جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "putin" در نشریات گروه "علوم سیاسی"

The new foreign policy doctrine of Russia in 2023 reflects fundamental changes in the international environment and the geopolitical goals of the country. This article, utilizing John Mearsheimer's framework of offensive realism, analyzes the foundations and implications of this doctrine. Offensive realism emphasizes the ongoing efforts of great powers to achieve regional hegemony and balance against international rivals. The main research question is: what principles and components does Putin's new foreign policy doctrine emphasize? It is assumed that the new foreign policy doctrine of Russia reflects the country's desire to redefine the international order and confront Western influence, particularly from the United States and NATO. This doctrine is formulated with the aim of achieving objectives such as expanding regional influence, establishing strategic alliances with non-Western powers, and reducing dependence on Western-led structures. The research findings indicate that Russia, through adopting aggressive policies in military, economic, and diplomatic fields, seeks to impose heavy costs on its rivals and increase strategic deterrence.

Although the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is interpreted based on geopolitical propositions such as the expansion of NATO to Eastern Europe, Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 under the code of special military operations can be an external example of the multi-order world and reflect the current reality of the world. Therefore, the research question is that; What is the basis of Russia's strategy under the leadership of Vladimir Putin in the 2022 Ukraine war, and how has Russia's Eurasianism strategy with China's support played a role in the formation of a multi polar world? The answer to the article's hypothesis is that; Russia's Eurasianism strategy, such as the military presence in Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the autonomous regions of Ukraine to this country in 2022, show the civilizational turn of Russia and the renewal of traditional values as the main strategic elements of the Kremlin's foreign policy in search of its position as a great power and China's cooperation with Russia in the Ukraine crisis provides the basis for the creation of a powerful Eastern bloc and the transition from a uni polar system to a multi polar system. For this purpose, this article has come to the conclusion that Russia, with its set of actions after Ukraine, together with China, provides the necessary ground for a new powerful block and confirms and emphasizes the existing hypothesis. This research will be explained using descriptive-analytical method.

Putin believes that he has an important, historical and sacred mission, the main focus of which is to restore Russia's historical greatness and compensate for the West's damages to Russia. Therefore, in order to compensate for Russia's geopolitical failure after the collapse of the Soviet Union and to avoid the mistakes of that era, it has tried to communicate with the African continent and develop its influence on different levels with this continent. The interesting thing about the nature of Russia's relations with the African continent lies in the fact that Putin does not spend money from the government's treasury in this direction. Therefore, when examining and analyzing Russian policies, one should not ignore Putin's political psychology, which seeks to restore Russia's greatness. Moscow has stepped into Africa with the aim of institutionalizing its military presence in the African continent and the Mediterranean coast, dominating the oil and gas and mining sectors, as well as creating new markets to sell its products.

Parties act as political institutions that connect government and society. They also play a vital role in the political endurance of nations. The Russian Federation is one the countries that has an active multi-party system. The formation of parties in Russia started later than in Western Europe. The first political parties were formed under Tsar Nicholas II in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. However, until 1905, the establishment of political associations in Russia was strongly opposed until the declaration of October17, 1905. With the October Revolution of 1917, a one-party system was gradually formed in Russia, thus ending the first period of party formation.At the end of the Soviet era in the late 1980s and after the implementation of “Perestroika” and “Glasnost” by Mikhail Gorbachev, important changes took place in the Russian political system. This especially led to the re-emergence of parties. In the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of political parties was very rapid and numerous. Subsequently, during the following years, the party structure of the Russian Federation experienced significant numerical and substantive changes, a subject which this article tries to investigate.

Research question: 

What is the role of political parties in the political life of Russia? Do all Russian political parties have equal influence and rights since Vladimir Putin assumed power?

Research hypothesis: 

The hypothesis of this atricle is that the party system in Putin's Russia is effectively a “dominant party” system; in which parties affiliated with Putin’s United Russia Party primarily dominate and control the legislative process. The authors of this article also argue that the amendment of the Russian constitution in 2020 did not change the role and position of Russian parties in practice.

