conduct of society, specifically within the context of the wise (ʿuqalāʾ). The debate over the origin of moral values—whether they are inherently recognized by reason, divinely assigned, or conventionally accepted by society—has long occupied the attention of Islamic scholars, particularly within the Imamiyyah (Shia) tradition. This paper explores the Legislator's stance toward the conduct of the wise, focusing on how these conducts interact with the principles of Sharia, particularly in the realm of transactions.
     The three primary perspectives on the origin of moral values in Islam are Ash'arism, Mu'tazilism, and a particular viewpoint within the Shia (Imamiyyah). Each of these schools of thought offers a distinct interpretation of the relationship between divine command and human reason in determining the moral value of actions. This paper, however, zeroes in on the third perspective within the Imamiyyah tradition, which posits that the moral value of actions like justice and injustice is recognized by the wise and is a product of societal conventions rather than an inherent or divinely assigned characteristic.
     The primary aim of this paper is to examine the Legislator's (Allah's) stance on the conduct of the wise in a contemporary context, especially as modern conduct have developed in ways that sometimes conflict with traditional Islamic legal teachings. By exploring the concepts of accompaniment, silence, or tolerance by the Legislator, the paper seeks to clarify how Islamic law can remain relevant and just in the face of evolving societal norms and conduct.
     The implications of this discussion are profound, particularly in light of the challenges posed by modernity and the globalized world. The paper delves into the ways in which Islamic jurisprudence can accommodate or resist these changes without undermining the fundamental principles of Sharia. This exploration is crucial for contemporary Islamic scholars, who must navigate the tension between upholding traditional legal teachings and addressing the practical needs of a modern Muslim society.

The central research question of this paper is: How does the Legislator's stance—whether of accompaniment, silence, or tolerance—toward the conduct of the wise impact the application of Sharia in the context of modern societal practices, particularly in the domain of transactions?
     This question is pivotal because it addresses the broader issue of how Islamic law interacts with evolving societal norms. As conduct change and develop over time, they often present challenges to established legal and religious frameworks. The research seeks to determine whether the Legislator's stance toward these conducts allows for flexibility within Sharia or whether it necessitates a more rigid adherence to traditional interpretations, even at the cost of causing harm, hardship, or corruption within society.

The hypothesis of the research is that the Legislator's opposition to the conduct of the wise weakens the efficacy and relevance of Sharia, imposes unnecessary hardships on the Muslim community, and undermines societal interests. Conversely, by accompanying, remaining silent, or showing tolerance toward these conducts, the Legislator preserves the integrity of Islamic law while ensuring that it remains aligned with the practical needs and moral intuitions of society.
     This hypothesis challenges the traditional notion that Islamic law is static and unchanging. Instead, it suggests that the Legislator's approach to conduct is dynamic and context-dependent, allowing for a more flexible application of Sharia that can accommodate the changing moral landscape of society. The hypothesis also implies that a rigid, unyielding application of Sharia that ignores the conduct of the wise may lead to outcomes that are contrary to the objectives of Islamic law, such as justice, mercy, and the prevention of harm.

The research is conducted using a doctrinal approach, which involves a detailed analysis of primary and secondary Islamic legal sources, including the Quran, Hadith, and the writings of classical and contemporary jurists. This approach is supplemented by a critical examination of the conduct of the wise and their evolution over time, particularly in response to changing social, economic, and political conditions.
     The framework for this analysis is built around three key concepts: accompaniment, silence, and tolerance. Each of these concepts represents a different way in which the Legislator might interact with the conduct of the wise:     Accompaniment refers to instances where the Legislator actively endorses and supports a particular custom, aligning it with the primary teachings of Sharia.
     Silence refers to cases where the Legislator neither endorses nor opposes a custom, thereby allowing it to persist without explicit approval or rejection.
     Tolerance refers to situations where the Legislator does not agree with a custom but refrains from opposing it due to the potential harm, hardship, or corruption that might result from such opposition.
     The research also employs a comparative analysis to explore how these concepts have been applied in different historical and geographical contexts. This includes examining the ways in which Islamic jurists have historically dealt with conduct that conflicted with Sharia, as well as how contemporary jurists are addressing similar issues in the modern world. By doing so, the research seeks to identify patterns and principles that can guide the application of Sharia in relation to the conduct of the wise in today's society.
     The paper's approach is both analytical and normative, aiming not only to describe how Islamic law has historically interacted with societal conduct but also to offer normative guidelines for how it should do so in the future.

