جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "philosophical concepts" در نشریات گروه "علوم انسانی"

Equating philosophical secondary intelligibles with logical secondary intelligibles, which is one of the essentials of the primacy of quiddity, leads to the assumption that their origins are identical. This assumption implies that the philosophical secondary intelligibles, like logical secondary intelligibles, rely on quiddities in their origin of attainment. This perception makes the method of attaining philosophical secondary intelligibles quiddity-based. Using an analytical-descriptive method, this article demonstrates that these two assumptions are wrong under the primacy of existence and have fundamental flaws. The existential nature of the philosophical secondary intelligibles causes its origin and the method of attainment to be existential. The instances of philosophical secondary intelligibles, according to the primacy of existence, possess externality, whereas quiddities have no share of externality, having conceptual identity and thingness. Hence, the origin of philosophical secondary intelligibles cannot be quiddities. With the change in perspective on the origin of philosophical secondary intelligibles, the method of attaining these concepts becomes different as well. The method proposed by ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī for attaining philosophical secondary intelligibles, based on knowledge by presence, aligns with the primacy of existence.

The review of the works and the writings of philosophers regarding the origin of philosophical concepts and the origin of the concepts and imaginations before it are indicative of the gradual and influenced formation and importance of this issue from a series of ideas in both the west and Islam. In the western world, the idea of innate ideas raised by rationalists and the rejection of the same idea by empiricists finally leads the Scottish philosopher Hume, who is evasive from the mysterious philosophy,to tract the origin of concepts and adaptations and by presenting a plan to refer concepts and adaptations has beaten all philosophies and introduced them as illusory and invalid concepts,and appeals to justifying the existence of these concepts in the mind to psychological and imaginary bases. later and in the passing of time due to the entry of western ideas into Iran,especially in the contemporary era,the issue of the origin of concepts and ideas (in general) and the origin of philosophical(in particular) by Allamh Tabatabayi has doubled its value and importance. Allameh, like Hume while rejecting the idea of innate and preconceived notions of the mind and bringing science to the field of presence and emphasizing the inherent existence and discovery of science and by reference all concepts and ideas to present science the validity and epistemological value of the philosophical concepts which are in Hume's philosophical dictionary restores what was disappeared and gives new life to philosophy and its concepts.

The common view is that philosophical concepts, such as existence, unity, causality, and necessity, have no objective existence and, even if they have, Man is not capable of perceiving them. This is because Man’s encounter with the world of sensibles is through the senses, which can only perceive sensible qualities of objects and are not even capable of perceiving all accidents. Based on these two points, the abstraction of philosophical concepts from external sensible realities seems to be totally impossible. Following a descriptive-analytic method and based on some of the principles of the Transcendent Philosophy, including the subsistence and affirmation of philosophical concepts in the outside and the quality of the existence of the soul and the quality of perceiving it, this study is intended to demonstrate that philosophical concepts are attained directly and without any intermediary from the heart of sensory perceptions. Although this theory does not exist in Mullā Ṣadrā’s works, his philosophical principles fittingly provide the context for such an explanation.

Comparative literature studies with two American and French approaches have grown more and more in the last decade. Poems, stories, novels, etc. of different nations have been examined both in terms of comparing similarities (American) and in terms of influence (French); but comparative studies in the field of literature for children and adolescents have deficiencies and inadequacies. By understanding this shortcoming, the present research provides the basis for comparative studies in children's and adolescent literature. In this research, with the approach of French comparative literature and descriptive and analytical method, we have compared the same elements in “The Little Prince “and Kashigar's “When Mina Woke Up”. Kashigar is one of the translators who translated” The Little Prince” from French to Persian. In addition, in examining the story elements and the concepts and content of these two stories, on the one hand, there are similarities in elements such as: character and characterization, setting, dialogue, place, etc., and on the other hand, there are similarities in the philosophical foundations of these stories. Two works, with philosophical themes such as: death, loneliness, returning to oneself, surprise, freedom and captivity, proof of philosophical existence... It strengthens the assertion that Kashigar in the creation of Mina's story “when she wakes up”. She was influenced by “ Little Prince”. This article shows this effect in detail.

