جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « emanation » در نشریات گروه « علوم انسانی »

This article tries to reread the opinions of the two great thinkers Akhund Khurāsānī and Allameh Tabatabaei about the rule of one (qāʿida al-wāḥid) in order to explain their differences and clarify their weaknesses. Despite their noteworthy strengths the author thinks that both views can be violated: for instance, Akhund's assumption that considers this rule can be validly applied to all kinds of cause and to both real and conventional sciences, unlike Allameh's assumption that confines the rule to efficient causes including emanative and natural. Considering the intellectual foundations of these two thinkers in the principles of jurisprudence and philosophy and considering the fact that the exact explanation of this rule belongs to philosophy, it should be said, as the conclusion of this research, that the rule of one exclusively includes the emanative causes that possess and can create only one specific perfection (except for the Creator who possesses all the perfections despite His complete simplicity and unity). It is worth noting that the rule of one is not limited to a "numerically" one; therefore, the application of this rule in cases such as the issues of "being correct and more general" or "obligatory with choice" is not justified in the principles of jurisprudence and philosophy in which the above topics are not discussed.

In Uthulujiyya, "thought" (fikr) is discussed in various ontological, theological, cosmological, and psychological contexts, while "contemplation," (nazar) often contrasted with "action" in contemporary discourse, is explored in theological discussions on cosmology and existential meaning. This paper aims to examine the ontological usage of the terms "thought" and "contemplation" in Uthulujiyya theological discourse. The central question is: How are "thought" and "contemplation" employed in relation to God and the world? Are these two concepts interchangeable? The answer posits that in Uthulujiyya theology, "thought" cannot be attributed to God (a negative approach), while "contemplation" can be ascribed to God, intellect and soul (a positive approach). "Contemplation" is discussed in the context of the theory of emanation (feiz wa soudour), intertwined with cosmology and theology. Based on this foundation, in this essay, we aim to elucidate the theological meanings of "thought" and " contemplation " in Uthulujiyya and examine their applications in the its theology and cosmology.

As all possible beings have a special order, determination, and emergence, each of these determinations is governed by a noun that is the origin of its emergence. It is the sovereign name that determines and governs the being’s manifestation.  In the system of creation, by the grace of the Almighty, there is a name ruling over this world and the hereafter, over the past, and over the laws revealed by the Divinity. These ruling names have governments which are endless for some and finite for some others. The names whose governments end are subordinated to other names or return to the essence of Supreme Being. The name that governs a human being is also the ruling and dominant name among his constant names, which is referred to as his "straight path". Therefore, the right path seeker, by taking on or determining and annihilating in his ruling name can achieve his levels of perfection. Of course, due to the comprehensiveness of the human species, in any order or in any world, man is also influenced by the ruling names in the order of the creation system. Among all names, the Exalted Name “Allah” belongs to the domain of the perfect man who is the epicenter of totality of all the names of God's beauty and glory; in this domain, no name prevails another, and this perfect divine body is in extreme moderation of all names. This ancient and eternal position is exclusive and limited to the Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h). Therefore, the perfect human being, in accordance with his divine essence is the origin, reference and medium of the appearance of all the sovereign names and has the position of sovereignty and lordship over them, and is the absolute caliph of the Most High in all levels of existence.

Al-Asfār and the Nicene Creed are among the most important works of Islamic philosophy and the world of Christianity. In these two sources, especially al-Asfār, the concepts of emanation and birth are frequently repeated. By examining these two concepts, the following results are obtained. First, the analysis of the two concepts leads us to common implications such as the emergence of something from something, eternity, cognation between Father and Son, or emanator and emanation, and the necessity of the existence of the intermediaries in the descending arc. Second, these implications are accepted in both sources. Third, in these sources, emanation and birth are used interchangeably. Fourth, the philosophy of Plotinus, in which emanation, burst, and eruption are central concepts, has had an impact on these two sources. Both perspectives, however, have mentioned justifications to avoid the materialistic sense of God, which finally show the closeness of the two concepts in the two sources.