In order to conduct this research and answer the key questions, a descriptive-analytical approach has been chosen. In addition, the authors have explained the problem and investigated the issue by collecting and analyzing the required data through desk research and descriptive analysis of available sources (articles, books and reliable internet sources).

The approval of the law on political parties in 2001 and the imposition of party electoral thresholds (minimum share of primary votes: 5-7 percent) drastically reduced the number of parties. But in October 2011, the government passed a bill to simplify party registration. After the approval of this law, the number of parties increased. From the 4th Duma (2003) to the 8th Duma (2021), the “United Russia” as Putin's “Party of Power” has always won an absolute majority of votes. This party has the largest number of representatives in the State Duma and in the regional parliaments.Since power in Russia is ultimately concentrated in the hands of the president, it is in the interests of political parties and party elites to get close to him in order to reduce any tensions and disagreements. Indeed, due to the dominance of the “Party of Power”, the Russian political party system is virtually non-competitive. This is the main problem of party development in today’s Russia. Therefore parliamentary parties have many resources, while non-parliamentary opposition parties have neither resources nor political stability.Considering the contemporary dominance of certain political parties in the Russian parliament and their failure to replace with newer parties, it has definitely reduced the interest and willingness of Russian citizens to vote. In this regard, in 2016, the lowest participation rate in the history of parliamentary elections of the Russian Federation was recorded with only 47.88 percent. This low turnout was in contrast to the previous four elections, in which 60 percent of all eligible voters participated and two elections, in which 55 percent participated.Several amended articles of the Russian constitution actually strengthen the role and position of the president. For example, according to clause 2 of Article 95 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the number of representatives of the President in the Federation Council increases from 17 to a maximum of 30. Likewise, Articles 129 and 107 increase the interference of the President in the judiciary and thus limit the independence of the country’s judiciary. On January 15, 2020, Vladimir Putin once again inexplicably reiterated the need for a strong presidential system and sufficient powers for the president in Russia.

Although according to the constitution of the Russian Federation (2020), the country has a multi-party system, but in practice, the Power Party (United Russia) plays the main role compared to other parties in Russia. The party system in Russia has become the dominant party system. Russian political parties are not an effective bridge between the people and the government due to the weakness of civil society in Russia. Therefore, until a strong civil society is formed in Russia, the country’s political parties will not play a central role as a link between civil society and the government. The “United Russia” party as the dominant political party in power, has practically become Putin's tool to hold the majority of seats in the parliament. As a result, when Putin wants to become the president of Russia, through this party and in the name of “the will of the Russian people” he can influence the establishment of laws in Parliament without opposition and in line with his political interests.

Russia is a country with long-standing ties to the African continent, so that Russia's role in the Black Continent can be analyzed in terms of its geopolitical and geoeconomic considerations and the idea of Russia's "glory" derived from the tsarist empire. Russia is now trying to realize the idea of the glory of the tsars and to play the role of a great power on the African scene, given the situation, given the reluctance of the United States to intervene directly in African affairs. This article answers the question of what goals and interests Russia is pursuing in Africa and why Moscow has been active in African countries in recent years to achieve its desired interests? The authors' hypothesis is that Russia seeks to enhance its role as a major power on the African continent; In practice, however, this role is largely limited to efforts to help balance, arms and conflict resolution in African countries, educational assistance, and economic benefits. This research has a descriptive-analytical aspect and data collection has been done to do it by library method.

In late 2021, Western intelligence services began issuing warnings about Moscow's readiness to invade Ukraine, although Russian elites, including Putin, denied the claim. But to the dismay of observers and the concern of Western nations, he ordered an invasion in February 2022. At first, this action was supposed to be a short and decisive operation with the aim of overthrowing the Zelenskyi government. But the field calculations were wrong and Moscow admitted that every war has its own path and does not necessarily follow the pre-planned path and the plan of the military commanders. The 2022 Russian war on Ukraine sparked different and even contradictory analyses. Some believe that because of NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's desire to join this security alliance, the Kremlin is opposed to any option except war. Other scholars believe that Putin attacked Ukraine because of Moscow's strong desire to be recognized and respected as a "great power" or because of elements of Russia's strategic culture. Other studies have focused on Putin's personal characteristics and ambitions as the main source of the attack.  This article examines the role of Putin's perceptions and miscalculations in relation to the issue of war. 