The exploration of the Islamic legislator's stance towards the conduct of the wise (Sīrah al-ʿUqalāʾ) reveals significant implications for contemporary Islamic jurisprudence. The results of this research indicate that Islamic legal rulings are not inherently opposed to the conduct of the wise, but rather, they are flexible and responsive to societal changes through a process of alignment, silence, or tolerance. The key findings can be summarized as follows:     Alignment with Conduct: The research confirms that in many instances, the Legislator aligns with the conduct of the wise, particularly those that resonate with the fundamental principles and objectives of Sharia. This alignment suggests that Islamic law is not static but can evolve to accommodate societal changes, provided these changes do not conflict with the core values of Islam. This perspective supports the idea conduct promote justice, fairness, and social welfare are likely to be endorsed by the Legislator.
     Silence toward New Conduct: Another significant finding is the Legislator's silence in response to new conduct. This silence does not imply indifference but rather a deliberate choice to allow this conduct to persist without direct interference. The silence of the Legislator can be interpreted as a form of tacit approval, particularly in cases where the new conduct do not directly contradict Islamic principles but rather exist in areas not explicitly addressed by primary legal evidence. This finding emphasizes the importance of considering silence as a form of legal reasoning within Islamic jurisprudence.
     Tolerance of Conflicting Conduct: The most complex and perhaps controversial finding is the Legislator's tolerance toward conduct that, on the surface, appear to contradict primary religious evidence. This tolerance is understood through the concept of secondary legal evidence, which can validate conduct by acting as negative evidence that nullifies conflicting rulings. The research shows that the Legislator’s tolerance is a pragmatic approach to prevent harm, hardship, or societal disruption, which could result from rigidly applying primary legal rulings without consideration of the conduct of the wise. This tolerance underscores the adaptability and resilience of Islamic law in the face of changing societal norms.
     Role of Secondary Legal Evidence: The discussion highlights the critical role of secondary legal evidence in reconciling apparent conflicts between Islamic law and societal conduct. Secondary evidence serves as a means to prioritize the objectives of Sharia, such as preventing harm and promoting societal welfare, over strict adherence to primary rulings that may not be applicable in modern contexts. This finding suggests that secondary legal evidence can limit or even override primary evidence when it comes to conduct that have gained widespread acceptance among the wise.
     Practical Application: In practice, the research concludes that Islamic legal rulings must be interpreted and applied in a manner that considers the conduct of the wise as a significant factor. This approach ensures that the law remains relevant and effective in addressing contemporary issues. The discussion emphasizes that any ruling that conflicts with established conduct of the wise is likely to be viewed as inconsistent with the Legislator's intent and, therefore, should not be enforced. This pragmatic approach to Islamic law highlights the need for jurists to be attuned to societal changes and to interpret Sharia in a way that aligns with the evolving moral and social landscape.
     Jurists’ Role in Shaping Conduct: Finally, the research touches on the proactive role that religious scholars and jurists can play in gradually shaping the conduct of the wise to better align with the principles and objectives of Sharia. This finding points to a dynamic interaction between Islamic law and society, where scholars are not merely passive observers but active participants in guiding societal norms in a direction that reflects Islamic values.

