جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « تقلیل گرایی » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

In the past, there has been a deep discussion among philosophers and theologians regarding the different aspects of the Divine will. This paper aims to first provide a detailed report and evaluation of Allameh Tabataba'i's theories, and then, in comparison with the ideas of eminent thinkers of transcendental theosophy, a new formulation of this interpretation will be presented based on the reductionist approach, how much they consider the attribute of the Divine will to be essential or action. According to the research method of each of the philosophers, Allameh Tabataba'i, considers God’s will to be debatable in the form of Divine actions and considers it difficult to carry it on the Essence in such a way that it is considered an independent concept, we will consider in the framework of anti-reductionism. We consider On the other hand, Imam Khomeini, who considers the Divine will to be one of the attributes of Essence and considers it to be constant in all levels of existence and one of the attributes of perfection, a minimalist reductionist, and Mulla Sadra, who refers the essential Will to other Essential attributes such as knowledge, love, or pleasure, we formulate maximal reductionist.

The aim of the present study is to organize Avicenna’s meta-ethical thought, providing a foundation for understanding the ethical system derived from his opinions. The primary focus is on determining Avicenna's overarching approach to the existence of moral attributes and propositions. In response to this inquiry, the author seeks to articulate three models of reductionism rooted in Avicenna's perspectives. These reductionist models could be crafted at the levels of conventional attitude, philosophical attitude, as well as Avicenna's mystical and monotheistic stance towards moral truths, so that it could be possible to establish coherence among them. This article begins by examining Avicenna’s viewpoint in accordance with his logical principles, introducing his constructivist approach – aimed at fame and intellectual agreement – as a model of reductionism at a conventional level. Subsequently, Avicenna's attitude is explored through the philosophical science of the soul and the truth of the happiness of the human soul, leading to the introduction of a form of moral reductionism based on Avicenna's philosophical opinions. Finally, attention is given to his mystical and monotheistic perspective, presenting yet another model of reductionism. The research concludes that, based on Avicenna's discussions in the field of ontology, it is not feasible to adopt a true realist position, as there is no independent truth for moral attributes.

Modern science has a unique and undeniable role in the formation of a new western civilization. The success of this modern type of human inquiry in solving epistemological problems within the scope of its subject matter and its practical achievements in improving many aspects of human life gradually led to the formation of a doctrine that seeks to extend the boundaries of science and the scientific method to other fields of human knowledge or other aspects of human life. This doctrine is called "scientism".

The purpose of this article is to introduce a clear picture or conceptual schema of the doctrine of scientism, distinguish its different types clearly and ultimately propose an integrated or comprehensive version of that doctrine. It is claimed that this task only could be done completely by showing the relation of scientism with other related concepts. These concepts together make a family resemblance through which the claim of scientism could be understood rightly. So some other doctrine like Naturalism, Physicalism, Materialism, Reductionism, and Mechanism is also described briefly and finally focused on the synthesis of epistemic scientism and methodological naturalism.

According to the close correlation between scientism and the modern notion of science, this paper begins with the history of the generation and development of the idea of scientism and traces it back to the 17th century when modern science was generated. Then different types of scientism are formulated and the discussion of the types of scientism was ended up with a comprehensive definition. Epistemic scientism is declared as the comprehensive notion of scientism which claims that any true knowledge or genuine explanation should be gained through the method of science. In the next step, the main concepts related to this doctrine are listed and the similarities between them are stated, finally, naturalism proposes as the most important and modified version of the idea lies behind all these related concepts. So naturalism is analyzed carefully and the two branches of naturalism (i.e. Methodological Naturalism and Ontological or Metaphysical Naturalism) are distinguished and discussed. It is claimed that the hardcore scientific method is restricted by methodological naturalism that states the neutrality of scientific explanation according to supernatural entities. Methodological Naturalism takes the role of the regulatory principle for the scientific method.

it is summed up that scientism leads to impermissible expansion of science and cannot also make a suitable justification for science itself. Naturalism also ends up with an incomplete explanation for natural phenomena. The synthesis of scientism and naturalism also implies atheism and cannot be compatible with the theistic worldview. Also, we should not equate modern science and empirical knowledge or sense data. Modern science is a modified system that is based on some philosophical premises like naturalism. These premises are given a priory and as a dogma that also challenges the position of empirical knowledge.

