جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « لذت » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Pleasure has been a topic of philosophical inquiry for centuries, with Islamic thinkers offering diverse definitions. This study employs an analytical and comparative approach to evaluate the most prominent definitions within Islamic philosophy, focusing on precision, inclusivity, and restrictiveness. The analysis reveals Ibn Sina's definition in Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat to be the most compelling. However, Ibn Sina emphasizes the conditions for attaining pleasure, linking it to intuition and attainment. This article proposes an alternative view, defining pleasure as a distinct quality of the soul separate from intuition and perception. More specifically, pleasure is the elation and contentment experienced through perceiving and attaining something harmonious and fulfilling for the individual. This experience ideally occurs in a state free from distractions that impede pleasure. According to the limitations outlined in this definition, pleasure is a quality of the soul, distinct from perception, voluntary, relative, and arises from human needs. An individual only achieves pleasure when they can understand the cause of the pleasure and recognize it as good and perfect for them. Ibn Sina considers rational pleasure to be the highest form of pleasure. He argues that conflicts can arise between different levels of sensual pleasures. To resolve these conflicts, a logical and comprehensive prioritization system is necessary.

One of the fundamental concerns of humanity since its inception has been the question of the meaning of life. Meaningfulness has two connotations: purposefulness and value. Certainly, the meaning of the meaning of life depends on the type of worldview and perspective of each philosopher. The present research seeks to examine the answer to the question of whether pleasure is related to meaningfulness or not. Does pleasure require pleasure to achieve the meaning of life? This research compares and contrasts the theories of Aristotle and Mulla Sadra on the relationship between pleasure and the meaning of life. In this article, the descriptive-analytical method is used to analyze the concepts. The most important philosophical bases that distinguish and differ between these two philosophers are the question of equivocation of existence. Aristotle does not believe in the equivocation of existence. From Aristotle's point of view, pleasure and happiness are a constant for all human beings and he does not believe in different levels of pleasure. He considers happiness to be limited to this world and exclusive to the rational part of man. He considers the way to reach meaning to be limited to the realm of virtue. However, Mulla Sadra, based on the principle of equivocation of existence, believes that pleasure has different levels, with intellectual pleasure being superior to sensory pleasure and being higher in terms of rank and existential dignity than the world of sense and matter. Mulla Sadra considers happiness to be related to the physical and spiritual dimensions, so Mulla Sadra believes in comprehensive happiness. He considers the way to reach meaning to be wisdom, imagination, and inner forces. He considers the way to reach happiness to be a human voluntary action. He considers the true example of happiness to be in the afterlife.

Thaddeus Metz has tried to show that the meaning in life, like morality and happiness, is one of the normative categories of life and emphasizes the distinction between the meaning in life and happiness. According to Metz's definition, happiness consists of "positive experiences" and pleasure is basically connected with happiness. Why is happiness different from meaningfulness and what are their differences? These are the main questions that this article addresses. By searching in Metz's works, we can provide some witnesses and reasons why Metz makes a distinction between happiness and meaningfulness. According to Metz's view, happiness is related to the animal realm of the individual, while meaningfulness is related to the human realm, so that although pleasure can increase happiness, but it will not necessarily lead to meaningfulness increase. He makes six distinctions between happiness and meaningfulness: 1. The source of meaning is "relational", but the source of happiness is "intrinsic"; 2. The bearer of meaning is "action", but the bearer of happiness is "sensation"; 3. The greater impact of happiness from “luck” than meaningfulness; 4. The desire to "continue" the state of happiness, wanting "esteem" to be meaningful; 5. The possibility of happiness, only "during the lifetime" in contrast to the possibility of meaningfulness "posthumously"; 6. bias towards the future v lack of bias. Although Metz has mentioned six important distinctions between happiness and meaning, his statement is not comprehensive and other distinctions can be added to Metz's list.

