جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « این همانی » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

One of the fundamental topics in the history of philosophy and theology is the issue of the personal identity of human beings during their lifetime in this world and hereafter. Philosophers have studied this issue from different perspectives and have raised conflicting opinions. This question has been raised to some extent by Avicenna and Mulla Sadra, and both philosophers have examined and answered the problem within their philosophical framework. Avicenna believes that mankind is one species whose immaterial soul is personalized and individualized by accidents, and with its survival, the identity and individuation of a human person are still preserved, even though his body has changed or completely destroyed. Mulla Sadra, according to his philosophical foundations, especially the substantial motion, believes that a person's identity is subject to existential change, and this continuous motion coincides with individual unity. Therefore, with the survival of this continuous and comprehensive being, the individual's identity is preserved in this world and hereafter. Accordingly, it can be said that the person in his/her life after death is the same as the worldly one, and in fact, an evolving person goes through sensory, imaginary, and in some cases intellectual stages. Although both opinions, based on their philosophical foundations, have significant and defensible points, they face challenges from the epistemological aspect. In other words, since both philosophers believe that the body –with its terrestrial features- is absent hereafter, how an observer can identify the other-worldly individuals with the worldly ones?

One of the most important spiritual or physical issues is resurrection.One of the most important challenges in physical resurrection is the identity and objectivity of eternity.The aim of the current research, which was conducted by collecting documentary and library research data and using the analytical-descriptive method, is to explain and describe the two approaches of objectivity and likeness in the relationship between the afterlife and the worldly life and the analysis of Sadr al-Maltahin Shirazi's landscape with narration. Ayatollah Javadi Amoli - Dam Zaleh - is in this challenge. The question of the research is, what is the compatibility of the afterlife with the worldly eternity, and what is the final opinion of Sadrul Matalhin Shirazi - considering the difference in the content of the texts? The findings indicate that the late Sadr al-Matallahin proves by using his philosophical principles in the transcendental wisdom that just as the rules and attributes of this world are different from the hereafter, so also the eternity in the hereafter is different from the eternity in this world. Being a human being, objectivity is fixed and justified, and if the intention is to preserve an elemental body in the afterlife, objectivity is impossible, but the sameness between the hereafter and the worldly life will be fixed, and Ayatollah Javadi Amoli also explained the relationship between the soul and the body and expressed the coordinates of the afterlife and rationality. The resurrection of the body emphasizes the same finding of Sadraei.

Essentialism and Haecceitism are theories to explain the issue of individuality in objects. Some philosophers consider these two schools of philosophy to be one, and others oppose this idea. In this regard, it seems that essentialism and Haecceitism can not be considered as one, because Essentialism in its strongest forms, such as Origen essentialism, seeks to solve the problem of individuality in objects through individual essence, and Haecceitism seeks to explain this problem through the Haecceity. Both views provide explanations to justify their claim, and challenge the other point of view and perspective. In this article, by explaining and criticizing the views of the followers of essentialism and Haecceitism, it has reached the general evaluation that it seems that Haecceitism has been more successful in proving its approach or in criticizing the Haecceitism by presenting more and stronger arguments and in justifying individuality for possible objects. It is more acceptable.