The unity or non-unity of science has been one of the most important philosophical issues in the twentieth century. One of the most important answers to the question of the unity of science has been suggested by reductionists. The present article focuses on two prominent examples of such approaches. The first example was taken from the philosophical movements of rational positivism and the second example was chosen from the post-positivist philosophical movements. We have shown that the supposedly successful reductions in science have given rise to the idea that the answer to the question of the unity of science is possible through reduction. We have then argued that the reductionist approach is fundamentally inefficient, inadequate, and incorrect. Reductionism is ineffective because it does not contribute to conceptual and ontological simplification. It is inadequate because, first, it does not cover the ontological diversity of fundamentally different scientific activities, and second, it does not provide an adequate answer to the explanatory need on why one ontological and epistemological layer is more fundamental than the other ones. Reductionism is wrong because, first, it is incompatible with the history of the evolution of scientific theories; second, it does not properly explain the relationship between evidences and theories. Third, according to Foder, it cannot solve the problem of multiple-realizability; fourth, according to Feyerabend, if the incomparability of scientific theories is correct, the possibility of any kind of communication, including deductive communication, is ruled out. The failure of reductionism shows that models like Nigel and Putnam-Oppenheim do not provide a suitable answer to the problem of the unity of science. Therefore, it is suggested that the answer to the problem of the unity of science be pursued through a non-reductionist approach.

In this article, after describing the content of the theory of Evolution from Darwin to the formation of modern synthesis or Neo-Darwinism, its theological implications are discussed. In particular, the Neo-Darwinian reading of Evolution is a ground for many Neo-Darwinists to advance the idea of naturalism. A critical aspect in the Neo-Darwinists defense of naturalism is their emphasis on following empirical evidence to shape their worldview. The second approach to Evolution is Intelligent Design. Although they are generally be presented as opposed to Evolution in the sense of a common ancestor, the central idea of this movement is the need for design in the process of Evolution, and they don't necessarily deny the Evolution from a common ancestor. Nevertheless, Neo-Darwinists often accuse the Intelligent Design movement of being unscientific and having religious motives. As a result, despite the scientific efforts of the Intelligent Design movement, there is no positive view of it in academia. But another interesting approach to Evolution is the third-way or post-Darwinian Evolution. It is opposed to intelligent design, but it has crucial criticisms of the Neo-Darwinian Evolution reading based on new biological evidence. But Neo-Darwinists confrontation with this evidence does not seem to be consistent with their claim to follow empirical evidence.

Despite all the ontological doubts about causality, one of the most important pillars of any philosophical theory is the issue of causality, with which it must clarify its task theory. Philosophy of biology as a field of philosophical knowledge has taken various uses of the term: proponents and opponents of the reductionist thesis speak of bottom-up (upward) and top-down (downward) causation, while proponents and opponents of extended evolutionary synthesis talk about reciprocal causation. People like Laland and his colleagues criticize the idea of Mayr including Proximate and Ultimate causation. scientist like Nobel speaks of causality in biological relativity based on an analogy in physics. Some scientists such as Okasha and Woodward, pay attention to causal democracy, while others deny the existence of causal relationships in the field of explaining biological actions and interactions for reasons such as the phenomenon of emergence. In the philosophy of science, there are theories about the properties of the element c causality, which can be used as a criterion to better understand the use of this word and provide a model to reduce disagreements.