Human nature is inherently inclined towards seeking stable pleasures and alleviating pain and suffering. Many of our desires are rooted in these fundamental drives. In this study, we aim to elucidate and compare the perspectives of Islamic philosophers, particularly Avicenna and Allameh Tabatabai, about the pleasure and pain. We will begin by outlining their respective views on pleasure and suffering and subsequently identify both their commonalities and differences on these subjects. Taking a descriptive-comparative approach to their philosophies, we find that both philosophers regard pleasure and suffering as forms of perception, forming a crucial basis for their categorizations. However, they differ in their interpretations, with Avicenna considering pleasure and suffering as psychological qualities that are incidental to the soul, while Allameh Tabatabai views them as inherent aspects of the soul itself, or existential properties. Furthermore, distinctions emerge in their classifications, manifestations, and the ways of opposition between pleasure and pain.

Happiness is a fundamental topic in practical philosophy, captivating the minds of philosophers, from the ancient Greeks to the contemporary philosophers. Throughout history, philosophers have explored this concept from various philosophical perspectives. One of the most influential theories of happiness was developed by Aristotle in his renowned work, Nicomachean Ethics</em>. His theory had a profound impact on subsequent philosophers, including Muslim philosophers like Avicenna, who was heavily influenced by Aristotle’s ideas on happiness. Aristotle believed that human happiness is attained through a rational life enriched with moral virtues. Similarly, Avicenna regarded intellectual pleasure as the highest form of good and happiness and emphasized achieving happiness through reaching the level of acquired intellect and striving for likeness with the active intellect, and maintaining control of reason over bodily desires. In this paper, we employ a comparative approach to examine and analyze Aristotle and Avicenna’s theories of happiness. We aim to highlight both the similarities and differences in their perspectives, while also employing a critical perspective to identify weaknesses and shortcomings within each theory.

The issue of human happiness has been analyzed and evaluated by different philosophers and thinkers from different viewpoints. This article seeks to look at this issue once again on the horizon of the originality of existence. And show that the basis of terms that have long been used to explain this concept, such as the terms: pleasure, goodness, perfection, and understanding, is the term existence. The principle of the originality of existence as the most important achievement of transcendent wisdom along with some of its branches such as hierarchical unity of existence, substantive movement, the union of knowledge, and the known and dynamic and hierarchical nature of human existence and human being in the world in enlightening and deepening the truth of human happiness plays the most important role. The result of this article is that: true happiness requires moving in the path of perfection and intensification of existence, and concerning the presence and consciousness in the higher levels of existence, the kind of pleasure and perfection and happiness that will result, will intensify and be perfected.

This study investigates the basic principles and arguments of Epicurean philosophy in relation to the baselessness of fear of death and whether his reasoning in this regard is justified. In Epicurus’ philosophy, the soul is mortal and, thus, death means annihilation. He believes that although this idea does not negate happiness, fear of death impedes happiness. Hence, he provides some arguments to prove that it is unjustified and explains the correct way of encountering death. Here, while presenting a new interpretation of Epicurean view of fear of death, the author tries to propound and evaluate his views and arguments in the cultural and philosophical context of this problem and emphasizes that one must make a distinction between “fear of the process of dying” and “fear of being dead” in order to clearly understand the Epicurean view in this regard.