The Philosophical investigations in to the Essence of Human freedom (1809), known as the Treatise on Freedom, is Schelling's attempt to establish a system of freedom. Schelling's main concern in this treatise is to resolve the confrontation between freedom and necessity, which, in his view, is the focus of philosophy. Schelling's main concern in this treatise is to resolve the confrontation between freedom and necessity, which, in his view, is the focus of philosophy. The principle pursued in the fundamental search for the formation of the system and the solution for the conformity of the system and freedom is " identity", which in the true sense means that in pantheism it becomes possible as the only possible system of reason. By proposing and rejecting possible and deterministic interpretations of pantheism, especially in the system of Spinoza and Leibniz, he not only corrects them, but shows that the leading system of pantheism to determinism is the result of a misunderstood ontological understanding. This study shows how, according to Schelling, misinterpretation of this principle allows the incompatibility of system and freedom in different definitions of pantheism. And how Schelling's interpretation of the need to pay attention to "is" leads to an ontological question of the meaning and truth of being in the thought of German idealism. A critical reading of Schelling's attempt to eliminate possible misinterpretations of identity means prioritizing ontological issues over theological issues such as pantheism and explaining a single basic principle for establishing a system as the jointure of the order of being.In order to answer the relationship between pantheism and freedom, we turn to reflection on different interpretations of Schelling's pantheism, this is done by criticizing and examining the errors in Spinoza's and Leibniz's misinterpretations of pantheism. Then, by discussing "is" and showing Schelling's transition from the usual understanding of the principle of identity, we question the true meaning of identity. Finally, we come to the position of answering this question, how does Schelling, with the correct interpretation of the true meaning of "is" in these statements, look for a foundation for the formation of the system and a solution for the compatibility of the system and freedom? Based on Schelling's new understanding of the principle of identity, the leading of a pantheistic system to determinism does not arise from its pantheistic and theological elements, but is the result of ontological misunderstanding and resulting misunderstandings. The wrong context that has become the root of such misunderstandings is the misunderstanding of the meaning of "is" and the role of the conjunction in the sentence. Therefore, the question of pantheism, as a question of the system, leads to the question of "is" and this means changing and transforming the theological question into an ontological question and planning the ontological foundations of the freedom system. Heidegger uses this material to show that the determining element in the question of pantheism is the ontological element, and according to this meaning of the principle of identity, the question of the possibility of a system of freedom is related to the adequate understanding of existence and its fundamental determination, and the question about pantheism is considered He attributes the question about the system to the question of "is" and the way of connecting the jointure of beings.

Legal and moral responsibility as well as human immortality in life after death and its reasonableness is based on the acceptance of "personal identity". Considering the existence of various changes in human beings, it is possible to accept this "personal identity" if, a fixed truth can be discovered in humans over time on the basis of an ontological perspective. Therefore, the important question is that, considering the existence of extensive changes during human life, what criterion is acceptable for personal identity? There are different views about the criterion of "sameness". The present article, with analytical-critical method, explains and compares two important views on identity, namely "psychic continuity" or "accidental identity" and the view of "non-physical essence". Paying attention to the important challenges of each of these two views will be a serious concern of this article. Since Mr. Mulla Sadra's point of view provides a precise criterion for this essential identity and does not have the problems of views such as physical continuity (especially my broad view), by solving the challenge of summation between "this identity" and "the essential movement of the soul", this non-physical essential identity is the chosen point of view. This article counts.

The aim of this article is to consider Hegel's unity, which is "the Unity of Identity and Difference" Or to examine and explain the "unity of seemingly contradictory features in a single coherent whole" in the light of the main problem of Hegel's philosophy, that is, the overcoming of divisions or dualities, as the solution of her philosophy. Unity (Einheit) is an important ideal, goal and end for Hegel's philosophical system. Hence, in his entire philosophical system and in different periods of his intellectual life, the traces of the search for unity are always obvious, from the beautiful artistic unity in Greece to his desired unity, which is a rational, speculative, philosophical, absolute and Mediated unity. For him, the whole of philosophy is nothing but the study of the definition of unity and its realization in society. A unity that, instead of eliminating or absorbing another, tries to preserve and eliminate pluralities and differences by accepting and recognizing another in a single coherent whole. A unity in which differences and dualities do not disappear but are preserved as necessary and inevitable moments. Unity that is not the result of direct intuition but the product and result of passing through different stages and an intersubjective matter. For Hegel, it is not atomism and excessive individualism in the modern world that lead to rupture, not mere mystical and abstract unions that wipe out all differences, but the unity of the whole in which All distinctions are preserved.