The conclusion of this research underscores the flexibility and adaptability of Islamic law in relation to the conduct of the wise. The analysis reveals that the Islamic Legislator does not inherently oppose societal conduct but instead adopts a nuanced approach that includes alignment, silence, or tolerance depending on the nature of the custom and its impact on society.
     The key conclusion is that no Islamic legal ruling should be enacted or enforced if it directly contradicts the established conduct of the wise, particularly when such conduct is supported by secondary legal evidence. This perspective suggests that the conduct of the wise play a crucial role in shaping the practical application of Sharia, serving as a form of negative evidence that can nullify conflicting primary rulings. As a result, the Legislator’s tolerance toward such conduct can be seen as a means of safeguarding the religion and the community from harm, hardship, and social disruption.
     Moreover, the research concludes that religious scholars and jurists must recognize the importance of conduct in the legal framework and work to harmonize Islamic law with societal practices. This does not mean compromising on core Islamic principles but rather ensuring that the application of these principles is contextually relevant and socially just. The research advocates for a jurisprudence that is both rooted in traditional Islamic teachings and responsive to the needs of contemporary society.
     In conclusion, the paper asserts that the flexibility inherent in Islamic jurisprudence allows it to remain a living tradition that can effectively address the challenges posed by modernity. The conduct of the wise are not merely to be tolerated; they are to be understood as integral to the continued relevance and applicability of Sharia in the modern world. By prioritizing the objectives of Sharia—such as justice, mercy, and the prevention of harm—over rigid adherence to primary legal rulings, Islamic law can continue to serve as a source of guidance and wisdom for Muslim communities across the globe.

This article examines the validity of confession from the perspective of the Holy Quran and seeks to answer the question of whether the validity of confession can be derived from the Quranic verses. If the validity of confession is proven through the Quran, what impact does it have on jurisprudence? Some jurists believe that the Quranic verses do not indicate the validity of confession, while others believe that numerous verses address confession, and the Quran's indication of the validity of confession is complete. In this study, by examining relevant verses, categorizing verses that indicate the validity of confession into seven groups, and reviewing the arguments of both sides, and by referring to multiple jurisprudential and interpretative sources, it is concluded that the validity of confession can be derived from the Holy Quran. If the validity of confession is proven through the Quran, the generality of the verses can be used, whereas if the proof is based on the consensus of rational individuals (bana al-uqala), as a rational-based argument, it (as a non-verbal proof) cannot be applied universally. The second outcome is that if the proof of confession is based on the consensus of rational individuals, it may vary over time, and with these changes, the scope of the validity of confession may also change. This article innovatively categorizes verses that indicate the validity of confession, explains how to argue with verses, and critiques opposing views. The research method is library-based in terms of data collection and descriptive-analytical in content

Considering the technology advancement and emergence of new trading methods for the greater welfare of humankind, the acceptance and non-acceptance (rejection) of the theory of union and spiritual distinction in meeting-place option (khiyār-i majlis) are among the issues that play a significant role in preserving the acquired rights of individuals in social life. In the past, arguments were placed in the meeting-place option regarding the relevance of union and physical distinction according to the form of the old trading methods, and gradually, with the emergence of transactions such as telephone contracts, internet contracts, etc. the topic of having an intellectual relationship was also raised by some experts. Now, the author uses a descriptive-analytical method regarding the loss of this intellectual relationship to prove a new claim under the title of the spiritual distinction theory in the meeting-place option based on intellectual connection, according to all the verses that indicate the importance of the intention and will of the parties and emphasis on the integrity and necessity of contracts, by reconciliation between conflicting traditions and justified justification of the conflicting narrative to the spiritual distinction in companionship of intellectuals procedure as well as resorting to the analogy of priority and the ruling of wisdom. According to the proof and acceptance of this theory in the event of disruption of the intellectual connection of the parties despite their physical union, the distinction, which is the end of the destruction of the meeting option, is realized due to the lack of objectivity of the physical distinction and union.