The key question of the study is: How have Putin’s misperceptions affected his policy towards Kyiv? There are also a few minor questions, such as: How Putin understands the international position of Russia and its relations with other countries, and how he perceives the intentions of other great powers.

This study hypothesizes that Putin's misperceptions of Russia's military might, Ukraine's will and power to resist, his misperception of Ukraine's intentions and his misunderstanding of the reactions of third parties critically contributed to and precipitated his decision to go to war.

To determine the main variables of the research, a conceptual framework, based on the findings of some key scholars of the psychology of International Politics, namely Jack Levy and Martin White, has been adopted. According to the conceptual framework, 3 main categories of misperceptions play an important role in leading countries to war: 1) Misperception of oneself and enemy’s military capabilities; 2) Misperception on the enemy’s intentions and the degree of its animosity, and 3) Misperception on the intentions and reactions of the third parties. The second tier of the conceptual framework includes two key elements of Russian strategic culture, “fear” and “arrogance” which according to Martin White, are the main elements of a war. All of these factors could pave the way for a costly and all-out war. To investigate the role of these factors in the 2022 war in Ukraine, the research method of qualitative content analysis has been used. Directed qualitative content analysis, unlike conventional inductive approaches, is a comparative research approach.  In this method, the researcher uses the existing theory and literature to determine the key concepts and variables. Based on those concepts and variables, the researcher begins to collect, code, decode and analyze the data. In the current study, according to the variables of the conceptual framework, the author has directly and indirectly pointed out Putin's views in this field in order to extract his possible misconceptions about Ukraine crisis. In collecting information related to Putin's words, the writer has referred to the interviews and documents published by the Russian Foreign Ministry. To strengthen the reliability of the research, the findings of the existing literature have also been examined. The collected data has been coded, decoded and analyzed in the conceptual framework.

Cognitive and psychological factors have played a significant role in creating the ground for the war in Ukraine. There is some evidence that highlights the role of the misperceived Russian elites, mainly Putin, in the war against Kyiv. These misconceptions are: 1) Misunderstanding of Ukraine's own and military capabilities, a) overestimating Moscow’s military capabilities and b) underestimating Ukraine's military capabilities 2) Misperception on the intentions of Kyiv; including a) Overestimating the animosity and evil intentions of Ukraine, and b) Underestimating the enemy’s will and courage to resist and 3) Misunderstanding of EU and US response to ongoing events, mainly underestimating their harsh and long-term response. These misconceptions, combined with two key elements of Russian strategic culture, fear and arrogance, led Russia to escalate the crisis into an all-out war. These findings contribute to the literature by articulating a meaningful conceptual framework.  Combining cognitive factors with elements of Russian strategic culture can be useful for explaining some fascinating and illusory issues of Russian foreign policy.

Russia invaded Ukraine for a variety of reasons. Geopolitical, geo-economics, geo-strategic and even geo-cultural factors played a role in pushing Moscow on the path to war. These factors had taken roots for a long time and didn’t appear suddenly. The findings of this paper help to explain why Putin chose the war path despite previous restraints. Elements of Russia's strategic culture highlighted Moscow's perceived threats and called for an immediate response. In the process of orchestrating a credible and decisive response to threats, elements of this misperception helped significantly to convince Putin that the time had come for a military strike. The role of these misconceptions in the form, tactics, and objectives of the initial mobilization of Russian forces is quite clear. In short, Putin and other military elites’ misperceptions, along with fear and arrogance, paved the way for his war in Ukraine.

The term global governance is a concept that refers to e management of international affairs and how to deal with conflicts and crises. Understanding dynamics of Western-Russian relations as the United States takes the lead of the former, given the changes it has undergone since 2014, requires global governance as a measure of research. This scale of analysis can provide an understanding of the circumstances at hand. Under Putin's presence in world government, Russia faces common structural and normative challenges. It has intended to adjust, revise or remove some of the precedence governing dynamics of international politics and relations at the global level. From the kremlin's perspective, the global governance is but the dominance of the West and a Neo-liberal order with the Americans at the helm. Having mentioned that, Russians insist on a productive role of the United Nations in resolving conflicts, recognizing authority at the regional scale, classic interpretation of international relations in defining its norms, and finally, recognizing sovereignty through a Westphalian lens. The Russians have also announced that they will update both the rules governing financial and monetary regimes and the UN Security Council, which legitimizes the use of force in times of need.