Schilling's treatise on The Philosophical Studies of the Essence of Human freedom (1809) is an attempt to establish a system of freedom. The most central concept in Schelling's system is the concept of "identity", which, with its correct interpretation and finding unity between the opposing concepts of freedom and necessity, justifies his main concern in the theory of absolute idealism. The principle that is pursued in the fundamental search for the formation of the system and the solution for the compatibility of the system and freedom is identity in the true sense that in pantheism as the only possible system of reason is possible. Heidegger's focus on Schelling's thought Revealed the importance of Schelling in the history of Western thought by writing Schelling's Treaties on the Essence of Human Freedom and his multiple interpretations in 1936 and 1941. This study shows how, according to Schelling, a misinterpretation of this principle allows the incompatibility of system and freedom in different interpretations of pantheism, and how Heidegger's interpretation of this principle leads to the question of what is the single and fundamental principle of beings.

Having attracted the attention of thinkers for a long time, the theory of the sameness of mind and brain is one of the oldest and most important issues in the philosophy of mind. In simple terms, this theory holds that the mental states and phenomena of a person at a given time are the same as the states and processes of his brain at the same time. In this research, some of the most important principles of this theory have been discussed. Using the descriptive-critical method, this paper directs many criticisms to this theory in terms of both Western and Islamic views. Considering these criticisms, especially in the field of Islamic thought, an attempt is made to prove the abstraction of the soul and the negation of its physicality. By proving the abstraction of the soul, it seems that one cannot believe in the sameness of mind and brain, and the indefensibility of this theory is proved.

Art by making ideas sensuous brings our conscious ideas into harmony with what is given to us unconsciously by nature. For Schelling, aesthetic intuition is the real expression of reason; it objectively produces what philosophy can only address ideally through intellectual intuition, thus art is the eternal organ of philosophy. The production of the artwork, which comes about through the work of genius, begins by the free conscious act, brings the identity of freedom and necessity, and ends in objective unconsciousness act of artwork. In the work of art, there is an identity between freedom and the necessity and also between subject and object; what brings harmony in the artwork  between the free conscious act and the objective unconscious act is the absolute, which initiates philosophy. By showing the inadequacy of practical reason, which is based on the division between subject and object, Schelling deviates from Fichte’s transcendental idealism. So the philosophy of art must be considered as a subversion of Fichte’s focus on practical reason, where Fichte grounds his system in the self’ s free activity, Schelling now argues that the true realization of human activity is in the work of art, which is objectively produced. This essay examines the position of genius in art product, by explaining the relation between the conscious act and the unconscious act and demonstrating the identity of the two in the production that is called the highest expression of nature. Therefore, with a focus on demounting the subversion of practical philosophy, the aim is to show how the absolute is objectified in the work of art, which is achieved through genius and aesthetic intuition.

The purpose of the present study is to combine the two theories of Shabah al-Mohaki (the representative image), and Wojud al-Zehni (the mental existence). In the context of Islamic philosophy, the relationship between mental and external realities has been a controversial issue among philosophers. It is well known that proponents of Shabah al-Mohaki believe that there is a dissimilarity between mental and external realities, and their rivals, the proponents of mental existence, believe that there is an essential identity between mental and external realities. This group claims that objects have two types of existence; "objective" which is the same reality in the external world, and “subjective” which is called "mental existence". It seems that in their view, subjective and objective realities are numerically identical. The representative theorists on the other side reject this claim. By investigating and analyzing the texts of the two theories, the author found that the two speak of identity but qualitative and not numerical identity. As far as the mental existence theory is concerned, when we analyze the claim of mental existence theorists and numerical identity, it turns out that they do not say anything better and more than what representative theorists claim. This analysis is done through the two principles of indiscernibility of identicals and identity of indiscernibles. According to the first, if two things are identical then they must be not be different from one another with respect to all of their properties. The principle speaks of numerical identity. The second principle (although it is controversial) states that if two things have the same properties in every respect then they are identical. This principle does not have the logical truth and speaks of qualitative identity.  If one considers the case of mental existence, the claim that mental existence and objective reality are numerically identical, then he identifies that these two are not only identical but they have different properties. For instance, the subjective reality such as the image of a book or fire has the property of being mental and the objective reality of that image, the book or fire in the external world, has the property of being external. This shows that they are two different things because they have different properties. Therefore, the only way to say that these two are the same (identical), is that they are qualitatively but not numerically, identical.   On the other side, the identity claim (qualitative identity) between subjective and objective realities is found in the texts of proponents of representative theorists. For instance, Shamsuddin Isfahani argues that what is ascribed to mental existence is an image of objective reality and the image of that particular object is contrary to the objective reality itself, although in some respects it is identical to that external reality in such a way that what is obtained from the object in the mind is the same as the external reality. This shows that representative theorists also accept the claim of identity in some respect but qualitative and not numerical identity between subjective and objective reality.

