جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "حکمت سینوی" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

The finitude of the natural body has implications and consequences in some of Avicenna’s philosophical issues. The proof of some problems in Avicennian philosophy is subject to proving the limitation of natural body. It should be made clear that the proof of which issues in this philosophy is the result of finitude of the body and what implications it has. In terms of background, only the finitude of the body and its dimensions has been examined in the existing research literature, and the connection between the finiteness of the natural body and other philosophical topics discussed by Avicenna is absent. To answer the question “What are the implications of the finitude of the body in Avicennian philosophy?” we have referred to the works of Avicenna and some of his prominent commentators, and have inferred and explained its physical and metaphysical implications. These considerable and important implications are as follows: non-separation of form from matter, proof of shape for body, rejection of void, proof of muḥaddid al-jihāt (the celestial sphere which determines the directions), rejection of infinite regress and proof of the Necessary

Throughout the theological thoughts of Khwadjah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, the influence of Avicenna’s wisdom is evident. Adapting the philosophical method he made it  common in Imamiyyah theology. In this article, Avicenna'sinfluence on KhwadjahTusi in two issues of "ontology" and "proofs of the existence of God and His oneness" has been studied and analyzed. The article is divided into two main sections. The first part is devoted to the cases of the influence of Avicenna's wisdom on Khwadjah’s theology and the second part is devoted to the cases of the independence of his view from Avicennain the two mentioned issues, using their most important theological and philosophical works. This research confirms that Khwadjah, while adhering to pure rationality in presenting Imami beliefs, has also used Ibn Avicenna's philosophical method in compiling and structuring his theological worksand some of his arguments on the subject of "proving the existence of God and His oneness" And part of the "ontological foundations" of his view has benefited.However, he has avoided using other views of Avicennaon these issues, whose argument is not strong enough.

In Avicennian wisdom, action is based on components such as perceptual and motivational power, and the diversity of perceptual powers and, more importantly, the threefold function of composition, elaboration, and imitation of imaginative power, and the influence of action on temperament, queen, and Shakleh offers a different face of the "action" issuance process. The main question of the present study is: Based on the metacognitive analysis of action and the inner capacities of Sinai wisdom, how many processes of action issuance can be presented? The results of this research are: 1. Contrary to the reports of Sinai wisdom about the issuance of action, it should be said: We are not faced with a simple process but with various processes of issuance of action and at least fourteen processes of issuance of "action". Can be deduced from the works of Ibn Sina; 2. Contrary to some reports, Ibn Sina has spoken of the imitation of the imaginary power in various positions; 3. Forms and meanings are sometimes the source of the "action" and sometimes lead to the action after the composition and elaboration. Sometimes metaphors of form and meaning are the source of the verb; 4. We have four types of control over "action" to a strong, imaginative deputy, which are: basic voluntary control; Non-basic immediate voluntary control; Long-term voluntary control; Indirect voluntary control. It is worth noting that the presentation of the fourteen processes of action issuance and the four forms of action control does not precede research.

Since one of the explicit differences between Avicenna and Mulla Sadra ‘s philosophical thought based on the important issue of ‘ Motion specially ‘ Substantial Motion’ , and there ‘s complete difference in the debate , the author has tried to response the questions about the origins and theoretical basis of this difference and to find out which position and principal have been involved in this contrast.First part of the essay studies the difference between Avicenna and Mulla Sadra ‘s essential position through analytical comparison of ‘Motion Premise’ in the thought of these two well-known philosophers .1. Sadra’s perception of motion against Avicenna’s issues attitude and essence attitude. 2. Development of ‘ Motion’ discussion toward sensual affairs specially human soul.3. Change in the position of’ Motion Premise’ in philosophical natural sciences to common affairs.By analytical studying of the mentioned points specially with meditating in Avicenna’s objections on ‘Substantial Motion’, we conclude that the difference of these well-known philosophers in the premise of ‘Substantial Motion’ , originates in the most important philosophical position that is called ‘Principal of Existence’ or ‘Priority of Essence’ .On this basis of these facts and despite of all denials and doubts of some other thinkers in Avicennas’s ‘Principal of Essentialism’ thought, based on this philosophical analysis , it can be explicitly seen the consideration of ‘Essence Principal’ ,which at least can end the doubts about ‘ Motion Premise’

In the history of philosophy, what is found about Ghazali’s views on philosophy is often his critical ones, so that his views are introduced as a departure point of the Ash'arites rationalism and are regarded as opposing to philosophy, especially, opposing to Avicenna and Farabi’s philosophical views. but, does this show the real position of Ghazali? The answer proposed in this article shows Ghazali’s fascination to Avicenna’s Eastern Hekmat and his following Avicenna’s footsteps. Also, Ghzali’s influence from Avicenna in his methodology and attitude is shown in a phenomenological way; that means, although critical literature of Ghazali, which is due to his political position, made some of his philosophical views, but individually, he is the follower of eastern Hekmat.