 The main question of this research is to find an answer to the views, ideas, and principles of Russia in the Putin era towards world government and how can it be explained?

Russia's view of world governance is parallel to a hegemonic goal and in essence, equates with the Neo-Liberal-American order. Ideas including an excessive role of the United Nations in resolving conflicts, reinforcing the classic international law, deescalating global governance to a regional level, setting the official and unofficial regulations in financial and monetary affairs worldwide, conceptualizing sovereignty according to that of Westphalia, the role of regional organizations as security providers, the UN Security Council's exclusive right to use force could be one of the most important issues for Russia, which is worth theorizing. These issues can be explained in terms of value, normative, institutional, economic, and security.

This research is based on a case study. This approach can be included in the historical analysis of a phenomenon, conducting quantitative and qualitative research on it, procedures, conducting research on sample characteristics, and studying the phenomenon/sample. Moreover, this approach follows the causal dynamics of events/examples/phenomena at its core. To gain a deeper understanding of normative issues in world affairs and to compare them with the Russian perspective, the described method was used, which also enables us to identify reasons, motives, and procedures why Russia in some cases acts following the norms of the world sovereignty and attacks against others.

Academic discussions on world affairs began with the ideas of American political scientist James Rosenau. In his work, he argues that in the post-international world, actors are confronted with multiple spheres of power in which the dynamics imposed by international politics and its changes can be interpreted by global governance as a framework. Rosenau explicitly states that the distribution of power and the structures of the international organization are what govern the world over time. In most of the definitions regarding global governance, it is described as a mechanism for resolving conflicts. Weiss and Wilkinson define it as a combination of ideas, values, norms, precedence, and organizations, official and unofficial, which assist all actors, whether state actors, international organizations, or even civil society, to resolve issues that transcend borders. Global governance economics also covers environmental security, human rights, and civil society.

The study shows that Russian officials in recent years have denounced US law enforcement methods and criticized its unilateralism around the world and in Eurasia. It has also been argued that regional sovereignty and world governance have long been a recognized norm of Westphalian international law and are now within United Nations principles. Theoretical concepts, especially governance in areas including security, institutions, norms, economy, and environment, are what has been produced in the Russian political lexicon:1- Russia's perception of the structure of world government is based on realism, so it is based on the state. Putin himself believes that the United States cannot form a world government, so he tries to maintain a conservative, nationalist and authoritarian order. In addition to governments, international organizations also play a very important role in world governance with Putin focusing on the United Nations as the main regulator of international relations.2- Russian officials believe that global governance has been facing challenges at a global scale. Thus, introducing governance responsibilities at the regional level helps address these challenges.3- Russia's position on international law is Westphalian. Russia and China prefer (hard) rule or totalitarian rule to good government and protection of human rights.4- Putin criticizes liberal democracy as the driving force behind the norms of international law, but his goal is to democratize international relations, thus pursuing a change in the process of world governance.5- Regarding the role of the economy in global governance, Putin is adjusting and reconstructing. This position suggests revisionism of the monetary and financial systems. He pursues to change the architecture of international monetary and economic organizations.6- In this perspective for global governance, the regional player plays a key role as a provider of security. In this regard, Russia uses the role of the UN Security Council in the use of force.7- Russia's view of world government has few elements in common with the West. Differences are visible in certain places. This is because they are derived separately from two separate systems. Thus, Russia can be considered a norm-breaker and invalidator of the principles and rules governing Western international relations.