In proposing his doctrine of creation, Avicenna is under the influence of Aristotle and Neoplatonian theory of emanation as well as Islamic theologicians and religious texts. This is why his thought is basically different from previous thinkers. While he defines “the agent” as “emanatory” and “cause of existence”, he believes that the relationship between the beings and the agent is based on an existential relationship. With minor amendments, his theory of “creative foreknowledge” can be proposed as a prominent theory about the origin of emanation of beings. He examines divine knowledge by referring to “knowledge by presence” and “unity of the knower and the known”. Given his comments about knowledge by presence, the divine knowledge about the created beings including mubda'at, mukhtara'at and mukawwanat can be explained based on his theory. Particularly, he explains divine knowledge about the created beings through the divine knowledge of his own essence. Then the emanation theory has not been neglected by later philosophers and has been considered as one of the most rational interpreatations of God as the creator and agent and of the creation of world. In this article. We have tried to explain the relationship between the creator and the created based on the emanation theory of Avicenna. The theory of emanation along with We have tried to explain the relationship between the creator and the created based on the emanation theory of Avicenna. The theory of emanation along with the divine knowledge has been proposed as the basis of “creation out of nothing” (creatio ex nihilo).

 Baha Soltan Al-Valad is one of the reflective mystics and one of the pioneers of Molavi,s school of thought who could preserve and develop his father’s school of thinking by describing and explaining his father’s words and organizing Moulaviye chain. He not only was the commentator of Moulavi,s thought, but also he has achieved so many novel experiences in the mysticism which had particular reflection in his works. Comprehensive contemplation in his works shows that he was deeply influenced by Qoran. Soltan Al-Valad considers himself as a commentator of Qoran and believes that he is able to unravel the Qoranic verses and unveil the mystic meanings of Qoran because of his practical succession and understanding the dignity of emanation in God and entering the threshold of divine subsistence.Even in his sonnets, he has Qoranic speech and explains and describes many of the mystic and religious facts using on the verses of Qoran. In this study, the authors investigate the Soltan Al-Valad,s Qoranic allusions and echoes. The results of the study show that the verses of Qoran have been widely used in Solta Av-Valad,s sonnets and he has applied them in line with his thoughts and sometimes he has glossed them. He makes use of the prophet’s anecdotes to explain the principals of mystic deeds and in many cases, he compares himself with the grand prophets and adapts the events of his time with those of the prophets, time.