In his Illuminationist Hikmatic System, Suhrawardi started from himself and his intuitive self-conscousness and then he reached at the God. On the one hand, he found the identity of himself and his light causes as “presence by oneself”, and on the other hand, he explained the agency (origin-ness) and the other-consciousness of substantial lights by illuminationist relation. According to those parts of the philosopher’s constructive works which are devoted to the explanation of the identity and determination of the status of illumination and intuition in the spheres of existence and cognition, one can conclude that “existence” and “presence” are identical in Suhrawardi’s philosophy and the necessary generality of this function can be proven based on the self-consciousness and other-consciousness of the Light of Lights. By this approach, any possible gap between ontology and epistemology are systematically overcome. In fact, by tracing the knowledge by correspondence (mediated) back to the knowledge by presence (immediate), by founding the human cognition upon the intuitive necessity and certainty, Suhrawardi left behind the challenge of unrecognizability of correspondence between known-by-itself (the subjective) and known-by-something-else (the objective), and explained the recognition of personal identity.

All kinds of identity are typical, genus, and numerical identity. This predication that is the basis of the propositional language of Aristotle is the condition of speaking and use of categories and general concepts in the realm of beings. Because of this, these categories are called categories of being. Before we can speak of prediction, everything must be self-identical. So we have now the best known and logical form of the principle of identity i.e. A=A. Aristotle with formulating the logic and with a concentrate on the numerical identity leads to a kind of concept of the world i.e. conceptual-logical world. The world, after that, is the world of mind and logical thought. With the superiority of the numerical identity and constitution of the principle of identity, the nature of categories is logical-Mindy nature. The definition of identity as A=A give rise to man solely directed at the logical form of this principle and will wipe out of ontological sense. So this particular view about identity leads to a formulation of logical-mindy nature of categories.

Identity is one of the most important and at the same time controversial topics in Frege’s writings. In this essay we discuss his account of this subject and try to explain and criticise it’s different interpretations. Our main question is about the elements that Identity is a relation between them. First of all we explain Frege’s view of Identity in “Begriffsschrift” (Conceptual Notation). The last considerations of Frege about this subject are represented in another well known work of him which is called “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (On Sense and Reference), therefore in the next section we examine the concept of identity in this essay. The aim of this essay is not criticizing the view of Frege, but primarily to understand it, because that is the only way that we can grasp crucial issues like the essence of number in “Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik” (Foundations of Mathematics) and Russell’s paradoxes concerning the fifth axiom of “Grundgesetze der Arithmetik” (Basic Laws of Arithmetic)

Many ordinary things are made up of material things. For example, the statue of Ferdousi in the University of Tehran is made up of a particular piece of bronze. Calling the relation between the statue of Ferdousi and that piece of bronze material constitution, many philosophers have claimed that this relation between a material thing and the thing that it constitutes is identity. Baker, in contrast, believes that these things have genuine unity without necessary identity. In this article, I first illustrate the principles of Baker’s theory and his explanation of this relation. Then I will assess the theory against objections. I will conclude that this theory can successfully explain relation between many of material things, but concerning things belonging to human beings, the theory fails to introduce a criterion for constitution.