Principality of existence and conventionality of quiddity can be considered as the main pillars of transcendental philosophy. This term has various interpretations each of which can be regarded as related to one dimension of that meaning. Thus, in the present article, we have attempted to review one of these interpretations (that of Master Gholam-Reza Fayyazi), and offer an explanation that seems to be closer to reality. Accordingly, in this article, we have stated Master Fayyazi’s foundations and offered a summary of his opinions regarding this principle to explain eight foundations and critiques about them, while explaining some part of semantic foundations that seems to be more correct. Besides, we have also investigated and reviewed the reason he has offered for his opinion on conventionality of quiddity with his special statement. We have continued with explaining and reviewing the most essential consequence of that statement, which seems not to be right. Therefore, in this article, we have attempted, while offering critiques of that statement, to present points for researchers in the transcendental philosophy to enable them to gain more of that philosophical school and come closer to the ontological depth of transcendental philosophy.

Analysis and study of philosophical concepts has long been discussed among philosophers. The main question of this research is whether Sheikh Ishraq’s interpretation of philosophical concepts is correct? Through this research, it becomes clear through descriptive analytical method. And he has considered them as mere mental matters and in the shadow of it, he has proposed the theory of the originality of the nature and validity of existence. The source of Sheikh Ishraq’s mistake lies in the fact that external realization equates concepts with concrete realization and neglects the realization of integration. Is. While this argument is based on the said egalitarianism, and by denying this egalitarianism, the above rule has not been current in philosophical concepts, and at the same time the philosophical concepts will have external realization, whether abstract external realization according to the famous view of philosophers or Realization of the image that is accepted by Sadr al-Mutachr('39')allehin.

How the philosophical concepts are realized in illumination philosophy is affected by the way they are realized in peripatetic philosophy. In peripatetic philosophy, the dominant view on the way those concepts are realized is the external superabundance of these concepts to the identity of the object of accident. Thus, Suhravardi maintains that superabundance of the philosophical concepts to the identity of the object of accident leads to origination of vicious circle and other rational drawbacks; thus, he negates the external realization of those concepts, and explicitly incorporates them into the logical concepts. After Suhravardi, nearly all of the philosophers before Mulla Sadra were influenced by his view, but most of them, unlike Suhravardi, maintained that although it is impossible for the philosophical concepts to be found in the external world, those concepts, unlike the logical ones, have their origin or the origin of their attributes in the external world.

How the philosophical meanings are realized in transcendental philosophy is subsidiary to the principality of existence and conventionality of meaning. By posing the ideas of principality of existence and conventionality of meaning, Mulla Sadra proved that external identities are of the type of truth of existence and that the meaning is impossible to be found in external world. Therefore, he maintains that the existence of meanings, including the philosophical meanings, in the external world is their verifying external quiddities. Considering the fact that Mulla Sadra does not know the external quiddities to be of the meaning type, he thus believes that the contrast of concepts and meanings would not necessarily lead to multiplicity of instances and it is possible that multiple concepts and meanings refer to one single quiddity. It is necessary to mention that although Mulla Sadra regards it possible for multiple concepts and meanings to refer to one single quiddity, by putting forward the idea that accident is separable from what it belongs to, he could prove that the accidents are externally supper added to what they belong to.

Philosophical concepts, which are a variety of general concepts, are considered as one of the most important philosophical issues in a way that, many scholars consider it the key to knowing and discovering reality and the adaptation of scientific forms to objective objects. The term philosophical concepts is a common term in Islamic philosophy especially Sadra’s philosophical school, but neglecting this type of concepts in the West, especially in epistemological issues, has caused many intellectual deviations. In contemporary times, some of the Sadr al-Muta’allehin’s views have been criticized, so despite the great importance of philosophical concepts, it is worthwhile for scholars to pay more attention to them. Using a descriptive-analytical method and strengthening the Islamic foundations of philosophy and epistemology this paper seeks to study the most important requirements of research in philosophical concepts by explaining their realism.

The study of atheism as a matter of knowledge in the 21st century has attracted the attention of many thinkers. Motahari and Pasquini are among those who have studied the causes and non-philosophical reasons of atheism and believe that atheism is against the human nature although it has a profound connection with how the image of God is, and that any lack of cognition or impeding the formation of proper knowledge can lead one to atheism. Motahari believes that the inadequacy of religious and ecclesiastical concepts impedes the formation of a correct understanding of God and ultimately a reversion to theism in the Western world, where the inaccurate political and social functioning of the church as a religious authority is also a sufficient of atheism and secularism in Western societies. Pasquini also believes that one's emotional and psychological failures in childhood and adolescence lead to a failure in the process of knowing and understanding God. Therefore, he uses the psychological theory of Professor Vitz "dysfunctional father" to illustrate the non-philosophical causes of atheism in individuals, and in particular in the leaders of the new atheism and intellectuals and thinkers and philosophers.

