جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « دستگاه اصل موضوعی » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

This paper examines two rival versions (normative-axiomatic and psychologistic) about the nature of deduction and its relation with intuition in Descartes' thought. The ideal of the first version is to reduce the role of the faculty of memory and, sometimes, the role of the faculty of imagination in long chains of deduction due to their fallibility in Descartes' view. Achieving this ideal also depends on the mental training and practicing to place longer inferential chains in a single Cartesian intuition. This version accepts the independence of a logical consequence, considers deduction to be definable on the basis of definiens such as rules of inference and the basic principles of logic, and does not contradict the axiomatic tree of Cartesian knowledge. But the second version essentially sees deduction as nothing more than an intuitive grasping: a simple mental act that is nothing more than a complex intuition of several intuitive things. Therefore, this version considers deduction to have no logical regulations and considers it indefinable based on definiens such as logical principles and rules, and instead places the grasp of a truth that manifests in a kind of psychological clarity experienced by the knowing subject. These two versions try to seem compatible with cognitive objectivity and offer an innate and inadoptable reading of Cartesian logic; But since the second version contradicts both the more fundamental points of Descartes' thought and the independence of logic, this version cannot lead to the cognitive objectivity and innateness of logic in an acceptable way.

The main background of this research is the study of Descartes' method in our knowledge to the sensible world and its relation to the ideal theme of axiomatic knowledge. I do not accept the objection that Descartes deviated from the axiomatic method in the knowledge of the material world, and therefore I have argued that he continued to axiomatic method by developing the rules of inference and breaking the monopoly of syllogism in his Tree of knowledge. One of the most important rules of non-deductive inference developed in his work is the method of inference to the best explanation (I.B.E). Through documentary analysis, I have shown that in addition to the basic formulation of the inference to best explanation (I.B.E), its extensive formulation can be clearly traced both in Preliminary design such as Discourse on Method and in the empirical sections of the principles of philosophy. Studying this development of inferential rules in Descartes's work not only illuminates some aspects of his important and deep idea of replacing the method with logic, but also provides a model for combining empirical knowledge with the axiomatic method. This model inspires knowledge and rational encounter with creative and constantly changing experimental and human events, and based on it, a window can be opened to get out of epistemic anarchy and even value anarchy in such areas.

In 1899¡ David Hilbert offers an articulated axiomatic system for Euclidean geometry and¡ demonstrating conditionally the meta-theorems of compatibility and independence for this system¡ proposes a solution to one of the enduring problems of mathematics (known as the problem of parallel lines). Gottlob Frege¡ the founder of new formal logic¡ fundamentally disagreed with Hilbert’s formalistic approach and his proofs for the meta-theorems of compatibility and independence. The reasons for the opposition show that Frege''s view on formality of logic and meta-theorems of compatibility and independence is very different from today''s point of view. In this paper¡ after briefly discussing Hilbert’s method in demonstrating meta-theorems of compatibility and independence¡ and also the main Frege’s objections toward it¡ I will indicate to Frege’s own method dealing with these issues¡ and then discuss why eventually mathematicians and logicians¡ following Hilbert¡ ignored Frege’s remarks and modern logic¡ proposing a model theory¡ stepped on a road which was for Frege a wrong way.