This article investigates and evaluates models of the unity of science in 20th century. In general, the models of unity of science could be divided into two parts and investigated separately. The first group are models which defend reductionism and eliminativism by relying on physicalism. The second group are the ones that by relying on methodology try to guarantee the unity of science. In evaluating the first group on the works of Thomas Nagle and William James it is argued that these models not adjusted to different ontological fields. The various methods of scientific research and different function of the values of preferring a theory in different contexts of comparison also undermine the claim of scientific unity in the second group models. Anyway, for avoiding the harmful result of the being incommensurable, relying on holism the possibility of giving a model of the unity of science could be defended which has provided possibility of interdisciplinary cooperation and defies any attempt for reductionism or ignorance of the plurality of methods.

The technique of content analysis methodology is considered as an interdisciplinary study of Quranic and Hadith sciences in the recent period, which has come from the field of social sciences in the field of Quranic-etymological studies. In order to provide a coherent framework and logical model in studies with analytic- The structure of religious texts is being processed. This paper, in three main sections, introduces the foundations and functions of the content analysis method in religious texts studies as one of the interdisciplinary capacities of Quran and Hadith sciences. 

This paper, using descriptive-analytical method, studies the capacities and carers of the method of content analysis in the studies of Quranic and hadith sciences.  Results and

The most important findings of this study, through the extraction of the foundations of interdisciplinary study of content analysis, are that content analysis method has two specific methodological and epistemological bases. The pluralism and the convergent combination of the most important methodological foundations of the content analysis method, as well as the avoidance of one-way relation to phenomena and texts, are the epistemological foundations of interdisciplinary content analysis. The application of this method in religious texts has a variety of functions, including compilation, reliability, reducibility, multilevel attitude, laminarogy of texts, and comparison of common texts and, most importantly, the degradation of the logical model through which interdisciplinary studies in science The Quran and hadith have been developed and generalized.

Human innate disposition has been among fundamental issues in anthropology which has attracted thinkers in the long run of the history. Some of these thinkers have held positions in which human innate disposition suffers more limited boundaries. Affected by these positions, nowadays the boundaries of human innate disposition are reduced into the arena of axiomatic perceptions, intuitive cognition, soul faculties and instincts. Reducing human innate disposition into axiomatic perceptions rejects human original innate disposition in contrast with human secondary innate disposition.  Besides, reducing innate disposition into intuitive cognition reduces boundaries of disposition even more than its previous type. Accordingly, even axiomatic perceptions are beyond the boundaries of innate disposition. These two recent interpretations of human innate disposition, yet, reduce the disposition into human instincts and faculties of soul. The first interpretation rejects every kinds of innate actual perception even after the birth and therefore, it is believed that all human perceptions are acquired. The second interpretation, however, touched by the theory of evolution, reduces innate disposition into instincts, either carnal or vital. According to religious thought none of these stances have given an accurate representation of innate disposition. In religious view Man possess different dimensions of innate disposition. In this sense, original disposition, axiomatic disposition and innate faculties are different dimension of human innate disposition (Fitra).

The eliminative materialism does not accept behavior explanation based on mental states and puts emphasis that human behavior should be explained just based nervous events. The supporter of this view, for the rejection of belief in mental states, call folk view which is against neuroscience. The following article, through the analysis of the epistemological basics of eliminative materialism, shown that this view is somehow an unreasonable monopoly of ontology. It will also be arguing that with defying the existence of mental state, not only there will be no space for psychology as a scientific and practical section, there is also no place for the key concepts of social sciences. Scientific psychology goes forward with assuming the existence of individuals in the social world of life and assumption which is the formation of psychology is scientific cannot interpreted in a physicalist way.Theaffirmative claim of this article is the fact that human nature can be understood deeply just through the interaction of psychology and neuroscience. Belief in immaterial mental states is not against neuroscience or other experiments sciences and definition based onimmaterial soul is an unmatchedand coherent ontological basis to defend scientific psychology.