In the current research, writers aim to specify that Ruzbahan has used "Eltebas" with the meaning that "Plotinus" have used emanation. "Eltebas" is a Peculiar Lexicon in Ruzbahan Baqli-e-Shirazi's Intellectual System. He has Used This Metaphorical Title for naming appearance of God. In his point of view, due to Eltebas, right, appears in the universe. This Thought has been seen previously in Greece philosophy, especially in Plato & Plotinus 'ideas have entered Islam world via translation of his work, companionship with Christians,…and had had an impression on intellectual stream of the Islam World. Ruzbahan's ideas about the relationship between creator & creatures are close to Plato& Plotinus's ideas in a way that they have the same allegory.By considering cultural exchanges between East & west Mediterranean it has to be said that this similarity is in a way that it proves that Ruzbahan had been impressed with these Greek philosopher. And it's not false to call him "Neo-platonic".Muslims were familiar with Plato’s (347 BC) name, his beliefs, and his works, but Plotinus (270 CE) does not appear in their work. In certain works of Islamic philosophy as well as those of sects and creeds, a person is mentioned as “the Greek master.” In contemporary scholarships, it has been determined that this person was Plotinus (see Badawi 1955:1). The Greek master is mentioned in Ṣiwān al-ḥikma, Al-ḥikmat al-khālida and Al-milal wa-l-niḥal, where some of his remarks are cited. The author of Al-ḥikmat al-khālida refers to the Greek master as having a particular philosophy, although he does not refer to his main beliefs (see Miskawayh 1358:216). It should be acknowledged that “in the history of Islamic philosophy, Plotinus was undoubtedly one of the most influential Greek philosophers, who was directly or indirectly considered throughout the history of philosophy in Islam” (Pourjavadi 1378:98). Some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that he is at least as influential as Aristotle (322 BC): “his influence in the Islamic thought is not by any means less than that of Aristotle” (Badawi 1955:2).Of Plotinus’s work, his Enneads (nine essays) is available to us. Summaries of the fourth, fifth, and sixth essays were translated into Arabic in the third century AH (ninth century CE) under Theologia. In this research, this work is more important than Enneads, because Muslims learned about Plotinus’s views through this Arabic translation. The essay was translated by a Christian scholar ‘Abd al-Masīḥ ibn ‘Abd Allāh Nā‘ima al-Ḥimṣī(third century AH). The work was misattributed to Aristotle (see Badawi 1955:1-18). It should be noted that Muslims’ acquaintance with Plotinus’s doctrines was not limited to Theologia. In fact, “they were familiar with the work of other Neo-Platonists, particularly Pyrphyry and Proclus” (Pourjavadi 1387:104). With these preliminaries and having in mind that a sort of unity in creation is articulated in the work translated from Plotinus and his studies into Arabic, it can be said that the most prominent impact of Plotinus on Muslims is where the theory of the unity of existence is developed (see O’Leary 1374:42). Plotinus says there is no doubt that we should not talk about observations, but about the observer and the observed, and one should dare talk about the pure unity (Stace 1388:243). On this account, it should be acknowledged that, in addition to Muslim philosophers, Islamic mysticism, particularly beauty-centered mysticism, is influenced by Plotinus’s doctrines.

 Methodology and Material:

The method of research here is based on historical method and content analysis. We first examined data about how the Greek intellectual heritage, particularly that of Plato and Plotinus, was transmitted to eastern neighbors of Greece and Rome. We have then examined the understanding of eastern intellectuals, particularly Rūzbahān Baqlī Shīrāzī. It is noteworthy that, of different dimensions of the impact of the heritages of Plato and Plotinus, this research focuses on the relation between the one and phenomena. We conclude that Rūzbahān was influenced by Plotinus’s views.

A problem raised in Plato’s and then in Plotinus’s philosophy is whether the Monad (the unified essence) is related with creatures? In discussions of his theory of Forms, Plato has deployed the metaphor of “participation” (methexis) in answering the question. This was strongly opposed by his student Aristotle. Later, Plotinus combined their views to provide a more rational structure of the issue. He explains the presence of the “one” in the world by drawing upon the metaphor of “emanation” or “issuance.” Plotinus likens the one to a bright volume from which light and warmth emanates involuntarily and without it undergoing a diminution or multiplicity. In this way, he describes how the one is related with other stages of creation. With this revision, Plato’s view found a less flawed form in Neo-Platonic philosophy.Rūzbahān Baqlī Shīrāzī (606 AH/1209 CE) was influenced by Plotinus’s doctrines. In his work, he was inspired by Neo-Platonic theology. An investigation of this reveals the great extent to which beauty-oriented mystics were influenced by Greek philosophical theology. For this reason, it is necessary to specify different dimensions of this influence. The outline of Rūzbahān’s intellectual system led him to offer an answer to the problem of the relation between the creator and creatures in line with his religious beliefs. He portrays the original creation in the same way as Neo-Platonic philosophers. He suggests that the creation is constituted by necessity and the principle of emanation, but instead of equivalents of “emanation” or “issuance,” he uses the term “iltibās” (clothing). (Baqlī Shīrāzī 1389:53-54)

