جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « سوبژکتیویته » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

This research has investigated the challenge of transcendental ego identity in Husserl's phenomenology. On the one hand, the central position of this theory, the ambiguities and fundamental criticisms from philosophers affiliated with the phenomenology tradition reveal the necessity of research in this regard. Based on the general picture he presents of the nature of egoic life and its ability to split, Husserl deals with the relationship between pure and empirical ego, which has been considered the central point of criticism. Based on the thesis of the production of a transcendental ego through the activity of the specific experimental ego, he has expressed the theory that the experimental ego has the basic ability to recognize itself in different ways and to start producing a multitude of new egos, each of which it has its unique stream of consciousness. Therefore, Husserl, while expressing the idea of the coexistence of the transcendental and empirical ego, has emphasized two ways of looking at the ego. Ego can also be viewed as an object in the world or from the perspective of the relationship between experience and the world to discover the inherent structures of experience. Therefore, the transcendental ego, as the only phenomenological residue of transcendental reduction, allows us to access a new area of existence that is absolute.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the reading that Armstrong draws from the Axis theory in order to provide a semantic approach to emerging from contemporary challenges, and to what extent this reading is based on Jaspers' thought about the Axis Age and the specific human existence (Existenz). The hypothesis of the article is that we can give a deeper reading of Armstrong's account. This Research leads us to a model called "empathic spirituality" which comes under two categories of consistency: First, the subjective aspect as self-reflection which emphasizes existential transcendence to "self-fulfillment". Thus, self-fulfillment is a transcendental attempt and an existential jump that is carried out with philosophizing and the existential effort to appear in the realm of existentialism. Second, the objective aspect as the connection that emphasizes the kind of relationship that is being used for "other flourishing". Thus, other flourishing is accompanied by the transcendental-self that efforts to have a relationship with another which is carried out with philosophizing and realization of a benevolent connection. This aspect confirms that "I will not be spiritual except in the light of the quest for spiritualization of "other one".

The idea of ​​ordering the system of existence can be traced back to the Greek philosophers; In philosophy, as well as in popular mysticism among Muslims, the theory of "the system of existence has levels" is a theory that, despite its different interpretations and explanations, has been accepted and is considered one of the fundamental issues. Although objectivity in some of those levels - such as the world of matter - is accepted by Muslim philosophers, but which of the two approaches, objective and subjective, is more justified in relation to the world of example, is a question that still requires an answer.The approach of transcendental wisdom and especially Mulla Sadra is purely objective towards the world of matter, towards the world of example, purely subjective, and towards the world of reason, it is an objective and subjective approach; This research tries to analyze the reasons that Mulla Sadra has put forward to prove the world of separate reason, to criticize the reasons that defend his purely subjective approach to the world of example, and to show that by sticking to reasons such as the rule of possibility, it is possible to prove the existence of the world of separate example. He also considered it justified and had an objective approach towards the world of example.

As Hegel claims in the phenomenology of the soul, subjectivity as the fate of the history of consciousness aims to show how the soul tries to establish a dialectical relationship between the objective and the subjective by becoming aware of itself and reconciling consciousness with self-awareness and to reconcile the two in the subjectivity found in absolute idealism. The main problem of this article is to show how and with what conceptual possibilities Hegel can overcome the one-sidedness of objective realism and subjective idealism by means of the subjectivity in the phenomenology of the soul. To answer this question, the author tries to explain the subjectivity in the book Phenomenology of the Spirit through the conceptual possibilities of consciousness, self-awareness, human society and political situation, and how to actualize the abstract absolute existing at the beginning of the history of consciousness through the mentioned concepts. show for this reason, it is explained that by bringing the absolute closer to the human community and creating an ontological dialectic between God and human "us", Hegel integrates the absolute into the political situation, and by integrating God into the political state, to reveal the absolute both to himself and to human "us" in philosophical knowledge and in this way establish a dialectical union between the realm of the subject and the realm of the object. In this article, the author has used the descriptive-analytical method to explain his position.

The topic of this paper is the investigation and analysis of the fundamental peace that occurs in the light of the encounter with the "Other" in the imperialist subject. Levinas presents a subject who imposes his desires on the world in order to establish an earthly paradise and is busy devouring others and subduing them to himself. The imperialism subject, who formed his identity with violence and in relation to others, encounters the "Other" who resists his totalitarianism. Levinas’ idea to end violence is rooted in subjectivity that cannot be reduced to consciousness and imposes an infinite responsibility on the subject. From the beginning, encountering the face of the "Other" is peaceful. By reminding the subject for peace and solidarity, the face motivates him to fulfill his duty and before any question and choice, he makes the subject personally responsible for peace with the "Other"; a responsibility that has already been placed in it and cannot withdraw from it. The peace considered by Levinas is the fundamental peace, original and beyond conventional war and peace.