The bases of intellectuals are the main reason that is introduced by Uṣūlī scholars for the validity of the imārāt (indications). This reason, along with the approval of the shāriʻ (lawmaker), is considered decisive proof of the validity of the indications. But, contrary to the theory of the validity of approved indications, can it be said that the validity of the indications is not made by shāriʻ and could not be, as it is not accepted and it is not possible to reject it at all by shāriʻ. Rather, do rational indications have inherent validity? Using the analytical method, this study tries to derive the role of rational taḥsīn (admiration) and taqbīḥ (condemnation) in relation to the rational indications and to substantiate the theory of the inherent validity of the rational indications by identifying its components. The theory that this study relies on as the criterion of ḥusn (good) and qubḥ (evil) is the criterion of expediency and corruption. This study comes to the conclusion that rational indications are formed based on the needs of life and public interests, which the society system depends on, and the public attitude is based on acting on them. Public interests and the needs of social life are the middle ground that recognizes rational indications as structures based on rational admiration and condemnation. As a result, they are valid by virtue of intellect. This ḥujjīyat (validity) is inherent according to virtue of intellect. Unlike the usual system of validity, in which the inherent validity is removed from it, and other indications have ʻaraḍī (accidental) validity, the theory of the inherent validity of rational indications provides a new structure of the uṣūlī validity system.

The Practice of Reasonable Persons is a universal behavior or mentality that, under identical circumstances and conditions, is adopted by erudite minds, regardless of their doctrinal and intellectual inclinations. This concept, which has gained a special status among scholars of the science of jurisprudence in the past two centuries, has sparked numerous discussions regarding its legitimacy and classifications. Among the foremost jurisprudents, discrepancies can be observed regarding the identification of instances of the Practice of Reasonable Persons. Understanding these instances must be considered as an inimitable simple task. This article aims to introduce and evaluate potential methodologies for identifying instances of the Practice of Reasonable Persons. Various approaches, such as referencing foreign legal systems, uniform and model laws, general principles of law, and the opinions of parliamentary representatives, have been scrutinized in this paper. Absolute rejection or endorsement of any one of these methods is a mistake. Instead, one can utilize the culmination of all these methods as a means to identify instances of Wisdom Praxis.

The famous ʾUṣūlīs have considered the validity of Banā-yi ʿUqalā (The common performance of the wise) to be subject to the non-repeal of the Sharīʿah. The study of Muḥaqiq Isfahānī and Muḥammad Bāqir Șadr’s views about Banā-yi ʿUqalā shows that both of them, like other ʾUṣūlīs, considered the validity of Banā-yi ʿUqalā to depend on non-repeal; But they have introduced the validity of Banā-yi ʿUqalā as being based on rationality. Is it possible to arrive at the theory of the impossibility of deterring Banāt which are based on rationality by analyzing that they are based on rationality? This essay tries to represent the concept of rationality of Banāʾāt-i ʿUqalā by using a descriptive-analytical method. Based on this framework, the study proves the theory of the impossibility of deterring rationality-based Banāʾāt.The identification of the theory of the impossibility of deterrence from the rationality-based Sīrahs is done with the aim of achieving the validity of the Sīrahs after the era of the Innocents (pbuh), in addition to facilitating the compatibility of Islamic law with the rationality of the time. The research contends that the necessities of life and expediencies of the governing system are the determining factors of the rationality of Sīrah and any Banā which is based on the necessities of life and expediencies of the governing system is irrevocable.