Iran and Russia are two important countries that have historically been in contiguous neighborhood relations, over and over. These relations are influenced by many different variables - including the historical background of Russian interventions in Iranian internal affairs, the type of Iran-Russia interaction with the West, Russian pragmatism and the role of ideology in Iranian foreign relations, the promotion or decline of Iran-Russia power and influence in the region. And in the international system and ... - it has led to the pursuit of the two countries' interactions with sophistication, billing and expansion. Meanwhile, according to some analysts, since Putin's power as Russian president, relations between the two countries under the influence of Putin's Eurasian doctrine and changes in the power equation in the Southwest Asian region have improved in military, economic and cultural security. This research seeks to test this view on the question of what factors and at what level did Iran's rise in Putin's Eurasian doctrine come to pass during this period (2012 to 2020)? The findings of this descriptive-analytic study show that variables such as Russia's attempt to regulate and politico-economic institutionalization in the Eurasian region and counteract US hegemonic goals in the region and increase Iran's strategic power after South Asian political and social developments The West has sharply promoted Iran's position in Putin's Eurasian doctrine.

Since the coming of Medvedev as the Russian president in 2008, Russia's foreign policy has changed. According to Russian foreign policy think tanks, Medvedev has been introduced as a liberal westward that has emphasized the improvement of relations with Western countries because of common security threats and the need for greater economic and political liberalization. This policy has led to changes in Russian foreign policy in the Middle East and Moscow's relations with regional powers. The two main questions of this research are: 1. What were the priorities and goals of Russian foreign policy during the Medvedev era? 2. These priorities have led to what changes in Russia's relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia? To test the main hypothesis of the study, which states that "economic development as the first priority of Russian foreign policy during the period of Medvedev's presidency led to the adoption of a Western-oriented approach by him and the Kremlin's re-examination of relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia." we examined the principles and patterns of Russian foreign policy, its foreign policy in the Middle East, and Russia's relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia during the Medvedev era. Finally, the result of this study is that the priority of economic development and the improvement of relations with the West, has led to Russia during the Medvedev period, the gradual cooling of relations with Iran and relative proximity to relations with Saudi Arabia.

One of the most important goals of Russian foreign policy during Putin’s presidency has been his attempt to revive and return to the superpower status of the Soviet Union era. Therefore Putin as the president of Russia has resorted to actions in foreign policy that have shown an attempt to increase the country’s power and his willingness to represent Russia as hegemony in international relations. So, in this paper in order to understand Russian behavior in the field of foreign policy during Putin’s presidency from 2012 to 2018 which is based on the theoretical framework of Mersheimer regarding the behaviors of great powers, we will examine and implement Putin’s foreign policy on the basis of Mersheimer’s indicators. The most important of these indicators are the strategy of war, alliance and coalition buildings, blackmailing, bloodletting, buck-passing and attempt to expand its hegemony in the region. Playing the role of External balance in other regions or attempts at regional hegemony, as well as increasing internal power, are other aspects of Russia’s attempt to restore its previous role in the region.
According to Mersheimer, the anarchic structure of the international system creates a permanent security competition among great powers, so they are forced to adopt offensive behavior in order to maintain their survival. Since access to power is a prerequisite for their survival and security, governments consider using military tools to maximize their powers as a natural and justifiable phenomenon. That’s why in international relations no power supports the current status quo but existing hegemony is determined to protect its upper level in comparison to its competitors. In this regard, if dissatisfied powers of the existing situation in international system come to this conclusion that the balance of power can be realized at a reasonable cost in this way, they will use force. Merschimmer believes that all states are influenced by this logic and Russia is no exception to this rule.
At first, this study shows that Russia follows a local hegemonic supremacy by controlling and solving local critical issues such as Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh crises. By utilizing the strategy of war and annexation of Crimea, pursuing blackmail strategy and supporting East-Ukrainian separatists against Ukrainian government, as well as using bloodletting strategy with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it has sought to consolidate its position in the region. In the next step, Russia tries to develop its influence in other zones to change the current status quo and dictate its policy. The obvious example of this can be seen in Russia’s foreign policy behavior toward the West Asian region particularly in relation to the Syrian crisis. Russia’s active presence in Syria has shown that the country along with its attention to the outside world has defined its long-term political, economic, security and geopolitical interests in the Middle East. Other steps in which the country has adopted are confronting Western bloc in the region to secure its interests and rebuild its weakened position. In this way, initially Russia sought to preserve and safeguard the survival of Bashar al-Assad regime by taking advantage of unity and coalition strategy and buck-Passing the shortcomings to its allies.
The next step was increasing its presence in Syria and as a result of this, under the pretext of fighting terrorism, it entered into the Syrian conflict directly. This was a clever imitation of pre-emptive war doctrine of the United States in (2001). Russia has been able to use the strategy of warfare calculation not only to reduce the United States options by direct military presence in Syria but also makes it harder to create a no-fly zone and prevent further advancement of terrorist groups in the country. It has also developed the Tartus and Latakia military sites in order to increase its military presence in this important region.
The findings of this research have also highlighted the issue that Russia is a dissatisfied player, so it tries to revive its previous position in international system. The United States has sought to achieve equal footings with Russia in the region by increasing its military presence (as an internal balance). In this way, Russia uses all its capacities including military and economic means to show its strengths. In the context of boosting economic power, Kremlin has been trying to save Russia from the economic crisis that has plagued the country by adopting economic reforms and anti-sanction measures against Europe and the United States. Since a significant part of the Russian economy relies on energy resources, the country has been trying to take advantage of its hegemony in the field of oil and natural gas (hydrocarbon resources) and control energy corridors as a mean to advance its political and economic interests. Among other things, in order to increase its economic strength, efforts have been made to exploit the capacities of economic organizations, such as global trade and economic integration within the Eurasian Union.
According to the national security strategy documents in Russia it is essential for this country to strengthen its military capability. In this way, the country has been strengthening and boosting its ground forces, air Force and its navy. In terms of nuclear power, it is worth noting that the country not only has nuclear capability but also a superior capacity as a means of deterrence and credibility for its foreign policy.
This paper is a descriptive-analytic study based on adaptation of the theory of the case and the methods of collecting information are based on virtual resources and citation data.