It has been seen, in the writings of western scholars in history of philosophy, that Avicenna was considered as a commentator of Aristotle, and many of Muslim and Arab authors have accepted this view, more or less. But as we Know he denied it in the several positions of his works: (Introduction of Hekmat-olmashreqien,outobiography and Almobahe ssat,).
The questions about of Avicenna’s philosophy: Is the philosophy of Avicenna continuation of Aristotle one? If not, what are the differences between tow philosophy (philosophy of Avicenna and Aristotle one)? And what criteria for recognition of these differences is reasonable? The article with using the Averroes reading of Aristotle, answers these three questions, and tally the differences on narration of Averroes, who is the credible and important commentator of Aristotle- regardless of Averroes’s critic of Avicenna and the answers to him.
Thus, as shown in the article, Averroes believed the philosophy of Avicenna is different from Aristotle one in more than fifty stands and isn’t the continuation of it. The Averroes’s point of view can be considered from three aspects: the phrases that show the differents, the Fundamental principles, and the philosophical details (more than the fifty stands). The criterion is the same comparison Averroes has done, as listed.

Aristotle was up to categorize fundamental types of beings. His followers and commentators, then, tried to come up with the theses of five predicables. According to this theses, all material beings share the same genus while differing in respect to their differentia. Avicenna, the great Muslim philosopher, in the light of the proposed distinction between existence and quiddity by Al-Farabi, built his new philosophical syst em. He organized philosophical problems somehow differently. Following Avicenna, traditionally som e philosophical problems were discussed under the title of existence and some of them under the title of quiddit. Mulla Sadra, the founder of transcendental philosophy, however, changed the philosophical scenery radically. Although, Mulla Sadara respected pedagogical tradition of philosophical writings, his revolutionary views on this matter has not been fully explored. One of this unexplored area is the topic of five predicables. In Islamic Peripatetic tradition, the title of five predicables is being discussed under the general topic of quiddity. If the principality of existence is true, quiddity is not real and therefore its related problems lose their intellectual importance. In this article, first, I take a brief look at five predicable and its importance in Avicennas. Then, I trace its evolution in transcendental philosophy. At the end, I argue that there is a tension between this doctrine and the theses of principality of existence and quiddity irrealism.

Principiality of Existence in Transcendent theosophy has two meanings and both are attributed to Mulla Sadra. In the first meaning, essence unlike existence does not exist outside at all and only exist in mind. But in the second meaning essence following becoming, exists out of mind. The Principality of Existence in first meaning is not attributed to Avicenna at all, because he believes in the realization of essence and he doesn’t consider it exclusively mental. The Principality of Existence in second meaning although is in closer relationship with Avicenna philosophy but is not attributed to Avicenna with all its principles and results, because he believes in the plurality of beings and instead of believing in the unity of essence and existence in the external world, he believes that existence is accidental. Also, concerning the results and outcomes of the debate, he claims that beings are multiplied truths and the necessary being is the simple being who has no essence and we can’t define him through genus and difference, instead of claiming that the necessary being is the truth of existence and this truth is unite.

In the present article, the focus of study and analysis is the ‘matter’ as a common subject for science and philosophy. Accordingly, we first mention the views of some philosophers and authorities – both early and recent – on matter, and then we analyze the matter as prime matter, secondary matter, empirical matter and their relationship. The notion of matter in Islamic philosophy has not altered in centuries for long, and marvelous scientific findings in this regard have not influenced Muslim philosophers. Accordingly, these definitions have nothing to do with matter studied by empirical sciences. In the present article, we show that if we look at matter from a newer angle, we may find a proper relationship between argumentative matter in Islamic philosophy and the empirical matter in new science.

Avicenna may be regarded as the first Muslim philosopher who has perceived a deep connection between Aristotelian concept of ousia and being and، analyzing the concept ontologically، he tried to correct the failures of Aristotle’s thought in this field. In this way، the ambiguity of the subject-matter of first philosophy has been omitted and the capability of Aristotle’s philosophical teachings is used for establishing a religious philosophy. As is explained، in spite of considerable changes made in contemporary studies on Aristotle`s philosophy، Avicenna can be regarded as a perfect authority in this field.