Drawing upon the notion of “participation,” Plato tried to argue that creatures participate in the divine essence. Thus, the world was portrayed as a fundamental unity, despite its multiplicity. Just like Plato, Plotinus believed in unity in multiplicity. Plato recognized that there is a separation between the worlds of ideas and senses in Plato’s view, Plotinus deployed “issuance” or “emanation” in his theory. In his view, the world results from the issuance of the one, where issuance does not lead to diminution, multiplicity, imperfection, and the like. Unity in multiplicity was characteristically acceptable to Muslims, as it was based on Quranic doctrines. The theory was deployed by philosophers and then mystics.Rūzbahān is obviously influenced by Plotinus’s theory. In his view, the creation of the world begins from God, and then ends in reason, spirit, and finally matter. The process is explained in line with Plotinus’s philosophy in his ‘Abhar al-‘āshiqīn and Sharḥ shaṭaḥiyyāt. In contrast to emanation, he uses the term iltibās. He views the mundane world as the abode of iltibās, which is God’s manifestation in the world. In other words, God’s iltibās is the manifestation or revelation of divine essence in sensible things. This is inevitable in the course of creation. On this account, Rūzbahān’s description of the creation of the world corresponds to Plotinus’s doctrines as they are generally received in the Islamic world, which indicates Rūzbahān Baqlī Shīrāzī’s evident influence from Plotinus’s views. Rūzbahān should, thus, be deemed a Neo-Platonic philosopher.

The rule of oneness (Al-vahed), as one of the most important philosophical rules, has always been considered by philosophers in order to explain the origin of the multiplicity of the universe from one. Most philosophers accepted its provisions, and some theologians denied it. Acceptance of the Al-vahed rule and belief in a single origin for all multiple beings leads the philosopher to the question of how to issue multiplicity from God, who is in all respects one. Meanwhile, Thomas Aquinas and Mulla Sadra also expressed their views on it based on their philosophical and ontological foundations. How many beings originated from a simple unit preoccupied the minds of both, and they, like other philosophers, had to find a way to do so. This article intends to study the works of Thomas and Mulla Sadra and the commentators and researchers in an analytical and research manner to examine the views of two philosophers on the Al-vahed rule to determine whether they both believe in the principle of the rule? What are the reasons for rejecting or accepting the rule in their opinion? How do each justify the emergence of plurals from the unit? Thomas ontologically denies the rule and criticizes those who believe in it. But Mulla Sadra, by accepting the principle of the rule, has restored it and based on his philosophical foundations, has presented a new plan of it.

The al-Wāḥid rule (the one does not emanate of it except one) is one of the important and controversial philosophical rules that had been paid attention by philosophers and theologians. From the beginning of its setting forth in the Islamic world, this theory has been accepted by the philosophers and denied by many of theologians. Philosophers like al-Fārābī and Avicenna have set forth and proved this theory in the Islamic world. One can say that all the important demonstrations to prove this rule have been set forth by Avicenna. In this regard, by numerous evidences such as limitedness in God’s power or regarding God as being an obliged agent, the theologians apposed this theory. One of these theologians is Ibn Malāḥimī al-Khwārazmī that criticized this rule on the basis of incoherence of this rule with the speeches of the philosophers themselves as well as claiming limitedness of the Divine power. This article examined the history of the al-Wāḥid rule, its conceptual clarification and the Ibn Malāḥimī al-Khwārazmī’s arguments and criticisms in order.

There are four basic theories on the ontology of the essential attributes of God that consist in: oneness of the Essence and the attributes, addition of the attributes to the Essence, negation of the attributes and deputyship of the Essence for the attributes and the theory of Aḥwāl (moods). Fayyaḍ Lāhīdjī, one of the philosopher-theologians of the Isfahan Thought School, talked about the philosophical theory of oneness from one hand, and the theory of deputyship from the other. This article tries to discover Lāhīdjī’s real view on the basis of his thought basis. It seems that according to the bases of emanation, necessity and compatibility (sinkhiyyah) of causality and meaning commonality of being, Lāhīdjī must accept the theory of oneness in ontology and positive theology in semantics, and his usage of word niyābah (deputyship) is because of confusing between the two theories of oneness and deputyship and not recognizing the differences of the two theories and their bases and various effects.