“According to “Confessions,” what is the root of the pessimistic view of St. Augustine and other first Christian philosophers on desire and pleasure, and why does this philosopher think that pleasures are evil?” This article is going to provide some insights about this question.Augustine believes that “the delight of loving God” is the one and only real pleasure, and all other earthly pleasures are considered as evil. But why are earthly pleasures evil? Augustine explains this from three different aspects: At first glance, it seems that Augustine blames some ignorance or perceptual (or cognitive) limitation for the deviation of pleasure and desire. Although this theory is consistent with some parts of “Confessions,” it is not consistent with the other parts. Augustine believes that even the pleasures and desires of children are evil. This clearly shows that in his philosophy, the evil of physical pleasure is not related to perceptual errors or ignorance. It seems that even the instincts are evil, and Augustine thinks these basic desires (instincts) are not perceptual. According to Confession’s text, Augustine believes in “original sin” and considers it as the cause of the deviation of the desires and pleasures of human beings. This Christian doctrine says that everyone is born sinful. Original sin is the guilt of disobedience to God passed on from Adam and Eve to all subsequent generations. Because of this disobedience, human pleasures and desires also became sinful. Although this theory justifies the issue in many cases, it cannot cover all the problems. If Augustine attributes the evil of human pleasure and desire only to the “original sin,” then he must always regard human desires and “needs” as evil. But he emphasizes in book 10th of “Confessions” that some prophets, such as “Noah” and “John the Baptist,” would eat any meat they wanted to satisfy their needs and never deviated, but “Esau” deviated once he consumed lentils. “greed” can be cited as the cause of the diversion of desires and pleasures. According to the holy Bible, the snake first seduced Eve, and then Eve seduced Adam to eat the forbidden fruit. What the snake did with Eve was nothing except arousing his greed. In fact, Adam and Eve became sinful due to their greed. It is clear that what caused them to be exiled from Eden was the desire (greed) they had before the descent and original sin. It should be noted that the above three answers are all the causes of deviation, but each one is itself the cause of another. In other words, human greed is the cause of the original sin, and the original sin is the cause of ignorance, error, and deviation of pleasure and desire. And these three causes (on three different levels) explain the deviation in our pleasures, inclinations, and desires.

In Avicenna’s work, pleasure and pain are explained and described in detail. However, not much research has been done on how perception determines pleasure and pain. In this study, two issues have been discussed: first, the place of ‘innate’ and ‘acquired’ perception in recognizing pleasure and pain; second, that in Avicenna’s intellectual system, pleasure is not limited to material and sensual pleasures, and non-sensual pleasures have strength and intensity. By explaining and describing the true nature of pleasure and pain, Avicenna seeks to overcome natural and animal pleasure and move towards intellectual and spiritual pleasure. Therefore, in Avicenna’s philosophical system, sensual pleasure means the feeling</em> of the suited, and intellectual pleasure means thinking</em> about the suited. In his interpretation of pleasure, Avicenna, in addition to the word ‘perception’, also used the word ‘attainment’. Since something is attained when its essence is present for the perceiver, pleasure is not attained by taking what is equal to the pleasant thing, but only by attaining the essence of the pleasant thing. In a content analysis of Avicenna’s work, we realize that attention to intellectual and spiritual pleasure is one of the most important features of his philosophical system, which he has also described as ‘bliss’.

Defining beauty is one of the most critical issues in philosophical aesthetics. Walking philosophers have brought or referred to the concept of "perfection" as one of the main elements of the definition of beauty. After explaining the views of Avicenna and Aquinas in this field, this research deals with the question of what is the place of the concept of perfection in the definition of the beauty of both of them. This research is descriptive-analytical. In the collection, it uses the library method, and in the analysis, it uses the qualitative method. The results of this research show that beauty is essential in the view of both philosophers about tangibles and abstractions. From Avicenna's perspective, the perfection of the senses should have three aesthetic elements: good order, good composition (composition), and good moderation. Aquinas also uses the concepts of pleasure, proportion, and clarity in his definitions. These elements in the definitions of beauty can be evaluated in some way in connection with the idea of the second perfection.

Disinterestedness in the aesthetics means that the aesthetic judgment should be free or pure of any interests. It should be just upon on pleasure way not based on agreeable, what is good for me, and what is morally good. Although it has been introduced as a one of innovations of Kant in the Aesthetics, texts of Avicenna about pleasure and beauty show that he also has emphasized to this concept. In fact, he has noted to the especial word that is “Molaem”. Its mean is a pleasingness and pleasure. The Molaem is perfection and goodness of a perceptive faculty. He has emphasized the pleasure perceive just by the Molaem so nothing else like agreeable, good and morally good do not influence to be obtained Molaem. Since the perceiving of beauty subject to obtaining Molaem or perceiving pleasure is known, the disinterestedness in his aesthetics is apprehensible. But it is clear that Kant has tried to explain it obviously, deeply and more than Avicenna. Therefore, after comprehensive review of the Avicenna’s beauty thought and his idea about disinterestedness by descriptive-analytical method, it compares with idea of Kant about the disinterestedness. The results show that the disinterestedness has been described by Avicenna and Kant, is same. So, we can claim that the concept that Kant has focused on, had noted by Avicenna.