This article aims to reassess the concepts of power, resistance, and subjectivity by examining the ideas of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. At first glance, it seems that these two thinkers, rooted in different philosophical and theoretical foundations, are in opposition to each other, making a dialogue between their perspectives seemingly impossible. However, this article proposes an alternative approach by highlighting the common grounds and commonalities in their deconstruction of power. Moreover, it argues that their political views can be seen as aligned and complementary, leading to a deepening and development of each other's ideas and the creation of new political approaches. Thus, the central questions addressed in this article are: what forms of agency emerge for the contemporary subject as result of the deconstruction of power in thought of Arendt and Foucault? How does power act as a source of resistance while opening up new possibilities for the subject? The main finding of this study is that, in contrast to traditional and modern interpretations, power in the works of these thinkers is seen as a positive, creative, and productive concept. Based on this understanding, resistance and alternative forms of empowerment for the subject emerge. It should be noted, however, that Arendt’s and Foucault’s interpretation of resistance agency and power may differ due to the primacy of political and social issues in their respective theories.

Kant considers the nature of rules of the taste to be interested, but at the same time believes that an objective basis can be found for the totality of these rulings in the power of judgment. First, given the coexistence of subjective and intersubjective elements in Kant's theory of interest, what relation does he establish between the subjective and the intersubjective judgments of taste? To answer this question, in the first part, while examining the logical features of the aesthetical sentence, we show that this sentence, in his view, is an aesthetic sentence that is issued in complete freedom and autonomy of the subject and by the other has a certain kind of general validity in its content. This kind of general validity, since it is purely based on transcendental structures which are common among all judgmental subjects, also has an intersubjective aspect, which Kant calls the names of subjective generality, aesthetic generality, and universal validity.  Second, how does Kant strike a relation between the subjective and the intersubjective? To answer this question, in the second part, we argue that Kant, although he believes in the subjectivity of the judgment of taste, considers this subjectivity to be of a special kind, which is the other aspect of intersubjectivity. For this purpose, we first try to explain the meaning of the subjectivity of the judgment of interest, and then to clarify the intersubjective aspect of this meaning. Finally, we show that Kant, based on the intersubjective validity he finds in the judgment of interest, considers the faculty of interest as a capacity for empathy between subjects and to bring them out of isolation.

We argue in this paper on art as the fine art in architectonic of system of Kant's philosophy. Here be shown that Kant had unitary image from his architectonic of system of philosophy as unitary statue. He thought the unitary statue as a whole. Therefore, his critical thought is metaphysics. Kant passed traditional metaphysics and he disclosed subjectivity that is ground of critical metaphysics and it rises from critical reason. All of elements of his philosophy is based on the ground. on the other hand, in modern time art be realized as fine art; Since art before modern time includes sense of more general it. Thus, it had functional, educative, cognitive role and for understanding this attitude from philosophical view we need to back to Kant. Therefore, be shown that fine art as product of genius in modern time and in Kant's thought is based on subjectivity as its condition of possibility.

idegger’s the authentic Dasein or Sartre’s pour soi existence (responsible free man). By paying attention to the ontological, anthropological and cognitive foundations of the phenomenological-existentialist perspective, however it is possible to cast doubts on these answers. Therefore, any determination based on originality and authenticity, such as the two above mentioned propositions, may be considered inadequate or even contradictory. It seems that a different (or conflicting) path must be taken to reach this unique subject and subjectivity. In order to provide a perspective on this phenomenological and existentialist subject, this paper concentrates on the views of Jose Ertega y Gasset. Marcel’s priority of être over avoir, Heidegger’s distinction between zuhandenheit and vorhandenheit, Hussel’s idea of the eternal unfinnished perception of things, Heidegger’s interpretation of das Geviert, are some important phenomenological and existentialist insights which pave the way for a new solution. In accordance with all the mentioned insiths and as a sum up of them, Ortega’s unique definition of la circumstancia, as well as his conception of horizonte de posibilidade and, ultimately, his Pueblo promise the emergence of a new subject and subjectivity. Pueblo- one of the most frequently used terms in Ortega’s system of ideas- can be considered as a non-individual and, at the same time, non-universal subject, a determination of subjectivity which is faithful to the foundations of phenomenological and existentialist philosophies.

