جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « روسیه » در نشریات گروه « علوم سیاسی »

The North-South Corridor is a strategic and economic plan that facilitates transportation processes and strengthens international trade cycles. By connecting the countries of India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia and other European countries through sea, rail and road routes, this corridor strives to provide an effective and less expensive transportation route than traditional routes such as the Suez Canal. The main research question is, what strategy have the Islamic Republic and Iran adopted for the North-South corridor? Based on this, the author is trying to test this hypothesis. The strategy of seeking cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia is for bilateral and multilateral cooperation and to facilitate and increase the volume of goods transit through this corridor. By collecting first-class data through library sources and reports, the findings of the research show that Iran and Russia have adopted a cooperative strategy through joint investments in transportation infrastructure, signing transit and customs agreements, and facilitating commercial procedures.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), concluded in September 1996, aimed to curb nuclear proliferation by prohibiting explosive nuclear testing. Although 187 states have signed the treaty and 177 have ratified it, however, the treaty has not yet implemented due to the specific procedural mechanism envisaged for its entry into force. On November 3, 2023, Russia, which had ratified the CTBT in 2000 after signing it in 1996, in a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, announced its withdrawal of ratification from the treaty. This decision sparked international reactions and raised questions about the compatibility of Russia’s action with international norms and the potential legal and security consequences. This article examines the legality of Russia’s withdrawal of ratification from the treaty and analyzes its impacts on the treaty, international nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime, and international peace and security.

The research method is a combination of legal analysis and trend impact techniques. In analyzing the legality of Russia’s action, the working method consists of inferring the rules by referring to relevant regulations, customs and procedures, and the method of analysis in the evaluation of the consequences of this action is based on the trend impact analysis.

The findings of this study are discussed under the following themes:1.Legality of Russia’s Ratification Withdrawal International law, the CTBT provisions, and United Nations Secretariat Practice do not prohibit a state (Russia) from withdrawing its ratification from the treaty (CTBT). 2.Negative Effects on Treaty Implementation Given Russia’s significant nuclear capabilities and its historical role and efforts to facilitate entry into force of the treaty, its withdrawal of ratification from the treaty will pose challenges to the CTBT’s implementation and increase harnesses to the implementation of the treaty.3. Impact on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament regime and international peace and security.  The CTBT plays a crucial role in preventing nuclear weapon proliferation and promoting nuclear disarmament. Russia’s withdrawal of ratification from the treaty intensifies challenges related to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and international peace and security.

Analysis:

From the very beginning, Russia has played an important and effective role in drafting and concluding and then facilitating entry into force of the CTBT. The Russian Federation was among the first states signed the treaty in 1996 and ratified it in 2000. However, following escalating tensions between the Russia and the United States, especially in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict in February 2022, Russia made the decision on November 3, 2023, to withdraw its ratification from the treaty. The central question pertains to the compatibility of Russia’s action with established norms of international law. Does the de-ratification of the treaty by Russia conform to the rules of international law?”Under international law, there is no explicit prohibition preventing a government from withdrawing its ratification of a treaty. Consequently, Russia’s decision to withdraw from the CTBT cannot be construed as a violation of its legal obligations. However, this withdrawal will impact entry into force of treaty and   will have consequences for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime as well as peace and international security. Russia’s withdrawal has the potential to dissuade states from joining the treaty or prompt existing contracting parties to retract their ratification Russia’s withdrawal can   discourage states to join the treaty or encourage existing contracting parties to withdraw their ratification from the treaty. Given the pivotal and consequential role played by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Russia’s withdrawal from its ratification may undermine the bedrock of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament framework, rendering it less effective. This development raises legitimate security apprehensions and concerns on the global stage.

While international law and practice do not explicitly prohibit Russia from withdrawing its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), this action poses significant challenges for the treaty’s future implementation. The withdrawal may have negative consequences for the global regime of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as international peace and security. As a signatory state to the CTBT, the Islamic Republic of Iran must closely monitor developments related to Russia’s withdrawal. The potential international and security implications require Iran to carefully assess the various consequences and adopt an appropriate approach in response to this issue.