Undoubtedly, the issue of gender change is one of the common and problematic issues in today's society. This research examines this emerging phenomenon in jurisprudence and criminal law. Due to the existence of many assumptions, the only ruling on the issue of gender change before the crime occurs is examined in the chapters of Hudud, Qisas and Dayat. After examining and examining the evidence, it can be said: Although the application is necessary to follow the rulings in accordance with the state after gender change, but due to the doubt in concluding the matter in the state after gender change, it is not correct to adhere to the application. Also, although it may be necessary for a reason such as rational basis, to consider the state after gender change, but in the chapters of Hudud and Qisas, the specific rules of these chapters such as the rule of caution in temperature, the basis of Hudud on discounts and the rule of Dara due to the importance of the chapter of Hudud and Its retribution and seriousness, as well as the special sensitivity of the Shariah to these chapters, especially when they lead to blood, govern the foundation of rationality, and because of narrowing, it narrows the subject of reason, such as the foundation of rationality, to definite cases in these chapters, and accordingly The requirement of these special rules is the implementation of the least punishment in this matter. This government is in accordance with the taste of Sharia in these chapters. In the matter of diet, considering the non-flow of the above three rules, it is necessary to consider the condition after the change of gender and, accordingly, infer the verdict based on that condition. In case of insisting on not accepting the rational basis, the basic rule is the process of assihab, according to which the state before gender change (primary creation) is assihab and the ruling is deduced based on it. In all of these cases, it is not possible to insist on the signs and correctness of carrying as signs of truth and understanding of the meaning, because there is a flaw in their meaning.

The most important reason for the authoritativeness of the apparent meaning of words and phrases of the verbal sources is the intellectuals’ stipulation [basis]. The question is: can this stipulation have an impact on the semantic shifting of words and phrases? If the answer is affirmative, how would it have such an impact? The intellectuals’ stipulation, sometimes as a rational indication, associated with the words and phrases, has an impact on the semantic extension or semantic limitation, and sometimes it has an impact on the construction of premises on the stipulation of which a general meaning for the words and phrases is established. In addition, the distinction between the custom and the intellectuals’ stipulation at the time when the verbal sources are issued and the time when the said sources is used is necessary. By giving some examples of the law of contract, this article introduces this impact of the intellectuals’ basis. In addition, the possible objections to the authoritativeness of this use of the intellectuals’ basis have been raised and answered.

With respect to the significance of the arguments of rationalists in inference of religious instructions, particularly in the case of new issues, a review of the jurists’ works on quality of applying the arguments of rationalists will help its understanding better. A restudy of jurisprudential works of Seyyed Hassan Bojnourdi and Imam Khomeini, as the two jurists with immense influence on perfection of jurisprudence, will be important and worthy in proving the point. To that end, we have reviewed the deductive and doctrinal jurisprudential texts of the two jurists based on content analysis methodology to analyze their claims. Findings of this paper indicate that both jurists have abundantly made use of the arguments of rationalists. In the meantime, both of them believe in its validity with no need to endorsement of the legislator, taking into consideration only lack of prohibition or rejection by the legislator. In particular, they have independently used the arguments of rationalists in invoking valid and important jurisprudential codes in deducing religious instructions. Given the effect of time and space on jurisprudential issues, the important and practical arguments of rationalists can be used for comparing and contrasting jurisprudence with modern-day issues and conditions toward rationality in settling modern-day problems.

The analysis of the standpoints about the criteria of rational approbation and disapprobation gives two major criteria which are "general prudence or depravity" and "justice or oppression". Furthermore, the conducts of the wise are formed based on rational approbation and disapprobation. Considering the two major standpoints about the criterion of approbation and disapprobation, the question at hand is: what is the impact of each criterion on the formation of the conducts of the wise? Have Osuli scholars noticed the impressibility of the formation of the conducts of the wise from both of the criteria? Is there any sample of the conducts of the wise impressible from each of the criteria? Research in the sayings of Osuli scholars shows that they have paid attention to the role of rational approbation and disapprobation in the formation of the conducts of the wise and because of this attention, the theory of "the impossibility of the rejection of the conducts of the wise" is proposed. Nevertheless, most of Osuli scholars' attention is directed towards the role of the general prudence or depravity in the formation of the conducts of the wise. But there are many examples of the conducts of the wise that are impressible from rational approbation and disapprobation that is based on justice and oppression. Some of the rules of the penal codes and international human rights customs fall into this category.