Analysis and investigation of secondary intelligibles has been focus of attention among philosophers since long ago. Epistemology of philosophical concepts deals with an investigation of these concepts, and in the present article, we have explored the epistemology of philosophical concepts in the minds of Allama Tabataba’i and Ayatollah Mesbah. In this study, it is clarified that Allama Tabataba’i was the first philosopher who put forward the mode of abstraction of the philosophical concepts including the concept of existence and non-existence. He believes that philosophical concepts are abstracted by using intuitive knowledge. Ayatollah Mesbah, unlike Allama, does not consider intuitive knowledge and internal experience as sufficient for abstraction of each of the primary philosophical concepts; rather, he maintains in addition to that, they must be compared with one another, and one must regard a certain relation among them. In his view, Allama’s method in abstracting philosophical concepts cannot be generalized

Abstracts One of the issues raised At the moment, is epistemology of value propositions. From viewpoint of some, value concepts are of philosophical concepts, And at result, propositions emerged from these concepts, are increasing- knowledg and provable. And from viewpoint of some, Concepts of this propositions, are from credibility of mind and since that the matter of analogy is from credits of mind, as a result propositions emerged from these concepts, he does not give, knowledg and are indemonstrable. Another argument that will proposed after this view, is the relative of value propositions. This treatise will that with a view of problem-oriented, with description and comparison between of writing of these two noble and rational analysis them, reality, would become clear. From accuracy in their writings, it shows that Allama and the martyr Motahhari, beliefs the second theory. But relativity of value propositions can not be attributed to them. It seems that view of credit is correct, in non-declarative sentences, but in the declarative sentences is not correct. Many defects, entered on ideas of Allama and martyr Motahari but most of them are not correct.

Training philosophy to children and adolescents is the only program that, by teaching philosophy through the discussion, provides the moral developmental requirements for children and adolescents, and this can be done by engaging in ethical exploration that requires critical and creative thinking. This research tries to study the effectiveness of training philosophical concepts on the development of ethical values.

This is a post hoc research. The statistical population included all female students of the Junior High School (second period) in Qarchak City in 2015. The size sample was 30, and sampling was done by multistage randomized cluster sampling method. 15 subjects were assigned to experimental group and 15 subjects to the control group. Data were gathered by questionnaire. Data were analyzed by uni and multi variate covariance.

The results of the research showed that there is a positive and significant relationship between the teaching of philosophical concepts and benevolence, traditionalism, consistency, security, pleasure, success, self-reliance and universalism scales, but relationship between teaching philosophy and the scale of power and excitement was not significant.

The results showed that training of the philosophical concepts lead to the development of benevolence, traditionalism, conformity, security, hedonism, success, self-reliance and universalism in adolescence.

Interpretation of “secondary intelligibles” is inextricably associated with ‘principality of existence’; this mutual relation is more visible in the philosophical system of Sheikh Ishraq and transcendental philosophy. In this inquiry, it is clarified that Suhrawardi regards logical and philosophical secondary intelligibles as lacking inconsistent external existence, and absolutely negates their external realization, considers them as mental affairs, and – on this very foundation – puts forward the idea of principality of quiddity and conventionality of existence. This is while Mulla Sadra believes that since container of realization of relation is the very container of realization of the two sides of relation, both sides are realized in one container which is the very container of characterizing the subject by the judgment. Therefore, since characterizing in philosophical concepts is organized in the external container, philosophical concepts must have external realization as well. In the light of this fact, Mulla Sadra has reviewed and criticized Sheikh Ishraq’s argument on conventionality of existence and has interpreted the mode of realization of existential concepts in the light of arguments for the theory of principality of existence.

ne of the issues raised in the philosophy of ethics is the recognition of the verisimilitude of value propositions. Some believe that value concepts are philosophical concepts. Consequently, the propositions derived from these concepts are knowledge-creating and provable. From the perspective of others, the notional concepts of these propositions are considered to be mentally-posited. Using a problem-oriented approach and describing and comparing the works of Martyr Motahari and their intellectual analysis, this research seeks to discover the truth about this issue from the viewpoint of Martyr Motahari. A careful attention to the professor's statements shows that professor Motahhari has the second perspective. But the relativity of value propositions cannot be attributed to him. It seems that the words of the professor are correct in imperative statements, but in the declarative propositions of statement, they are false.