This article examines the role of members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as potential role models in the transition and power transfer of the American order. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization consisting of China, Russia, India, Pakistan and several Central Asian countries has emerged as an important player in global geopolitics. Since the international balance of power is changing and the United States is facing challenges in maintaining its hegemonic influence, it becomes very important to examine alternative models for power transfer. This article investigates the potential of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a normative power that affects the American order through its cultural and social initiatives with a descriptive and analytical method and using library sources. This article also examines how the internal dynamics of these countries affect their foreign behavior and the reasons for their presence in this important regional organization, and examines the role of this organization on the potential consequences of power transfer.

After a long period of diplomatic tension between Russia and Ukraine, these two countries entered into a direct military conflict at the end of February 2022. This conflict has changed a wide field of international politics to a large extent. America is seeking to expand the borders of NATO towards the western borders of Russia in order to tighten the encirclement ring of this country, this issue has caused great tension in Eastern Europe. The purpose of this article is to investigate the influential variables in the adoption of policies of the Biden government towards the 2022 war between Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, it seeks to find the answer to the question of what factors influenced the American foreign policy in response to Russia's attack on Ukraine and how can it be explained? The findings of the research show that the behavior of the American foreign policy is a mixture of which the teachings of neoclassical realism in the behavior of the American foreign policy are a mixture of the interaction of external factors (international system) and internal factors (internal structure and power and the type of perception of the decision-making elites of the American foreign policy) and it can be explained from the point of view of the neoclassical realism approach. The present research method is descriptive and analytical, using library resources and websites.

Since February 24 (March 5, 1400), when the Russia-Ukraine war began, the confrontation between Russia and the United States in Ukraine has led to an increase in Iran's strategic importance. Considering the prolongation of the war in Ukraine, this article aims to obtain basic solutions to strengthen the capacity of Iran's media diplomacy in the war between Russia and Ukraine.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

Experts in this field have given different definitions for media diplomacy. Abuwebo, in his definition, describes the media as a tool to express and promote foreign policy.

 The method of this article is applied in terms of purpose and in terms of qualitative nature of thematic analysis. The study includes 11 media experts. Content validity was determined using the opinions of professors and experts. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect information. Data analysis was done in two stages. At first, based on the results of the interviews, information was extracted and then coding and classification of the data was done. MaxQDA 2022 software was used to perform thematic analysis.

It showed that by using the content produced in social media, political and economic factors can be strengthened in promoting Iran's national interests.

It indicates that Iran's media diplomacy field can benefit from the opportunities created by the Ukraine war in order to develop the country's exports and imports and strengthen its hegemony as an active player.

The South Caucasus has always been of interest to major powers, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it became a stage for regional and extra-regional power competition. Iran and Russia are among the countries that have focused on the South Caucasus and have sought to expand their influence in this region. This region holds significant strategic importance for both Iran and Russia. One of the important crises in the South Caucasus is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which has had various stages throughout history. The First Nagorno-Karabakh War continued from 1991 to 1994. The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War began on September 27, 2020, and lasted for 44 days. According to the authors, the concept of a "shatter belt" can provide a useful framework for analyzing Iran and Russia's approach to the first and second Nagorno-Karabakh war. In this study, the South Caucasus is considered a shatter belt. In response to the question of "what approach Iran and Russia had towards the first and second Nagorno-Karabakh wars and what factors influenced their approach," the authors propose the hypothesis that "factors such as interest in preserving regional independence and security, mediating in regional conflicts, competing with regional and global powers, internal factors of each country, and the need to realize national interests have influenced Iran and Russia's approach to the first and second Nagorno-Karabakh wars." A descriptive-analytical method has been used to answer this question.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 not only damaged Ukraine’s economy but also put so much pressure on Russia and European countries in gas trade due to the loss of big trade partners. This article aims to answer two main questions: 1- What are the impacts of Russia and Ukraine’s war on the United States and the European Union in the energy area? 2-Does it impact the position of Iran in the energy part in global markets? This research has been done based on the narrative review approach. The findings show the gradual loss of former position in global markets for Ukraine, Russia, and the European Union and the increasing dependency of European countries on the United States in the energy area. If European countries avoid cooperating with huge oil and gas resource-owning countries like Iran, besides aggravating their dependency on the United States, they deprive themselves of cheaper energy resources.