This article is about the dispute between existentialism and physicalism concerning the in/authenticity of the human being's thought and freedom. It deals with the impossibility of reducing human thought, practice, choice, and decision to their physical, biological, brain-based or neurological aspects. In other words, the way of thinking which can be called naturalism, materialism, or physicalism based on different criteria (from seventeenth-century until twentieth century) tries to interpret human existence (“soul” in the mythological language of Plato, “transcendental imagination” in Kant’s philosophy, “existence” in Kierkegaard’s thought and existentialism and “Dasein” in Heidegger’s view) as a product of physical, natural or material processes and does not regard human freedom of choice as authentic (or irreducible) but as a secondary product of biological natural phenomena. This article claims that the main matter of the dispute is not specifically determined in the debate between physicalism or reductionism on the one hand and the philosophers believing in existence or Dasein on the other hand. This vagueness has caused the discussion about the theoretical challenge not to undergo a smooth path. In order to make clear the exact parameters of the central matter of dispute, I try to challenge the fundamentals of physicalism.

Given that moral relativism is rooted in the relativity of episteme, it is necessary to address its epistemic foundations. In this paper, three bases of rationalism, individualism, and reductionism will be examined. Since relativism may also be raised at the level of religious ethics, secular ethics will remove the first possibility out of discussion. Among the foundations of relativism, minimalistic rationalism is that the moral stimulus of human is not intellect, rather is emotion. The reason simply is a prudent instrumental under desire. Here, the rationality disappears and the authority of all moral theories destroys. . In individualism, all humans are equal and have rights to be free to determine ethical values. In this case, "other" isn’t important at all. Non awareness of all personal desires, the absence of solution as behavioral contradictions occurs is due to this base fault. Reductionism as another foundation regards the human in one aspect and reduces the morality to subjective things and it serves ethics just toward the biological needs. Not only this base destroys authority itself, also it denies the lower values and needs by negation of higher values

Emergentism as a solution to the problems of physicalistic explanation of natural events is against the physicalistic reductionalism. It is important especially in the philosophy of mind, because it claims to resolve the problem of mind-body relationship. Interestingly, emergentism and Islamic philosophy (in particular Mulla-Sadra’s Philosophy) have two common aspects. First, they both criticize the physicalistic explanation of mental states. Second, they have monistic approaches to the world. In this article, emergentistic and Mulla-Sadra’s views of the nature of mind and its relation to body are evaluated.

Our task in this essay is to explain some of the Neo-Darwinist's foundations and assumptions. Neo-Darwinists, on the one hand, never give any argument for those foundations and assumptions, and on the other hand, always attempt to put these assumptions and their inevitable consequences in their audience's minds. In this case, we speak of confusions and prejudicial conclusions that Neo-Darwinists make. Holding these assumptions and being neglected of the distinctions that are prerequisites for any scientific activity, Neo-Darwinists inevitably make fallacies and mistakes that can be clearly seen throughout their works.

In Islamic philosophical psychology common sense has been regarded as a cognitive faculty thereby sensible, artificial and intuitive concepts are produced. In this paper, historical approach of Muslim`s philosophers has been examined firstly. Epistemologically viewed, the perceptions of the faculty, both conceptually and intuitively, have been surveyed. Considering the epistemological function of the faculty in Avicennian philosophy, one of the most epistemological problems, namely the problem of correspondence, has been studied. And finally, Avicenna`s view on the considerable religious function of the faculty in perceiving and conveying the details of Divine revelation has been introduced.

In the Islamic philosophy, common sense is conceived as a cognitive faculty that perceives sensual, conventional, and intuitive concepts. This article deals with the issue of common sense ontologically and epistemologically. Muslim philosophers, since IbnSina, have adopted an ontologically reductionist approach to common sense by suggesting the unity of nafsand by reducing its faculties to mere concepts and names. In this article, common sense is epistemologically investigated. The question of whether common sense provides knowledge by presence or be presentation is examined first, and then IbnSina’s idea is explained with regard to the issue of correspondence. At the end, the authors study the problem of substantial motion in IbnSina to answer a challenge to his theory concerning lack of any pivot for absolute knowledge. The conclusion is some sort of epistemology, called gradational epistemology.