In the religion of Islam, security and order in society are the basis for the formation and maintenance of a social system.And this can be found in the thought of the elders of religion. The system is used in a variety of concepts such as the organization of social life, the state of affairs, the state, the set of Islamic rules and regulations, and the political, cultural, social, and economic subsystems. And when it is said that disruption of the system is considered to be the system of the Islamic system, the Islamic system and the land, the system of the Islamic government and the system of life and livelihood of the people, and the prohibition of disturbance in this research, what is meant is the prohibition of disturbance in the social system and the livelihood. People. Imam Khomeini is one of the contemporary elders who has discussed and discussed the prohibition of disorder in the system. In their view, it is forbidden to preserve the system according to the wisdom of the imperative and to disrupt it. This descriptive-analytical study with a library study has introduced the principle of non-systemic disorder with an approach to Khomeini's approach as a principle.

One of the sources of knowledge introduced by the Usūlis is reason, enjoying its special place in the structure of the field of Usūl. However, neither its role nor its contribution has received sufficient attention as it deserves, despite the fact that in order to promote jurisprudence, first, the field of Usūl must be strengthened and in order to strengthen the field of Usūl, it is necessary to strengthen the role and position of reason in the field of principles of jurisprudence. Master Javādi Āmoli believes that regarding the reason, the right path has not been taken, in two aspects: first, in terms of its role, because reason is the light, not the way, therefore, reason enjoys no function but discovering the rule. Based on this, to consider reason as one of the sources of divine rules along with the Book and Tradition is a confusion between the light and the way. The second is that the reason has not been adequately addressed in the field of principles, despite its efficient contribution to the field. Employing a descriptive and analytical method, this research aims to provide a basis for reforming the structure and categorization of a much deeper and efficient knowledge in the field of principles of jurisprudence compared to its current system, emphasizing the

The jurists have considered the documents to guarantee the receipt of a corrupt contract. Sheikh Ansari, for example, has tried to study and explain it; However, most of them, after examining the contents and explaining the meaning of the prophetic narration of "Ali Al-Alid", have not considered its citation to prove the acceptable guarantee of a corrupt contract. In this article, after a brief semantics of the construction of the wise, the author examines its function in documenting and discovering the scope of the above-mentioned prophetic narration, and as a result, considers the narration to be complete in terms of documents and meanings. Also, with a new expression, he considers the guarantee of a corrupt contract to be based on the "Ali al-Alid" rule.

he purpose of this study is to examine the foundations of the legitimacy related "upstream documents and development plans" of the Islamic government in the view of Imam Khomeini. The hypothesis is that in Imam Khomeini's jurisprudence, the authority of these documents can be proved by citing arguments such as "general and special custom", "the way of life of the wise" and "the rule of preserving the Islamic system". The method of this research is descriptive-analytical. Findings show that Imam Khomeini in connection with the need for "planning", while emphasizing the comprehensiveness of Islam, emphasized on the importance of Islamic law to guide the economic, political and cultural aspects, in order to guide the material and spiritual development programs of society, and by citing various examples, they rise up against those who consider Islam to be against development and civilization. According to his belief, due to the necessity of foresight and management of the affairs of the society and the people, every government needs to compile upstream documents and development plans that originate from the general and specific custom. These documents are binding if they do not contradict the Sharia and the Constitution, they are imperative and Sharia' rulings too. If they are not implemented correctly and accurately, the government and society will definitely suffer from stagnation, backwardness and weakening. This is contrary to the rule of "preserving the Islamic system" and is considered Haram and against the Sharia'

Some of the jurisprudential rules have undertaken some changes over the time. Naturally different causes and factors have played role in the process. This article is seeking to define the roles played by time, place, and other influential factors and having presented an example of jurisprusential issues about "cutting the young boy’s hand" it discusses the influential factors. First, it deals with the importance of analyzing this matter. Next, it examines the ruling of cutting the young boy’s hand as an example in three parts. Primarily, it examines the reliable traditions about cutting the young boy’s hand when he commits stealing. Next, the different periods of jurisprudence are reviewed.  It then examines the jurisprudents' standing against such traditions and the rulings issued by them regarding this matter, including both the cons and pros of cutting the hand. Next, it makes a reference to the arguments of the opponents of this ruling in spite of the reliable evidences existed regarding this matter. Finally, it focuses on the role played by time and place, as well as the conduct of the wise, and the reason.