The war in Ukraine is arguably the most significant tension between Russia and the West since the Cold War, with far-reaching consequences beyond Ukraine itself. The neighboring Caucasus region, in particular, has been greatly impacted by this conflict. This study aims to explore the effects of the war in Ukraine on the economic corridors of the Caucasus. The researchers test the hypothesis that the increased economic risks resulting from the war, Russia's diverted attention to Ukraine, and Europe's search for alternative energy sources are three crucial factors that enhance the significance of the economic corridors in the Caucasus. The research data indicates that, since the onset of the war in Ukraine, transit routes for goods and energy passing through the Caucasus, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipelines, the western corridor of the north-south corridor, the Trasica corridor, and the Zangzor corridor, have gained considerable attention and favor by regional and extra-regional actors. Furthermore, it is anticipated that China will increasingly express interest in the Caucasus region for its One Belt One Road project in the near future.

The current study in the framework of realism paradigm based on international political economy and emphasizing the importance of the concept of food security has investigated the impact of the war between Russia and Ukraine on the wheat economy in Egypt through the analysis of indicators of food gap, self-sufficiency and foreign dependence. The Egyptian government has designed a package of measures to reduce the pressure of the crisis on its citizens, one of the most important of which is to encourage wheat farmers to produce more by increasing the guaranteed purchase price and completing strategic sheds and increasing storage capacity. Continuing to expand the area under cultivation of cereals, especially wheat, through horizontal development, continuing to support scientific and technical studies related to wheat, especially new varieties, diversifying imported markets and reducing the percentage of losses of produced and imported wheat are among the most important suggestions of this study.

Russia's military attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, affected, dramatically, the international system. The following change in the balance of power between the great powers, opportunities and threats has emerged for the Islamic Republic of Iran and has affected the country's relations with Russia. It seems that Iranian instrumental and academic elites have different viewpoints regarding the nature of these opportunities and threats and their effects on Tehran-Moscow relations. Therefore, the present study aims to investigate the approach of Iran's (scientific and instrumental) elites towards the war between Russia and Ukraine and its effects on Tehran-Moscow relations. The current paper seeks to answer the question that from the viewpoint of Iranian elites, how the 2022 war in Ukraine has affected the relations between Iran and Russia? In order to investigate the perceptual process of Iranian elites regarding the developments in Ukraine and its impact on Iran's relations with Russia, a questionnaire has been adopted. The data collection method of this research is based on a field study and the data analysis method is "mixed method". The sample of this research consists of 24 instrumental and academic elites with qualifications in this field. The findings of the research indicate that from the point of view of the majority of Iranian elites, geopolitical requirements, common threats and sanctions have been an effective factor in bringing the positions of Iran and Russia closer to the developments in Ukraine. From the point of view of these elites, the relative improvement of relations between Iran and Russia was merely a reaction to international conditions.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has grappled with the specter of decline and the prospect of losing its status as one of the world's great powers. The increased military engagement between Ukraine and the West indicated that Ukraine (or Ukraine along with NATO) might one day challenge Russia in the foreseeable future. A country that was a buffer country of great strategic importance for Russia, so it took practical action against it. Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, marks the resurgence of war on the European continent and a final attempt to reform the Western-led system that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War. Before this war, Russia used to complain about the world order in its declarations, but with this war, it has practically challenged the world order. Now this question is raised, what are the causes of the war between Russia and Ukraine? Russia's war with Ukraine has caused the emergence and expansion of what concepts in the international order? By expressing the conceptual framework of order in an explanatory way, the expansion of NATO is considered to be the cause of Russia's war with Ukraine, and in line with the definition of the new Russian order, the expansion of the concept of Russkimir, the expansion of the concept of Greater Eurasia in the form of a multi-order world, challenging the concept of liberal order and international laws in It examines the polycentric order

The Syrian internal crisis started in 2011, but with the intervention of regional andextra-regional actors, it turned into one of the most complex international crises.Russia and the United States are extra-regional players and Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia are regional players in this crisis who tried to succeed in maintaining or overthrowing Basharal-Assad's regime by using soft and hard powerThe confrontation between Russia and Turkey in the Syrian crisis and the superiority of Russia's position in maintaining the regimeof Bashar al-Assad is the aim of this research, so in this article, an attempt will be made to strategically and intelligently combine the soft and hard power(smart power) of Russia against Turkey, focusing on the Syrian crisis.be paid The main question is, how has Russia used smart power against Turkey's intervention in the Syrian crisis (2011-2023)?In order to examine the issue in the framework of the intelligent power point of view, from Joseph Nye's pointof view, Russia's soft power in the dimensions of culture, value and foreign policy and hard power in the military andeconomic dimensions have been discussed.The findings of this research show that in the Syrian field,Russia's smart power has been used with more emphasis on soft power to restrain Turkey, and the most important achievement of Russia from the use of smartpower, without serious military involvement withTurkeyis to preserve Basharal-Assad's regimeand prevent action. Turkey's extensive military action against Syriahas beento take the initiativeof peace talks and gain strategic advantage by signing military and economic contracts. ​