The al-Wahid principle has been constantly drawing attention from Muslim philosophers and theologians throughout the history of Islamic thought, while some have sought to substantiate this principle and some others have attempted to criticize and reject it. It was not only theologians who challenged the principle, it also did not sit well with some philosophers who were critical of it. One of these philosophers was Aliquli Bin Qarachghai Khan Torkamani, a Safavid era philosopher and pupil to Mulla Rajabali Tabrizi. He challenges Ibn Sina’s arguments for the al-Wahid, believing that if we consider the Necessary Existent as a pure simple entity that is aware of oneself and others and is also able to create others, then, knowing that knowledge and power are identical with His essence, we can say that the emanation of the multiple from the Necessary Existent will not require existence of multiple aspects within Him. Accordingly, we can accept the emanation of the multiple from the one. In this article we undertake an explication and critique of Aliquli Bin Qarachghai Khan’s view of the al-Wahid principle. In brief, this article argues that although to some degree his critiques of Ibn Sina’s proofs are successful, he fails to take an all-inclusive approach to the issue.

 According to Sadra, the relationship between possible beings and the Necessary Being is dependency. He believes that all other Muslim philosophers before him, including Jalal al-Din Davani understood this relationship to be relational. However, Davani, who in his works holds that the relation between the cause and the effect is a kind of “attribution”, explains this relation in two different forms, the first of which is known as the theory of Zawq al-Ta'alluh (Inclination to Divinity); from his views in this regard one can mostly conclude the relationality of possible beings. In the second form he uses the concept of emanation instead of causality and the notion of the source of attributions (Um al-Nisab) to more precisely explain the concept of “attribution” and considers it to be synonymous with manifestation and emanation in a way that one can say Davani's view corresponds to that of Sadra concerning personal unity. In this paper, firstly it is shown that the second approach to Davani's view is a more complete and precise one and secondly, it is concluded that two matters caused Sadra to believe that Davani considered possible beings to be relational beings:  Davani’s unsuccessful explanation of his intended meaning and Sadra’s inattention to the second form of the explanation of “attribution”.

One of the most important concerns of Avicenna in theology was systematic explanation of knowledge of Almighty Necessary. He wants to provide a theory for explanation of the omniscience of Almighty Necessary, which is unchangeable and comprehensive, without harming His simplicity. In order to achieve this goal, Avicenna introduced the theory of “Imprinted Forms”. Avicenna held that these Forms are essential properties of the Essences and causes of beings and raising from the Necessary’s intellectual thought, He also held that the knowledge of Almighty Necessary to the creatures come from knowledge to these Forms(causes). It is clear that the underlying ground of this view is the causal relationship between the Forms and objective beings. Although there is clearly this relationship in either Avicenna’s works ,and his commentaries, but, this point has been completely neglected in the phase of the creation of multiplicity of creatures. Avicenna didn’t say anything about the role and participation of these Forms in emanation of the First Intellect and the other Intellects and heavenly Spheres. Conversely he held that the First intellect immediately created from the Almighty Necessary. He also thought that the Intellects and heavenly Spheres emanated from each other, and not from Imprinted Forms. We show, in this Article, that there is inconsistency between these two explanations.

In Islamic Mysticism, all aspects of being are manifestations of the Real Haqq and according to the principle of emanation, they are derived from one origin. These manifestations are Sometimes called “Word”. This term shows that the only real speaker in the world is the supreme Being and all creatures are created by the “Breath of the All – merciful” and they are related to him directly and obviously, like the relation between speaker and his words. In mystical literature of Islam these Divine Words are called with terms which are mostly taken from the Holy Quran. Some of these terms are: “cosmic words”, “soul-related words” and “Quranic words”. These three divine words make three cosmic, soul-related, and Quranic book and a collective attention to them leads to a comprehensive knowledge of God. Furthermore, as they are derived from the same origin there would be many correspondences between them.