One of the Important philosophical issues and debates dating back over two thousand years, and the beginning of wisdom in ancient Greece has been Proposed, is the problem of essence. Some believe that the discussion on the issue of substance is Aristotelian thought, and believe that the roots of this attribution in Aristotle approach to the existence and its relation with the essence and nature of things. Because based on Aristotelian thought, recognition of existence is nothing but nature and essence of objects. Therefore, according to the First Teacher, words of existence and essence are synonymous. But fate of substance in Avicenna`s Philosophy has been changed by the distinction made between existence and essence; it, therefore, has separated its way from existence. Unlike Aristotle, Avicenna has considered the divider of substance and accident as essence of things and has adapted Aristotelian categories on the essence of the objects. This writing, considering importance of the position of substance issue in Ibn Sina's thought and his historical evolution in philosophy, discusses about dimensions and different angles of this category with the problem-oriented approach in Avicenna wisdom. Therefore, according to a lack of consensus on the definition and because of semantic variations course, It is clear that the quiddity and epistemic evolution of substance, explanation of essence and accidents divider, manner of divisions exclusiveness, Ibn Sina's specific viewpoint on substantiality of transcendental Necessary Being are the main issues that will be researched in this article.

Analysis of Ibn Sina''s Approach in motion theory shows he has doubt in proving certain types of accidental movements and in denying the substantial motion process. This doubt is indicative of sheikh’s philosophical foundations in essentiality of existence and is accompanied by proof of certain types of accidental movements such as Quantity and quality of motion in the creatures because of negating gradation in quiddity and believe its mentally posited in sinavy thought. Yet Ibn Sina Submitted to its accuracy because the moving process in Quantity and quality is evident. But on the other hand، he refuses to accept the motion in creatures«substance Due to the lack of serious concern in essentiality of existence and its abstraction Principles. It is reflected in some positions of his thought. In these positions Ibn Sina implicitly and even explicitly has acknowledged the incomplete immateriality of soul and possibility of ishtidad، despite of denial of substantial motion of souls.

In Islamic philosophical psychology common sense has been regarded as a cognitive faculty thereby sensible, artificial and intuitive concepts are produced. In this paper, historical approach of Muslim`s philosophers has been examined firstly. Epistemologically viewed, the perceptions of the faculty, both conceptually and intuitively, have been surveyed. Considering the epistemological function of the faculty in Avicennian philosophy, one of the most epistemological problems, namely the problem of correspondence, has been studied. And finally, Avicenna`s view on the considerable religious function of the faculty in perceiving and conveying the details of Divine revelation has been introduced.

By a careful study of the process of formation of Islamic thought in Islamic world and its entering Andalusia and a look at Toledo’s school of translators and then its propagation in other Western countries and by a study and analysis of the role of each Islamic philosophers and their works we find out that Ibn Sina has been one of the main architects in building the edifice of thought, philosophy and science in the East and West, to the extent that Ibn Sina and Avicennian philosophy can be considered the fountain – head of growth and development of Western philosophical thought in the Middle – Ages.The effective and dynamic role of Islamic thought in Spain by virtue of its eight hundred years of historical identity under the influence of Islamic government in Andalusia made this country in the Middle Ages as a main conveyer of Islamic thought to the West. At the present age too realistic position of Spanish thinkers and scholars in the way they confront the role of Islamic thinkers in philosophy and its influence in scholastic philosophy and then in Renaissance presents the best picture of the place of role of Islamic thought in Western world. The present article intends to explain the process of course and degree of role and influence of Ibn Sina and Avicennian philosophy on Andalusia and contemporary Spain as a passage way for transfer of Islamic philosophy to Western world.

The position of active intellect in peripatetic philosophy is an intricate issue. One problem round this notion is that while Aristotle himself did not say anything about active intellect his Alexandrian and Neo-platonic commentators theorized this notion. Avicenna, as an independent philosopher, who has been introduced as the representative of peripatetic philosophy while he himself has rejected this claim, has a view of active intellect, consistent with his own philosophical system, which is different from the views of commentators like Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius. Thomas Aquinas, a philosopher and Christian theologian, who has been influenced by Avicenna in his theologian-philosophic thoughts, because of his Christian-Aristotelian position on this issue, disagrees with Avicenna on some aspect of Avicenna’s active intellect theory. What the present article intends to achieve is to answer to the question whether Aquinas’s opposition has an ontological or epistemological origin.