This article aims to investigate the impact of Western sanctions on the Russian economy, and in this context, it has focused on the economic sanctions of the United States and European Union member states on Russia. The research method was descriptive-analytical and used library data and information. The findings of the research indicate that among Western sanctions against the Russian economy, financial and banking sanctions with a frequency of 8 have the highest frequency, followed by exchange sanctions with a frequency of 6, scientific and technological sanctions with a frequency of 3, and transportation sanctions with a frequency of 1. They are ranked next. The findings of the research on the macroeconomic indicators of Russia such as the economic growth rate, exchange rate, inflation rate, interest rate, export and import rate of this country showed that the Russian economy during 2014, which was the beginning of Western economic sanctions, until 2022 (which is the latest and most up-to-date The data of the World Bank is related to this year) has followed a downward trend and the economy of this country has faced fundamental challenges in various fields, especially liquidity. Therefore, the goals of Western economic sanctions have been achieved to a significant extent in Russia, and the country's economy, as the fifth economic power in the world, has been able to face a crisis. However, paying attention to confrontation with sanctions and policy-making based on the special conditions of sanctions can partially compensate for the harmful and destructive effects of economic sanctions in the sanctioned countries, or even bring mutual costs to the sanctioning countries.

Putin believes that he has an important, historical and sacred mission, the main focus of which is to restore Russia's historical greatness and compensate for the West's damages to Russia. Therefore, in order to compensate for Russia's geopolitical failure after the collapse of the Soviet Union and to avoid the mistakes of that era, it has tried to communicate with the African continent and develop its influence on different levels with this continent. The interesting thing about the nature of Russia's relations with the African continent lies in the fact that Putin does not spend money from the government's treasury in this direction. Therefore, when examining and analyzing Russian policies, one should not ignore Putin's political psychology, which seeks to restore Russia's greatness. Moscow has stepped into Africa with the aim of institutionalizing its military presence in the African continent and the Mediterranean coast, dominating the oil and gas and mining sectors, as well as creating new markets to sell its products.

The Ukrainecrisis turned into a warin February 2021 after the escalation of conflicts. What sets this event apart from its 2014 record is the breadth, depth, subject matter, and sides of the conflict. In the third decade of the twenty-first millennium, a security-military crisis broke out again and geopolitical differences between the powers led to a massive conflict in the territory of a weak neighbor. Moscow's stance is that the expansionism of its Western rivals through the eastward expansion of NATO is a military preparation of Russian geography and the direct threat against it. Theoretically, the war in Ukraine is reminiscent ofthe concept of “indirect balance of power” which is defined as the competition of great powers over a small or weak country and their conflict on its territory. The war in Ukraine has shown the breadth and depth of the offensive / defensive power on both sides, forcing others to support one side against the other. Iran, which previously pursued balance in its foreign policy based on the “Looking to the East” policy and promoted its strategic relations with Moscow, has taken a position based onits grand strategy. Since the war in Ukraine has gained international dimensions, any stance Iran takes on international structural disputes and subject to sanctions, will affect the country’s foreign policy.

Research question: 

what effects do the Ukraine war have on Iran's balancing foreign policy and does it lead to a balanced foreign policy?

Research hypothesis: 

The war in Ukraine has made Iran increase the geographical scope of its balancing measures and promote the “Looking to the East” Policy at divided (bilateral) levels; combined (trilateral); institutionalized (multilateral) and “regional politics” in the framework of restoration diplomacy.

Methodology and theoretical framework: 

The purpose of the article is to analyze the impact of the Ukrainian war on Iran's balancing foreign policy to show the process of continuity and change, outline the perspective of this policy and evaluate its results. Also, the goal is to critically analyze Iran’s balancing policy in the context of war. In this article, the trend Impact Analysis (TIA) method is used as a qualitative research method based on descriptive-analytical approach. TIA is a method for analyzing consecutive events in a given period to formulate trends by extracting data. Accordingly, events that shape or fluctuate a trend are selected as independent variables. Therefore, trends are the result of successive events as turning points. Understanding events allows analysts interested in tracking a particular trend to systematically examine the effects of current and future significantevents. TIA considers events as data and reflects trends by examining the relationship between them. Trends are identified with events and are defined as the result of successive events over time periods. The war in Ukraine has affected the balancing processof Iran's foreign policy in aseries of events that show the conflict between the interests of Russia and the West. Therefore, TIA is suitable for analyzing Iran's foreign policy and uses two theories; The theory of “balancing as a model of foreign policy” to explain Iran's foreign policy, which aims to prevent a great powerfrom attaining a dominant position or to counter such a position through alliances with rival powers, and the new theory of “balance of relation” which includes the concept of “balanced foreign policy” criticizes Iran's balancing foreign policy.