With Putin's reelection on March 2018, a new era of relations started between Russia and the West. During the period of Putin's presence in the Kremlin, relations between West and Russia have experienced some periods of tension and peaceful concords. In early 1990s, there were prospects about Russia’s becoming a democratic state and becoming part of the normative framework of the West. After the end of the Cold War, Russia sought an equal status in international system and it also was against Western values and normative imposition. The main question of the article is "how the areas of disagreement between the Russian Federation and the West can be assessed?" The author believes that there has been a divergence between Russia and the West’s attitude towards the international system after the end of the Cold War. Russia tries to stabilize its position as a global power ​​and the rejects the existence of its specific spheres of influence that is claimed by the West.

The purpose of this article is to gain Putin's behavioral style in Foreign Policy as the current Russian president to anticipate his future political behaviors. Political psychology of personality can be used as one of the most appropriate interdisciplinary methods in understanding politics and recognizing political personalities. These studies have been based on psychoanalysis in the past and in recent years with a cognitive approach. Cognitive Psychology seeks to answer the question of how people think. In this case, intelligence can be considered as an umbrella of unity, which we can understand the adaptive nature of human cognition through it. The study of Putin's political intelligence can be a solution to the problem. According to most psychologists, intelligence controls the balance between mental structures affected by the peripheral environment and external realities. Some mental abilities such as learning ability, memory power, problem solving, creativity, and decision making in intelligence system are very important. This article studies the role of these abilities in the political intelligence of this person, relying on cognitive theories and political psychology.

The image of every nation is formed in accordance to the policies of each country, be it domestic and international planning and actions which a nation has done. Nowadays, international image management is a basic principles in statecraft and it is the cause of regional and international influence of nations and it changes the preferences, ideas, identity and culture of countries to internationalization. Also, nation branding increases the attractiveness of a country and makes the country appear as a good country. Russia, with thousands years of history and identity is a good case study. What is the role of the culture, economy, identity, politics and totally nation branding of Russia in world and what kind of direction has it taken? What is Russia’s national image around the world, especially in the West and regional environment? This paper, after some review of theoretical background of nation branding, examines the nation branding and nation image process of Russia with a focus on Russian image in the West.

After collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia is faced with strategic vaccum in its foreign policy for a time. Thus, we were witnessing a period of unstable, inactive and reactionary policy- making in Russian foreign policy while the US was expanding its influence on the Russian periphery. But in Putin's administration, the Russian foreign policy has evolved dramatically. Putin put the influence expansion strategy as top priority of his foreign policy to globally revive Russia's historical power. According to the authors, neoclassical realism due to focusing on both domestic and systemic variables, is a proper theoretical framework for understanding strategic evolution of Putin’s foreign policy. This research attempts to investigate the causes of strategic change in Putin's foreign policy through answering the following question: what are the important factors of the influence of expansion strategy and how they work? The main hypothesis of this study is that economic growth (mainly based on energy sector development) and Russia's internal cohesion are the major factors affecting the Russian leader's perception of relative power which led to influence expansion strategy in Putin's foreign policy.

With the re access of Putin to power in Russia which provided a second chance for this country to avoid both from the West and the benefits of convergence with its foreign policy and regional and trans-regional equations can take advantages from other side. Approach points of divergence and independence of Russia's dispute with the West, will increase level of Russian influence in the international arena.
The main question of this paper is whether Russian foreign policy in Putin new term in office, could be continuation of past policies or that it has adopted a policy of continuity and change? With descriptive and analytical methodology can be stated that Russia's foreign policy in its approaches has changed from the past with different torsion and the country's foreign policy more oriented with Eurasia foundation but the balance was known West axis at once the foundation 'Atlantic-oriented' (West wing) and exchange-based East was Executive that it is based on theoretical foundations. Thus the hypothesis that the changes occurred due to the new international environment, adopt a pragmatic approach by Putin in Russia's new foreign policy principles fusion of past and new approaches must be considered.

Russia's foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of this country has been a lot of ups and downs. The formation of the grand principles of Russian foreign policy based on multi-polar world, conservatism, realism and balance of power has taken shape. The first period of Russian foreign policy in the form of the "common European house" was introduced. During this period (1991-1995) and continues the policy of "new thinking" Gorbachev, the Russian Federation and the use of advanced technology integration of Western capitalist economic system be considered. In the second period, from 1996 to the State Department by Primakov's tenure began, the shift in Russian foreign policy began to look to the East and the West can be considered. In the second stage, a balance between looking to the East and West was maintained, but Putin who is the embodiment of the third period of Russian foreign policy, introduced two special features for Russian foreign policy. First, Russia's foreign policy was to be a great pragmatist and secondly, from 2000 onwards Putin was looking for a strategic partnership with Europe and particularly with the United States. On the other hand, Putin set out to re-establish the glory of Russia by returning to the principles of Soviet Russia foreign policy but not in terms of ideology but rather by relying on Russian nationalism and authoritarianism and his doctrine on the foundations of Russia's foreign policy and national security can be established. The authoritarianism and aspires to return to the power and authority of Soviet Russia is shown in Russian foreign policy during Putin and "Medvedev" periods. In this paper we investigate the claim that despite the creation of the "Putin-Medvedev" and the president and prime minister, continued the cycle of their sovereignty, is there any fundamental difference in principle between performance and overall concept for Putin and Medvedev's foreign policy or Medvedev as Putin continues the way he is, but with some minor changes in the policy?

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US and Russian Federation relations have been experienced obvious ups and downs. The period of believing the end of long-lasting competition between the two countries after the cold war was too short enough to approve the optimistic analysis of Westerners politicians. The next developments showed quickly the distance between Moscow and Washington’s views on issues of international peace and security. On the one hand, Russia’s growing concerns about the former republics on its own periphery were intensified by the increasing effects of the Global War on Terrorism. On the other hand, the US growing presence in West Asia, Afghanistan and Iraq, and then Syrian crisis, Iranian nuclear program and deployment of the US Missile Defense System in Europe, prepared the ground for creating more confrontation between them. A decade after the independence of the former Soviet Republics, Russian president, Vladimir Putin, crafted and fixed a pragmatic foreign policy. Dmitry Medvedev, the next President of Russia, put this policy on the path of “reset”, which is now facing with complicated problems. However, the question raised by this article is: “What internal, regional or international factors changed the Russian and US relations during Medvedev’s presidency? This paper is based on a descriptive-analytic method, and to examine the mechanisms of this change from the Russian point of view, it studies the positions of its experts.

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