The relation of existential monotheism to existence and multiplicities is regarded as theological and mystical topic little studied in theology. The hypothesis of the paper has been explained and proved by relying on reasonings of Divine Essence (pure existence, essence of simplicity, absoluteness, analyzing efficient cause) and of universe (caused and dependent existence of universe and multiplicities). Again, the topic has been studied with regard to Quranic verses and traditions with various explanations including God`s omnipresence, His accompaniment and nearness to existence, His state of being the First and the Last, the Outward and Inward and Light) and, in this way, the theory of universality of existential monotheism to the whole of existence and ojective multiplicities has been explained; such an explanation leads to unity of existence and negate God`s existence as distinct from that of contingents.

Al-Wāḥid is one of the oldest and most controversial philosophical principles, which always faced so many agreements and disagreements, particularly by theologians. Depending on different definitions of its conceptual origins, the referents and applications have been changed and applied to prove unity of First intellect to plurality of soul faculties. Its opponents have regarded that as a violation of God’s Absolute efficient, omnipotence and will. In the meantime, there are certain expressions in some Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā’s works -who advocate the principle- which require that, the principle should be denied or revised basically. It should be noted that some of Islamic philosophers have supported the principle as a strong foundation and original axiom. Through rethinking some origins of the principle, we can review and criticize its proofs to show that the other proofs should be required to advocate the theory in which just one immediate entity has been issued from God.

The theory of emanation (ṣudur) is one of the solutions proposed in the Islamic philosophy for the problem of causation relation. This theory originates from the Neo-Platonist philosophy. In Avicenna’s works, this theory is sometimes based on the ‘determination of the effect by its adequate cause’, and sometimes on the notion of ‘causal necessity’. This article shows that Avicenna has argued for the theory of emanation based on a new model he provides for the latter notion. Avicenna discusses a new analysis for the relation between cause and effect according to which effect should be ‘possible by itself’. He argues that a being which is possible by itself does not come to existence unless it is necessitated—i.e., it comes out of the mere possibility—by some other thing that is ‘necessary by itself’. Therefore, ‘necessitation’ plays the most crucial role in bringing something that is possible by itself to existence.

The phrase “the one does issue him only the one” is content of a rule which is very important in Islamic philosophy. Muslim philosophers such as Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra accepted this principle and presented certain proofs to prove it. On the other hand, some theologians denied this rule, and through violations and objections were seeking to undermine this principle. This rule, in accordance with the principles of transcendental wisdom has certain elements, so that deniers of that rule fail to understand the correct meaning of these elements. In this paper, firstly, we explain the elements of this rule, and with Sadraian approach, arguments and objections to this rule has been analyzed, and although some Peripatetic arguments against this rule is not without problems, but according to principles of transcendent Wisdom we presented the more stronger argument in witness of this rule and answered the violations and the objections to it.

As same as many other philosophical principles, the rule of al-Wahid have been subjected to a great criticism and cavil by scholars and authorities throughout ages. This rule has, despite the celebrated point of view, been challenged by not only the theologians but also some philosophers and mystics as well– at least, in the extensional aspects. Having taken the background of this rule into consideration and the purpose of philosophers who had in presenting it, this article has endeavored to analyze the prominent statements regarding the rule of al-Wahid and also point out each of their main presumptions in order to show that the expositions made by Muhaqiq-Tusi are the most comprehensive comparing to those scholars before or even after him; other statements presented by other authorities contain specific ambiguities in regard to al-Wahid on the effect side. Therefore, thanks to the more accurate expositions provided by Khajeh and the resolution of the ambiguity, the conceptual contradictions involved in the rule mentioned above due to the formation based on the principle of the resemblance become evident. Presuming that the rule of al-Wahid is theoretically accurate, the author has analyzed the extensional criticisms made by some thinkers in regard to this philosophical principle. Thus, it has been shown that the rule of al-Wahid lacks outer extensions in terms of compatibility with the external world regarding the principle of resemblance, unity on the causal side, unity on the effect side, and the concept of emanation.