The main subject of the article is to explain the impact of the war in Ukraine on Iran's balancing foreign policy. While inspired by the concept of balanced foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, balancing foreign policy was theoretically formulated within realism concept as a behavioral model of the Cold War era. To explain Iran's behavior towards the war, the foreign balancing theorized by Waltz and Morgenthau was mentioned. Studies show that Iran's balancing foreign policy within the framework “Looking to the East” has been revived after the withdrawal of U.S. from the JCPOA and expanded with the warbetween Russia and Ukraine. From Iran’s point of view, the anti-hegemonic nature of the war and the prospect of continued conflict between the West is based on its foreign policy. Iran has expanded its relations with rising powers in the framework of the “Looking tothe east again” policy, through which Russia is military-security ally and China is an economic-trade partner. Furthermore, Iran seeks to form a strategic triangle including Tehran-Moscow-Beijing. Also, Iran’s diplomatic actions, including membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS and the creation of economic blocks for Asia, show that it considers the war as an institutionalized way toadjustits “Looking to the East” policy and expand its balancing foreign policy. Finally, Iran has expanded balancing and has undertaken diplomacyto rebuild the region.

The goal of Iran's balancing foreign policy isto reduce structural pressures by expanding relations with the emerging powers, reducing the consensus of great powers and the ability of the United States to delegitimize Iran at the international level. The “Looking to the East” approach is based on the balance of power during the Cold War. Today, countries act based on a different logic of balancing and adaption to international power dynamics. The logic is based on the balance of relations, diversifyingpartners from the different poles of power, avoiding alliances with one power against another and focusing on balance in interaction with great powers, whether old / new or West / East. Therefore, although in the dominant discourse of Iran's foreign policy, the classical balancing act originating from the cold war era is strategically necessary, but it lacks strategic sufficiency; because it does not include the diversity of orientation in geographical and thematic areas and therefore does not lead to a balanced foreign policy. The countries strategy in the balanced foreign policy is aimed at achieving interests in various subject areas through communication with a wide range of great powers without conflict, while this strategy has no place in Iran's foreign policy.

The crisis between the world powers in Ukraine began when Viktor Yanukovych, the country's former president, refused to sign a free trade and cooperation agreement with the European Union aimed at building closer ties with Russia. On February 22, 2014, following street protests against the government and the deterioration of the internal situation in Ukraine, Yanukovych was removed from the presidency by a vote of the Ukrainian parliament. Following these events, the “Crimean Peninsula” was occupied by Russian forces under the title of protecting the Russians of this autonomous region. A few days after these events, the people of the Crimean Peninsula declared their 96% approval to join Russia in a national referendum and the peninsula officially became part of Russian territory. After this incident, the scope of differences between the two countries remained and manifested itself in different ways until finally the war between the two countries started in 2022 and the field and military conflict has continued until now.

Research Question: 

How did the European Union react to the security crisis in Ukraine from 2014 to 2023 in relation to Russia?

Research Hypothesis: 

The hypothesis is that the European Union’s response to security threats between 2014 and 2023 was due to the lack of a coherent security and defense policy against Russia's uncompromising policy towards the developments in Ukraine, a result other than the annexation of Crimea to Russia in 2014 is the escalation of conflicts in the Donbass and the Sea of Azov and finally the field war and the annexation of the eastern regions of Ukraine to Russia by 2023.