Moral concepts, like well-known philosophical concepts, belong to the category of ideas, not forms, and have an external and non- subjective manifestation; therefore, they have great resemblance to secondary intelligibles. However, firstly, as the external realization of moral concepts is the basis for the voluntary act of man, and secondly, finding their examples is the basis for the doer’s intention, moral concepts are different from famous philosophical concepts. This difference has led Muslim scholars to discuss the philosophical concepts and propositions related to ontological area under the rubric of theoretical philosophy, and to discuss the concepts and propositions related to axiology under the rubric of practical philosophy. In this paper, while investigating the reality of philosophical concepts, we examine the nature of moral concepts and their differences with famous philosophical concepts. The existence of a fundamental distinction between these two categories of concepts has led to interpreting famous philosophical concepts as "secondary ontological intelligibles", and considering moral concepts or any concept related to the voluntary and purposeful actions of man as "secondary axiological intelligibles."

In the modern era, we frequently see readings of Peripatetic philosophy on the basis of Mulla Sadran view and New-Mulla Sadran views for the idea of ‘the way of realization of philosophical concepts’, readings that are rejected and not defendable according to the bases of Peripatetic philosophy and the extant works as well as the readings of the most prominent expositors and critiques of Peripatetic philosophy, including Mulla Sadra. Today, those views are often attributed to Peripatetic philosophers; they consider philosophical concepts existing in the external world in the form of analytical accident and united to the carrier of the accident. However, referring to the extant works of Peripatetic philosophers leads us to a series of bases in Peripatetic philosophy according to which Peripatetic philosophy lacks, in principle, the capacity to propose the theory of analytical accident and unity of accident and its carrier; besides, according o the same bases, the mode of existence of the accidents is merely possible in concrete form. It is, however, necessary to note that, as we find in Avicenna’s works, he sometimes believes in the unity of several contradictory concepts in a single one. We evaluate this view as the rare and uncommon view in Peripatetic philosophy; however, the same view was known as the common view on the way philosophical concepts are realized.

The two philosophical systems of Ibn Sina and Sadra have provided different explanations of the reality of time and its relation with movement. In Ibn Sina's philosophical view, time is an accidental category, a nonon-static continuous quantity [e1] . This viewpoint faces several important challenges:first, regarding the concept and reality of time as quidditive; second, separating the reality of time from the reality of material beings, which requires the denial of the real assignment of time to material beings; third, the incompatibility between the "denial of the external existence of cuttingmovement" and " interpreting time as the amount of cutting-movement "in Ibn Sina’s philosophical system. To overcome these challenges, Mulla Sadra
has put forward a new perspective. In his view, the concept of motion is a philosophical secondary intelligible, and its reality is not a cognation of quiddities. Motion and time exist with one being, and time is the amount of the substantial  ovement of material objects.

One of the important issues raised in the philosophy of ethics is whether ethical propositions are realistic and provable, or the consistency of these propositions is considered to be mentally-posited and unprovable. Considering the importance of Allameh Tabatabai 's novel perspective, this paper attempts to extract and examine his views on whether the moral propositions are realistic or not, and also on relativity or absoluteness of ethics .The analysis of his thoughts suggests that, although he believes that moral propositions are mentally-posited or relative, first, his ideas are only true with regard to the mentally-posited or relative things (moral obligations), not the provable or real propositions. Second, the unprovability of mentally-posited propositions in the domain of morality is not a reason for moral relativity.

The present article investigates the question of what the reaction of the Islamic philosophy to the problems facing the religious epistemology is. Is it passive to them? Does it justify them and withdraw or it solves the problems and presents rational and wise solutions? The authors, after their constant efforts in a few decades, have found that the Islamic philosophy, with its broaden domain, has the ability to solve the problems of philosophy of religion and religious epistemology. The collection of solutions it presents can, at least, be considered as alternate solutions – along with other solutions – by those thinkers who do not favor this disposition. After stating a list of problems and their answers based on the Islamic intellectual and philosophical tradition, the present study investigates, for example, two reasons among the most important reasons for disability of intellect and intellectual reasoning in [proving] God’s existence (i.e. the meaninglessness of the words and concepts of necessary and possible [being] and denial of predicative existence) and presents answers based on that tradition.