Undoubtedly, the concern of happiness and achieving felicity, and getting rid of misery is one of the main concerns of every human being during his life. Facts such as Happiness and sadness should also be considered as the most important worries that affect human life in close connection with felicity and misery. In the history of philosophy, a philosopher like Sadr al-Mutallahin with his original and deep theoretical foundations has been very helpful in explaining this issue. By explanation the nature of happiness and sadness, the types of sadness and happiness, as well as their real examples, he has helped a lot in deepening the meaning of life in human beings. The main question of the present study is that by emphasizing the thoughts of Sadr al-Mutallahin, how to analyze the two concepts of happiness and sadness? In a descriptive-analytical approach, the author has concluded that Sadra, while dividing happiness and sadness into four categories: sensory, imaginary, illusory, and intellectual, considers the happiness of intellectual pleasure as the most complete happiness and the sadness of its loss as the saddest kind of sorrow.

In various works of Ibn Sina, there are a number of scattered topics about the subject of pleasure. One of those topics is the definition of pleasure that needs to be thoroughly reviewed in order to achieve a coherent vision. In this paper, we will explore two ways to investigate pleasure quiddity. One way is through the classification of the six definitions based on the discussion of which each definition is expressed under it, and the other one is by examining the terms used in the definitions. These two methods bring us closer to a better understanding of Avicenna's vision. The first way leads us to the conclusion that the structure of definitions differs according to its subject. With regard to various structures, Ibn Sina has introduced various definitions for various purposes. However, the investigation through the second method shows that Ibn Sina’s view of pleasure is a unitary and coherent viewpoint because, with the use of components such as "perception" and "proper" that constitute the core of all definitions, they have a lexical and conceptual harmony.

 From the time human beings are born, they are forever confronted with the phenomena of pleasure and happiness. These two concepts are very close but there are major differences and that is that pleasure is also used in momentary cases, and happiness is used only for lasting or relatively lasting pleasures. Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra completely separated these two concepts and provided separate definitions for them. There is a deep relationship between pleasure and happiness. Psychology has a direct effect on pleasure and happiness. According to the perceptual powers of the soul, it considers different levels for pleasure and happiness, among which it considers intellectual pleasure and intellectual or spiritual happiness in terms of evidence, proof, and quantity and quality of superior than other pleasures and happiness. And among the powers of the soul, it is the only intellectual power that has not been destroyed by death, and in the world of the hereafter, ultimate happiness and pleasure will be determined by it. The method used in this article is descriptive and analytical and the method of collecting materials is library.

Responding to the question requires an understanding of the nature of happiness in the view of Ibn Sina.Avicenna considers enjoyment the nature and essences of happiness. Therefore’ he often begins the debate of happiness from the debate of enjoyment. However Avicenna’s aim in the definition of happiness is not absolute enjoyment, but he means the extreme kind of enjoyment (i.e. intellectual enjoyment). Here the meaning of the theory is Theory Reason Practical and the meaning of action is Morality. He in the comparison between the shares of thought and practice believes that although both (thought and practice) are effective in human happiness, the real happy person is the person who has reached the perfection in both aspects, but he does not regard their share equal and places the importance on the effect of thought. He believes that the role of practice in human happiness is not positive (i.e. ethical acts do not have independent importance. Priority of thought, from the perspective of Avicenna, refers to his anthropological foundations and his definition of the nature and essence of happiness.

In Ibn Sina's view, "pleasure" is one of the qualities of the ego. It's conceptual is present perception. In his book, " Al-isharat wa al-tanbihat," he describes pleasure is a perception and achievement to something that is perfection and goodness in the human. Who percept it. Since in this description, contrary to other descriptions, for the description of pleasure he has used the word "Neil", some researchers have conceived that "Neil" refers to the present perception of the essence of evidence in Ibn Sina's mind. whereas that's a contradiction with his philosophy. This idea has been raised by Khaje Nasir al-Din and reflected in new researches. Even some researchers, based on this interpretation, have explained the mistakes of pleasure in the thought of Ibn Sina. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze by descriptive-analytical method his description of pleasure in the book. The results of the research show that basically, the interpretation of the achievement to the present perception as a pleasure of perceptibility is not acceptable.