Consciousness, which is one of the central issues of German idealism, has received various interpretations among German philosophers. Assuming the thing-in-itself, Kant presented consciousness in pieces and presented it in the form of three critiques. After him, Reinholt and Schultze, by criticizing the thing-in-itself, provided the ground for a new interpretation of consciousness by Fichte. Fichte with approval Schultze's critique of the thing-in-itself, rightly gathered consciousness into the unity of the absolute subject. He then gave a revolutionary interpretation of how consciousness develops by creating a dialectical relationship between consciousness, self-consciousness, and intersubjectivity. In this article, we try to explain Fichte's interpretation of consciousness according to the relationship that he establishes between consciousness, self-consciousness and intersubjectivity, and to present the calendar of consciousness and self-consciousness in the political situation. He first argues that consciousness logically requires an order in which self-consciousness provides its development and He then considers the order in consciousness as dependent on the creation of a relationship that occurs in the process of recognition between subjects.

In the phenomenology of Husserl, subjectivity is important as a prior necessity, insight, and a self-evident in our consciousness, hence it’s not produced or cleared as content. Does it mean Husserl ignored subjectivity and its value as content in human minds? If it's not, how we have owned it? Or is it the subjectivity placement inside an object or against it? Neither! Because both of them may mislead us. We aren't the subject or its owner, we only select a single type of concept and delimit it by subjectivity. It's not a probabilistic action, because we only separate a concept from others, then introject it as a predicate without every content. After all, there are empty and it’s only stimulate our sensibility without every new data. In this paper, we change our point of view from the primacy of the subject to the object’s effect on consciousness as the sphere of ownness, between us and other things or other minds.

Lacan and Levinas were among the first contemporary thinkers of the twentieth century who have put emphasize on the concepts of otherness and subjectivity. The approach of these two thinkers to the issue has been accompanied by critique and challenge of rational subjectivism and the ethics of modern philosophy. Accordingly, the decentralization of the self-sovereignty subject, the priority of the other in the destruction of subjectivity and the redefinition of Ethics among the common principles that have been heuristic in presenting their new reading of the subject. However, Lacan and Levinas have taken different interpretations, insights, and conclusions in their attempts to explain the meaning of the other, the reason for its priority over the subject, and also to redefine the subject. On the one hand, in the contexts of structuralist and poststructuralist approaches in the heart of the field of psychoanalysis, Lacan Summoned the lacking subject, which is split and barred, to resist and negate with the structure of the big other, and in this resistance, the concept of desire plays a key role. On the other hand, Levinas with a phenomenological approach and in the heart of a religion-based approach, exposes the subject to the other with asymmetric responsibility, and in this regard, the face of the other plays a fundamental role in evoking the inescapable responsibility in the subject. Lacan and Levinas deal with two different aspects of otherness, which has also led to a different reading of subjectivity.

In modern philosophy, Hegel recognized the crisis which he believed arose from the finitude and particularity of the subjective approach to consciousness, and the skepticism and alienation of consciousness from reality as a result. Thus, one of the things that Hegel considered a fundamental issue for philosophy, especially in the Jena period of his thought, was the resolution of this crisis. By focusing on the chapter of self-consciousness in Phenomenology of the Spirit, this article examines and analyzes one of the most important aspects of Hegel's attempt to eliminate this crisis that emerged in the theory of mutual recognition and intersubjective approach to consciousness. This paper will show how adopting an individualistic view of consciousness and acknowledging the immediacy of transcendental consciousness as a condition for the possibility of consciousness always causes fundamental conflicts in cognition. I will also show that mediation provided by the supposed recognition of intersubjective interactions is needed to overcome these conflicts. Finally, the claim that subjectivity finds the possibility of universality in which the gap between consciousness and reality is disappeared, not in some kind of internal relationship with itself, but through its acceptance and recognition, is introduced as Hegel's important vision in phenomenology for resolving this crisis.

and their relation to the theory in question is called "fundamental methodology”. By the means of a descriptive-analytical method and a fundamental methodology approach, this paper investigates John Locke's social contract theory and aims to clarify the relationship of this theory with Locke's ontological, epistemological and anthropological principles. In terms of ontology, subjectivity and humanism, as well as secularism govern Lock's social contract thought. Combining empiricism with a kind of metaphysics and weakening of sacred intellect by placing the reason as the judge of revelation, are the two important principles of Locke's epistemology in this theory. In terms of anthropology, an optimistic view towards the human nature has influenced his thinking. Accordingly, Locke's social contract theory, which has been put forward after the modern era, has a new nature, a nature that represents a new attitude towards man and his relation to the world, an attitude in which man and his wills and desires is centered.