Gottlobe Frege is considered as one of the first incisive critics of psychologism in logic and semantics. In this article, Frege's criticism of Ideational Theory of Meaning is discussed. According to Frege, this theory invalidates truth, but also problematizes meaning and the possibility of communication as well. These critiques are framed through Frege's main conceptual frameworks, namely, that of logisim and the first theorem of Grundlage der Arithmetik, by which he distinguishes between the objective/logical and the subjective/psychological. These critiques are then compared with later Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument (PLA). We argue that a detailed account of Frege's concept of idea illustrates that his assumptions about the relation between the inner world (Innenwelt) and language could be criticized. Through discussing "private definition of a sign'', ''following a rule'' and ''criteria of the identity'', Wittgenstein's definition of the Private Language and his arguments against it are analyzed so that we can critically study these assumptions.

In what follows, the author has dealt with the mind-boy relation. Different theories have been offered by the scholars in order to explain the relation, all of which can be classified into two major groups: monistic and dualistic. In the monistic view, mind and body are of one single substance with two different functions; in the dualistic view, however, mind and body are two different and separate substances with their own particular functions. The latter view has a background as long as history of philosophy backed by Plato of the ancient philosophers and Descartes among the later ones. Meanwhile, the majority of Muslim philosophers have the inclination towards the dualistic view one of the most prominent theorists of which is Avicenna. Since both views are open to serious criticisms, it is very challenging to choose one of them, though the dualistic view seem more justifiable.

The discussion of the criterion of individuation has been an important and complex metaphysical debate in the history of philosophy and this is related with what its presence makes us to reach from the general or universal person to the fiddling person. The interpreters of Aristotle''s philosophy are disagreeing about the criterion of beings individuation in his view. The most commentators believe that the form or matter and qualified matter or realized form in the opinion of others، is the criterion of individuation in Aristotle''s view. In the beginning of this article، we will review the difference in application of concepts such as individuation، identity and plurality in the texts of Aristotle. Although these three concepts are closely related to each other، but the commentators have been wrong in judging of criterion of individuation for incomprehension the difference between them. Then، we will study and review all terms of Aristotle''s texts that various commentators resort or can resort to them in confirmation of their claim about the criterion of of individuation in Aristotle''s view and we will show strengths and weaknesses of the various claims. Finally، we will discuss about this question that whether the criterion of individuation basically is an Aristotelian problem or not.

Regress is one of the oldest philosophical problems raised by Aristotle. The first serious research on the problem of declining infinite regress was carried out by Mirdamad. By declining infinite regress is meant setting the cause at the beginning of the chain without effects coming to the end. Defining particular conditions for disproving regress, Mirdamad does not consider declining regress impossible. He holds that the two conditions i. e. the intellectual agreement of the cause with the effect, and the sameness of the direction of successive order with that of the infinity of causes are missing in declining regress, thus the latter not being impossible. Relying on contingency with perpetual and eternal duration, posteriority of effect to its nonexistence in cause, and the foundations of priority in terms of cause, Mirdamad believes that this type of regress is not impossible. Giving the effect the role of relation in respect to the cause, and taking its dependence into consideration, Mulla Sadra holds that such a problem is not raised at all, and in case it is, regress will have an end. On the other hand, Sadrite philosophers have taken the objective agreement of existence into consideration criticizing Mirdamad׳s view.

If we say: "Pegasus exists" we would suffer from tautology, and if we say " Pegasus does not exist", we have made a self-contradictory proposition, since the word "Pegasus" refers to something in the external world. Attempting to eliminate this difficulty, following other analytical philosophers, and believing that existential propositions are the same type as those of identity, Quine has philosophically denied the peculiarity of existence, and has logically denied the capability of existence to be predicate. Thus he has regarded the maximum function of existence as playing the role of quantifier. Although denying predicative existence has originated from Hume and Kant, it has reached its zenith with Quine and other analytical philosophers. Presenting Mulla Sadra׳s view as a yardstick on distinguishing "subsistence of a thing" in simple whethernesses, from "subsistence of a thing for another thing" in composite whethernesses, we clearly come to the conclusion that Quine׳s attempt is abortive. Furthermore, discussion of predicative existence is a philosophical and logical one rather than a logico -linguistic one, as held by Quine and his followers. His argument is questionable since he imagines whethernesses, including simple and composite ones, signify subsistence of a thing for another thing. In addition, identity is ambiguous in his theory, since identity presupposes existence itself.