Avicenna and Suhrawardi have brief and scattered discussions about the issue of pleasure in their various works. One of those topics is the views of the two thinkers on the quiddity of pleasure. Thus, the purpose of this paper is a comparative study of pleasure from viewpoints of the heads of the two schools of Peripatetic and Illuminationist philosophy and according to their epistemological and ontological bases. The problem of pleasure is a small part of the epistemic network of the two schools of Peripateticism and Illuminationism. Therefore, to get a better understanding and a deeper perception of the issue, it is necessary to review other aspects of the network, such as the basis of their philosophy. One of the implications of this study is to understand the reason that Ibn Sina distinct between transcendent and human pleasure, while there is no such distinction in Suhrawardi's philosophy, due to their difference in the issue of existence and perception of quiddity in their philosophical systems. Another implication is that although 'perception' and 'appropriate'(agreeable to one's nature) are consistent and repetitive terms in definitions of pleasure, given the epistemological and ontological differences of the two schools in their explanation, we come to a different understanding of pleasure. The most important of these differences are: from the epistemological perspective in Peripateticism, the emphasis is on knowledge by acquaintance. According to Illuminationism, however, the perception is based on the knowledge by presence. Also, the basis of ontology in Peripatetic philosophy is existence, but in the philosophy of illumination, the basis is light.

One of most important issues discussed by philosophers is the nature of man’s happiness and its relationship with the pleasure. St. Thomas Aquinas in Christian tradition and Sadr al-Muta’allihin Shirazi in Islamic tradition has discussed in details this issue. Both of them maintain that man attains happiness when his intellect, as the Characteristic of human being, fulfills its potentials and apprehends the highest intelligibles. Also because they consider pleasure as the conception the things which are pleasant and agreeable to powers, man can reach the excellent and the most perfect pleasure through the perception of the highest intellects. Nonetheless they differ in that St. Thomas considers pleasure as concomitant to happiness and Mullasadra believes in the identity of the happiness and the pleasure. To put it in a different way, while St. Thomas categorizes the happiness and the pleasure respectively as action and affection, Mulla Sadra holds that these two concepts, though different with regard to their meaning, denotes a unique reality which is simultaneously both happiness and pleasure, so they are not included among the categories.

In Mullā Ṣadrā’s works, bliss (bahjat) is introduced as one of the effects of existence and, similar to other ontological elements, no quiddative definition could be provided for it. Hence, through an assessment of bliss in a semantic network consisting of “pleasure”, “happiness”, and “love”, it has been tried to develop a more accurate knowledge of their ontological meanings and referents. Accordingly, the authors argue that the ontological level of bliss is higher than pleasure and enjoys both generality and particularity relations. On the other hand, happiness means attaining an immaterial and independent existence or the same transcendental existence. Bliss means the soul’s awareness of the realization of such a transcendent level. Thus bliss and happiness are the effects of attaining the highest levels of existence and, in terms of reference, there is an absolute generality and particularity relationship between them. Love and bliss are both the effects of the realization of the perfection of the soul as well and, when it comes to their meanings and referents, they bear an equality relationship to each other. Therefore, it can be said that in Mullā Ṣadrā’s ontological system, the elements of bliss, pleasure, love, and happiness are tightly intertwined and related to each other so that the realization of each paves the context for the soul’s access to the other effects and good deeds of existence. Among them, bliss, as the main feature of such ontological benefits, plays an undeniably significant role. After clarifying the similarities and differences among them, the authors identify the affirmative and positive elements of bliss and, hence, conclude that bliss can be considered to be the contemplation of the most supreme ontological perfections of the soul which are realized through attaining the level of immaterial, independent existence and a transcendent configuration. Reaching such a level is possible for the soul through the knowledge of God as the cause granting life and self-knowledge to human beings. This results in massive bliss for the soul. The attention to the soul’s ontological grade at this level and its unique achievement, i.e. knowledge of God and self-knowledge, reveals the place of bliss and its effects on the soul.