In his third critique, Kant sees universal validity possible in aesthetic judgment in two quite different ways. One is requesting the other party to agree, and the second leads to a form of individual freedom and finally collective freedom. These two different paths have made interpreters to reach different opinions. Some, such as Rogerson, claim that Kant’s request is moral. Some others, including Guyer, have maintained that it is a cognitive claim. In the present study, we have attempted to present a proper solution for the problem of universal validity of aesthetic judgment, a solution wherein both the beauty in Kant’s theory and morality are considered with a reliance on the subjectivity theory.

We want to study the expansion of subjectivity in Descartes' philosophy, so we all know that subjectivity is the foundation of the human self in the realms of epistemology, cosmology, ethics, art, religion, and science. This article shows that Descartes's general skepticism led him to subjectivity because after he doubted everything, he found himself as the first and only certain being, and then he considered the principle of "I think, therefore I am" (Cogito) as the foundation of cognition and every being in the world, including the being of God and corporal substances. Descartes considered the human reason to be independent of everything other than reason itself respecting the matter (problem) of cognition, and, in this direction, he resorts to the mental innate concepts to shape the scientific construction itself. Subjectivity (the human self) embraces all aspects of Descartes' philosophy, and in this philosophy, the whole world appears as a set of objects, and the universe (cosmos) has no other truth than the image that the human being made from it. Therefore, the only real subject is nothing but the human self. Descartes' subjectivity changed the course of modern philosophy, and later philosophers philosophized in that direction. Descartes's philosophy, and in particular his epistemology, is based on the mind. It begins with the mind and continues with the mind, and ends with the human mind. And this is the culmination of the broad scope of subjectivism in René Descartes's philosophy, and our goal was to emphasize the breadth of subjectivism

Law is a concept that has a long history in western thought. Even with all of the intellectual-cultural upheavals that have taken place in the western world from ancient times till the modern era, it has always retained its importance and centrality [in the totality of knowledge]. In modern thought, law changed along with the fundamental changes that occurred in the relation between modern man and the world. This was such that the subject became the foundation of the world and everything else became the object of this subject. In this relation, law took on a new meaning. Better than anyone, Kant, one of the greatest philosophers of modern thought, depicted the concept of modern law under the topic of the relation of the subject with the world. According to Kant, with its subjective law, the practical intellect delineates the will. Thus, the intellect delineates and legislates. This delineation is the very concept of freedom in the modern interpretation of this term. Therefore, modern law is autonomous. In the creation of the practical law, it is necessary for the intellect to assume its existence. This understanding of the law is completely different from the common meaning of the term that is popular in our legal circles today. An analysis of it is important in the understanding of our relation with modern law, especially in the delineation of the place of law in foundations of religious thought.

Concept of the other in philosophy of Levinas gives identity to his other concept. He criticizes the epistemology and ontology, at the same time questions the integrity of the subject and the universality of other. According to Levinas the other is possibility to deny the totality of the subject and possibility to transcendence to go beyond static identity. This article tries to show that relationship between subject and the other is not cognitive or ontological, but it's foundation is ethical relationship that is formed in proximity the other. The most important dimension of other's existence that we understand it, is the moment of his/her death. This leads to fundamental ethical relationship in which responsibility for the death of the other is the most important aspect of realization of our being. According to us, understanding being, as Heidegger insists on it, is not being toward death through a genuine relationship with his own death, but we believe that other's death is the moment of devastating departure to find out such a being tied with the nothingness. The existence is realized in being for other and subjectivity in the acts of relation to the other and subsequently by protecting others against death.

This article tries to show that there is a religious understanding of “Subjectivity” in all writings of Soren Kierkegaard, especially, Concluding Unscientific Postscript and other works. He uses key concepts such as Christianity, truth, passion, God, faith for describing and explanation of “subjectivity”. For Kierkegaard, Christian faith is not a matter of regurgitating church dogma. It is a matter of individual subjective passion, which cannot be mediated by the clergy or by human artifacts. For example, he criticizes the current attitude to Christianity, mainly based on objective and historical attitude. In addition, it can be said that, by means of these concepts, he wants to introduce existentialistic subjectivity instead of modern philosophical subjectivity (Cartesian and Kantian one). It seems that most of the thinkers tend to confuse Kierkegaard's discussion of subjectivity with subjectivism. Kierkegaard stresses the former, and need not be seen as advocating the latter. Kierkegaard is not particularly interested in epistemological theories of objective truth. He is simply not all that concerned with the status of ordinary empirical or scientific truths. Rather, as a primarily ethico-religious thinker, his concern is with truth as it pertains to the existing individual.