Methodology and Theoretical Framework: 

In this article, based on a qualitative method and a systematic review, we examine the issue in the context of the concept of acting and lack of acting. The tools for collecting data and information were based on the existing method in the library format and the use of reliable internet sources.The European Union is considered as an important actor in the international community and according to the developments of the international system, it seeks to play a positive role and improve its position in various fields. Therefore, in an attempt to critically evaluate the performance of the European Union in response to security threats in the Ukraine crisis, we use the concept of activism as used by Burston and Volger in 2006. Activism has been a central concept in EU foreign policy since 1977. This concept refers to the active and conscious capacity of the European community in relation to other actors of the international system and the response to external crises, such as the Ukraine crisis is fully applicable to the concept of European activism. The acting parameters considered by Barston and Volger namely “Opportunities, Presence and capabilities” are designed for the international system. These parameters examine the strengths and weaknesses of the European Union as a provider of security in Eastern Europe. Thus, it is an assessment of the EU's ability to influence foreign relations by shaping the “perceptions, expectations and behaviors of other actors in international politics”. Therefore, the parameters of “opportunity, presence and ability” can show the evaluation criteria of the active European Union in the field of providing security and capabilities of this actor in the Ukraine crisis.

According to the findings, the European Union’s behavior towards the Ukraine crisis has changed from a passive actor to an influential one, but their uncoordinated defense behavior so far has been nothing but the imposition of sanctions, the establishment of a joint security and defense mission in November 2014, the Eastern Partnership program and the use of all-out support for Ukraine to counter Russia's powerful role.

This article, from November 2013, describes a series of important points in the gradual evolution of the conflict in Ukraine, including: Yanukovych’s decision not to sign the accession agreement, the emergence of the internal crisis and the fall of Yanukovych’s government, the annexation of Crimea to Russia, the war in Donbas and the downing of the plane MH17 and finally, it examines the war in Ukraine due to the lack of EU role before the war and the active role of Ukraine after the war. During the annexation of Crimea, the EU played the role of a neutral actor with no interest in the crisis and despite the EU’s continued peace-building efforts, which were carried out through the launch of a special mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in November 2014, due to its powerful role in Central Eurasia and Ukraine, the Kremlin was able to defeat the Union in this security crisis as it achieved its goals in this regard by annexing Crimea and building a bridge connecting Crimea and the Russian mainland in May 2018. As a result, by wasting the opportunity, presence and ability, the European Union failed to demonstrate the international community’s expectations for an effective role in the Ukraine crisis as well as in the Balkan conflicts. Even as Donbass elections in November 2018 confirmed Russia’s annexation, EU officials like Mogherini only condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine. However, after the start of the war in Ukraine, the reactions of the European Union were accompanied by many changes and created the impression that it would distant itself from neutrality and passivity and will fully support this country.

The Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022 caused changes in the international system and blackened the balance of power prospects, especially in a region like Central Asia where Russia has a strong role and influence. Factors such as Russia's military conflict in Ukraine, and this country's focus on its ability to disrupt equations in its favor, which subsequently causes changes in its national and foreign policies, open paths for new questions. Such as whether the war in Ukraine and its consequences have caused Russia's role to diminish, or we can even say Russia's hegemony (especially from a security point of view) in Central Asia? In this case, is China, another influential and powerful actor in the region, going to fill the vacuum of Russian influence? Or will the countries of the region take advantage of the opportunity this time and highlight other regional actors such as India, Turkey, Iran, or trans regional actors such as the European Union in their foreign policy? In order to answer these questions, this research has tried to investigate the variables of China and Russia's sources of power and influence in Central Asia, and their changes after the Ukraine war. After evaluating the prospects of challenges and the opportunities created by this war for the influence of China and Russia in this region will provide scenarios for the future situation in Central Asia and the influential actors in the region.

After three decades, the Eurasian region is still facing many issues and problems in the field of development and security, and despite the many possibilities for cooperation and convergence, it still appears to be a conflicted and fragmented region, with important missing linkage that is to enter a period of stability, prosperity and progress. The main question in this article is what are the consequences of Iran's regional policy after the membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for security and stability in the Eurasian region? The hypothesis is that according to the evolution of Russia's approach in the framework of the Greater Eurasia project, China's new role in the Belt and Road Initiative, Expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Iran's membership, ore opportunities have been provided for Iran's cooperation in the field of trade, transportation and energy transfer, which can have a serious effect on the economic development of the region and strengthen regional security more seriously. The authors have tried to use the theoretical framework of "development and security link" in the new studies of national security to examine the arguments of their hypothesis. To examine the hypothesis, we have used the method of qualitative content analysis of documents, texts, reports and news related to the Eurasian area. The findings of this research show that Iran enters a series of Eurasian cooperation for the third decade of the 21st century, which creates important possibilities for institutionalism, convergence, development and regional security.