Scientific study of Islamic jurisprudence is based on reason and revelation and expresses the religious duty of every responsible Muslim. At the same time, society and its thoughts and behaviors are effective in different levels of inference and recognition of instances. Social surveys, including opinion polls and behavioral surveys of communities, have increased the accuracy of identifying social realities by indexing, sampling, and observing and analyzing data. This new tool as a human achievement can be used in cases of jurisprudence dependence on understanding the thoughts and behavior of society and along with jurisprudential frameworks increase the accuracy of jurisprudential results. The discovery of the rational structure, sire-ye motasharre’eh[1], ertekaz-e orfi[2], and its recognition of emergence can be used in the method of inference using social survey. In certain cases, measuring the effect of a fatwa with social survey tools can affect inference by itself. Recognizing the examples of Islamic rulings conditioned on social actions is the main position of using social survey tools in Islamic jurisprudence. This rank is reserved for the Islamic ruler, as to recognize the instances of the great sharia’ rulings, as well as the legislative institutions that to do so with the permission of the Islamic ruler.

The conduct of the wise in deducing the rules is one of the most important issues of the modern time because it plays a great role both in responding to the increasing needs of the societies and the adaptation of jurisprudence to the new social life. Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the evolutionary process of the conduct of the wise to the Shi'ascholars of the principles of jurisprudence and the amount of referring to the conduct of the wise from the early to the contemporary scholars of the principles of jurisprudence. The results showed that the Shi'ascholars of the principles of jurisprudence specifically the later ones have relied on the conduct of the wise on most of the principles of jurisprudence and sometimes have regarded it as the only evidence or the best evidence.

“Legal person” is an accepted concept in law that its accuracy from perspective of Sharia is in dispute. Some of the Islamic scholars deny its existence in Sharia and hold it is free from Sharia conditions. Some others although accept that in the Islamic jurisprudence things other than real persons are also subject of canons and rights, they deny religiosity of the new forms of legal person. And finally some others claim that all forms of legal person are in accordance with Sharia. The authors although accept the last idea, do not believe that all of their arguments are able to prove their claims. The main cause of differences of the ideas on the issue may be the weakness of the reasons propounded. Reasons like lexical absoluteness of the reasons of sale, confirmation of the laws about legal person by the Guardian Council and the manner of the reasonable are not accepted as sufficient reasons by the authors of the paper. Only removal of exclusivity and the manner of the reasonable which is confirmed by the establisher of Sharia (Share’) are accepted as reasons.

In Islamic jurisprudence criminal teachings are often classified under the title of decrees and punishments (ahkām va siyāsāt). Even jurists who classified different sections of Islamic jurisprudence in a different way, have not put criminal teachings as a part of the acts of worships (ībādāt). In practice, however, the way jurists treat criminal teachings is more consistent with assuming them as a part of the acts of worships, i.e. fixed and unchangeable laws. This article clarifies the location of criminal teachings in Islamic jurisprudence first and then mentions the methodological consequences of this classification. The article concludes that not all criminal teachings and rules can be counted among mysterious laws and/or acts of worships. The laws that contain prohibition of some behaviors might be counted as something mysterious and as a part of the acts of worships, but not those related to the quality and quantity of punishments. Therefore, they can be under the influence of social developments and accept some rational changes except those changes that have been rejected implicitly or explicitly by the holy lawmaker.